

ECCLESIASTICAL KNIGHTS

The Military Orders in Castile, 1150–1330

SAM ZENO CONEDERA, SJ

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PREFACE

One day, while I was doing research for this book, my eyes fell upon these lines from Maurice Keen's classic work on chivalry:

In the crusading context, the military orders—the Temple, the Hospital and the Teutonic and Spanish orders—came to be just that, the strong right arm of the militant church. Their organisation, as reflected in their rules of life, represented a real fusion of ecclesiastical (as opposed to simply Christian) and martial ideals.¹

The passage put an idea in my head, an idea that has taken some time to work out. What follows is the fruit of my labors.

Ecclesiastical Knights is a spirituality study. The military orders, which emerged on the frontiers of Europe in the twelfth century, have long fascinated general readers and professional historians alike. Some of this fascination is tied up with occult mythology, the manifestations of which are legion in print and film. Worthier of attention, though, is the seemingly incongruous combination of monastic devotion and the practice of warfare into a single form of religious life. Defining, categorizing, and explaining this way of life is a major problem for the historiography of the military orders, one that Riley-Smith has called “the elephant in the room.”² I propose a new name and a new conceptual model for understanding the Iberian military orders, one that better captures how they combined the exercise of arms and the monastic tradition into a single way of life. I hope that this model helps move the scholarly discussion beyond the label “warrior monks.” But a name or a model alone serves little to illuminate the spirituality of the military orders, which was lived in flesh and blood and the heat of the day. I undertake a detailed study of the military-religious vocation as it was lived out in the Orders of Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara in León-Castile during the first century and a half of their existence.

I would like to thank the people who have helped bring this project to fruition, beginning with Teo Ruiz, Patrick Geary, Kevin Terraciano, and John Dagenais, my professors at UCLA. Carlos de Ayala Martínez and Francisco García Serrano provided invaluable assistance and advice while I was in Madrid, and Helen J. Nicholson's painstaking attention to numerous drafts has dramatically improved the final product. I am grateful to the patient and dedicated board and staff of Fordham University Press, especially Franklin Harkins, Mary Erler, and William Cerbone. My fellow Jesuits have provided the necessary permissions, means, and support for the completion of the project, and family, friends, and colleagues have offered encouragement and more

than polite interest all the while. A special thanks goes to Santa Clara University and its president Mike Engh, SJ, for the generous production support of this volume. I must recall, finally, the great Robert I. Burns, SJ, to whose scholarship on medieval Iberia I am greatly indebted, and whose departure from this life has been a loss for all who knew him.

This might be a good place to answer a question that is sometimes posed to me about the relationship of my chosen field of study to my state of life. Years ago, I rather abruptly left my doctoral program to enter the Society of Jesus. Some have asked me if studying the military orders led to this decision. I'm not sure what the connection is supposed to be. I can say this much: like the members of the military orders, we Jesuits are not monks.³

ABBREVIATIONS

AHN OOMM	Archivo Histórico Nacional, Sección de Órdenes Militares, Madrid, Spain
BA	Ignacio José de Ortega y Cotes, José Fernández de Brizuela, and Pedro de Ortega-Zúñiga y Aranda, eds., <i>Bullarium ordinis militiae de Alcantara, olim sancti Juliani de Pereiro</i> (Madrid: Tipografía Marín, 1761)
BC	Ignacio José de Ortega y Cotes, Juan Francisco Álvarez de Baquedano, and Pedro de Ortega- Zúñiga y Aranda, eds., <i>Bullarium ordinis militiae de Calatrava</i> (Madrid: Antonio Martín, 1759), reedited by Derek Lomax (Barcelona: El Abir, 1981)
BN	Biblioteca Nacional (BN), Madrid, Spain
BS	Antonio Francisco Aguado de Córdova, Alfonso Antonio Alemán y Rosales, and José López Agurleta, eds., <i>Bullarium equestris ordinis sancti Iacobi de Spatha</i> (Madrid: Typographia Ioannis de Aritzia, 1719)
HDRH	Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, <i>Historia de rebus Hispanie</i> , ed. Juan Fernández Valverde, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis 72 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1987)
SBO	Jean Leclercq, OSB, H. Rochais, and C. H. Talbot, eds., <i>Sancti Bernardi Opera</i> , 8 vols. (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1957– 1977)

INTRODUCTION: WARRIOR MONKS?

When asked for a short description of these institutions, many historians fall back on a well-known label: “warrior monks.”

—Luis García-Guijarro Ramos¹

The Iberian military orders’ way of life from the twelfth to the early fourteenth centuries represented the consecration of knighthood to God in accordance with the ideals of the Gregorian Reform and the crusading movement, with the help of practices and norms taken from the monastic tradition. The exercise of arms and its exigencies were always primary in this hybrid way of life and gave prior form to the selection and ordering of the monastic elements. Thanks to their permanent commitment to holy war through the profession of vows and the practice of religious discipline, the orders offered to the medieval knight the highest possible opportunity to serve God that did not require him to abandon warfare altogether. The men who took this opportunity were not “warrior monks,” despite the persistent and mistaken use of that term. They were, rather, ecclesiastical knights, or warriors animated by ideals and spiritual currents endorsed by the church hierarchy.

The present inquiry offers a fresh perspective on two difficult and closely related problems concerning the military orders—namely, definition and spirituality. The union of the seemingly incongruous traditions of knighthood and monasticism into a single type has long fascinated and puzzled observers, whether medieval or modern, and created serious difficulties for classifying the military orders. Some scholars, pointing to the ambiguity and discordance of the sources, have suggested that the search for greater precision is in vain. Similar problems have long bedeviled the effort to understand the orders’ spirituality, an issue that has been relatively neglected until recently.² The scholarly contributions of latter days, despite their quality, have yet to put forth a compelling synthesis of the question. *Ecclesiastical Knights* aims to contribute to such a synthesis by offering a new model of the military-religious life for the Orders of Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara in Castile-León from their foundations until their spiritual decline in the early fourteenth century. The new model of “ecclesiastical knighthood” may help to explain persistent problems in the historiography of other orders, such as the militarization of the Hospital, better than any alternative offered thus far. Last but not least, the present inquiry debunks the “warrior monks” nomenclature that remains a source of confusion and distortion.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

In placing *Ecclesiastical Knights* within the relevant historiography, I am mindful of Borchardt's warning that no honest scholar can claim to present entirely new ideas about the military orders between 1100 and 1300.³ My claims must be understood within an existing tradition of inquiry into definition and spirituality. General works on the military orders normally begin with their origins, accounting for the factors that led to the founding of the Knights Templar in the Latin East, highlighting the role of St. Bernard of Clairvaux in overcoming the objections voiced by contemporary churchmen, and telling how the Templars expanded and inspired the foundation of other military orders in various "crusading theaters" on Europe's frontiers.⁴ This process is contrasted with the case of the Hospitallers, a religious community that underwent militarization. Such narratives often depict the birth of these two orders as a fusion of monastic and knightly ideals, closely dependent on the new crusading and religious impulses in Europe, without going into great depth or detail about the terms upon which this fusion took place. Noting the closing of the gap that had formerly separated the religious from the military way of life, Alan Forey observes that, in the early twelfth century, "the way was therefore open for the two kinds of *miles Christi* to be combined in the same person."⁵ Franco Cardini attributes to St. Bernard of Clairvaux the view that the Templars were at once perfect monks and perfect knights.⁶ Carlos de Ayala Martínez has written that the Templars represented the "perfect conjunction" of knighthood and monasticism.⁷ Antonio Linage Conde says that the "typically medieval" military orders sought to fuse crusading and monastic ideals.⁸ Joseph O'Callaghan offers his own variation on the theme: "seeking to combine the ideals of monasticism and chivalry, the military Orders pledged to defend Christendom against the infidels and for more than a century were largely faithful to that trust."⁹ This lack of specificity also hampers two of the most important books written on the Iberian military orders during the past decade: Carlos de Ayala Martínez's *Las órdenes militares hispánicas en la Edad Media: siglos XII–XV* and Enrique Rodríguez-Picavea's *Los monjes guerreros en los reinos hispánicos*.¹⁰ These works have synthesized the great outpouring of research on the Iberian military orders and have much to say on the subject of spirituality, but overall their conceptual models are murky, a problem that Ayala Martínez has subsequently acknowledged. Sometimes the orders are treated as if they represented a particular kind of consecrated knighthood; at other times they are measured against the standard of monastic life and the other new religious movements of the twelfth century. To do the latter, tempting

as it is, is to misunderstand the nature and purpose of the military orders, the key to which lies not only in the discussions of the learned but also in the way that the orders articulated themselves in the sources they have left behind.

The work of Giles Constable, Anthony Luttrell, and James Brundage emphasizes the inherent difficulties of attaining greater specificity about how this fusion of military and monastic ideals took place. Luttrell highlights the seemingly insurmountable obstacles that face the historian who aims at greater precision, including the clear exceptions to any general rules that might be formulated, the medieval Church's lack of effort to provide a canonical definition of the orders, and the vagueness and constant change of the institutions and vocabulary of early crusading.¹¹ Constable is no more sanguine than Luttrell about the prospects for advancing the discussion of how the military orders should be categorized.¹² These works call attention to the fact that medieval writers themselves were at a loss to explain or precisely define the military-religious life. Johannes Teutonicus, author of the standard gloss on Gratian's *Decretum*, wrote in the second half of the thirteenth century that the Templars and Hospitallers were neither clerics nor laymen. He placed them in the same class as *conversi* (a kind of lay brother with a status beneath that of choir monks), with the caveat that they had a unique license to bear arms. In effect, he created a new juridical category for the military brethren because they fit nowhere else.¹³ Thomas Aquinas, the great systematizer of medieval theology, took up the question of whether a religious order could be instituted for the sake of waging war, in his *Summa Theologiae*.¹⁴ Although he answered in the affirmative, he made no specific mention of the military orders as such, nor did he enter into the more difficult questions that pertained to their classification.¹⁵ The same appears to be true for nearly all the medieval commentators, none of whom (save St. Bernard) devoted full treatises or even extensive treatments to the military-religious life. Some writers, like Otto of Freising and Anselm of Havelberg, included the military orders in their discussions of religious life, but others did not.¹⁶ The erudition of scholars like Luttrell, Constable, and Brundage might convince one that greater precision is a chimera, and the desire thereof a bugaboo of the modern, rather than the medieval, mind. While these scholars are right to say that the issue is difficult and complex, I think I have arrived at a better understanding of the military orders' spirituality and, hence, of how to define them.

Many contributions have made this possible. I point, first of all, to the work of Kaspar Elm and André Vauchez, who highlight the importance of the military orders for creating new spiritual opportunities for laymen.¹⁷ This is an essential insight for

understanding the military orders as a particular kind of consecrated knighthood. Yet Elm does not sketch the contours of this lay spirituality in sufficient detail, and Vauchez claims that the orders' lay character was rapidly effaced by the rigidity of the monastic traditions, above all the vow of chastity. As I demonstrate in this book, the military orders' adaptation of the monastic tradition (including, in the case of Santiago, the vow of chastity) was always guided by the exigencies of knighthood operating as a prior form. Vauchez's complaint—that the orders were a real option for only the few—points to the fact that ecclesiastical ideals about knighthood always had limited appeal to the majority of Europe's military class.

Jonathan Riley-Smith and James Brodman have furthered our understanding of the military orders by making distinctions among them. Riley-Smith has argued that the Temple and the Hospital were two very different orders. The former was from its foundations dedicated exclusively to holy war, whereas the latter represented a more conventional religious life that only gradually adopted military pursuits while maintaining its commitment to the care of the sick.¹⁸ Although Riley-Smith's work on the military orders is better known for reigniting the debate over the trial of the Templars, his claims about the fundamental difference between the Hospital and the Temple are, I think, correct, and they have influenced my conception of ecclesiastical knighthood.¹⁹ Brodman has attempted to separate all military orders in medieval Europe into two categories: the "military-monastic" and the "military-hospitaller."²⁰ According to this model, orders like the Hospital and Santiago that dedicated a significant part of their work to the care of the sick fall into the latter category, whereas orders that apparently did not, like the Temple and Calatrava, fall into the former. Brodman traces the reason for this discrepancy back to the different rules according to which each order lived. Those that hewed closely to the Benedictine-Cistercian tradition were generally more monastic, and therefore less inclined toward hospitaller work. By contrast, those orders that were more influenced by the Rule of Augustine, or whose governing norms were eclectic, were more inclined toward the care of the sick, which often enough had been their original mission before they underwent militarization.²¹ Brodman's taxonomy therefore rests ultimately on developments within religious life and the ferment it underwent during the late eleventh and twelfth centuries: some military orders were more like monks, whereas others were more like canons. Brodman's attempt to explain the deep roots of the apparent "types" of military-religious life has improved our understanding of definition and spirituality.²² Yet I believe that the fundamental distinction between different kinds of military orders did not hinge on whether

they followed a monastic or a canonical rule (though this issue has its place), but on the degree to which they were able and willing to articulate themselves in terms of ecclesiastical knighthood.

It has been commonplace to treat the history of the military orders in terms of an early, heroic stage of growth and commitment to their mission that lasted perhaps until 1250, followed by the emergence of significant disciplinary issues and other problems that gradually gave way to marked decline by the early fourteenth century.²³ The French historian Philippe Josserand has challenged this traditional perspective in his impressive work *Église et pouvoir dans la Péninsule Ibérique*.²⁴ He thinks that “decline” has become a lazy convention among historians, and he marshals an impressive amount of evidence to demonstrate that the Iberian orders were alive and well in the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.²⁵ Yet he also shows quite clearly that this was a period of significant *transformation* for the Iberian orders, a transformation that diminished their religious profile in society.²⁶ Josserand’s work has convinced me that the rise-and-decline model, whatever its problems for the Iberian orders’ general history, remains applicable to their spirituality.

Giles Constable’s earlier reflections on the military orders in *The Reformation of the Twelfth Century* highlight the priority of the exercise of arms within this hybrid phenomenon. He says that the genius of the military orders was the combination of two distinct types into a new type that was neither one nor the other; “in practice, however, it seems that the military side predominated over the monastic.”²⁷ Here is an attempt to specify the terms upon which the two ways of life were combined. Constable has apparently changed his mind since he wrote those lines, but he was right the first time. I would add, moreover, that the military side predominated over the monastic both in practice and in theory. This is a key point that allows for greater precision of definition and the rejection of the label “warrior monks” in favor of “ecclesiastical knights.” Writing in a similar vein, Luis Corral Val has dealt seriously with the question of spirituality, above all its link with the problem of definition, in his work on the Order of Alcántara. He says that the military brother was not simply a monk who dedicated part of his time to the exercise of arms, nor a knight who sought perfection by means of monastic spirituality, but one who had a genuine spirituality of his own. This way of perfection consisted of fulfilling the duties of a warrior under the condition of a religious. This definition, which has considerable merit, is nevertheless taken from a book with the problematic title (in translation) “Soldier Monks.”²⁸

With the work of Alain Demurger and Simonetta Cerrini, we arrive at some of the most important recent contributions to the question of

the military orders' spirituality. When Demurger writes of the Templars as a *chevalerie chrétienne* or the members of the military orders as *chevaliers du Christ*, he is correctly identifying their knightly character, although these terms do not identify the military orders' specific difference within the genus of knighthood. In speaking of a "Templar revolution," Cerrini calls attention to the fact that the military orders were neither monks nor canons, but broke new ground for both the exercise of arms and the tradition of religious life.²⁹ Her detailed study of the Templar Rule and her explanation of the role of Hugh of Payns in the order's foundation are invaluable. Yet there are important ambiguities in her treatment of Templar spirituality. It is not always clear if she thinks the order's "revolution" was articulated in accordance with or against the ecclesiastical trends inaugurated by the Gregorian Reform. Often she associates the Templars with new and doctrinally suspect intellectual trends of the age, such as the thought of Abelard, kabbalism, or religious pluralism. At other times, she presents the Templars as loyal and obedient sons of the Church.³⁰ A related tension, to which I return in [Chapter 2](#), is manifest in her characterization of the Templar Rule as *antihéroïque* and *anti-ascétique*, which could imply that Templar life is founded upon negative principles.

Ayala Martínez's article "Nuevos tiempos, nuevas ideas" has offered the most important stimulus for *Ecclesiastical Knights*. Criticizing widespread scholarly nomenclature as well as his own earlier work, the Spanish historian has leveled a direct attack on the concept of the warrior monk.³¹ He argues that this notion has no warrant in the thought of St. Bernard of Clairvaux, whose *De laude novae militiae* has often been cited in support of it. Bernard, Peter the Venerable, and other monastic writers of the twelfth century who wrote favorably of the Templars or other military orders adhered to the traditional doctrine that the exercise of arms was forbidden to monks. In this and several subsequent articles, Ayala Martínez has both opposed the nomenclature of "warrior monks" and sought more adequate explanations for the emergence and development of the military-religious life.³² The present work seeks to fulfill Ayala Martínez's objective by proposing ecclesiastical knighthood as a better conceptual model of how the military orders combined the knightly and monastic ideals into a single way of life, thereby completing the refutation of the "warrior monks" nomenclature.

One need not look far in the popular and scholarly literature for this terminology. Desmond Seward's problematic but influential book was entitled *The Monks of War*; a major conference of the mid-1990s used the title *Los monjes soldados* for its proceedings, as did Corral Val for his work on the Order of Alcántara; and the latest comprehensive

survey of the Iberian orders is called *Los monjes guerreros*.³³ Vauchez's complaint that the military orders lost their lay character is punctuated by the claim that they became "moines-soldats."³⁴ Sebastian Salvadó calls the Templars "the first military monks," and Dominic Selwood equates the daily life of Templars and Hospitallers in the West with that of any other monk.³⁵ The work of Alain Demurger prevaricates on this issue. The first edition of his survey is titled *Chevaliers du Christ*, in which he explicitly denies that the Templars were monks.³⁶ His book on the Templars, however, says that the term *moines-soldats* is overused but nevertheless legitimate, on the grounds that St. Bernard himself associated the Templars with both monks and knights.³⁷ The second edition of his survey has been renamed *Moines et guerriers*, on the grounds that the members of the military orders both prayed and fought. Curiously, however, Demurger does not in the second edition retract his denial that the Templars were monks, raising the question of why the title has been changed.³⁸ Recently Saul António Gomes has restated and defended the concept of the *monge-cavaleiro*, on the grounds that the members of the military orders had various levels of religious practice and spirituality, especially when living in community away from the frontier, where their life would have had a less bellicose and more monastic character. Gomes's treatment, however, does not take sufficiently into account the problems that will be discussed in this book.³⁹ Likewise Damien Carraz uses *moines-soldats* and *monachisme militaire* repeatedly throughout his study of the Templars in Provence, but his justification of these terms is surprisingly brief.⁴⁰ There are, in addition, countless passing references to warrior monks or soldier monks scattered across the pages of medieval historiography. Jean Leclercq, the great monastic historian of the twentieth century, speaks of them, as does Malcolm Barber, who has written numerous major works on the Templars.⁴¹ Frederick Russell's classic on just war in the Middle Ages claims that St. Bernard created the image of the warrior monk, whereas Duggan says that he "passionately espoused" this new institution.⁴² In her work on the Order of Santiago, María Echániz Sans refers to the *monje-soldado*.⁴³ A lavishly illustrated popular survey of the military orders begins with these words: "This is a book about monks who were also soldiers," and the introduction to Jonathan Phillip's monograph on the Second Crusade mentions warrior monks.⁴⁴ C. H. Lawrence, an expert on medieval religious life, freely employs this nomenclature, describing the military orders as "orders of knights dedicated to fighting the infidel, who were also fully professed monks. They look like a contradiction in terms."⁴⁵ Even when scholars use such terms consciously and deliberately, purple passages from St. Bernard are generally the only thing they

offer by way of support or explanation. Often one finds the label “warrior monk” and its equivalents only in passing, or in the titles of books or conferences, where it most readily catches the reader’s eye. Does this usage merely reflect the desire of authors or editors to generate more interest in their publications? There is, on the one hand, hesitation to explain and defend warrior monks as a conceptual model for the military orders and, on the other hand, a widespread use of a well-known label that easily escapes deeper consideration.

What are the conceptual problems with understanding the members of the military orders as warrior monks? The earliest theorists and practitioners of the monastic life saw it not as a unique movement but as the fulfillment of the Christian vocation bestowed in baptism, characterized not by sacramental authority but by *conversatio morum*.⁴⁶ With the passage of time, these figures began to acquire a distinct status and established numerous traditions and organizational models, such that it was eventually possible to speak of a monastic “order” to which they all belonged.⁴⁷ The defining characteristics of this way of life were the following: flight from the world and worldly activities, conversion from sin, the permanent dedication to prayer and penance in solitude or in community, and the profession of religious vows.⁴⁸ Most important for the present inquiry, combat was absolutely incompatible with this life, a situation that did not change even after the foundation of the military orders. St. Bernard and other early apologists for the military brethren did not consider them monks at all, but instead held a fundamentally traditional understanding of monasticism. Whatever points of commonality there were between monks and the members of the military orders, they were still two fundamentally different kinds of religious life.

The “warrior monks” nomenclature also encourages the related and misleading tendency to view the military orders’ spirituality primarily from the standpoint of the other religious movements of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.⁴⁹ The military orders, especially the Temple and the Iberian Cistercian groups, clearly took a great deal from these movements, even to the point of maintaining strong institutional ties with them. Yet the new monastic orders and mendicants participated much more fully in the Church’s liturgical and spiritual patrimony, especially in its written articulation, than did the military orders. Held up against this standard, the latter’s spirituality can appear only thin and impoverished by comparison, and cannot be properly understood on its own terms.

Some scholars, as noted already, have attempted to link the military orders with canons regular, but this solution is even more problematic. Canons were fundamentally “ordained clerics organized into groups for the performance of the holy offices in cathedrals and

other large churches.”⁵⁰ Although the military orders did have chaplains, they were distinctively lay (in the sense of nonordained) organizations under lay leadership, meaning that the military brethren had even less in common with canons than with monks. Caroline Walker Bynum’s distinction between monks and canons—that the former saw themselves fundamentally as learners, whereas the latter sought to teach by word and example—is clearly inapplicable to military orders’ form of religious life.⁵¹ While the military orders drew elements from both the monastic and the canonical traditions, they were more estranged from the latter. Perhaps this is why the phrase “warrior canons” has never been in vogue. The point is that the spiritual life of the military orders cannot be understood primarily by reference to monks or canons, or to the distinction between the two, but rather as a particular kind of consecrated knighthood.

The problem with the term “warrior monk” is therefore threefold: first, it suggests that the members of the military orders were in fact monks according to the definition offered earlier; second, it suggests that the medieval Church, through figures like St. Bernard, radically altered its understanding of monasticism to accommodate the military orders and include them among its ranks; third, it evaluates the military-religious life according to a standard that it never could nor intended to meet. The combination, then, of “warrior” and “monk” in a single phrase is simply a misnomer. In this vein, Christian Vogel expresses strong reservations about calling the Templars monks or canons, or even identifying the Benedictine or Augustinian influences on their Rule, saying that Bernard and the Council of Troyes helped them establish their own framework (*Rahmen*).⁵²

What sort of framework could achieve the seemingly incongruous union of knighthood and monasticism into a single way of life? Richard Kaeuper’s study of chivalry suggests that it was no easy task. He identifies a major period of Church reform at the end of the twelfth century that struggled to influence an often ascetically oriented but independent-minded knightly class that was apt to carry out its devotional life without too much regard for clerical authority.⁵³ Kaeuper has little to say about the military orders, perhaps because they sought precisely the ecclesiastical sources of order to which others paid little heed, and maybe also because he seems to reject the whole notion of a Christian knighthood when he accuses medieval warriors of “squaring the circle” by combining religious asceticism and heroic vengeance.⁵⁴ A view less wedded to pacifist readings of Christianity can be found in Katherine Allen Smith’s *War and the Making of Medieval Monastic Culture*, which explores the mutual influences between warriors and monks during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. She contends that while scholars have been well

aware of the impact that churchmen had on the emerging knightly class, they have been somewhat slower to appreciate the way that the outside or secular world penetrated monastic life:

After the turn of the first millennium the concept of *miles Christi* was dramatically expanded as spiritual warfare became intertwined with the emerging ethos of holy war and monks' long-held dominance of the spiritual battlefield was challenged by crusaders, members of the military orders, and pious arms-bearers more generally.⁵⁵

At first, Smith's arguments would seem to militate against any attempt to draw sharp, neat distinctions among the various kinds of *milites Christi* of this period. Smith herself cautions strongly against such distinctions and notes the problems that medieval writers faced in trying to classify certain groups, including the military orders. She rejects "the ideological separation of peace-loving religious communities from bloodthirsty knights, of 'those who prayed' from 'those who fought,'" and rightly so.⁵⁶ *War and the Making of Medieval Monastic Culture* nevertheless makes a fundamental point for the study of knighthood and monasticism: both these phenomena were part of a cultural milieu deeply informed by the idea and reality of warfare, especially holy warfare. Knights prayed and monks fought, if in different ways. This should remind us that an arms bearer who desired to consecrate his life to God and serve him the rest of his days did not thereby become a monk, still less a warrior monk. Nor did a monk who envisioned his struggles against the devil with all the trappings of contemporary siege warfare thereby become an arms bearer. The distinctions between ways of life are just as important as the common influences that underlie them.

ECCLESIASTICAL KNIGHTS

The crucial distinction between the military orders and any other religious community was that the former were permitted and expected to bear arms.⁵⁷ This is a clear line of demarcation within the great spectrum of new religious movements, *loricati*, and other hybrid or marginal phenomena that Smith identifies. Although Duggan has shown how churchmen of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries established significant qualifications to the traditional prohibition on clerical arms bearing, only for the military orders' was fighting normalized as a way of life.⁵⁸ The question is why they, alone of all the new groups of the twelfth century, should have been permitted to make this radical departure. The answer is that the military orders did not represent a new form of monasticism. They did not come into existence in the same way or by following the same motives as the other new orders of the period did. The way of life that the Templars

pioneered, and that St. Bernard defended, was a new *knighthood*. The Temple sprang from the points of contact between the religious aspirations of twelfth-century knights, which had been fed by monastic renewal and crusade spirituality, and the ideals and plans of churchmen that had emerged out of the Gregorian Reform. Just as crusading itself was such a point of contact, with explosive results, so also was the Temple, though for a more restricted group of people. The phenomenon that we call knighthood was still in its infancy in the first decades of the twelfth century, and in time it would follow multiple lines of development across time and space. The Temple and the Iberian military orders represented one of these lines, the one most closely tied to the ideals, institutional models, and organizational control of the hierarchical Church. The traditions of monastic observance, modified for the unique demands of this military-religious life, were pressed into service and gave the orders a certain monastic cast, without thereby making their members into monks properly speaking. The military orders were indeed hybrids; in the words of James Brundage, “they were not exactly monks, nor were they canons-regular, nor were they clerics, yet in some respects their way of life resembled elements of each of these conventional religious groups.”⁵⁹ Within this hybrid phenomenon, however, the warrior was the primary type. This, I believe, is the point that has frequently been overlooked in discussions of classification. Knighthood, understood in the broader sense of the exercise of arms on horseback, gave form to the military-religious life, and the vows and religious observance served to purify and consecrate that knighthood to the service of God. I therefore use the term “ecclesiastical knights” to describe the members of the military orders, as their roots lay fundamentally in the knightly piety and crusading impulses of the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries.⁶⁰ The men who entered these orders were, for the most part, already warriors and did not wish to leave behind that way of life. They wished, instead, to make it holy.

The terms “knight” and “ecclesiastical” both require explanation, especially in the face of various objections. “Knight” originally derives from an Old English word meaning “servant,” and it did not yet exist in the twelfth century when the military orders were born. The most basic sense of “knight” in English refers to a warrior who fights on horseback, but the semantic range of the term is wider than that. Defining what a knight is, and still more what knighthood is, is a problematic endeavor, such that some historians prefer to use terms like “arms bearer” instead.⁶¹ The issue is rendered more complex still by the particularities of the English language, which distinguishes between “knighthood” and “chivalry,” the latter having particular associations with European courtly culture that did not develop, at the

earliest, until the late twelfth century.⁶² As for the term “ecclesiastical,” the fact that the members of the military orders wanted to consecrate their knighthood did not, in itself, set them apart from other knights. Even the strongest scholarly advocates of the “secular” character of knighthood acknowledge that Christian elements were incorporated into it, and the ritual forms associated with knighthood, however removed from clerical control they may have been, represented a kind of consecration. Many knights, moreover, took their salvation seriously and tried to turn their exercise of arms to the service of God. What then justifies the use of the term “knight” and the adjective “ecclesiastical” with respect to the military orders?

I understand “knight,” as it is now used with reference to the Middle Ages, as the English equivalent of *miles*, a Latin term that does date from the period under investigation. This word, which in antiquity usually referred to the Roman infantryman, became almost exclusively associated with the mounted warrior sometime during the latter eleventh century. During this time, the warrior class was undergoing significant changes; indeed, it was becoming possible to identify it as a distinct group. Richard Barber’s definition of the “knight” is apropos: “a mounted warrior who enjoys a specific social status and a distinct ethos, *esprit de corps*, mentality—call it what we will—which eventually blossoms into the wider culture of chivalry.”⁶³ The attributes of specific social status and distinct ethos are the basis of my own working definition, and I accept as “knights” even those mounted warriors belonging to this general background who were not formally dubbed, especially in the Iberian context.⁶⁴ The members of the military orders were mostly drawn from this same social group, and in the exercise of their new vocation, they did not entirely lose their social status or distinct ethos. Rather, both were transformed and defined by their religious observance and the particular orientation of their practice of warfare. The profession of vows and commitment to a religious rule had far-reaching consequences. In the first place, the members of the military orders, unlike their lay counterparts, chose to submit themselves to ecclesiastical discipline in perpetuity. From a positive standpoint, this meant that they followed certain rhythms and patterns of the monastic life, with common dress, horarium, prayer, penance, and so on. It also means that their exercise of arms was beholden to the cause of holy war rather than mere rapine and lust for gain. While in practice there were plenty of both in the history of the military orders, the security concerns of the Holy Land and other frontier zones gave them real obligations that all of Latin Christendom counted on them to maintain. From a negative standpoint, the military orders’ way of life precluded their members from participating in a

variety of activities that would become characteristic of the culture of chivalry. The most obvious of these, thanks to the vow of chastity, was the pursuit of women, whether in marriage or outside of it. But other pastimes, like tournaments, hunting, gaming, secular music, or celebrating the greatness of one's lineage, were also excluded. In short, the military orders' way of life was meant to breathe the atmosphere of the cloister rather than the court. Their way of life conformed to the ideals and prerogatives of the Gregorian Reform about the exercise of arms and of the proper place and activities of the knight in society, ideals to which relatively few men were willing to commit themselves.⁶⁵ Hence the best way to understand the military orders' spirituality in its own terms is as a particular kind of consecrated knighthood. Viewed from this perspective, the distinctive religious ethos of the military orders, as well as their achievements and shortcomings, can be better appreciated.

METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

It is necessary to explain how the present work is a spirituality study, as well as identify some of the inherent difficulties in undertaking such a task. When applied to a particular religious order or family of orders, "spirituality" refers to an aggregate that can be grasped but not always defined, "the principles more commonly and more habitually referred to, the forms of prayer in more ordinary use, the more common manner of directing souls."⁶⁶ Sometimes the roughly equivalent term "charism" is also used.⁶⁷ Yet research on the military orders' spirituality remains hampered by a number of factors, which have been addressed by Hans-Dietrich Kahl and José Mattoso.⁶⁸ The military orders, especially the Iberian ones, did not produce the kind of narrative or devotional sources upon which historians of spirituality usually rely, and even liturgical books have mostly been lost.⁶⁹ The evidence we do possess for their religious practices indicates a fairly thin spirituality and has led to the suggestion that the pattern of the military brothers' devotion lay somewhere between that of *conversi* and third-order religious.⁷⁰ Mattoso highlights, in addition to the lack of sources, the difficulty that modern people generally have in understanding the religious motives of the past and the lack of the specialized spiritual formation that would facilitate such an understanding. I think it is impossible to capture the charism of the military orders using the methods and sources that scholars of religious life normally use.⁷¹ The best alternative is to examine, from a variety of perspectives, specific military orders in their historical context as particular instantiations of the military-religious life. The primary focus of this study is the three Iberian military orders of

Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara, all of which were based in the Kingdoms of León and Castile. I do, however, discuss the Templars and the Hospitallers as well, for three reasons. First, it is nearly impossible to explain the genesis and development of any military order without reference to these “universal” orders.⁷² Second, I can adequately explain the problem of “warrior monks” only by beginning with the Templars. Third, I mean to suggest the concept of ecclesiastical knighthood as a point of departure for further research into other military-religious communities. Thus, while my treatment of the Temple and the Hospital is primarily propaedeutic to a study of Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara, it is also intended for scholars who know other orders better than I do.

The Iberian Peninsula was fertile ground for this way of life, with more than a dozen distinct orders founded or established there between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries.⁷³ While the Temple and the Hospital have generated greater popular and scholarly interest, their Iberian counterparts have by no means been neglected, as the great outpouring of research in recent decades has shown.⁷⁴ They were not mere imitations of the Temple or the Hospital but rather were influenced by both the Outremer-based orders and historical developments and institutions particular to the Iberian Peninsula. They were, in other words, distinct permutations of ecclesiastical knighthood.

What is the “variety of perspectives” that this investigation offers? [Chapter 1](#) is dedicated to the foundations of the orders, meant in a dual sense: first, the acts and events by which they came into being at particular moments, and second, the broader historical developments, whether in Europe, the Holy Land, or Iberia, whose confluence made their existence possible. Here, I trace the paths of development that each order followed and differentiate between two classificatory schemas: one according to genesis, and the other according to range of activities and membership. The concept of ecclesiastical knighthood is presented as a way of explaining and unifying these two schemas. [Chapter 2](#) examines how the structures of monasticism were adapted to meet the demands of the new vocation and how the orders incorporated other members, such as clerics and women, into a military organization. A major problem for studying the military-religious life in Iberia is that the extant sources are largely normative in character. This means that it is much easier to show how constructs were set up than how they were filled with content by those who lived them. Any spirituality study of the orders, including mine, runs up against this difficulty. Jochen Schenk and Nicholas Paul have provided excellent examples of how to study prosopographically the spirituality of crusaders and military orders “on the ground” in Western Europe,

and such an approach to the Iberian orders could be a fruitful avenue for future research.⁷⁵ My own contribution to a close contextual study can be found primarily in the final two chapters, which seek to partially overcome the limitations of the normative sources. [Chapter 3](#) is concerned with the mission and purpose of the orders. Although fighting was their principal *raison d'être*, they dedicated themselves to other activities, such as the care of the sick and the ransoming of captives, all of which they saw as ways of exercising Christian charity. [Chapter 4](#), finally, analyzes a group of documents, known as *hermandades*, to demonstrate how the military orders' relations with one another reflected a common understanding of their vocation. Broadly speaking, I offer three perspectives: one of the orders' internal workings, one of their external mission and activities, and one of their relations to each other. When viewed through the lens of ecclesiastical knighthood, these various aspects converge into a single vision of the Iberian military orders' spirituality.

As mentioned already, sources are a problem, but researchers find themselves assisted by an accident of history. In the nineteenth century, the Spanish government carried out an extensive seizure of ecclesiastical lands known as *desamortización*. In so doing, the government had to take responsibility for many of the local archives whose former caretakers had been expelled. Their contents were brought to Madrid and placed in the Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN) and organized into various sections, including one dedicated to the military orders (OOMM). It is subdivided into sections for each order: Santiago, Calatrava, Alcántara, Montesa, the Hospital, and the Temple. Previous researchers have undertaken the task of classifying this material, which greatly facilitates its use.⁷⁶ Santiago and Calatrava both have considerable collections, but Alcántara's central archive was lost, and only a few documents are available. The vast majority of the documentation deals with day-to-day business: property transactions, royal and ecclesiastical privileges, donation letters, and the like, but its yield for the present study has been surprisingly good. Sources from other sections of the AHN, such as *Códices*, have also been consulted.

The most important printed sources are the *bullaria*, collections of privileges, and donations that were compiled in the eighteenth century.⁷⁷ Some of the orders' rules, statutes, and other governing norms can be found in the *bullaria*, and others have been published separately.⁷⁸ The loss of Alcántara's central archive has been compensated by the dogged effort of Bonifacio Palacios Martín and a team of scholars to collect and publish the surviving material scattered across Europe.⁷⁹ Joseph Delaville Le Roulx's multivolume general cartulary is the principal source for the Hospitallers, whereas Carlos

de Ayala Martínez spearheaded the publication of the same order's cartulary for Castile-León.⁸⁰ Hiestand has brought together materials for both the Temple and the Hospital into one volume.⁸¹ The documentary collection for one of Santiago's principal female monasteries is also available in book form.⁸² Certain monographs contain indispensable documentary collections.⁸³ The works of Julio González, who collected a massive corpus of documents from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, have also been consulted.⁸⁴ Volumes of papal correspondence have both provided necessary background and filled gaps in the orders' own collections.⁸⁵ The one major liturgical source is the *Kalendario de Uclés*, which pertains to the Order of Santiago.⁸⁶ Yet the orders produced almost nothing in the way of spiritual writing, nor are there any saints from the early period, and so no hagiography.⁸⁷ Because two of the Iberian military orders were affiliated with the Cistercian Order, the Rule of Benedict and a collection of the Cistercian general chapter proceedings have been consulted.⁸⁸ St. Bernard's crucial role in the foundation of the Templars make his collected works a valuable source.⁸⁹

The most important chronicles dedicated to the Iberian military orders are the works of Francisco Rades y Andrada and Alonso de Torres y Tapia.⁹⁰ The first general history for one of the orders, known as the *Primera historia de Santiago*, was of only limited usefulness for this study.⁹¹ Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada's *Historia de rebus Hispaniae* is especially important for the foundation of Calatrava and provides some valuable commentary on the orders' place in Castilian society.⁹² Many general chronicles were written in Iberia during the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries, and these provide valuable information on the orders and the world in which they lived.⁹³ Certain crusade chronicles, especially William of Tyre, are crucial for the Temple and the Hospital.⁹⁴

CONCLUSION

In the end, the judgment of other scholars and the silent artillery of time determine the significance of one's work, yet I do wish to reiterate the purpose of the present inquiry and its place in the historiography of the military orders. The aim of *Ecclesiastical Knights* is to show how the military-religious life in Iberia was a particular kind of consecrated knighthood, thereby discrediting the label of "warrior monks" and contributing to a synthesis of the Iberian orders' spirituality that until now has been lacking. I acknowledge, with Luttrell and Constable, that defining the military orders is a difficult task, but I think it is possible to do better. I agree with Ayala Martínez that the members of the military orders were not warrior monks, and

if my work convinces scholars to stop using that term, I will have partially accomplished my task. I concur with Brodman and Riley-Smith on the importance of making distinctions among the various military orders with respect to spirituality, although I have drawn those distinctions somewhat differently than they have. I hope my proposed model will move the discussion of definition and spirituality beyond its present impasse and improve our understanding of these knights who consecrated their warfare with the vows of religion.

CHAPTER ONE

FOUNDATIONS

Greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends.
—John 15:3¹

Walter Map, writing in the last decades of the twelfth century, observed, “It is in the period of this century that the Templars, the Hospitallers in Jerusalem, the Knights called of the Sword in Spain, from whom our discourse took its departure earlier, have grown to the zenith of their strength.”² This remark, made almost offhandedly amid Map’s trenchant commentary on the varieties of religious life in his day, shows the tendency of contemporaries both to perceive connections between the various military orders and to misapprehend the nature of those connections.³ Modern historians have often encountered similar difficulties, thanks to several problems: the extant source material, the hybrid nature of the military-religious life, and the different contexts in which it emerged. An inquiry into the nature of the military-religious life must accomplish three main tasks. First, to survey the historical backgrounds of several regions: Western Europe from the latter half of the eleventh century, the Holy Land in the wake of the First Crusade, and Iberia from the beginning of the twelfth century. Second, to follow the respective historical trajectories of the universal and Iberian orders from their foundations through their first decades. Third, to formulate a conceptual model grounded in the way that the orders articulated themselves and the way they were understood by contemporaries. Such a model must be sufficiently complex and flexible to account for the relevant differences of context between the Holy Land and Iberia, and sufficiently unified, in formal terms, to apply to the various orders in question. I begin with the Temple and the Hospital, which are first in terms of chronology and importance, and proceed to Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara, placing each order in its context.

THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY ORDERS: BACKGROUND

Most accounts of the emergence of the military orders adhere to a familiar narrative of developments in Western Europe. During the eleventh century, a new social and political elite, collectively known as *milites*, took shape, forming the basis of what would become knighthood.⁴ Stimulated by the Peace and Truce of God movement as

well as their contacts with monasteries and other religious movements, these mounted warriors experienced an upswing in religious piety, as manifested in foundations of monasteries, entrance into religion, the taking of the habit before death, and most important, pilgrimage.⁵ Most knights chose to remain in the world rather than enter religion, but the spiritual ideals and aspirations of monks and pious laymen were often remarkably similar.⁶ Richard Kaeuper has noted, however, that European knights maintained a marked degree of independence from Church authority and ecclesiastical ideals.⁷ These trajectories, in turn, intersected with numerous others. The churchmen associated with the Gregorian Reform began to rethink a traditional Christian aversion to the use of force and began to identify instances in which the exercise of arms could be a spiritually meritorious activity.⁸ A corollary to this development was the application of the term *miles Christi*, once reserved for monks and clergy alone, to those who took up the sword on the Church's behalf.⁹ At the same time, the Byzantine Empire was suffering terrible losses to the Seljuk Turks and began appealing to the West for aid. Pope Urban II's proclamation of what would later become known as the First Crusade tapped into deep currents of devotion and enthusiasm, and enormous armies were recruited for the journey to the East.¹⁰ Against all reasonable expectations, the crusader army experienced a series of victories that culminated in the fall of Jerusalem in 1099.¹¹ Thus began Latin rule over the holy places, and with it, the insoluble problems of maintaining that rule. What follows is not an exhaustive account of the origins of the five military orders under consideration, but rather an exposition of how these now-familiar narratives point toward a new model of the military-religious life: ecclesiastical knighthood.

THE TEMPLARS

Origins

Although the crusaders attributed their unlikely conquest of Jerusalem to the Almighty, they immediately faced the practical problems of victory. Because the campaign was both a pilgrimage and a penitential war, crusaders fulfilled their vow once they had visited the holy places. Most participants decided to return home, and although their departures were offset somewhat by new arrivals, the Crusader States were constantly short of manpower.¹² Subsequent campaigns often exacerbated the problem, because the armies fought to gain territory that, even if captured, could not be held once they departed. The warriors who did remain could not be expected to fight at all times, or serve their lords indefinitely, since professional standing armies did not yet exist. What the Latin East needed were well-trained men

permanently dedicated to the practice of war, but there was no precedent for such a thing.

No precedent, that is, until the foundation of the Knights Templar. There are numerous narrative sources for this event, which already manifest divergent understandings of the new group and its significance.¹³ According to William of Tyre, a group of pious knights, led by Hugh of Payns, took religious vows under the Latin patriarch of Jerusalem.¹⁴ They promised to devote themselves to the service of God like regular canons, but in a particular way: by protecting the roads from attacks of thieves and bandits, especially for the sake of pilgrims.¹⁵ Walter Map claims that, before the group was established, Hugh had already begun his work of protecting pilgrims by ambushing Saracens at a horse pool outside the city. He was able to convince pilgrims who were warriors to join him either temporarily or permanently in the service of God in chastity and sobriety.¹⁶ King Baldwin II of Jerusalem granted a base to this confraternity at his own palace, the Dome of the Rock, which the Christians believed to be the Temple of Solomon. There the knights followed the liturgical life of the Canons of the Holy Sepulcher, who served as their chaplains.¹⁷ They also received numerous benefices with which to sustain themselves. The date that William of Tyre gives for these events is 1118, but Malcolm Barber has argued for a foundation date between January 14 and September 13 of 1120.¹⁸ At some point before 1129, the Templars also began serving in the army of Jerusalem.¹⁹ The account of Bernard the Treasurer, though dating from the 1230s, seems to draw on an earlier tradition. This much simpler version lacks numerous key elements of the other narratives, such as the role of Hugh of Payns, the protection of pilgrims, or the renewal of knighthood. It does, however, emphasize the Templar connection to the Canons of the Holy Sepulcher.²⁰ The early years of the Templars' existence were marked by poverty and obscurity, and the group's survival was uncertain. Barber suggests that William of Tyre's figure of nine original members is incorrect. Michael the Syrian reports a more probable estimate of thirty founding members.²¹ Simon de St. Bertin and Orderic Vitalis do not offer full accounts of the Templars' origins but only mention them in passing. The value of their testimony lies primarily in the fact that it precedes that of William, Michael, and Walter by decades. Simon indicates that the first Templars had participated in the crusade, without naming anyone in particular. These men vowed themselves to the Temple of God under a common life of poverty, chastity, and a poor habit, and they committed themselves to using arms only against the pagans to defend the land, as necessity required. The impetus for this decision, says Simon, came from the leaders of the army of God, while no mention is made of the

patriarch of Jerusalem.²² Orderic Vitalis, writing in the 1120s or 1130s, refers to Fulk of Anjou's association with the Templars, as "admirable knights" dedicated to fighting for God in mind and body, who hold all worldly things in contempt and face martyrdom daily.²³ Anselm of Havelberg erroneously locates the foundation of the Temple, a *nova religionis institutio*, in the pontificate of Urban II. He praises their religious and military discipline in terms reminiscent of St. Bernard, calling them laymen (*laici*), religious men (*virī religiosi*), and knights of the Temple (*milites de Templo*). He also attributes to Urban the view that they were equal in merit to monks or canons.²⁴ It may ultimately be impossible to sort out the disagreements in these accounts. What is important to note is that none of these writers identifies the first Templars as monks, even if they in some cases compare their discipline to that of monks.²⁵ William and Simon both place emphasis on the profession of vows, with the former observing that the members lived according to the *more canonicorum*. Yet it is equally clear that this profession of vows and renunciation of the world did not involve, as it did for all other monks and canons, the renunciation of the use of arms. The first Templars were *milites*, or men of the *equestri ordine*, and such they would remain for the protection of pilgrims and of the Holy Land more broadly.

Although the sources do not agree on the exact circumstances of the Templars' foundation, it is clear that Hugh of Payns and King Baldwin used their contacts in the West to obtain support for the new community, and their efforts came to fruition at the Council of Troyes in 1129. There, before numerous prominent churchmen and lay lords, Hugh presented an account of his community's customs and solicited advice for their improvement. The papal legate raised the Templars to the status of a religious order, and the assembly drafted them a new rule.²⁶

The fairly quiet and humble circumstances of the Templar foundation belie its significance. Pope Urban's call of 1095 had been successful because it represented a point of convergence between the ideas and plans of ecclesiastics and the aspirations and interests of Europe's knightly class. The foundation of the Knights Templar represented another point of convergence, but one that was more demanding and therefore limited to the few.²⁷ If the pious impulses of the First Crusade had brought thousands of knights halfway across the world to Jerusalem, it is not surprising that some of them wanted to dedicate themselves in a permanent way to those same ideals. Neither the churchmen who approved the order nor the Templars themselves were creating a group of "warrior monks." Instead, they were channeling nascent knightly ideals down a path regulated by the Church and characterized by Gregorian notions of the use of force,

thereby reforming and consecrating knighthood.²⁸ Thus, I disagree with Cerrini's claim that the Templars were seeking to restore and democratize sacred kingship, albeit in a different form, working against the reform effort to desacralize the laity.²⁹ What the Gregorians took away with one hand, they gave back with the other: the opportunity for the laity to obtain spiritual rewards through participating in holy warfare. Church reform, crusade, and recruitment to the Temple would often go hand in hand in Europe.³⁰ The Templars, like their lay counterparts, constituted a defined group with a distinct ethos, but the milieu of these ecclesiastical knights would be the cloister rather than the court.³¹ They were inspired by the monastic ideal of *imitatio Christi* that had penetrated their world both in Europe and throughout the course of the First Crusade.³² They also drew heavily on the Maccabees and other Old Testament figures to articulate a warrior spirituality.³³ The opening of the Templar Rule blends the Rule of Benedict with knighthood:

We speak firstly to all those who secretly despise their own will and desire with a pure heart to serve the sovereign king as a knight and with studious care desire to wear, and wear permanently, the very noble armour of obedience.³⁴

Cerrini's study of the Templar Rule shows how thoroughly imbued it is with the language and spirit of knighthood.³⁵ The trajectory of development from the first stirrings of knightly piety in Europe to the foundation of the Templars can be characterized as an ascent of states of life. First, there was the conversion from worldly knighthood and its wickedness to the service of Christ, primarily through prayer and fasting, pilgrimage, and taking the habit before death. Then the exercise of arms itself, if properly directed, was articulated by Pope Gregory and other reformers as a true way of serving God. In preaching the First Crusade, Urban II offered a concrete enterprise whose spiritual merit was ensured because it was directed by the Church and it involved the profession of a temporary vow. For the knight who wanted to permanently consecrate himself to the exercise of arms according to the new crusade spirituality, the Templars offered just such a way of life.³⁶ The articulation of this spiritual theology took place in the context of the urgent practical necessities of the Crusader States, first in the protection of pilgrims and then in the defense of the entire region. The Templars began, as William of Tyre says, living according to the *more canonichorum*, but the Council of Troyes modified their customs, distancing them from the Canons of the Holy Sepulcher and drawing them closer to Benedictine observance. This owed to the Templars' encounter with the preeminent churchman of the age, St. Bernard of Clairvaux.

St. Bernard and the Templars

While St. Bernard's remarkable life cannot be treated in detail here, he was more responsible than anyone else for the rapid growth and success of the Cistercian Order.³⁷ He also played a crucial, but often misunderstood, role in the founding of the Knights Templar.³⁸ Along with Stephen Harding, he was present at the Council of Troyes and assisted with the drafting of the Templar Rule. Sometime between 1130 and 1136 Bernard also authored his treatise *De laude novae militiae*.³⁹ Bernard was at first reluctant to write this work, as he knew rather little about the Temple before the Council of Troyes.⁴⁰ One author sees in Bernard's choice of title a deliberate effort to employ all the semantic complexity of the word *militia*, which can refer both to the conduct of war in the abstract and to the organization that wages war.⁴¹ *De laude* has been correctly read as a full-blown apology for the legitimate and even laudable use of force in the service of God. Some historians have also read the work as an endorsement of the warrior monk.⁴² Yet Carlos de Ayala Martínez has persuasively argued that St. Bernard, both in *De laude* and in his other writings, was thoroughly traditional in his conception of the monastic life.⁴³ Rather than inventing the concept of the warrior monk, he promoted the Templars as a model of ecclesiastical knighthood.

The first four chapters of *De laude* are an apology for the "new knighthood" that the Templars represented, and the latter nine are meditations on the various holy sites of Jerusalem. What is the work's message? It must be admitted that two passages do appear to endorse the idea of the warrior monk:

When someone strongly resists a foe in the flesh, relying solely on the strength of the flesh, I would hardly remark it, since this is common enough. And when war is waged by spiritual strength against vices or demons, this, too, is nothing remarkable, praiseworthy as it is, for the world is full of monks. But when the one sees a man powerfully girding himself with both swords and nobly marking his belt, who would not consider it worthy of all wonder, the more so since it has been hitherto unknown?⁴⁴

I do not know if it would be more appropriate to refer to them as monks or as soldiers, unless perhaps it would be better to recognize them as being both. Indeed they lack neither monastic meekness nor military might.⁴⁵

Tempting as they are, these statements must be regarded as rhetorical. The main thrust of the first four chapters is twofold: first, to lay out a model of a new knighthood, in contrast to the wickedness of worldly knighthood; second, to identify the Templars with the former group. "This is, I say, a new kind of knighthood and one unknown to the ages gone by. It ceaselessly wages a twofold war both against flesh and blood and against a spiritual army of evil in the heavens."⁴⁶ For Bernard, it was essential that the new knights be dedicated not only to temporal warfare but also to the battle against sin and vice

represented by the fallen angels. He dedicates his second chapter to excoriating the vices of worldly knighthood, using the familiar identification of *militia* and *malitia*.⁴⁷ He chastises the knights' vanity, their wrath, their "terrible insecurity of conscience," all of which lead them "to take such a dangerous business on such slight and frivolous grounds."⁴⁸ These were well-established tropes and represented no innovation on Bernard's part.⁴⁹

Chapter 3 offers a contrasting image of the knight of Christ, who "may strike with confidence and die yet more confidently, for he serves Christ when he strikes and serves himself when he falls."⁵⁰ He is "secure on every side, for his soul is protected by the armor of faith just as his body is protected by the armor of steel."⁵¹ The principal difference between him and the worldly knight is his faith and the right intention of his heart. Bernard answers objections against the use of force with copious references to Scripture. This line of argumentation was merely following the trajectory of thought on holy warfare that the Gregorian Reformers and crusading had already launched. But Chapter 4, titled "De conversatione militum templi," does offer something novel: the identification of the Templars with the new knighthood. The Templars are praised in terms highly reminiscent of monasticism: their discipline, their self-renunciation, and their poverty are all sublime; there is no distinction of persons between them; they keep their hair short in accordance with the apostle's saying; they arm themselves with faith and steel rather than with gold.⁵² This was a highly idealized picture, as Bernard had never seen them in action.⁵³ Applying the dichotomy of good and bad knights specifically to the Templars is the principal innovation of *De laude*.⁵⁴

What explains Bernard's special esteem for the new order as a model of true knighthood? William Purkis and Malcolm Barber have argued that, in Bernard's view, their status as professed religious allowed the Templars to go beyond the elementary piety of ordinary knights and crusaders to a deeper spiritual life centered on Jerusalem.⁵⁵ These historians therefore view the second half of *De laude*, which contains the meditations on the holy sites of the life of Christ, as a devotional manual for the Templars.⁵⁶ Their consecrated life made them, in his view, the real inheritors of the warrior spirituality of the First Crusade. *De laude*, therefore, is addressed to a new kind of knight rather than a new kind of monk.⁵⁷

This point is all the more apparent upon further examination of Bernard's understanding of the monastic life, in which there was no place for the mobility or temporal warfare that the Templar vocation entailed. In 1124, Arnold, Abbot of Morimond, proposed to abandon his monastery and take the majority of his monks to Jerusalem to

establish a new community there. Morimond was in a state of crisis, and Arnold did not have the approval of the Cistercian general chapter for this action.⁵⁸ When he learned of the proposal, Bernard showed himself resolutely opposed and coordinated an effort to block it, on the grounds that it violated the vows of obedience and *stabilitas loci* that were essential to the Cistercian monastic life.⁵⁹ He asked “who does not perceive that in that land [Jerusalem] is more need of soldiers to fight than of monks to sing or pray?”⁶⁰ Bernard backed up his words with deeds when he rejected King Baldwin II’s donation of land near Jerusalem for the construction of a community, giving it instead to the Premonstratensians.⁶¹ Clearly, he thought that monks should be dedicated to prayer and not to combat, a view also evident in his discomfort with preaching the Second Crusade.⁶² Even after he had undertaken this endeavor, he found it necessary, in 1147, to dissuade some Cistercians who wanted more direct participation in the struggle for the earthly Jerusalem.⁶³ He compares them to Abi’ram and Dathan, who were swallowed up by the earth for murmuring against Moses, and castigates their desire to take the cross when they already bore it in their monastic life.⁶⁴ These were no idle words: Bernard invokes the authority of the Apostolic See that any Cistercian who joined a crusade would be excommunicated.⁶⁵ This opposition echoes in the Cistercian general chapter of 1157 as well, which determined that monks who had gone to Jerusalem were to be banished to another community.⁶⁶ For Bernard, Clairvaux was the true prefigurement of the heavenly Jerusalem, as he writes in a letter praising the canon Philip’s decision to forsake his pilgrimage to the East in favor of entering Clairvaux.⁶⁷ As Jotischky says, “The settlement of monks in the Holy Land was seen as detracting from the fundamental vocation of monasticism.”⁶⁸ Bernard’s understanding of the monastic vocation was, in this respect, the same as what his predecessors had handed down to him.⁶⁹ It was good to become a crusader or a Templar, but it was better still to become a monk.⁷⁰ This was the same view held by Bernard’s contemporary Peter the Venerable, who once wrote a letter praising the Templars and comparing them to monks, as Bernard had done in *De laude*.⁷¹ Yet in the same letter, and in another addressed to the pope, Peter makes it clear that the Templars are not monks and do not follow, strictly speaking, a monastic life.⁷² For both men, monasticism excluded, by definition, constant mobility and participation in worldly combat.⁷³ There is no question that St. Bernard wished to fully support the new Templar Order, that he saw in it both a practical tool for the defense of Christendom and a way to sanctification for pious knights. But he is not responsible for the concept of the warrior monk, and as I will argue further on, he might have balked at certain subsequent

developments within the military-religious vocation.⁷⁴ Thus, Bernard, *pace* Cardini, represents the “ascetic” strand of reform thought, which resisted the idea of finding salvation outside the monastery, only to the degree that he wished to preserve the monastic vocation in its proper integrity. His endorsement of the Temple identifies him closely with the “Gregorian” strand, which encouraged the exercise of arms in service of the Church; but the men who undertook this task could not at the same time be “perfect monks.”⁷⁵ Bernard’s treatise did not address, let alone refute, all the objections raised against the new knighthood, and it is fair to think that he might have shared some of those objections had he lived longer.⁷⁶

Expansion and Criticism of the Templars

After the Council of Troyes, the Temple was highly successful in obtaining recruits and donations throughout the Holy Land and Europe.⁷⁷ The papacy lent its full support in a series of three bulls: *Omne datum optimum* (1139), *Milites Templi* (1144), and *Militia Dei* (1145).⁷⁸ In addition to affirming the order’s mission and legitimacy in the strongest terms, these documents also exempted it from the payment of tithes, allowed it to keep any spoils obtained from the Muslims, granted indulgences to the faithful who made contributions, and allowed for the erection of oratories.⁷⁹ These bulls were crucial for obtaining the support of pious laymen, for only at this point did the Temple enjoy the exemptions, privileges, and authority to provide spiritual assistance.⁸⁰ For the first time, the Templars were allowed to have their own priests, who were to be subject to the master, as full members of the order. The bulls also explicitly refer to the Templars as imitators of Christ, in their reference to John 15:13, a favorite scriptural passage of crusade spirituality.⁸¹ Through the middle decades of the twelfth century, then, the order was amassing riches of many kinds, as well as expanding its responsibilities from protecting pilgrims to defending the entire Latin East. It was also undergoing an elaboration of its disciplinary regime. The original Rule of seventy-two clauses, composed and edited at Troyes in 1129, was inadequate to the order’s growing responsibilities. Additional statutes, written in French and known as the *retrais*, were issued sometime in the second half of the twelfth century to regulate the order’s offices, penances, and conventual life.⁸²

Yet the order’s growth and favor invited criticism. The well-known complaints of John of Salisbury and William of Tyre are best understood as objections to the papal extension of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, especially over churches and priests, of men who were fundamentally knights.⁸³ For these members of the secular clergy, the Templars’ privileges represented a confusion of proper roles within

Christian society. Walter Map, who wrote in a similar vein, also makes a brief objection to the military-religious profession as such.⁸⁴ Isaac of Stella, in referring to the “new knighthood” as a “new monstrosity” and “the Order of the Fifth Gospel,” voices some of the doubt concerning crusading spirituality that could still be heard in Europe.⁸⁵ These critiques did not necessarily undermine the Templars’ popularity, but they did reveal the hybrid nature of the vocation and the tensions that flowed from it.⁸⁶ The Templars always occupied an ambiguous place in any schema of medieval society, which fueled the criticism they faced from time to time. If, as I have argued, the Templars were fundamentally knights, then the papal expansion of their ecclesiastical jurisdiction, especially over churches and priests, would naturally invite objections from clerical or monastic writers who saw this as a confusion of proper roles. Of course, it was the king of France, rather than clerical and monastic critics, who in the end posed the real threat to the Templars.

THE HOSPITALERS

One of the strongest objections to the concept of ecclesiastical knighthood is that it does not apply to the other great military order founded in the Latin East, the Knights Hospitaller. The impetus for the order’s establishment had little to do with knightly piety or crusade spirituality. Originally founded to care for poor and sick pilgrims in Jerusalem, the order underwent militarization during the twelfth century. This remains a difficult historiographical problem because of the conflicting nature of the evidence. One must distinguish, first of all, between the order’s assumption of military responsibilities, which may have been contracted to servants or mercenaries, and the participation of professed brethren in combat. Alan Forey thinks that there is sound evidence for the former by the 1130s, because at that time the order began to receive important fortresses.⁸⁷ Members of the Hospital were present at several major battles in both the Holy Land and Iberia in the 1140s, which suggests that they were engaged in combat.⁸⁸ Yet the Rule of 1153 makes no mention of this activity. The first clear references to military officers date from the 1160s, and they do not appear in capitular decrees until 1182.⁸⁹ Circa 1178–1180 Pope Alexander III (1159–1181) warned the Hospital not to abandon the care of the sick, its principal commitment, for the sake of fighting.⁹⁰ During and after the Third Crusade, the order witnessed a dramatic expansion of its military activity, although it did not abandon hospitaller work.⁹¹ Rather, the Hospital presented fighting as an extension of its existing charitable efforts.⁹² Modern historians, such as Luis García-Guijarro Ramos and Helen Nicholson, warn

against presuming a deep cleavage between military and hospitaller activities, a mind-set not characteristic of the twelfth century.⁹³ García-Guijarro Ramos believes that militarization was neither so dramatic nor so sudden as some historians have supposed, which partially explains the murkiness of the documentary record. Fighting and caring for the sick were different manifestations of the same service, and popes recognized the elastic nature of the activities undertaken in that service, given the special circumstances of the Holy Land.⁹⁴

These observations, while apropos, are not entirely satisfactory. Jonathan Riley-Smith's recent monograph on the Hospitallers sheds some additional light on the problem. His narrative of the order's militarization does not settle, once and for all, when and to what extent the process came about. Riley-Smith does identify, however, an aggressive attempt by Master Gilbert of Assailly, elected in 1163, to transform the Hospital through the purchase and building of castles and the adoption of militaristic rhetoric. This attempt to reorganize the Hospitallers along lines that were more akin to the Temple met with strong resistance from many of the order's members, such that it ultimately failed.⁹⁵ By the 1180s, the Hospitallers were articulating their warfare in terms of "a symbiotic relationship to the care of the sick poor."⁹⁶ These events highlight an important point. Twelfth-century writers could endorse the fairly novel view of warfare as an act of love. They could not, however, so readily accept the participation of monks or canons in combat. The attitude of St. Bernard, Peter the Venerable, and others has already been made clear: the fight against powers and principalities through prayer and fasting was superior to the fight against flesh and blood by the sword. They endorsed the Temple because it aimed to renew and convert knighthood from *malitia* to a true *militia* of Christ. It was laudable for a man to turn from sin to righteousness, or to ascend from one state of life to a more perfect one. No justification could be offered, however, for descending to a less perfect state. Even before their militarization, the Hospitallers were pioneering a new way of life with a more active commitment in the world.⁹⁷ But while the Hospitallers were never traditional monks properly speaking, the shedding of blood would have unquestionably been regarded as a deviation from their original purity. They could not, therefore, employ the Templars' language about the conversion of knighthood, because their transformation took them, in terms of spiritual theology, from a higher to a lower way of life. Such a move could not be justified according to any of the various schemas of Christian states of life or the orders of society.⁹⁸ It is true that such schemas were many and contradictory, that they were still being developed even in the late twelfth century, and that nothing like

consensus was ever achieved.⁹⁹ Most writers, however, continued to assert the superiority of the priestly or religious life.¹⁰⁰ Arguing from the absence of evidence is always risky, but I suspect that the hesitant nature of the Hospital's militarization, as well as the strong opposition to the initiatives of Assailly, owes primarily to the order's inability and unwillingness to frame these developments within the spiritual doctrine of its day. Recent research has shown how Hospitaller foundation narratives through the end of the thirteenth century emphasize a fabled connection to Christ and the apostles, and to the care of the sick, rather than the exercise of arms.¹⁰¹ Although the dire situation in the Latin East after the Battle of Hattin gave impetus to a new wave of castle construction and other military preparations, the fact that the Hospital felt the need in 1217 to ask Honorius III for crusade indulgences for its brothers and supporters underscores the order's misgivings and hesitancy.¹⁰² Militarization was largely a response to practical necessity, and when the order did at last speak of it, it presented militarization as an extension of existing charitable activities, not as the conversion of knighthood.¹⁰³ This admittedly renders the term "ecclesiastical knighthood" problematic with reference to the Hospital. Although by the late twelfth century the Order of St. John had assumed military commitments that rivaled or even surpassed its care of the sick, the latter was primary in the Hospitallers' institutional memory and practice, at least prior to their relocation to Rhodes.¹⁰⁴ This tied the Hospital, despite its militarization, more closely to the mainstream of religious life. Not by accident do the Hospitallers boast of canonized saints (none of them knightly brethren), whereas the other military orders do not.¹⁰⁵ Given the source problems and the complexity of the Hospital's self-understanding, these proposals are preliminary and mean to suggest possibilities for further research.¹⁰⁶

The Hospital, like the Temple, faced some criticism from contemporaries, but it seems that the problem of its transformation went mostly unacknowledged. This may have owed to the duration and ambiguity of the process, which must have escaped the notice of most observers, just as it has eluded the investigations of modern historians. After the Third Crusade, when the order's military endeavors dramatically increased, the situation in the Holy Land was too dire for anyone to complain. Writers instead critiqued the order's privileges, or its pride, or its wealth. In other words, the Hospital was seen in much the same light as the Temple.¹⁰⁷ Alongside these remarks was praise of its military valor or its commitment to the care of the sick.¹⁰⁸ The Hospital thus became a very successful military order on the same scale as the Temple, but with a different self-understanding.

THE IBERIAN MILITARY ORDERS: BACKGROUND

“Reconquest” and Crusade

The military-religious life took root not only in the Holy Land, but also in the Iberian Peninsula, the medieval history of which has for some time been dominated by a key concept: the Reconquest.¹⁰⁹ In the past several decades, this term has come under considerable criticism and has begun to fade from textbooks, although it still has its defenders. While Martín Ríos Saloma has shown that the concept was consolidated only in the nineteenth century, some contemporary Iberian medievalists have continued to use the term to describe the gradual and deliberate Christian takeover of Muslim territory in the peninsula.¹¹⁰ Despite its late emergence, I do not think that “Reconquest” is so problematic that it should not be used as shorthand, which I do throughout this study. A few points concerning this complex topic will suffice. Although it is true that the contest for Iberia between Christians and Muslims dates all the way back to 711, it is also true that the articulation of this conflict as a systematic and religiously or ideologically motivated campaign is ephemeral prior to the eleventh century, and that material gain was often a more important motive than religion.¹¹¹ Christians and Muslims frequently allied with one another against their respective coreligionists.¹¹² This situation changed significantly from the latter half of the eleventh century, posing for scholars the question of the relationship between Reconquest and crusade. Three main issues have dominated: when and to what degree the Christian-Muslim wars in Iberia acquired religious and ideological overtones; whether those overtones were primarily the result of outside influences or developments within the peninsula; and whether the campaigns of the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries should be designated as holy wars, crusades, or proto-crusades. One reason the genesis of crusading in Iberia is difficult to pin down is that, unlike in the Latin East, there was no clear association with pilgrimage; Santiago de Compostela was not the ultimate destination for crusaders to Iberia.¹¹³ The evidence for a robust Reconquest ideology or commitment to holy war on the Christian side is rather weak even for the second half of the eleventh-century, as Richard Fletcher’s analysis of charters and chronicles of this period has demonstrated.¹¹⁴ O’Callaghan maintains, however, that the idea of Reconquest, though perhaps not always tangible in the sources, “was nevertheless real in that it influenced the actions of Spanish kings and princes.”¹¹⁵ Yet the idea took root only gradually and often went hand in hand with the more immediate objectives of spoils or land. By the 1120s, the notions of Reconquest and crusade in Iberia became more explicit; by the 1140s, they were still more so.¹¹⁶

The evidence suggest that influences from across the Pyrenees after the mid-eleventh century were more important than local religion or politics in stimulating ideological motivations for warfare.¹¹⁷ This argument has received additional support from Purkis's investigations, which have demonstrated the enthusiastic response of Iberians to Urban II's summons of 1095, and the persistent difficulties that the papacy faced in convincing them to stay at home.¹¹⁸ The popes of the early twelfth century, seeking to redirect this crusading enthusiasm, began recognizing campaigns against the Iberian Muslims as crusades and offering the same rewards and privileges to participants.¹¹⁹ Canon 10 of the First Lateran Council discusses the obligations of those who take the cross and make a vow to go to Jerusalem or Spain, thus equating the two destinations with each other.¹²⁰ Even after 1123, however, the war against the Moors continued to be justified in terms of defending the Holy City. Diego Gelmírez, in a council held at Compostela in 1124, proclaimed a campaign to defeat the Muslims in Iberia and North Africa and thereby open up a "shorter" route to Jerusalem.¹²¹ This concept remained attractive at least until the time of the Second Crusade, when at last a local crusading ideology became well established. This owed to the renewal of military efforts under Alfonso VII as well as the dissemination of the *Codex Calixtinus*, which helped transform St. James into a patron of Reconquest and crusade.¹²² Perhaps the label "holy wars" can be used for the Iberian campaigns, such as Barbastro and Tarragona, from the late eleventh century, but I follow most historians in rejecting the term "crusades," because Urban's call of 1095 combined penance, warfare, and pilgrimage to Jerusalem in a novel way.¹²³ Whatever names are used, however, it is important to remember that Reconquest and crusade were fluid concepts and practices, subject to change over time and variably invoked.¹²⁴ Political necessity, the desire for gain, and the pursuit of salvation were often combined in complex ways.

The development of knighthood also took a somewhat different course in the Iberian Peninsula than it did north of the Pyrenees. While in France shifting relations of power and lordship, the Peace and Truce of God, and new piety were crucial factors, in Iberia the frontier was the central reality. On the one hand, the need for mounted warriors and the phenomenon of castellation already had a pedigree in Iberia long before the late eleventh century. On the other hand, the nature of the frontier conflict as "Reconquest and crusade" was significantly altered by outside influences, which in turn had important consequences for the development of Iberian knighthood. Many of the characteristic features of the new French knighthood were imported, but slowly. For example, the great families of Castile-León did not begin to use heraldic devices until the very end of the

twelfth century.¹²⁵ The development of chivalrous culture properly speaking likewise took longer and was mostly based on French models, but with a certain local flavor. Rodríguez-Velasco dates the earliest interest of the Castilian monarchy in the institution of chivalry to the reign of Alfonso VIII (coinciding with the *Cantar de mio Cid*), and says that only with the Siete Partidas of Alfonso X was it incorporated into a legal framework.¹²⁶ In general, the practical necessities of warfare in Iberia weakened the exclusive link between nobility and the exercise of arms.¹²⁷ This reality was most apparent in the existence of the *caballeros villanos*, or non-noble knights, whose military, political, and social role on the frontier was crucial. Knighthood in Iberia, then, has a long trajectory of development, consisting of both internal and external influences, that is often difficult to follow because of the scarcity and ambiguity of the evidence, especially before the time of Alfonso VIII.¹²⁸ It must be regarded as a rather flexible category for which the exercise of arms was the crucial factor.

The contest of Christians and Muslims, newly invigorated by injections of religious fervor from abroad, proceeded apace during the twelfth century. The Almoravids, a reformist and warlike group from North Africa, had taken up the Islamic cause from the time of Alfonso VI. By about 1150, five Iberian Christian polities had emerged that would abide for the remainder of the Middle Ages: León, Castile, Navarre, Portugal, and the Crown of Aragon. Around the same time, the Almohads, another North African power, supplanted the Almoravids as masters of Al-Andalus. Each of the Christian kingdoms pursued its own Reconquest, sometimes in cooperation, most often in conflict, with the others. Such were the circumstances in Iberia when the military orders first appeared on the scene.

Templars and Hospitallers

Early in their history, the Templars and Hospitallers came to Iberia, where they encountered a new set of expectations. Their goal was to acquire land and other donations to support their efforts in the Holy Land, but Iberian monarchs wanted assistance with their own campaigns. The first Iberian donation to the Temple dates from 1128, in Portugal, and the order enjoyed early success there and in Aragon and Catalonia, acquiring donations throughout the 1130s.¹²⁹ The Hospital was present from an even earlier time.¹³⁰ Ramón Berenguer III entered the Templars in 1131, and that same year witnessed the extraordinary will of Alfonso I, who left his realms to the Temple, the Hospital, and the Canons of the Holy Sepulcher.¹³¹ Although the terms of the will were not carried out, the orders were handsomely compensated, which made them major landowners in Aragon and

Catalonia.¹³² In Castile and León, by contrast, the Temple did not establish itself until much later; its earliest donations date from the 1140s.¹³³ The royal family under Alfonso VII was fairly generous to the Hospital, but much less so to the Temple.¹³⁴ Yet even the Hospital remained much less significant in León or Castile than it was in the Crown of Aragon. This was an important factor in the foundation and subsequent success of Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara.

Iberian monarchs saw that the universal orders, whose principal interests lay in the Holy Land, were less than ideal for the pursuit of the Reconquest. Alfonso I of Aragon, a crusader par excellence, was the first Iberian monarch to experiment with creating local forces. He was responsible for the foundation of two pious military confraternities, Belchite and Monreal, around 1122 and 1128, respectively.¹³⁵ They offered the remission of sins to anyone who joined and proclaimed their intent to follow the *iter per Hispaniam* to Jerusalem.¹³⁶ These organizations were not military orders properly speaking, and their existence was ephemeral. Alfonso's decision, moreover, to name the Templars and Hospitallers as heirs to his kingdom reduced the opportunity for local foundations. In midcentury León and Castile, by contrast, there were relatively few Templar or Hospitaller holdings. Instead, there were a number of military confraternities and urban militias, which were exclusively dedicated to fighting in the peninsula and closely bound to royal authority.¹³⁷ These groups, as well as the Temple and the Hospital, became models for the Iberian military orders.¹³⁸

CALATRAVA

The *Historia de rebus Hispaniae* of Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, archbishop of Toledo, is the primary source for the origins of Calatrava.¹³⁹ In 1158, the Templars alerted the Castilian King Sancho III (1157–1158) that they had insufficient resources to hold the border fortress of Calatrava against an impending Almohad attack. The king was alarmed, as the fortress, located on the Guadiana River, was a strategic location vital to the security of Toledo. The fortunate presence of Raymond, the Cistercian abbot of Fitero, and his monk Diego Velázquez, provided the unlikely solution to the problem. Diego had been a knight prior to his entrance into the Cistercians, and he suggested that his abbot accept responsibility for the fortress, which Diego and others would then defend. The request was granted, and the castle and town of Calatrava were donated to Raymond.¹⁴⁰ Juan, archbishop of Toledo, offered indulgences and aid to anyone who would come to its defense. There was a great outpouring of recruits and material assistance for the endeavor, and divine favor was

demonstrated when the Muslim army never arrived. The abbot moved to Calatrava, bringing along the other monks of Fitero (except the aged and infirm) and their movable goods, to establish a new community. He also brought a “multitude of warriors,” for whose maintenance he took responsibility.¹⁴¹

There are numerous problems with Jiménez de Rada’s account. In the first place, there is no diplomatic evidence for the original donation of Calatrava to the Templars, and on the basis of what is known about the itinerary of Sancho’s short reign, the meeting with Abbot Raymond must have taken place in 1157, and not in Toledo. The threat of an Almohad attack is not mentioned in any Muslim chronicle, and the king’s reliance on two Cistercian monks to garrison a fortress was “extraordinary and unprecedented.”¹⁴² Both Ayala Martínez and Rodríguez-Picavea see a strong royal hand in the supposed departure of the Templars and the creation of a new community.¹⁴³ Whatever the case may be, it is significant that a community of Cistercians left the abbey for the dangers of the frontier, and that there is at least the possibility that some of them embraced a military-religious vocation.¹⁴⁴ These converts to the military life, if such there were, might accurately be described as “warrior monks,” as they had previously been living some kind of Cistercian monastic observance until they decided to take up the sword. For better or worse, St. Bernard was gone and no longer able to fulminate against a move completely contrary to his teaching on the monastic life.

To understand the relationship of the Iberian military orders and the Cistercians, a few words about the latter are necessary. The Cistercian Order produced three important innovations that contributed to its growth. The first was the basic organizational structure. Instead of making all houses subordinate to a single abbey, after the manner of Cluny, the Cistercians allowed for an individual community to found daughter abbeys, which would retain juridical links of visitation with the mother house. The networks thus established allowed for both uniformity of practice and collegiality in governance.¹⁴⁵ Matters of greater moment were addressed by the general chapter, the second important Cistercian innovation. This institution, convened on an annual basis, also allowed for building consensus, sharing responsibility, and disseminating information and norms.¹⁴⁶ The third innovation was a new category of members, the *conversi*. The *conversi* were religious “who had a fixed status from which promotion was impossible, lived apart from the ordained (or choir) monks, did not participate in the offices, and performed distinct functions, often of a menial nature.”¹⁴⁷ There were other antecedents for this new category at Vallombrosa and Grandmont, but the Cistercians made it widespread and clearly defined.¹⁴⁸ The *conversi*

lived in their own quarters and, in lieu of chanting the Divine Office, prayed fixed numbers of simple prayers and made reverential gestures during its performance. This new category was a path for men of humbler status, including the illiterate.¹⁴⁹ This last innovation was the most important one in establishing ties between the Cistercians and the military orders.¹⁵⁰ Yet integrating the fighting brethren into the overall Cistercian structure proved a difficult task.

It is nearly impossible to follow exactly what happened at Calatrava in the period 1158–1164. Villegas Díaz suggests that Raymond of Fitero, who had already taken responsibility for the castle of Tudején in 1157, oversaw until 1161 the creation of a Cistercian-inspired militia in embryonic form that would become the Order of Calatrava.¹⁵¹ An 1158 donation to Calatrava of Cirujares distinguishes monks from fighting brethren and shows that both were living in the new community.¹⁵² Fitero was briefly abandoned in 1159 because of an Almohad attack, but soon thereafter it was restored, under the authority of a new abbot named Guillermo.¹⁵³ Then Raymond transferred the monastic community at Calatrava to Ciruelos, leaving the fortress to the fighting brethren.¹⁵⁴ The most plausible explanation for this development, which is at least implicitly supported by subsequent documentation, is that the monks and fighting brethren found themselves at odds with one another and experienced a struggle for leadership of the community, a struggle that the monks either lost or forfeited.¹⁵⁵

In 1164, the military brethren, under the leadership of one Don García, sought recognition and a rule of life from the Cistercian general chapter. The chapter agreed to the request, accepting the brethren into the order and issuing a brief rule, or *forma vivendi*.¹⁵⁶ The office of abbot of Calatrava was replaced by that of master. All the members of Calatrava would enjoy the same canonical status as other Cistercian *fratres*.¹⁵⁷ This was significant because it placed the brothers in a higher category than the *conversi*. They could not, however, enter the cloistered area when visiting other Cistercian houses, supposedly because they were not familiar with the order's customs.¹⁵⁸ They were to be assigned chaplains to say Mass and hear their confessions, since the military brothers could not receive Holy Orders. The French abbot of Scala Dei was entrusted with overseeing Calatrava's rule of life, but he was not assigned as its *pater abbas*, which made for weak juridical ties.¹⁵⁹ Curiously, the document makes no mention of the Temple or Hospital as precedents for the new group, but it does very briefly employ language reminiscent of the *De laude* in describing the brothers' conversion from worldly knighthood to the service of God.¹⁶⁰ Later that same year, Alexander III approved this new arrangement.¹⁶¹ Thus, a new military order was born, one

that was not immediately subject to the papacy but rather was affiliated to the Cistercian Order. In subsequent decades, Calatrava benefited from the generosity of donors, building up a patrimony in Castile, which from the beginning was its territorial and political center. Only in the early thirteenth century did it gain a foothold in the Kingdom of Aragon, the commandery of Alcañiz, and its possessions there would always be modest.

But the relationship to the Cistercians was problematic from the beginning and took decades to sort out. In 1186, the master of Calatrava requested that the general chapter fully incorporate his order by providing a father abbot. A new document was issued, expanding on the text of 1164, and making Morimond, not Scala Dei, the mother house, with the corresponding rights of visitation.¹⁶² In the days of St. Bernard, the abbot of Morimond had infamously attempted to transfer his monks to Jerusalem. Although this endeavor failed, Morimond succeeded in founding the first Cistercian houses in the Holy Land, Belmont and Salvatio, between 1157 and 1161.¹⁶³ Ayala Martínez believes that Morimond was the seat of a more militant spirituality within the Cistercian Order, and for this reason was made Calatrava's mother house.¹⁶⁴ Yet the affiliation to Morimond did not sit well with everyone. Sometime between 1183 and 1187, Alfonso VIII tried unsuccessfully to replace Morimond with Fitero.¹⁶⁵ In the 1190s, he arranged for the Castilian abbey of San Pedro de Gumiel to act as Morimond's delegate for disciplinary oversight of Calatrava.¹⁶⁶ The fighting brethren had to seek an additional confirmation of their dependency on Morimond from Innocent III in 1199.¹⁶⁷ Later, the king of Castile made numerous failed attempts to decouple Calatrava from its French mother house and have it assigned directly to San Pedro de Gumiel.¹⁶⁸ In 1237, the pope admonished Fernando III to respect Morimond's jurisdiction, just two years after the Cistercian general chapter had rejected San Pedro de Gumiel's claim.¹⁶⁹ Much later, in 1249, it was necessary for the Cistercian general chapter to repeat and clarify the norms of the affiliation, and later Morimond's right to appoint the prior of Calatrava was confirmed on two separate occasions.¹⁷⁰ The chapter also opposed Alfonso X's failed attempt in 1254 to abolish the distinction between Calatrava and Alcántara by uniting both orders under the mastership of Pedro Ibáñez.¹⁷¹

Several points about the Cistercian affiliation merit attention. There is no evidence of any well-articulated, principled objection among Cistercians to bringing the military brethren of Calatrava into their order.¹⁷² Yet clearly there was tension between the monks and military brothers during the years 1158–1164. The length of time that it took to establish Calatrava's status is still more suggestive of

Cistercian discomfort with the initiative. Even granting that Morimond was the seat of a more bellicose spirituality within the order, defining the place of the fighting brethren was a difficult task. Were they *conversi*? Were they monks? Ultimately the Cistercians seem to have decided that they were *sui generis* and gave them a place somewhere between the two.¹⁷³ These difficulties raise the question of why the affiliation was ever undertaken in the first place.¹⁷⁴ The initiative of establishing Calatrava had been made by Cistercians, even if without the consent of the general chapter, and therefore they could claim some responsibility or authority over the community. The triumph of the military brethren at Calatrava between 1158 and 1164, however, gave them the initiative. Surely the new community felt the need for the improved organization, institutional support, and legitimacy that the Cistercians could provide, but it might be asked why they did not turn to the Templars instead, which already had a well-established model for the military-religious life.

I think there are two basic explanations for this. First, there were already ties between the Cistercian Order and the military-religious life through the Templars. Even though they did not adopt the Rule of Benedict, as St. Bernard had recommended at Troyes, the Templars clearly borrowed from it.¹⁷⁵ One author has suggested that Benedict's Rule, with its militaristic language, was well suited to the new vocation, making the Cistercian affiliation a natural development.¹⁷⁶ Given that most of the military orders followed or at least borrowed heavily from the Rule, this argument has some merit. One innovation of the Cistercian Order, the *conversus*, created a greater flexibility of categories of membership and opened up the possibility of religious life to those who lacked the gifts or the inclination to be monks. Structurally speaking, therefore, the Cistercians were more disposed than anyone else to create space for the military brethren. The length of time needed to establish the status of Calatrava, and the ultimate ambiguity of the brothers' position, however, is evidence that not everyone was quite comfortable with the arrangement; the sentiments of Isaac of Stella may have resonated widely. In addition to the irregularities of the foundation itself, the question of whether the military life really had a proper place within the order must have vexed some monks. The second explanation for the affiliation, which may have been the decisive one, is that the Castilian monarch wanted to ensure that the new community was committed to the Reconquest, and therefore to his own authority. Excessively close ties with the Templars would have placed this plan in jeopardy, and perhaps the king really did encourage the order to leave the fortress so he could install his own group.¹⁷⁷ The lack of evidence makes this hypothesis conjectural, but it is consistent with the king's later attempts to

subordinate Calatrava to a Castilian rather than a French abbey.

SANTIAGO

Calatrava, with its Cistercian affiliation, represented one model of the Iberian military order, which nearly all subsequent foundations would follow. The main exception was the Order of Santiago, whose genesis and development were quite different. For many years the truth of the order's foundation was obscured by spurious legends, but the pioneering work of scholars like Derek Lomax and José Luis Martín has cleared the picture considerably. At the beginning of August 1170, a group of knights, under the leadership of one Pedro Fernández, formed a confraternity at Cáceres with the support, or possibly at the behest, of King Fernando II (1157–1188) of León.¹⁷⁸ The following year, the confraternity signed a pact, or *hermandad*, with the archbishop of Santiago.¹⁷⁹ The agreement conferred the name and blessing of the apostle James upon the confraternity along with a host of other benefits, catapulting a fairly humble organization to the status of “militia of Santiago.”¹⁸⁰ Both the Leonese monarchy and the archbishop wanted to employ the new organization in their kingdom's pursuit of the Reconquest, above all to capture the see of Mérida, whose archiepiscopal rights had been transferred to Compostela.¹⁸¹ This was a moment of considerable fighting among Christian rulers, and the Leonese wanted to prevent their coreligionists from crowding them out of future conquests. For the confraternity of Cáceres, the affiliation with Compostela was a source of legitimation and of benefits both spiritual and temporal. Yet the new community had ambitions well beyond the confines of León. Already in 1171, Alfonso VIII was offering castles and other properties, saying that it befitted the royal dignity to love knights, especially those who fought for God alone.¹⁸² Soon Santiago was seeking properties in Portugal, France, and even Antioch.¹⁸³ In 1172, members of another military confraternity in Ávila entered the militia of Santiago en masse while retaining certain privileges and characteristics as a distinct group.¹⁸⁴ The Almohad offensive of 1173 and 1174 wiped out most of Santiago's possessions in León and Portugal, and there were no new Leonese royal grants between 1172 and 1176.¹⁸⁵ This favored a relationship with the rival Kingdom of Castile, which was strengthened when Alfonso VIII (1158–1214) donated the fortress of Uclés in 1174 so that the brothers would establish their headquarters there.¹⁸⁶

The support of kings and the archbishop of Compostela was crucial to the militia's success, but it still lacked one crucial source of patronage. While Calatrava had sought canonical recognition and

ecclesiastical support through the Cistercian Order, Santiago would seek it directly from the papacy. The visit of the legate Cardinal Hyacinth to the peninsula in 1172 provided the opportunity. He met with members of the new community and received their petition to be recognized as a religious order.¹⁸⁷ Around this time the group's first governing norm, known as the Primitive Rule, was drafted.¹⁸⁸ The deliberative process over the community's canonical status was surprisingly short, thanks in large part to the support of Cardinal Alberto de Morra.¹⁸⁹ In 1175, the reigning pontiff, Alexander III, issued a bull confirming the community as a religious order directly subject to the Holy See and laid down norms that expanded and modified the terms of the Primitive Rule.¹⁹⁰

Around the same time, Cardinal Morra wrote a prologue to the Rule, explaining the community's origins.¹⁹¹ It reveals the Roman Curia's vision and idealized history of the order and, by extension, of the military-religious life in general. The same tropes of conversion found in the *De laude* are prominent here as well:

In recent times the grace of the Holy Spirit mercifully shone upon the land of the Spaniards and compassionately called aside from worldly pomp and the work of the Devil men who were Christians in name more than in fact and number more than in merit.¹⁹²

The prologue notes the worldly wisdom, wealth, and might of these "men of noble origin," as well as their wickedness, linking together *militia* and *malitia*.¹⁹³ But God turned them aside "from the abyss of eternal damnation, and into the wonderful kingdom of the light of His Son," converting them from being "free men of iniquity" to "the slaves of justice."¹⁹⁴ Their conversion was not only for their own sake, however, but also for the sake of all Spain, which was riven by faction and threatened by the Saracens:

At the time of their conversion, then, the Church was tossed about in the storm amongst the Spaniards. Kings were fighting one another: the King of Leon against the King of Portugal, the Kings of Portugal and Castile against the King of Leon, the Kings of Leon and Navarre against the King of Castile, and the Kings of Castile and Aragon against the King of Navarre. With the kings in such disagreement a multitude of Saracens came from beyond the seas to lay waste the lands of the Christians and to destroy the Church of God.¹⁹⁵

The brothers of Santiago, "inspired by the grace of the Holy Spirit and seeing the great peril that threatened the Christians," decided to set aside the vanities of the world, as well as quarrels with their coreligionists, to dedicate themselves to fighting the enemies of Christ, under the emblem of the apostle James. Instead of being merely an instrument of Leonese expansion, the Order of Santiago would be an instrument of Christian unity in pursuit of the Reconquest.¹⁹⁶ This idea had at least some basis in reality, for the order subsequently

acquired lordships in all the peninsula's frontier kingdoms. Santiago's foundation was undoubtedly of higher profile than Calatrava's and was known widely enough to reach the ears of Walter Map.¹⁹⁷

Santiago was like the Temple in that it began as a confraternity of pious knights that, within a few years, acquired canonical status as a religious order. Yet there were also numerous differences with the Templars. By now, the concept of the military order was well established in Latin Christendom, and the foundation did not generate any new challenges. Nor was Santiago founded to protect pilgrims, despite its association with Compostela.¹⁹⁸ From its earliest days, however, the order was engaged in the care of the sick and the ransoming of captives, activities more characteristic of the Hospitallers than the Templars.¹⁹⁹ Most important, however, the brethren of Santiago maintained a striking prerogative, even after the community's transformation into an order: the option to marry.

Unique among the military orders, and indeed in Catholic religious life, was the vow of *conjugal* chastity that the brothers of Santiago professed.²⁰⁰ This was by far the most innovative aspect of their life, and it is revealing to see how it originated and received papal approval. The Primitive Rule contains only oblique references to this discipline, yet it is unmistakably clear that the early members were married.²⁰¹ Pope Alexander's bull of 1175 makes an explicit attempt to explain and justify this departure from the norm. Because the faithful, says Alexander, are divided into married and celibate, and because the Lord Jesus Christ was born of a woman for the sake of women as well as men, the Order of Santiago contains both men and women, some of whom lead a celibate life, and others of whom are married.²⁰² The latter follow the counsel of St. Paul, who recommends marriage for the sake of producing children and avoiding incontinence.²⁰³ Together the married and celibate members serve the same king and build together one house, some with wood, hay and mud, others with gold, silver, and precious stones.²⁰⁴

The confusing circumlocutions of this passage reflect numerous divergent impulses. On the one hand, there is an evident desire to safeguard the superiority of consecrated celibacy to marriage: hence the comparison of building materials. On the other hand, the pope wants to provide some legitimacy to order's innovative practice: hence the appeal to the example of Christ and the teaching of Paul. Rather than being a deep theological innovation, however, conjugal chastity was a practical accommodation to the fact that the founders of Santiago were probably already married and were disinclined to set aside their wives and families. The ambitions of the original confraternity, after all, may have been something less than the formation of a religious order. The intervention of the monarch and

high ecclesiastics had been crucial to that development.²⁰⁵ Because the pope and several key cardinals in the Roman Curia recognized the value of the new community in pursuing the Reconquest, they were willing to grant an exception to the normal observance of the vow of chastity.²⁰⁶ This recognition of Santiago's usefulness was the reason not only for permitting conjugal relations but also for the many privileges, royal and ecclesiastical, lavished upon the new order.

Santiago represented a different model for the military-religious vocation. Because its earliest members had been lay knights, the order's origins followed more closely the path of ecclesiastical knighthood already trodden by the Templars, but thanks to the vow of conjugal chastity, it was even less closely wedded to the monastic tradition and total conversion from the world. Ayala Martínez has suggested that the more "secular" model of Santiago was an adjustment to the resistance and doubts surrounding the military-religious vocation manifested in Calatrava's early history.²⁰⁷ I think the resistance and doubts that did exist emanated more from within the Cistercian Order than from Castilian society at large, but surely the Order of Santiago offered a religious life that was more palatable to knights who otherwise might balk at the demands of chastity.²⁰⁸

ALCÁNTARA

The final order under consideration is San Julián del Pereiro, also known as Alcántara. Its origins have long been obscured by the loss of the order's central archives and the existence of divergent historiographical traditions, one of which posits 1156 as the foundational year.²⁰⁹ Yet the earliest extant documentation dates from January 1176, when the first royal donations were made to a community of brothers, under the leadership of one Gómez, residing at the church of San Julián del Pereiro on the Leonese frontier.²¹⁰ Alexander III confirmed the community in 1176, placing it under his protection, but the document makes no mention of any military commitments.²¹¹ By 1183, however, Pope Lucius III (1181–1185) was reminding the order that its canonical protection was for the sake of fighting against the Muslims.²¹² Sometime between 1176 and 1183, therefore, the brethren of San Julián took up military activity, but the sources provide no information how this came about. Nor does the confirmation of 1183 offer any details of community life or religious observance, saying only that the brothers follow the Rule of Benedict.²¹³ The basic picture, therefore, is of a fairly small religious community or confraternity in León, which, within the space of seven years, became militarized.

Matters are greatly complicated by a significant historiographical

problem: San Julián's relationships to the Orders of Calatrava and Trujillo. Once again, the scarcity of source material and the competing claims of historians have caused confusion. When Gregory VIII confirmed Calatrava's possessions in 1187, the town of Pereiro was listed among them, meaning at the very least that Calatrava was claiming some kind of rights over it.²¹⁴ In 1190, however, the community of San Julián sought and obtained formal incorporation into the Cistercian Order as an independent entity.²¹⁵ The master of Calatrava, Martín de Siones, pressed his claim, denouncing the master of San Julián before an ecclesiastical court. When that body ruled in San Julián's favor, Martín convinced some members of San Julián, probably through bribery, to accept his authority over the community as a whole.²¹⁶ The extant documentation goes silent about San Julián's status until 1218, when two important events took place. First, Alfonso IX donated the fortress of Alcántara to the Order of Calatrava. Second, the Order of Calatrava gave that same fortress to San Julián in exchange for the latter's submission to Calatrava's authority.²¹⁷ This may have been an exchange of sorts: Calatrava gained hegemony and San Julián gained a new headquarters. Thenceforth the order was known as Alcántara and continued to participate in the Reconquest, but its territorial extension was limited to the kingdom of León.

Sorting out Alcántara's exact relationship to Calatrava is a challenge. O'Callaghan draws an analogy between Morimond's rights over Calatrava and Calatrava's rights over Alcántara, suggesting filiation according to the Cistercian model.²¹⁸ Yet Luis Corral Val has presented a more convincing argument, namely that the master of Calatrava had visitation rights over Alcántara, but the latter was not juridically dependent on the former.²¹⁹ Alcántara was inclined to resist even the infrequent attempts by Calatrava to exercise or extend its right of visitation.²²⁰ This led to a deterioration of their relationship during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.²²¹ The abbot of Morimond was a more important source of disciplinary authority, issuing Alcántara's first extant set of statutes in 1306.²²² Overall, Alcántara's ties to the Cistercians, at least on a practical level, were probably weaker than Calatrava's because Alcántara had the right to choose its own prior, whereas Calatrava received its prior directly from Morimond.²²³ It is probably most helpful to describe Alcántara as a kind of junior brother to Calatrava: organized along the same lines and following the same modified Cistercian observance, but smaller, more geographically confined, and more limited in its range of activities.

The relationship to Trujillo, a military community centered on the Castilian fortress of the same name, is even more elusive. The most

convincing theory is that Trujillo began as an independent confraternity that merged with San Julián at some unknown moment, but probably before 1188.²²⁴ Between 1188 and 1193, the charters give the same name, Gómez, for the master of Trujillo and the master of San Julián, suggesting that they may have been the same person.²²⁵ Trujillo was lost in the Almohad offensive of 1195, and most of the community's few remaining possessions passed into the hands of Calatrava.²²⁶ Later on, Alcántara received a donation from Fernando III in compensation for the loss of its rights in Trujillo.²²⁷ For a brief period, then, the Order of Trujillo was the Castilian branch of San Julián, but its disappearance returned Alcántara to its exclusively Leonese orientation.

ECCLESIASTICAL KNIGHTHOOD: CHARACTERISTICS AND PERMUTATIONS

There are two basic ways of classifying the various military orders: according to genesis and according to range of activity and membership. The genesis of the Temple and Santiago follow the model of a group of pious knights elevated to the status of a religious order, whereas Calatrava and Alcántara follow the Hospitaller model of a religious community that underwent militarization. When considered from the standpoint of activity and membership, however, Santiago belongs in the same category as the Hospital; both were thoroughly committed to the care of the sick and to incorporating women into their communities. As [Chapter 3](#) will show, Calatrava and Alcántara also performed some hospitaller work, though notably less of it, and Calatrava had a few female communities, whereas the Temple at least in theory refused to accept women. Hence the classification by activity follows Brodman's distinction between the "military-hospitaller" and "military-monastic" models.²²⁸

Why the divergence between the two approaches? Why did one sacralized militia, the Temple, follow the military-monastic model while the other, Santiago, became more of a military-hospitaller order? Conversely, why did the Hospitallers retain their commitment to the care of the sick, whereas Calatrava and Alcántara seem to have forgotten their origins in nonmilitary religious life? The answers to these questions lie in the two issues of the foundational influences on the orders and the way the orders articulated themselves. In their early years, the Templars were often viewed from the outside as part of a triad with the Hospital and the Canons of the Holy Sepulcher.²²⁹ As knights who were primarily interested in fighting for God, the Templars probably saw no reason to concern themselves with caring for the sick, which others were already handling. There is no evidence

that the Templars themselves commemorated their early association with the Canons of the Holy Sepulcher.²³⁰ The Rule, *De laude*, and other early documents show how the Templars articulated themselves as ecclesiastical knights. Other spiritual currents exercised a minimal influence on their corporate life. By the time the Order of St. John began to undergo militarization, it had already articulated itself as a hospitaller community. The order would have been unable to articulate itself in another way, both because it ran against its own foundational spirit and because the spiritual doctrine of the age concerning the hierarchy of states of life would have prevented it. Fighting was therefore presented as an extension of the order's existing charitable activities rather than as the conversion of knighthood. The key is that the Hospital's self-understanding and institutional memory remained rooted in its foundational impulse.

The cases of Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara are different. While Santiago began as a sacralized militia, other currents of new spirituality were present from the beginning. Although this can partly be attributed to the generosity of patrons who established or donated ransom hospitals, the presence of women through the vow of conjugal chastity was even more important. What began as the Church's concession to the fleshly weakness of a group of pious knights became a channel through which other currents of spirituality, especially for women, entered the order. The predominant spirit of ecclesiastical knighthood was henceforth accompanied by the care of the sick and female religious life, with fighting articulated as the source of all charitable activities.²³¹ Calatrava and Alcántara both emerged from the Benedictine-Cistercian tradition, but information about the premilitarization phase of these communities is very limited. In Calatrava's case, there was conflict between knightly brethren and monks from the beginning, whereas for Alcántara virtually nothing is known. Neither group in its earliest years articulated itself as a traditional Benedictine community, and neither preserved an institutional memory or corresponding practice of its origins in this way of life. The groups were, moreover, selective about the elements of Cistercian observance that they adopted, as is explained in the next chapter. This suggests that, unlike in the Hospital's case, knighthood was always the prior form that ordered the other aspects of their life. Although their origins seemed to have prevented them from employing the kind of robust language about the conversion of knighthood that one finds in Santiago or the Temple, the sources for Calatrava and Alcántara always present them as being dedicated fundamentally and primarily to the exercise of arms. The traditional Benedictine monastic beginnings were, for all intents and purposes, forgotten. Hence, these orders are authentic instantiations of

ecclesiastical knighthood, which is the deep structure that informs all three Iberian orders and that underlies even the distinction between “military-monastic” and “military-hospitaller.”

It is always important to keep in mind the importance of specific context when employing either of these classificatory schemes. Most historians have assumed, I think correctly, that the Iberian military orders consciously imitated the Temple and the Hospital. Yet the evidence of such imitation is almost nonexistent in the sources.²³² All three orders began as small military or religious confraternities, organizations that were characteristic of life on the Iberian frontier. Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara did not simply “copy” the universal orders, but rather they followed trajectories of development that imitated them in some respects and not in others, according to the particularities of local context. Hence, the mission of the Iberian orders was somewhat different from that of their universal counterparts. The Temple was originally dedicated to the protection of pilgrims, and the Hospital cared for them; only subsequently, and in the Hospital’s case gradually, did these orders acquire the mission of permanent readiness for and engagement in combat. Even then, however, these orders maintained a mostly defensive role against an ever-encroaching Muslim foe. The same was not true in the Iberian theater, where the frontier was expanding, and the legitimacy of holy war and crusade was, by the 1160s, fairly well established. Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara were servants of the Reconquest. Their task was to defend and expand the Iberian kingdoms by fighting against the Muslims.²³³ The debate over whether the orders had a place in Christian society was essentially settled, as the need was great and there were men available for the task. Yet the Reconquest, whatever opportunities it provided, was always a royal endeavor, and therefore the Iberian orders had a different relationship to temporal powers than did their universal counterparts. The Temple and the Hospital, thanks both to their international scope and to the weakness of the Crusader States, enjoyed a fairly high level of independence in the Holy Land.²³⁴ The Iberian situation could not allow for such independence, not only because the peninsula was divided into multiple kingdoms vying with each other for supremacy, but also because individual kings were in command of the Reconquest in their own domains.²³⁵ Calatrava was, despite some holdings in Aragon and León, essentially a Castilian order, and Alcántara was almost exclusively Leonese. Only Santiago succeeded in establishing itself throughout the peninsula, but even it bowed to the exigencies of political fragmentation, as will be explained later.

CONCLUSION

The two great universal military orders followed two distinct trajectories of development. The Temple, which organized itself along the “military-monastic” model, articulated its way of life in terms that I have named “ecclesiastical knighthood,” whereas the Hospital, already committed to the care of the sick, did not articulate itself in those terms. The Iberian orders, which emerged in a different context, did in general follow either the “military-monastic” or “military-hospitaller” models, but they all articulated themselves in terms of ecclesiastical knighthood. This, despite their differences of activity, membership, and religious tradition, was the prior form that ordered their way of life.

CHAPTER TWO

INTERIOR CASTLE: THE ORDERS' RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE

Hearken, my son, to the precepts of the master and incline the ear of thy heart. . . . To thee are my words now addressed, whosoever thou mayest be that renouncing thine own will to fight for the true King, Christ, dost take up the strong and glorious weapons of obedience.¹

—The Rule of St. Benedict

MILITIA OR ORDO?

I have argued that the three Iberian orders, despite their various origins, were all instantiations of ecclesiastical knighthood because of the way that the exercise of arms gave prior form to their way of life. If this claim is true, it must be evident in the orders' internal structure and organization. Blas Casado Quintanilla has called attention to Calatrava's reluctance to refer to itself as an "order." Much more common, at least for the first forty years or so of its existence, are the designations *fratres*, *milites*, or *caballeros* of Calatrava, and the master's own first reference to his community as an "order" dates from 1252.² Casado Quintanilla concludes that the brothers of Calatrava viewed themselves, as did the Castilian society to which they belonged, as more of a military group than a religious one.³ Is this a meaningful distinction, given the hybrid nature of the life? Is it more appropriate to think of the orders as the military militias of the Church or as religious orders? How did these groups, whose core members were fundamentally oriented to the exercise of arms, adapt the structures of monasticism to meet new demands while at the same time remaining committed to the traditional goal of religious life: the salvation of the souls of the professed?

The organization of the orders was by no means static, but they underwent considerable change and development. At the beginning of the period, their structures were quite rudimentary, and the orders only barely survived the Almohad offensive of the 1190s.⁴ Only by the 1220s did they begin to acquire institutional maturity, which was followed by the rapid acquisition of territory.⁵ After the middle of the thirteenth century, there were signs that the structures of religious observance were coming under strain and that the brethren were beginning to align themselves more with the lay nobility. This development marks an important shift that, at least from the

standpoint of the founding ideals, must be considered a form of decline.⁶

The orders' governing documents are the most important sources for understanding their religious observance. I use the term "governing documents" because "rule" belies their complexity. The Order of Santiago had its own unique Rule, which went through several redactions over the course of time. There has been much debate over whether it is fundamentally Augustinian or Benedictine in character.⁷ Although the majority of interpreters have favored the Augustinian interpretation, the Rule of Santiago was not only eclectic but also, in many respects, radically novel.⁸ Rather than trying to fit it onto a Procrustean bed, it seems better to examine it on its own terms. The extant texts include the Primitive Rule, probably written around 1172.⁹ Alexander III's confirmation bull of 1175 was the order's next definitive governing norm.¹⁰ A substantially expanded Spanish Rule, probably a translation of another Latin version, appeared in the thirteenth century.¹¹ A later Latin-Spanish version, a sixteenth-century copy of a fifteenth-century original, has been edited and translated into English.¹² The general chapter meetings of Santiago also promulgated a series of *establecimientos*, or statutes, that modified existing norms or created new ones. The earliest appeared in the middle of the thirteenth century, during the mastership of Pelayo Pérez Correa.¹³ The earliest norms for Calatrava and Alcántara are the *formae vivendi*, which were issued in 1164, 1186, and 1199.¹⁴ Yet these are not complete monastic rules and seem to presuppose the existence and operation of other documents. As Cistercian communities, the orders were theoretically beholden to the norms of Cistercian life, like the Rule of Benedict, the Charta Charitatis, and the decisions of general chapters. The lack of manuscripts of these documents, however, suggests that Cistercian norms may not have had much influence on the life of the military communities. In addition, the abbot of Morimond, in his capacity as visitor, issued *difiniciones*, or statutes, for both orders.¹⁵ Although most of them date from the beginning of the fourteenth century at the earliest, their roots are in the twelfth and thirteenth, as the repetition of formulae indicates.¹⁶ Alcántara has the least amount of extant source material, but it can be supplemented with reference to Calatrava's norms.¹⁷

These governing documents share a set of problems. In the first place, few manuscripts survive, especially of the *establecimientos* and *difiniciones*. Some historians therefore doubt their real significance in the life of the orders. Even for such texts that are centrally important, like the Rule of Santiago, the question of how well they were known and how they were used is contentious. There is, unfortunately, little else in the way of source material besides these documents that would

help answer these questions. None of the Iberian orders experienced anything like the Templar trial that produced a large and detailed body of source material. Yet I suggest that the absence of evidence is itself significant, and for the same reason that it is significant in the case of the orders' foundation. The lack of normal Cistercian texts for Calatrava and Alcántara indicates the orders' inability or unwillingness to articulate themselves as Cistercian communities. Like Santiago, they adopted monastic structures and practices, but in a highly selective way. This selectivity is all the more notable for Calatrava and Alcántara because, unlike Santiago, they were theoretically beholden to an existing tradition with its own norms. I think the best approach, then, is to draw whatever conclusions can be drawn from the extant texts while keeping in mind their limitations and potential to mislead.

The monastic structures and practices under consideration fall into two main categories: the institutional framework, with its governing documents, categories of members and hierarchy of offices; and the framework of religious observance, including prayer, vows, and penance.

INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

Categories of Members

The Iberian military orders had basically four categories of members: knights, sergeants, clerics, and sisters.¹⁸ The knightly brothers took vows, exercised arms, and constituted the orders' core group, whereas the clerics existed primarily to provide the sacraments.¹⁹ At first, the orders probably relied on secular clergy to assist them, but eventually they began to receive or train priests as full members.²⁰ While the majority of lay brethren were knights, there were some who belonged to another category. In the universal orders like the Temple, the Hospital, and the Teutonic Knights, there was a clear distinction between knights and sergeants, the latter being combatants generally of non-noble status who had a lower rank and were more numerous than the knights.²¹ This is fundamentally a distinction of birth and military rank that would also be found among lay warriors. Of the three Iberian orders, however, only Santiago offers any evidence, which is rather scanty, of sergeants.²² Ayala Martínez considers them a kind of intermediary rank between the professed brothers and the laymen linked to the order through confraternity.²³ The Rule of Santiago also refers to brothers of office, that is, men unfit for combat who could perform other tasks.²⁴ Calatrava and Alcántara probably had *conversi* along the lines of the Cistercian model, but the evidence concerning them is sparse.²⁵

For all intents and purposes, therefore, the principal categories of men were lay knights and clergy. They often lived in the same buildings, though in separate spaces. From a juridical standpoint, the military brothers lived in commanderies, and the clerics lived in priories.²⁶ Calatrava's early conflict between the knights and monks was resolved to the former's advantage, as shown in the previous chapter. In Alcántara, there are no signs of strong conflict between the lay and clerical brothers, but Santiago suffered protracted problems in this regard.²⁷ The payment of tithes, which the military brothers owed to the clerics, was a recurring issue.²⁸ The first major incident took place in the 1220s, when the master imprisoned his priests for three days, took control of their goods, and put a layman in the prior's place, apparently as a punishment for the prior having attended the Fourth Lateran Council.²⁹ An ecclesiastical court ruled in favor of the harassed clerics, but in 1231, the priests of the order agreed to renounce their right to tithes, so that the master, to whom they promised obedience, could care for them instead.³⁰ Problems continued, however, and a proposed settlement between master and prior in 1239 was rejected by the Council of Thirteen, the master's advisory group.³¹ When in 1250 the master forbade his clerics from using the gates at Uclés, effectively placing them under house arrest, Innocent IV intervened against the master's action.³² In the end, however, the military brethren carried the day, and the clerics were to periodically suffer further humiliations.³³ In Santiago as well as in Calatrava, the priests were left in no doubt about their subordinate role. The papacy's acceptance and support of the military brothers' superior position over the clergy suggests that the orders were viewed primarily as bodies of religiously consecrated knights, since such a subordination of clergy would not have been permitted in another type of order, nor did it accord with the hieratic views of most thirteenth-century popes.

The presence of women is a remarkable feature of the military orders.³⁴ Although it was common practice for male religious communities to have women's branches associated with them, the Iberian military orders established unique relationships with their female members.³⁵ In 1219, the Order of Calatrava received a donation from Garcí Gutiérrez and his wife, María Suárez, in which both parties agreed to establish a convent for all the sisters of Calatrava at San Felices de Amaya, near Burgos.³⁶ It is not entirely clear how these women had entered the order or where they were before, but an agreement from the following year between the master and María, who became the abbess, said that the community would take care of the wives and children of the military brethren.³⁷ This statement may indicate that the order had been experiencing problems

with the observance of chastity. The convent was organized along the same lines as other female Cistercian houses, with the sisters cloistered and dedicated to prayer.³⁸ The second female convent of Calatrava was San Salvador de Penilla, which, though founded in 1218, did not become affiliated with the order until the mid-thirteenth century.³⁹ The development of female religious life in Calatrava was therefore quite limited and always subordinate to the interests and control of the brothers.⁴⁰

In the Order of Santiago, by contrast, women were present from its earliest days. The Primitive Rule clearly demonstrates this, as it allows female members to marry at their own discretion.⁴¹ Not all the earliest female members were simply wives of the military brothers. Those who remained single were to live together in community.⁴² The foundational bull of 1175 mitigates these privileges somewhat. It refers only to widows of the brethren, not to single women, and leaves the decision about their marriage in the hands of the master.⁴³ Under Pelayo Pérez Correa, additional changes were made: women whose husbands had died ordinarily had to live in the female houses. At the master's discretion, a virtuous widow could be allowed to live on her own or to remarry.⁴⁴ There remained, nevertheless, two basic models of female membership in the order: those who lived with their families and those who lived in a convent.⁴⁵ According to Echániz Sans, the order was attractive to women because it provided a new option for a religious life, with the following features: freedom from cloister; affirmation of marriage and family; access to greater economic, political, and social power; and the possibility of creating their own space together in community.⁴⁶ For women of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, these were no small opportunities.⁴⁷ The fact that they were available in the first place owes much to the Church's willingness to accord Santiago's knightly pattern of life, which included marriage, the status of religious profession.

The first female convent of Santiago was Santa Eufemia de Cozuelos, established in 1186, and it was followed by five additional foundations throughout the peninsula, the last of which was Sancti Spiritus of Salamanca in 1268.⁴⁸ They represent a significant institutional commitment on the order's part and demonstrate the attraction of the female vocation for aspirants and donors alike. Houses were typically governed by a female commander who was, like other commanders, subject to the master. The female houses of Santiago had several purposes within the order. The most important was the commitment to prayer, especially the Divine Office, for which the conventual sisters were responsible.⁴⁹ During Advent and Lent, periods of sexual abstinence, the married women of the order left their own homes for the convents.⁵⁰ These communities were also the

destination of widows who decided not to remarry, even if they did not become conventual sisters in the technical sense. The convents educated the daughters of married members, for whom the order was responsible until they reached the age of fifteen, at which time they could choose either to profess in the community or to leave.⁵¹ This general pattern of life underwent changes: from the middle of the thirteenth century, the female houses became more aristocratic and more ordered along a conventional monastic model.⁵² This was consistent with general patterns of female religious life as well as the aristocratic transformation of Castilian society.⁵³ The crucial point is that the female presence, which was more significant in Santiago than in Calatrava, bolstered the properly religious mission of the orders, thanks to the women's permanent dedication to prayer and common life. In Santiago, the women were also the primary bearers of a new kind of vowed life that allowed for marriage and family.

Does this diversity of membership vitiate the claim that the Iberian military orders' way of life can be called ecclesiastical knighthood?⁵⁴ Many members of the military orders, but certainly not all, were recruited from knightly families, and all fighting brethren, whether knights or sergeants, were expected to dedicate themselves permanently to the exercise of arms. There is less evidence for the self-understanding of the clergy or other noncombatants. It was not their task to fight, and hence it is doubtful that they saw themselves individually as ecclesiastical knights. But the subordinate position of the clergy and serving brothers shows quite clearly that the categories of members were arranged in such a way as to serve the military orders' distinctive purpose, and it is likely that the noncombatants understood the auxiliary nature of their role. The issue merits further research, but the knights were certainly the core members, even when they were a numerical minority. Thus, Gomes's and Selwood's point that the daily life of the military brethren who lived away from the frontier was just like that of other monks needs qualification.⁵⁵ In the first place, the Iberian brethren generally lived much closer to their main sphere of military activity than did the Templars or Hospitallers, and thus needed to live in a state of greater readiness for combat.⁵⁶ More important, though, their religious life was always and already modified by the prior form of knighthood in such a way as to distinguish it from the life of monks. Only the female members had a place within the orders that, though still subordinate, had an end that was mostly independent of military exigencies. This owed to the fact both that women did not normally participate in combat and that their role was not circumscribed by their contribution to victory. This gave the sisters a more traditionally religious or monastic profile than the fighting brethren. While I have argued against a taxonomy of the

military orders that is based primarily on the religious rule that they followed, I basically agree with Myra Bom's assertion that the Temple and Calatrava had sisters who lived like Cistercian nuns, whereas Santiago, the Teutonic Knights, and the Hospitallers had sisters who lived more like Augustinian canonesses.⁵⁷

Offices

Although a full institutional study of the orders is beyond the scope of this chapter, a brief look at certain offices sheds light on the orders' spirituality. The most important figure was the master. Santiago's was directly responsible to the pope, whereas in Calatrava and Alcántara he answered to the Cistercian mother abbey of Morimond and the general chapter. In practice, however, the authority of the master was essentially the same for all three orders. He was master in two senses of the word: as a military commander and as head of the religious community. The master's duties were manifold. He received the religious profession of all who entered the order; was responsible for obtaining and distributing sustenance for the brethren; oversaw the acquisition and management of the order's properties; assigned brothers to various tasks and offices; and exercised disciplinary authority, especially over infractions.⁵⁸ Masters led their troops into battle, from which they did not always return.⁵⁹

Overall, the power of the master was more controlled in Calatrava and Alcántara than in Santiago.⁶⁰ While the approval of the Cistercian general chapter was necessary for electing a master of Calatrava or Alcántara, Santiago's elections were carried out independently.⁶¹ Yet the mere existence of the office of master was a modification of the Cistercian tradition, and no Cistercian abbot exercised the level of authority that the masters of Calatrava and Alcántara enjoyed. The exigencies of military command required this concentration of power in a single superior, another indicator of how the monastic tradition was appropriated and transformed within ecclesiastical knighthood. So, although Calatrava's sources compare the master to a Cistercian abbot, his role in the life of the order was articulated in a quite different way.⁶² Most of the early masters of Santiago and Calatrava renounced their command, even though it was theoretically an office for life.⁶³ Alcántara seems to have had greater stability in this office, although less information is available. By the thirteenth century, however, both Santiago's and Calatrava's leadership stabilized, and the office of master grew in actual power, above all in terms of the economic resources at its disposal.⁶⁴

Complementing the master in his governing role was the chapter, or the assembly of professed brethren. The early norms prescribe a general chapter, limited to the orders' most important members, to be

held every year.⁶⁵ In practice, however, it does not seem that this chapter was held with great regularity, and as a governing institution it remained fairly weak until the middle of the thirteenth century.⁶⁶ Santiago had an additional body, known as the Council of Thirteen, which exercised important governing functions, including the election and, in certain circumstances, deposition of the master.⁶⁷ In Calatrava and Alcántara the *seniores* or *ancianos* (elders), who held the highest offices, had a similar role.⁶⁸ Santiago's chapter acquired a stronger corporate identity in reaction to the ambition of Pelayo Pérez Correa, and for a time it acted as a check on his authority.⁶⁹ But in 1264, Innocent IV shored up the master of Santiago's claims over and against the Council of Thirteen, underscoring the monarchical character of the office.⁷⁰ This is another sign of how military models and priorities were the controlling factors in the development and exercise of governance during this period, and of how monastic structures that meshed poorly with these priorities had difficulty gaining traction.

The *comendador mayor*, or grand commander, was responsible for the administration of an order's headquarters and the land attached to it. He was the master's representative when the latter was not present, and in the case of Calatrava and Alcántara, he governed the order during an interregnum.⁷¹ He was responsible for leading the host into battle, he kept the insignia, and he received and redistributed the horse and arms of fallen brothers.⁷² Although the office was originally associated with an order's headquarters, territorial expansion resulted in the creation of new grand commanderies. The location of these varied with the movement of the frontier, but Santiago maintained a grand commandery in each of the five kingdoms.⁷³ The relative autonomy of the grand commanders vis-à-vis the masters varied across the orders. Alcántara did not undergo the same kind of administrative decentralization as Santiago, so the master retained strong authority over the *encomiendas mayores*, or grand commanderies, of Alcántara and La Serena.⁷⁴

The prior was the head cleric within a military order and had authority over strictly spiritual matters. Brothers were required to confess to him or to other priests to whom the prior had delegated that responsibility.⁷⁵ He was also charged with supporting, training, and disciplining the orders' clergy. His financial needs were underwritten by the collection of tithes from the orders' domains. Santiago gave its prior the responsibility of governing the order between the death of a master and the election of a new one, and in case of a deadlock in the election, the prior had the authority to appoint a new master directly.⁷⁶ Santiago and Alcántara chose their own priors, but Calatrava received its prior from Morimond.⁷⁷ In

1259, the pope gave the prior of Calatrava the same faculties for absolution and dispensation as Cistercian abbots had.⁷⁸ Yet unlike Cistercian abbots, the priors were clearly subordinate to the masters and grand commanders, following the internal logic of ecclesiastical knighthood.

Territorial Divisions

Each of the military orders was organized around a headquarters, where the highest officials resided. Although the brothers of Santiago long delayed in designating a headquarters so as not to offend the kings of Castile or León, Uclés clearly held the primacy of place.⁷⁹ Calatrava's central command was located in the fortress of the same name, prior to its loss in 1195, after which the brothers relocated to Salvatierra. Once Calatrava was recaptured on the Las Navas campaign, a new headquarters was established there at a short distance from the original site. Alcántara became the order's eponymous headquarters in 1218; before then, San Julián del Pereiro in León and Trujillo in Castile had been its central locations. As the orders acquired considerable territory through the middle of the thirteenth century, new communities were established according to a territorial model. This system, pioneered by the Temple and the Hospital, was unlike the filiation model practiced by the Cistercian Order, and it represented an important institutional innovation in the history of religious life.⁸⁰ The priority of territory over affiliation reflects the mind-set of military men beholden to the practical necessities of defense, organization, and settling large tracts of land. The basic units of governance and economic exploitation were the *encomienda*, or commandery, and the priory.⁸¹ The commanderies and priories were the basic territorial and administrative units of the military orders, headed by a commander or prior.⁸² The evidence suggests that individual communities, especially those located far from the frontier, often contained just a handful of brethren.⁸³

Several observations can be made about the institutional structure of the three orders as it pertains to their distinctive vocation. The most striking aspect is the authority of lay brothers over clergy, reflecting the distinctiveness of ecclesiastical knighthood as a form of Catholic religious life. The exercise of arms was the essence of the military-religious vocation, which relegated clergy to an auxiliary role. The presence of professed women demonstrates continuity with the monastic tradition, the recognition of the need for dedication to prayer, and the orders' propensity for adaptation and appealing to laypeople. The presence of consultative and governing bodies that could check, to some degree, the master's exercise of power was typical of medieval notions of governance. Yet the predominantly

monarchical character of the mastership was well suited to the orders' disciplinary needs.⁸⁴ The use of a territorial model of administration and governance corresponded to the strategic importance of the military orders, whose task it was to hold the frontier and colonize newly pacified lands. If the military brethren's desert combat bore little resemblance to St. Anthony's, it was because knighthood gave prior form to their way of life.

RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE

The institutional organization of the military orders offers only a bare outline of this particular type of religious life. An inquiry into its symbols is necessary. The scope of symbols goes well beyond the use of images or insignia to include the whole range of natural signs that communicate meaning within an order.⁸⁵ "The principal signs of religious life in a community were uniform clothing or the habit, common residence, common table, similar furnishings, common Mass and prayer, and a horarium or daily order."⁸⁶ The administration of penances is also an important aspect of the symbolism of religious life, as it reveals both what an order holds sacrosanct and how it seeks to rectify offenses. The available source materials, primarily prescriptive rather than descriptive, provide only limited information, and particular instances of brothers receiving discipline for infractions are rarely recorded. It is fair to say, however, that the frequent appearance of offenses in the orders' statutes indicates that they were sufficiently common to require legislation. Offenses and their corresponding penances formed part of the larger narrative of the life of an ecclesiastical knight, beginning with his entrance into the order and ending, if he persevered, with burial among his brethren.

Recruitment and Formation

Information about how the orders obtained recruits is meager. In Santiago it was not uncommon for sons to inherit their fathers' vocation.⁸⁷ The only "recruiting letter" extant from this period was directed, curiously enough, to Germany.⁸⁸ The social background of entrants varied. As with other religious orders, free birth was a prerequisite.⁸⁹ It appears that Calatrava drew most of its members from the urban oligarchies, and only in the fourteenth century do the statutes mention legitimate birth as a prerequisite.⁹⁰ Santiago, by contrast, was already restricting entrance to men of noble status from the middle of the thirteenth century.⁹¹ The letter of the law concerning admissions was not always followed, as some apparently entered Santiago while under excommunication.⁹² Simony was not unknown, and the Fourth Lateran Council ruled that members found

guilty of it should be transferred to a stricter order.⁹³ Among all religious communities, the military orders were considered the laxest, as is clear from a ruling of Innocent III.⁹⁴ This fact seems to vindicate the thesis that ecclesiastical knighthood occupied an intermediate place in the orders of society. They were the most exalted of those who fought, the lowest of those who prayed.

Once accepted into the order, the men had to undergo formation. There is reason to believe that Santiago had no novitiate, whereas Calatrava and Alcántara may have had problems consistently maintaining a one-year probation.⁹⁵ The need for rapid recruitment after major losses in battle was one reason for this tendency, which was also rendered possible by the brothers' rather limited spiritual formation.⁹⁶ In theory, they needed to be familiar with their rule, but given the high levels of illiteracy among the brothers, it is hard to believe that they understood it well.⁹⁷ Their regimen of prayer would not have taken a great deal of time to learn.

Ora et labora

The daily routine of the military orders consisted, as it did in monasteries, of prayer and work, but both were modified for their particular needs. All three orders were obliged to celebrate the Divine Office each day, Santiago according to canonical usage, and Calatrava and Alcántara according to Benedictine monastic usage.⁹⁸ The Rule of Santiago expects that the brothers rise every morning with the bell to attend Matins. Instead of chanting, however, they are to commit themselves in prayer to God, the Blessed Virgin, the apostles Peter and Paul, and St. James, saying three Paternosters in honor of the Holy Trinity and bowing toward the altar at the appropriate times.⁹⁹ At Lauds they are to say twenty-six Paternosters and at Vespers ten, while during the other hours of Prime, Terce, Sext, None, and Compline, they are to say a total of seven for each. To this observance is added daily Mass.¹⁰⁰ In addition to the liturgy, each brother is supposed to say a total of twenty-three Paternosters for a variety of intentions. These include three for the pope and the Roman Church; one for the master; three for the living; six for the dead; and one each for the king, the bishop, and the patriarch of Jerusalem.¹⁰¹ Presumably the brothers are to say these prayers on their own throughout the day. Because Calatrava and Alcántara kept Cistercian customs, the early governing documents of these orders do not explain their observance in any detail.¹⁰² In his confirmation of Alcántara, Lucius III states that the brothers will observe the *ordo monasticus* according to the Rule of Benedict.¹⁰³ There are some indicators of their liturgical practices from subsequent documents. Calatrava obtained the right to celebrate the Office privately in its churches

during times of interdict.¹⁰⁴ A later papal dispensation from the obligation to pray all the prescribed prayers when occupied in other tasks lists the total number of daily Paternosters at 267.¹⁰⁵ This indicates a significantly more demanding regimen of prayer for the Cistercian affiliates than for Santiago, and it shows the stronger influence of the monastic tradition on the former.

It is nevertheless doubtful that these prayers were always said in their entirety on a daily basis, especially during campaigns. The Rule of Santiago specifically mentions engagement in other necessary activities as a legitimate reason for not attending the daily Mass.¹⁰⁶ Even when they were present, the brethren may not have always paid close attention, as Calatrava's *difiniciones* of 1338 remind brothers that they have to remain in church during the celebration of Mass instead of wandering around.¹⁰⁷ The *difiniciones* of 1325 emphasize the priests' duty to celebrate the Office together.¹⁰⁸ The related issue of maintaining silence, essential to the monastic atmosphere of recollection, was important as well. Santiago imposed silence at table, whereas Calatrava, invoking the dire warnings of St. Bernard, enforced it in the cloister, church, dormitory, and refectory.¹⁰⁹ All three orders were supposed to celebrate a daily chapter to handle community affairs, although there is no way of knowing whether this was actually done.¹¹⁰

The Rule of Benedict, as well as the customary practices of various monastic traditions, allows time during the day for work or study in addition to prayer.¹¹¹ The governing documents say very little about these activities, although here and there are indications that they spent this time in training exercises and attending to their equipment. There is not much in the way of detail, but wrestling, swordsmanship, hunting, and other combat exercises probably constituted the labor of the military orders.¹¹² Alfonso X's *Libro de ajedrez* contains some illuminations of brothers playing chess, which suggests the cultivation of aristocratic amusements.¹¹³ There were a few important book productions, such as the Biblia de Uclés of 1298, associated with the military orders, and the town of San Martín donated a church to Santiago in 1188 on the condition that the order would teach the parishioners' children for free.¹¹⁴ But this work, if it was actually done by members of the orders, would have been performed by the clerics rather than the military brethren.

Particular Devotions

Did the Iberian military orders have devotions to particular saints or patrons? The Rule of Santiago does mention, as noted already, several intercessors, most notably the Blessed Virgin and Santiago, to whom the brothers should dedicate themselves during the Divine Office. It

has been noted that churches around Mérida named in honor of Santiago were always in the territory of the military orders, which suggests his role as a religious patron.¹¹⁵ Marian devotion, despite the relative scarcity of evidence specifying its practice, was an important part of the military-religious life in general.¹¹⁶ In the case of the Iberian orders, this devotion took the form of prayer, of naming churches in her honor, and of acknowledging her aid in battle.¹¹⁷ One curious item in Santiago's sources is an account of the mother of God's miraculous intercession on behalf of Master Pelayo Pérez Correa in 1248. The account says that he prayed to the Virgin to stop the course of the sun so that he could complete his victory, using the words, *Santa María, detén tu día*.¹¹⁸ Thereafter, the site was known as Santa María de Tudía, and this Virgin is invoked several times in the *Cantigas de Santa María*.¹¹⁹ The account is an obvious reference to Joshua, the great warrior figure of the Old Testament. It is tempting to view Marian devotion as ecclesiastical knighthood's counterpart to the service of one's lady in the broader chivalric ethos; the two devotions, as Richard Barber has noted, appeared at the same time.¹²⁰ But the evidence is simply too thin to say anything conclusive. For the most part, the Iberian orders did not invent or perpetuate new devotions, but they seem to have followed the local devotions of the places where they settled.¹²¹ This contrasts with the Templars, for whom there is evidence of particular devotion to the True Cross, in the form of the numerous fragments of it scattered throughout their European communities.¹²² More research may be needed to determine whether the Iberian orders, like the Templars, expressed their devotion by sumptuously decorating their chapels, a practice strikingly at variance with Cistercian norms.¹²³

The relative absence of hagiographical materials was noted in the Introduction. Even the Hospital, which claims a few saints and blessed among its members, recognized them for their care of the sick rather than for martial achievements.¹²⁴ Santiago's eighteenth-century archivist unsuccessfully attempted to promote the canonization of the order's founder by authoring a vita. Even this devotee had to admit that Pedro Fernández had left no testimony to the world other than his epitaph.¹²⁵ The "founder" of Calatrava, Raymond of Fitero, was canonized, but for other reasons, and indeed Calatrava showed no interest in promoting his cause, despite Jiménez de Rada's reports of miracles at his grave.¹²⁶ Despite popular belief that the brethren were martyrs, the Iberian orders, like their universal counterparts and crusading in general, never established a true cult of martyrdom.¹²⁷ The *Kalendario de Uclés*, which contains several references to brothers who died in battle, never employs the term "martyr."¹²⁸ The anonymity of the individual in the military orders is striking and

contrasts with other religious communities of the Middle Ages, which generally sought to promote their saints. No doubt this owes partly to the Church's ambivalence about glorifying combat and partly to the orders' modest ecclesiastical, literary, and cultural resources.¹²⁹ It may also owe to the cultivation of discipline and obedience that downplayed the individual's importance for the sake of common objectives.

Sacramental Practices

With respect to the sacraments, the military orders seem to have been most concerned that their members receive communion a few times a year and confess only to priests of their own order.¹³⁰ Some statutes insist upon the reception of the sacraments of penance and communion on certain feast days, an indication that the brothers sometimes failed to do so.¹³¹ The statutes of all three orders repeatedly legislate against the practice of brothers confessing to other clergy, especially the mendicant friars, without special permission.¹³² For a time, the Order of Santiago had a problem with commanders commuting penances given by priests. This was a sign of the period's transitional understanding of satisfaction for sins, in which the link between completion of the penance and forgiveness was still murky.¹³³ The order legislated on the matter, saying that commanders could only substitute penances, not commute them altogether.¹³⁴ This delimited the religious authority that a layman could legitimately exercise over sacramental matters, without eliminating it altogether. The Rule of Santiago has a curious passage concerning the reception of communion: "let the Brethren who live in a monastery or on the border receive the Eucharist each Sunday if they so wish unless there is a reason to abstain; but first let them go to confession."¹³⁵ The stipulation that the brothers should confess first (*primo confiteantur*) is not found in the thirteenth-century vernacular rule, but only in the fifteenth-century Latin version.¹³⁶ It may seem surprising that the brothers of Santiago, whose vocation and observance was considered lax in the first place, should be permitted to communicate so often. Yet some crusaders received communion frequently to fortify themselves, especially before battle.¹³⁷ Instead of viewing themselves as unworthy to receive the Lord, the knights of Santiago may have seen themselves as being in greater need of sacramental graces, owing to the constant danger to which they exposed themselves on the frontier.¹³⁸

Several things can be said about the prayer and sacramental life of these communities. First, the norms described here attempted to create an observance of the Divine Office for men of little or no literacy. Instead of chanting, the brothers recited fixed numbers of

memorized prayers and made the appropriate ritual gestures. The practice in Santiago of praying daily for specific persons was intended to orient the brothers' supplications toward common ends. Yet the dispensations granted, as well as the relative silence of the statutes on this matter, suggest that the observance of prayer was not a major disciplinary issue. The orders did not practice or promote particular devotions in any developed way, even if they claimed certain saints as patrons. The need for flexibility and the adaptation of monastic prayer to a different kind of religious life was clearly recognized. Thus, Dominic Selwood's judgment about the novelty of the Templars' and Hospitallers' religious life, as a new form that initiated the break with the cloister, applies to the Iberian orders as well.¹³⁹ Knighthood imposed a prior form on their religious life that required myriad innovations and adjustments.

The Vows

Catholic religious life is often defined according to the profession of three vows: poverty, chastity, and obedience.¹⁴⁰ The Order of Santiago identifies these three vows quite clearly in the text of its Rule, but the Orders of Calatrava and Alcántara do not.¹⁴¹ The three vows in Benedict's Rule are different: *stabilitas*, *conversatio morum*, and *oboedientia*.¹⁴² The first stipulates that the monk remains permanently in the monastery where he makes his profession. The second, although it includes poverty and chastity, is broader in scope and means the willingness to change and conform all one's habits to Christ. Clearly, the vow of *stabilitas* was impossible for the military brethren, who always had to be prepared to go on campaign and who could be moved from house to house. *Conversatio morum* was also somewhat problematic, not only because of the broad range of behavior that it covered, but also because previous monastic writers had understood it to mean the renunciation of all worldly activity, especially fighting. Curiously, however, the vows receive no systematic treatment in the foundational documents of Calatrava or Alcántara. The first *forma vivendi* of Calatrava briefly mentions obedience in a description of how the brothers are to make their profession.¹⁴³ Only from subsequent legislation, the *difiniciones*, can it be surmised that these orders eventually came to articulate their vows as poverty, chastity, and obedience in lieu of the traditional Benedictine formula.¹⁴⁴ Here again is evidence of flexibility and adaptation, as well as imprecision, in the military-religious life, features closely associated with Calatrava's and Alcántara's hesitancy to articulate themselves as Cistercians. Ambiguity about the vows may also have owed something to the high medieval dispute over what constituted monastic profession. Some argued for taking the habit, others for lawful

profession, and others for true love of God and contempt of the world.¹⁴⁵ The *formae vivendi* are quite specific about the particulars of fasting, penance, and dress, but they are not concerned with juridical matters or precise definitions. This fact owes something to the nature of the texts themselves as foundational prescriptive documents rather than treatises on controversial matters, but it also reflects the priorities of relatively uneducated men who were mostly concerned with other matters.

Chastity

The observance of chastity in the Orders of Calatrava and Alcántara was straightforward, at least conceptually, and receives very little attention in the *formae vivendi*.¹⁴⁶ As mentioned earlier, the foundation charter of the female convent of San Felices de Amaya may indicate frequent violations.¹⁴⁷ Punishments for fornication were sometimes repeated or expanded in subsequent *difiniciones*.¹⁴⁸ The uniqueness of Santiago's vow of conjugal chastity already received some attention in the previous chapter, but here it is important to explore its ramifications, which affected the whole life of the order. The later versions of the Rule, like Alexander's bull of 1175, are defensive on the subject. The first article after the prologue is an explanation of the vows, which contains the following commentary on chastity:

In conjugal chastity, living without sin in order to follow the example of the ancient fathers, "for it is better to marry than to burn," we manifestly cannot be better than our forefathers; it would be imprudent to presume that we can attain what they themselves could not endure.¹⁴⁹

The "forefathers" mentioned here are the patriarchs of the Old Testament, men not generally regarded for their continence, and the preference for marriage over burning comes from St. Paul.¹⁵⁰ The brothers, like the pope, sought biblical precedent for their particular way of life, although once again they were really appealing for tolerance of their weakness.

The governing documents envision a situation in which the married brethren would normally live apart from the community with their wives and families while the celibates would reside in commanderies. The children of these unions were to be educated in the order until the age of fifteen, at which time they could choose either to profess or to leave with their inheritance.¹⁵¹ It was expected, however, that even the married brothers would abstain from sexual relations with their wives during Advent and Lent, during which seasons they came to live in community. The wives, for their part, would generally move into one of Santiago's female houses for the duration.¹⁵² Sexual abstinence

was also enjoined to the married brothers for the feasts of the Virgin, St. John the Baptist, the apostles, and other major holy days and vigils, “for an impetuous lover of his own wife is an adulterer.”¹⁵³ The masters of Santiago were supposed to be celibate, following the tradition of the founder Pedro Fernández.¹⁵⁴ Whether this was always observed is another matter. Rades y Andrada tells of one master of Santiago, Pedro Alonso, who fathered a child. The chronicler claims ignorance about whether the master was married. In any case, the master’s son received the castle and town of Monreal.¹⁵⁵ Another master, Gonzalo Ruí Girón, entered the order after the death of his wife, Elvira Díaz.¹⁵⁶ The statutes before 1330 show little concern with offenses against chastity, at least for the celibate brothers, although later on violations seem to have become more common.¹⁵⁷ What is truly surprising about Santiago’s vow of conjugal chastity is not the presence of objections to it, but the speed and ease with which it was confirmed by the Church.¹⁵⁸ Here and there echoes of disapproval were heard, but they were surprisingly muted.¹⁵⁹ There were still those who looked askance, of course; Count Rodrigo Álvarez, formerly of Santiago, founded the Order of Mountjoy because he wanted a more austere life, and undoubtedly the practice of conjugal chastity was one of his complaints.¹⁶⁰ Aside from its sexual aspect, conjugal chastity was one of several factors that led to more serious problems with the vow of poverty.

Poverty

The difficulties that the military orders encountered in observing poverty may already be hinted at in the Rule of Santiago, which reads, “And although they may possess much, let them try to be in accord with the Apostle, ‘as having nothing yet possessing all things.’”¹⁶¹ Even more so than for other religious communities, the acquisition of property was essential to the military orders’ mission. Not only were they entrusted with holding large tracts of territory, but war itself was, as it is now, an expensive business. By the middle of the thirteenth century, Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara had become great landholders, especially south of the Tagus River.¹⁶² Strictly speaking, the orders’ large landholdings were not a violation of poverty, because the vow required only that individual brothers not have personal possessions. In practice, however, the acquisition of wealth by a religious order creates considerable room for abuses and detracts from its austerity. Corral Val identifies three causes for Alcántara’s problems with poverty, which also apply well to Santiago and Calatrava: the accumulation of personal goods, the patrimonialization of offices, and the transformation of commanderies into sources of supplementary income for members of noble families.

The masters led the way by extracting resources from common use to create a *mesa maestral*, a source of revenue under their exclusive control. This was imitated in a parallel way by the commanders, who came to hold their positions for life.¹⁶³ The orders repeatedly legislated against the brothers having their own property, but this was in vain.¹⁶⁴ In the case of Santiago, this tendency was exacerbated, even necessitated, by the practice of allowing brothers to marry.¹⁶⁵ The brothers' wives and children had to be provided for, which made some privatization of goods inescapable. This typically meant that when married couples entered the order, they retained the right over some of their property in order to pass it along to their children.¹⁶⁶ The tendency toward privatization is evident in statutes prescribing punishments for brothers who sold off the orders' property.¹⁶⁷ Commanders of Calatrava and Alcántara were also supposed to periodically submit inventories of their commanderies' goods as a check against this trend.¹⁶⁸ The practice of individual brethren making wills was not entirely absent from the orders' early history, although it seems to have happened by way of exception. Fernando Díaz, a former master of Santiago, obtained permission from Alfonso VIII in 1204 to bequeath certain goods to the Monastery of San Audito without interference from the order.¹⁶⁹ The abbot of Morimond's *difinciones* of 1304 and 1306 condemn, in the strongest terms, the practice of making wills.¹⁷⁰ Yet the tide was against him. Later, sometime before 1385, one of his successors gave permission to brethren of Calatrava and Alcántara to leave half of their movable goods to their servants.¹⁷¹

At the same time, the orders' concerns over property cannot all be attributed to the growth of avarice and individualism. Throughout the period, they had to protest the usurpation of their goods by laymen and ecclesiastics. During the early decades of the fourteenth century, there are numerous letters of complaint directed to the bishops or cathedral chapters of Toledo, León, and Valencia insisting on the restitution of Calatrava's usurped property.¹⁷² In addition, it appears that the orders were beset from time to time with financial difficulties, especially Santiago, which issued a request for aid to kings and ecclesiastics in 1233.¹⁷³ The fiscal problems of the mastership of Pelayo Pérez Correa were especially notorious.¹⁷⁴ In short, therefore, these institutions, like their counterparts in the Latin East, were constantly in need of new sources of revenue despite their prodigious holdings, which left them open to the charge of avarice.¹⁷⁵ Whatever their failings in this regard, the military brethren were not engaged in high theological debates about poverty. Their materialism was a consequence not only of human failing but also of the demands of their particular mission.

Obedience

The confirmation bull of 1175 names obedience in humility under one master as the first thing the brothers of Santiago must observe.¹⁷⁶ This reflects very nicely the singular importance of this vow for the military orders. Abnegation of the will has always been a significant aspect of learning religious discipline, a kind of stepping-stone to spiritual perfection, as the Rule of Benedict makes clear.¹⁷⁷ But the vow of obedience gained new importance in the military-religious vocation. As professed religious, the brethren understood and practiced this spiritual obedience. But for them, the vow was also necessary to the fulfillment of practical tasks, their very mission, in a way without parallel in the monastic tradition.¹⁷⁸ Obedience to the commands of superiors could be a matter of life and death, and hence prompt and full compliance was expected, especially in Santiago.¹⁷⁹ Indeed, while all the vows served to distinguish the military brothers from secular warriors, obedience was the most important for setting the former apart as an élite fighting force.¹⁸⁰

At the same time, the threats against breaking obedience are mainstays in the statutes, which suggests that the vow was subject to frequent violation. The *difiniciones* of 1211, written at a time of great insecurity and danger for Calatrava, already include multiple clauses against disobedience. Brothers found disobedient were to be scourged, compelled to fast on bread and water for three days without their cloaks, and to suffer the loss of horse and arms for six months. *Conversi*, not subject to the loss of arms, were to fast on bread and water and be scourged every Wednesday and Friday until the following visitation.¹⁸¹ A brother who violated a truce and attacked Muslim or Christian could not be received back into the order without the consent of the master, the visitor from Morimond, and the king.¹⁸² Only rarely does one get a glimpse into the actual historical circumstances in which alleged breaches of obedience took place. Brothers of Calatrava complained to Gregory IX about a master whom they alleged had usurped the office and was destroying the order, but little else is known of this case.¹⁸³ In 1304 and 1306, the abbot of Morimond found it necessary to remind the brothers of Calatrava and Alcántara not to be rebellious in chapter against receiving discipline or in any other matter. Violations were to result in three days on bread and water, and the same punishment would be given to a commander who failed to discipline such a brother.¹⁸⁴ Raising a rebellion against the order or any of its officers is mentioned several times. Violators are reckoned as “conspirators” and subject to incarceration for a year, two years, or even for life.¹⁸⁵ This problem is also considered in the *hermandades* of 1313 and 1318, to be discussed in more detail in [Chapter 4](#). The statutes of 1325, while not containing

any specific references to violations of obedience, do employ the phrase “in virtue of holy obedience” several times.¹⁸⁶ Santiago’s injunctions against disobedience, at least in the statutes of the thirteenth century, are generally less frequent or severe.¹⁸⁷ This may be significant given that the order’s expectations regarding obedience were higher than Calatrava’s or Alcántara’s.¹⁸⁸ The tumultuous mastership of Pelayo Pérez Correa, however, did witness some important breakdowns in obedience. At one point, the Council of Thirteen tried to have him deposed, probably for his attempt to involve the order in an expedition to the Latin Empire of Constantinople. The latter endeavor had the support of Innocent IV, however, so the attempt was unsuccessful.¹⁸⁹ The chapter of 1275 sought to limit the master’s authority, issuing a number of statutes to strengthen the power of the chapter.¹⁹⁰ Once again, the effort did not have any long-term effect, and the strength of the mastership was ultimately upheld.

One of the gravest offenses that could be committed against obedience, and indeed against the whole meaning of the military-religious vocation, was defection to the Moors. Apparently this happened often enough to require mention in the statutes of all three orders. Santiago invokes the divine curse upon such a man and requires that he obtain a mandate from the Holy See in order to be received back into the order, at which point he must do three years’ penance.¹⁹¹ There are two cases of brethren of Santiago handing over castles to the Moors, or at least threatening to do so, from 1299 and 1311.¹⁹² In another instance, a brother of Calatrava lost a castle, but in 1304 the pope asked him to be received back into the order to perform a year’s penance. The circumstances suggest that the castle was lost not in battle but through some blameworthy action of the brother.¹⁹³ Desertion was another serious offense against which there are warnings from an early date. Alexander III refers to those who, like dogs returning to their vomit, go back to life in the world.¹⁹⁴ Honorius III told the peninsular kings to compel Santiago’s deserters to return.¹⁹⁵ Pelayo Pérez Correa waged a campaign against desertion in the 1240s, obtaining numerous papal bulls directed at the Iberian monarchs.¹⁹⁶ This effort seems to have been successful, for Innocent IV asked the master to receive back a brother *salva Ordinis disciplina* (meaning that he was first to be punished) in 1243.¹⁹⁷ Around the same time Calatrava obtained papal permission to receive apostate brethren back into the order, although in 1265 the pope specified that the deserters first had to restore any goods they had stolen.¹⁹⁸ Further difficulties surrounding obedience are evident in several letters of Urban IV. In 1262, he asked for King Alfonso X’s assistance in promoting peace within Santiago, where quarrels had broken out

among the brethren, and later in the same year he wrote a letter to the order urging obedience to the master.¹⁹⁹ The evident problems with obedience were partly due to the orders' high expectations regarding its fulfillment, and in Santiago's case, to the ongoing conflict between lay and clerical brethren.

Dress

Despite Pascal's trenchant remark on the subject, dress was an essential aspect of religious life in the Middle Ages.²⁰⁰ The taking of a religious habit was often considered the sign of authentic religious profession, even in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.²⁰¹ It was also a sign of the vows, especially of poverty, in that inexpensive and simple materials were usually chosen.²⁰² Modifications in a religious habit, or its abandonment altogether, have important symbolic significance, and no less in the case of the Iberian military orders.²⁰³

The first regulations of Calatrava's *formae vivendi* deal with dress. The *forma* of 1164 stipulates that only the brothers' undergarments can be made of linen.²⁰⁴ Their tunics were to be made of wool and cut short for riding. They should wear a lined robe, known as a pelisse, and a scapular as signs of religious profession. The brothers were supposed to sleep fully dressed, and it was of the utmost importance that their garments draw no attention on account of superfluity. To this end, there was to be a relative uniformity in their color and thickness.²⁰⁵ These injunctions were standard in the Cistercian Order, though the cut of the tunic for riding and the permission to wear the pelisse were concessions to Calatrava's particular labors.²⁰⁶ The second *forma* of 1186 modifies these norms by removing the specific names of the garments, adding that they should be *moderatas*, *honestas*, and *commodas*, according to the judgment of the abbot of Morimond and the master of Calatrava.²⁰⁷ One scholar has identified five main garments in Calatrava's sources: tunic, scapular, pelisse, cloak, and cappa.²⁰⁸ Yet the terminology surrounding the specific articles of clothing becomes muddled as time goes on. The pelisse seems to have disappeared, while the cappa had to be worn indoors, and the brothers donned cowls (*cucullae*) for use in religious services.²⁰⁹

The Order of Santiago was terser in its prescriptions for dress but maintained a similar spirit. The brothers were expected to wear black, brown, or white clothes, with lambskins or other items of low price, according to what the master provided.²¹⁰ Thanks to the early *hermandad* with Santiago of Compostela, the brothers wore the sword-shaped cross of the apostle upon their garments.²¹¹ The devotional treatise *Dichos de los santos padres* portrays this symbol as Christomimetic. Just as Jesus died to wash away sin, so the brethren of

Santiago should not hesitate to die for him.²¹² The only reference to dress in the confirmation bull of 1175 is directed at the order's clerics, saying that they should wear *superpelliceis*, apparently a kind of overcoat.²¹³ The Rule does expect, however, that the brothers' used garments should be given to the hospitals or distributed to the poor, along with food, on three specific days each year that were assigned for charitable donations.²¹⁴ Regulations about dress are frequent in the *establecimientos*, specifying the kind of cloth the brothers were allowed to wear.²¹⁵

Very little information is available on the original dress of Alcántara, as its foundational documents make no mention of the topic, and only scattered references exist in other sources. Rades y Andrada believes they dressed like the brethren of Calatrava but also says that little is known about the appearance of their habit.²¹⁶ Torres y Tapia cites a text of 1291 in which a priest offers himself as a *familiar* of the order and is to receive a set of garments every Christmas.²¹⁷ These include a white tunic, black cappa, and a white chapel cloak. In assessing various theories, Corral Val opts for the view that Alcántara's dress was similar to Calatrava's but rejects the possibility of obtaining very precise information.²¹⁸

All three orders, however, had considerable difficulty maintaining austerity of dress. The earliest *difiniciones* from Morimond, dated around 1211, include injunctions against diverse appearance of habits, imitation of secular dress, and adornment with precious metals. Likewise, the failure to wear the capuche, or pointed head covering, resulted in a demotion of dress; the cappa was to be taken away and the tunic of *conversi* worn instead.²¹⁹ Apparently the abuse of demanding payment for taking the habit crept in, for Honorius III issued a bull against it in 1220.²²⁰ In 1275, Gregory X warned Calatrava, under threat of excommunication, not to abandon its proper dress.²²¹ Abbot Juan in 1325 repeats the need to avoid the luxury of *nobles e preciosas vestiduras*, whereas the *difiniciones* of 1336 recall the brothers to the *estatutos de la orden antiguos* (ancient statutes) concerning the avoidance of bright colors.²²² There were instructions about the brothers being properly shod, as well as reminders to the master to ensure that each year the brothers received the necessary garments.²²³ Alcántara's *difiniciones* of 1306 insist that brothers be shod and command that the clothing and other possessions of dead brothers be returned to the convent. Anyone who failed to do so would be considered a thief.²²⁴

The regulations emanating from Santiago's *establecimientos* are somewhat different. There are injunctions to avoid wearing the *venera* (scallop-shell symbol associated with the apostle St. James) or coat of arms on the habit, as well as prohibitions against sleeping without

shoes.²²⁵ The brothers are reminded to wear their cloaks (*mantos*) when entering chapel, chapter, or refectory.²²⁶ A statute from 1265 specifies the kind of clothing to be worn, even the material of which it is supposed to be made, instead of offering a litany of abuses and excesses.²²⁷ The need for such specificity, however, is an indicator that, in practice, the brothers' clothing was made of insufficiently humble fabrics. In 1310, the brothers were commanded to wear only black or brown *blanquetas* (large woolen cloaks).²²⁸ The lesser frequency and vehemence of protests against inappropriate dress in Santiago may have owed to the fact that, unlike Calatrava and Alcántara, they were not subject to monastic oversight. An illumination from the *Tumbo menor de Castilla* gives some idea what the habit might have looked like. Two brothers of Santiago are depicted wearing tunics with a cappa of slightly shorter length fastened across the front, with a red cross emblazoned on it. The garments are white and there is no sign of a cowl.²²⁹ Echániz Sans claims that the habit did not have a distinctive form in the Middle Ages apart from the white cappa and red cross.²³⁰ Eventually, the attempts to control luxury in dress were effectively abandoned.²³¹ Although this took place after the period under study, it is clear that long experience of failure was the main reason for the change. In 1397, Calatrava was granted the use of the red fleur-de-lis cross that is now the characteristic symbol of the order.²³² Alcántara tried to maintain its standards a little longer, and early fifteenth-century *definiciones* fulminate against violations of dress.²³³ In the end, though, this order too petitioned the pope for a relaxation of its standards, at which time it also received permission to wear a green cross of the same shape as Calatrava's. The cross became an important identifying mark once the monastic character of their dress was lost.²³⁴ It might even be appropriate to think of the new crosses as coats of arms, in a period when such symbols were signs of pride for Castilian nobility.²³⁵ Much later, in 1486, Santiago obtained permission from the pope for the brothers to dress however they pleased, so long as they retained the habit for certain ceremonial occasions.²³⁶

It is necessary to emphasize that, in 1330, the dynamics of decline concerning dress were by no means as far advanced as they would be a century later. But even the earliest statutes complain of abuses, which suggests another manifestation of the internal tensions of the military-religious vocation.²³⁷ Medieval writers often direct vituperative language against the pomp and vanity of knighthood, above all in matters of dress. St. Bernard, in *De laude*, inveighs against the long locks and golden accoutrements of worldly knights, taunting them for their effeminacy.²³⁸ These concerns also appear in the

Templar Rule.²³⁹ Indeed, purification from luxuries was a major concern of the crusading movement in general. Defeat in battle was considered a consequence of the sins of Christians, for which all people, combatant and noncombatant alike, were expected to make reparations. The bull *Quantum predecessores* includes sumptuary legislation, and after the defeat of Alarcos, a council held at Narbonne called for the donning of simple garb as a sign of penance.²⁴⁰ For one who aspired to be a true knight of Christ, the habits that most needed conversion were avarice and pride, the cardinal vices of worldly knighthood, of which dress was an important outward sign.

Food

Food, like dress, was an important aspect of religious poverty, and it functioned, in part, as a barometer of an order's austerity. One of the Cistercian critiques of Cluny had been the latter's rich table.²⁴¹ The question of food went hand in hand with the question of fasting, which served not only as a form of penance but also as a regular ascetic practice. The military orders, on account of their engagement in warfare, needed a more robust diet than that of their cloistered counterparts, so again modifications had to be made. These adjustments were a source of concern, though not nearly to the extent that dress was. Unlike baubles and worldly tinsel, adequate nourishment was correctly considered essential for the orders' mission. As the Rule of Santiago put it, "It is much better to fight than to fast."²⁴²

Immediately following its regulations concerning dress, the first *forma vivendi* of Calatrava states that "on three days of the week, that is, Tuesday, Thursday, and Sunday, along with the principal feast days, meat can be eaten." The brothers are to have only one dish of one kind of meat.²⁴³ This allowance, of course, was a major departure from Cistercian customs, which were vegetarian and allowed meat only to the infirm. The instructions for fasting were fairly consistent between 1164 and 1199. The brothers had to fast three days a week, on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, from the Exaltation of the Cross (September 14) until Easter, but the master was free to dispense brothers who were engaged against the Saracens.²⁴⁴ In his confirmation bull of 1164, Alexander III is not so specific, only enjoining the regimen of Cistercian *conversi* upon the brothers.²⁴⁵ The second *forma* excludes the major feasts of Christmas, Epiphany, All Saints', and feasts of the apostles from the requirement of fasting.²⁴⁶ The Order of Santiago, in keeping with its more relaxed observance, allowed for two kinds of meat to be served on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Sundays.²⁴⁷ It also followed a different calendar for the year, maintaining two periods of Lenten observance: one from the Feast of

the Four Crowned Martyrs until Christmas, the other from Ash Wednesday until Easter. From the feast of St. Michael until Pentecost, the brothers fasted each Friday, but from Pentecost to the feast of St. Michael, the Friday observance of fasting was changed to Lenten food.²⁴⁸ The Rule stipulates, however, that the sick are not bound to observe these norms if the master dispenses them, and the very next clause of the Rule warns against leaving off the defense of Christians for the sake of performing penances.²⁴⁹ In 1247, the pope granted a further relaxation with respect to eating meat on campaigns.²⁵⁰ Unlike the Templars, the brethren of Santiago were not forbidden to hunt.²⁵¹ Alcántara's foundational documents made no mention of an eating regimen, but it is likely that they followed Calatrava.

In addition to its significance for the devotional life, eating was also a communal activity. The brothers were accordingly expected to follow the monastic practices of silence accompanied by reading at table.²⁵² Santiago was less concerned about violations of these rules, as the grand commanders were granted permission to eat outside the common dining area as early as 1274.²⁵³ The master and grand commanders were allowed to eat in other commanderies no more than once a year, although this requirement had more to do with stretching the limited means of the houses than with concerns about austerity.²⁵⁴ The communal aspect of eating was a greater concern for Calatrava and Alcántara, as statutes indicate a move toward private dining on the part of important officials.²⁵⁵ Innocent III forbade the master of Calatrava from using more of the order's goods than was necessary for his own sustenance.²⁵⁶ In 1312, during the crisis of Calatrava's internal governance, some brothers refused to eat with the master as a protest against his leadership.²⁵⁷ The attenuated eating regimen of the military orders was another example of the adaptation of monastic to their particular needs, as well as a sign of their lesser austerity. Certainly they were generous in granting exceptions to the rule as their activities required, but the symbolic significance of a common table was taken seriously, and the tendency toward atomization, already evident by the early fourteenth century, tested it severely.

Penance

Since the gate is narrow and the way is hard that leads to life, the brothers were wont to fall short of expectations. The regimen of penance within the military orders, therefore, receives considerable attention in their governing documents. Luis Rafael Villegas Díaz has written of the "correctional system" of the Order of Calatrava, and on the whole it is a model that applies to the other orders as well. He defines "correctional system" as "the code that regulates punishments,

penalties, sanctions, external penances—in effect since the Church’s earliest times—within an institution for the failure to comply with its specific norms, its rule.”²⁵⁸ Visitations were the principal means of maintaining uniform discipline. Calatrava and Alcántara received visitations from Morimond, whereas the master of Santiago assigned visitors himself to the order’s subordinate houses.²⁵⁹ What medicine did they apply to the ills they encountered?

Although its actual requirements of observance are generally weaker than those of other communities, the thirteenth-century Rule of Santiago metes out very severe punishments for a host of infractions. The norms of “penance for one year” are described in detail. They include removal of the cross from the brother’s habit, regular flogging, deprivation of horse and arms, the eating of meals on the ground, expulsion from chapter, and regular fasting on Wednesdays and Fridays. The Rule also specifies that the offender, while eating, cannot fend off stray animals that try to take his food.²⁶⁰ This penance is meted out for bearing false witness, arson, striking someone, and flinging down one’s habit in anger. This last action was equivalent to rejecting one’s very self as a religious.²⁶¹ More severe consequences are envisioned for killing a brother or one’s wife, which have to be determined by the master with the counsel of the Holy See or his representative.²⁶² Chaining and imprisonment, while not the most common penalties inflicted, had become more common by the early fourteenth century, following a general European trend.²⁶³ Other offenses specifically mentioned in the Rule are lying, mutilation, revealing sins, fomenting factionalism, challenging or humiliating a fellow brother, praising one’s own family, or speaking of worldly things.²⁶⁴ Indeed, the prevalence of regulations against various kinds of conflicts between brothers, both verbal and physical, is another reflection of the unique challenges the military orders faced with respect to fraternal charity. Men steeped in the ways of war were considered more likely to defend their honor or resort to violence in disputes. That most of these specific clauses are absent from the earlier editions of the Rule suggests that they were the product of experience, and such legislation is found also in the *establecimientos*.²⁶⁵

The Orders of Calatrava and Alcántara, though quite sparing with details in their *formae vivendi*, also specify offenses and their corresponding punishments in their *difiniciones*. Not surprisingly, these resemble the practices of Santiago. Speaking in anger, calling a brother a traitor or fornicator, reminding him of previous faults, and illicitly shedding blood number among the offenses mentioned. Punishments include fasting, flogging, expulsion, and *ligera culpa*, a kind of monastic excommunication in which the offender is cut off

from the social life of the community.²⁶⁶ Likewise, there was a prohibition against communicating with powerful people outside the order, an infraction to be punished with the loss of habit and jailing.²⁶⁷ References to the role of the *ancianos* in determining penances show that the masters relied on the counsel of the orders' wisest and most experienced men.²⁶⁸ Whatever their respective monastic traditions, all three orders faced similar problems and devised similar means of addressing them.

A notable aspect of the orders' penitential systems is the relative absence of specifically spiritual punishments or penances. Excommunication is not mentioned in any of the sources prior to 1330. Expulsion from the community was indeed a grave consequence, but it did not carry with it that higher level of ecclesiastical sanction. Nor were offenders assigned to recite prayers or keep vigils as a way of making reparation for their faults. Fasting, of course, was nothing new in religious life, but the orders sought above all to chasten the brothers' pride. The loss of horse and arms, or eating on the floor with animals, were punishments consciously tailored to humiliate a warrior.

REFORM AND DECLINE

Although the military orders did not generate reform movements in the same way as other religious communities, the *establecimientos* and *difiniciones* of the early fourteenth century show awareness of the need for renewal.²⁶⁹ In fact, the flurry of legislation for Calatrava and Alcántara from this period was occasioned by schisms within the orders that, while not entirely without precedent, give clear signs of a breakdown of authority and religious discipline. The long mastership of García Lopez de Padilla of Calatrava (1297–1336) was marked by several episodes of turmoil, including a conspiracy against his rule and schism.²⁷⁰ His support of Jaime II of Aragon was the major cause of strife. First the abbot of San Pedro de Gumiel, acting illicitly, deposed García Lopez and replaced him with a brother named Alemán. These events occasioned numerous visits of the abbot of Morimond to restore order, which also produced the *difiniciones* of 1304 and 1307.²⁷¹ Another rebellion against García Lopez broke out in 1311, when a cabal demanded his resignation. During his absence in Aragon, the rebels took control of Calatrava and Salvatierra and threatened to depose and imprison García. Once again, the abbot of Morimond came to investigate the situation.²⁷² Restored to office, García Lopez managed to gain the favor of Don Pedro, tutor of the minor Alfonso XI. But in 1325, the brothers moved against their master again, denouncing him to the king at Valladolid. Alfonso supported the

rebels and a new master, Juan Núñez de Prado, was elected, but by 1329 García had won his office back, thanks to the support of the Cistercian general chapter. Seeing himself opposed, however, he renounced the mastership and was given the commandery of Zorita and some Aragonese possessions in compensation. Within a short time, however, García Lopez was fighting for his old position, which effort came to an end with his death in 1336. This incident marked a serious breakdown of authority and obedience within the order, as well as a confusion regarding the role of other groups: Morimond, San Pedro de Gumiel, the Cistercian general chapter, and the peninsular monarchs.

Alcántara also suffered a major conflict over the succession of the master in the second decade of the fourteenth century. Thanks to the great discontent within the order against Master Ruy Vázquez, the Cistercian abbots of Valparaiso and Valdeiglesias, along with the master of Calatrava, visited the order and deposed Vázquez, appointing Suero Pérez in his place.²⁷³ This was a rare instance of Calatrava exercising jurisdictional authority over Alcántara, but it is more important as an indicator of weakening ties of obedience, a common pattern among the Iberian orders. Nor did Alcántara's leadership woes end there. In 1337, Master Rodrigo Pérez fell into disfavor and was replaced by a royal favorite, Gonzalo Martínez de Oviedo. Alfonso's favor did not last long, however, and Gonzalo was not only removed from office but also executed.²⁷⁴

Unlike Calatrava and Alcántara, Santiago was already regularly issuing *establecimientos* during the thirteenth century, and in 1310 the chapter sought to correct problems such as not wearing the habit and abuse of authority.²⁷⁵ This document tells the brothers to wear their traditional habit and to receive the stipend for it in cloth rather than in money. The cloth was to be black or white.²⁷⁶ Limits were placed on the number of houses a master could have for his own use, and the number of times any given house had to provide for his visit. Bribing the master for a commandery was forbidden and to be punished by loss of arms, horse, commandery, and habit for one year. Eating alone without permission on campaign was forbidden to everyone except the grand commanders.²⁷⁷ Visitors to the houses were supposed to correct both spiritual and temporal aberrations, and all present at the chapter swore on the cross and the four Gospels to observe these rules.²⁷⁸ Yet these attempts at reform were effectively neutralized by the period's civil strife and the Portuguese schism.²⁷⁹ The latter was a consequence of two main dynamics: the creation of individual patrimonies on the part of commanders and the general trend toward the "nationalization" of the orders, which was especially pronounced in Portugal.²⁸⁰ In 1288, the Portuguese commander petitioned the

pope to create a mastership that would be independent of Uclés, which request was granted. The master of Uclés, Juan Osorio (1293–1310), reacted against this decision and sought to bring the Portuguese brethren back to obedience. Celestine V issued a bull affirming the legitimacy of the Portuguese master but did not show himself entirely decisive on the matter.²⁸¹ Boniface VIII sided with the Castilian commandery and ordered the Portuguese back to obedience, as did John XXII.²⁸² Matters would not remain that way, however, and in 1327, a chapter held in Lisbon laid down a series of *establecimientos* that made the schism complete.²⁸³ This was both a crisis of obedience and a clear illustration of how larger historical dynamics, like nationalization, were affecting Santiago.

The aforementioned episodes demonstrate why reform efforts in all three orders failed: increasing identification with the landed nobility, direct royal interference in the orders' internal affairs, and confusion about the proper chain of command. The political tensions between increasingly well-defined kingdoms were fundamental to the schisms in both Santiago and Calatrava. By 1330, each of the peninsular monarchs had the Iberian military orders in his domain firmly under his control, and royal interference in their internal affairs became commonplace. Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara were fully creatures of the Castilian king, whereas Aragon had the Order of Montesa, and Portugal controlled the Orders of Christ and Avis and the Portuguese branch of Santiago. Alfonso XI's appointment of his eleven-year-old son Fadrique to the mastership of Santiago in 1342, while a striking move, merely culminated a process that had been decades in the making.²⁸⁴

MILITIA OR ORDO?

It is now time to answer the question posed at the beginning of the chapter, namely, whether it is more appropriate to consider Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara as military organizations or to consider them religious orders. In one respect, this is a false dichotomy, as it is clear that they were both. Yet Casado Quintanilla's diplomatic evidence for Calatrava supports the view that the military orders represent a type of religious life whose substantial form is knighthood. He argues that the early use of the term "order" to describe Calatrava in royal documents refers to the concept of the order of knighthood rather than to a religious order.²⁸⁵ This may also be the case in an early reference to Santiago as *illum summum ordinem*, which was made prior to its canonical approval by the Holy See.²⁸⁶ Terms like *Ordini-Jacobitano* and *Jacobitano ordini*, in contrast, probably refer to a religious order.²⁸⁷ While this linguistic point may not admit of a

definitive solution, it is clear that the exigencies of warfare were the controlling factors in the establishment and development of the military-religious life, and the orders' patterns of internal organization articulate this fact. Monastic structures and practices had to be adjusted or excised altogether for the brothers to carry out their mission. The limited articulation of Calatrava and Alcántara as Cistercian communities illustrates the point very well. Although the phenomena of urban militias and military confraternities were widespread in late twelfth-century Iberia, the religious order, with its ties of permanent commitment and hierarchy, was the best institutional model for ecclesiastical knighthood. But the religious model was not merely pragmatic. The swearing of vows and the subordination to authority allowed its members to achieve their ultimate goal: the salvation of their souls. So while Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara were more apt to articulate themselves as military militias of the Church, they were also religious orders, though ones whose prior form was imposed by the exercise of arms. In light of the fact that medieval writers employed the term *societas* to designate a religious community, the military orders were *societates* organized for war.²⁸⁸

CONCLUSION

Although the Iberian military orders inherited the traditions of monastic and canonical observance, they were highly modified to their particular form of life. This is evident in all aspects: categories of members, offices, territorial division, and religious observance. The penitential system mostly directed its attention to failures of obedience and to the acquisition and use of property. In general, practices such as fasting were greatly attenuated in favor of maintaining the brothers' strength for battle.²⁸⁹ There were, nevertheless, penances of considerable severity, and one is inclined to think that the loss of horse and arms was thoroughly humiliating for a knight. When Cerrini speaks of the Templar observance as *anti-ascétique et anti-héroïque*, she has in mind features that also pertain to the Iberian orders.²⁹⁰ Santiago, with its option of conjugal chastity, seems to merit her assessment even more than the Templars. Yet Cerrini's nomenclature, when applied to any military order, can be misleading. The "antiheroic" aspects of the Iberian orders' governing norms express precisely the kind of asceticism proper to these groups: the renunciation of the vanity, rapacity, and desire for earthly glory that were characteristic of lay knights and that were so widely excoriated by reform-minded clerics. Although in terms of fasting and prayer the military orders were less demanding than other religious

communities, they were certainly more demanding than what would be expected of a lay knight in the world. Both the “anti-heroic” and “anti-ascetic” aspects find a common explanation in the model of ecclesiastical knighthood as expressions of a new kind of asceticism. It is therefore a mistake to judge the military orders’ observance according to a traditional monastic standard. The temptations that faced the military brothers were different from those of monks. To refrain from seeking glory—whether by feats of arms, by wearing luxurious clothing and armor, or by keeping a commandery for oneself—was a high standard indeed, and Demurger acknowledges that this was the primary asceticism that they practiced.²⁹¹ Ultimately, however, the standard proved too high. From the perspective of their religious observance, the Iberian military orders were probably not yet in an advanced state of decline by 1330.²⁹² Such a view anticipates the reality by at least half a century. Yet even the attenuated regimen was already experiencing considerable strain, above all with regard to the quintessentially knightly vices of avarice and pride. Violations of the vow of poverty, and the related matter of dress, had become common. Most serious for a military order, however, were the violations of the vow of obedience. They received, to be sure, the most severe punishments, but the episodes discussed here cannot be ignored as signs of a breakdown in discipline and, therefore, in the orders’ way of life.

CHAPTER THREE

AD EXTRA: THE ORDERS' MISSION IN THE WORLD

These are the picked troops of God, whom he has recruited from the ends of the earth . . . each man sword in hand, and superbly trained to war.¹

—St. Bernard of Clairvaux

The continuator of Lucas of Túy's *Chronicon mundi* says that Pelayo Pérez Correa, the famous master of Santiago, was so greatly feared that Muslim parents used his name to stop their children from crying.² Fighting was indeed the military orders' principal activity, whereas the care of the sick and the ransoming of captives were significant but subordinate aspects of their mission. A key to understanding the spirituality of Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara is to see how they articulated each of these activities and their relation to one another within the framework of ecclesiastical knighthood. The networks that the orders established with other elements of Castilian society, through donations and ties of confraternity, also shed light on their mission and how it was understood by contemporaries. This mission, like the orders' internal religious observance, showed signs of decline by the early fourteenth century.

FIGHTING

The prosecution of holy warfare justified the military orders' existence and made them distinct from other religious communities. Before moving to questions of spirituality, it will be helpful to consider a few points about the orders' role in the Reconquest.³ They were much more important for their qualitative rather than for their quantitative contributions. In most respects, their basic weapons, strategies, and tactics were the same as their lay counterparts.⁴ Their military role was less significant than that played by the Temple or the Hospital in the Holy Land.⁵ Rodríguez-Picavea suggests that about half of the Christian fighting forces in the Holy Land were supplied by the Temple or the Hospital, whereas in Iberia the military orders provided something like 10 percent.⁶ Reliable data are hard to obtain, but O'Callaghan has estimated that there were no more than fifty or a hundred brethren ready for battle in any of the three Iberian orders at any time.⁷ The total membership of Calatrava or Santiago in all the peninsular kingdoms at any given moment during the thirteenth century was probably not greater than several hundred fighting brethren.⁸ No more than two hundred brethren from the three orders

combined participated in the crusade against Seville, which was the high point of their martial activities.⁹ It is possible, at the same time, to underestimate their value, because the brothers brought additional forces into the field besides themselves. These included their own squires as well as vassals of their lands and other auxiliaries. Their principal advantages as military units were their discipline and organization, their ability to mobilize forces quickly, and their expertise gained from permanent dedication to warfare. For this reason, one historian has called them “élite units for special operations.”¹⁰ Master Pérez Correa was the military strategist behind the conquest of Seville, while in 1310, all three Iberian orders provided guard duty on campaign for the Infantes.¹¹ Rades y Andrada speaks of the particular fear and enmity of the Muslims for the military brethren.¹² The orders’ availability for holding border fortresses and repopulating those areas made them indispensable to securing and Christianizing new territories.¹³ Pedro II’s donation to Calatrava of the castle of Monterubio, for example, singles out the order as the only entity capable of resettling the area.¹⁴ It is clear, therefore, that despite their numerical limitations, the military orders played an essential role in the Reconquest.

There are three main kinds of evidence that shed light on the orders’ warfare as a spiritually meritorious enterprise. First, there are the references in the orders’ own writings to fighting as a religious endeavor. Second, there are similar references in documents written by others, such as donations, chronicles, papal and royal confirmation letters, and literary works. Finally, there are concrete offers of spiritual merit to nonbrethren for participating in the orders’ campaigns.

Foundational Documents

The spiritual significance of fighting is presented under three main headings in the orders’ foundational documents: the defense and expansion of Christendom, the love of one’s neighbor, and the conversion of knighthood.¹⁵ The original donation of Calatrava to Raymond of Fitero enjoins upon him the task of defending against the pagan enemies of the Cross, and Calatrava’s confirmation bull states that the new community’s purpose is to fight against the Saracens for the defense of the Cistercian Order and the fortress of Calatrava.¹⁶ Recognizing that Calatrava’s scope and purpose had expanded in the intervening years, Gregory VIII amended the second confirmation bull to read, “With weapons girded you faithfully contend against the Saracens for the protection of the Christian people.”¹⁷ The prologue of Santiago’s Rule says that the new brethren “imprinted on their chests the cross in the shape of a sword with the ensign and invocation of the

Blessed James to stop the hostile advance of the enemies of Christ, defend the Church, and expose themselves as a wall of the faithful to the fury of the infidels.”¹⁸ Lucius III’s 1183 confirmation of San Julián del Pereiro acknowledges a similar purpose.¹⁹ The defense of the faithful against the enemies of Christ became a commonplace theme, especially in papal donations and confirmations.²⁰ So did the appellations *athletae Domini* or *athletae Christi*, which, like *milites Christi*, had formerly been used only for monks.²¹

The Christo-mimetic piety associated with crusading rested on the idea that fighting could legitimately express the love of one’s neighbor.²² The principal scriptural locus for this view was John 15:13: “Greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends,” a passage which also appears in Santiago’s Rule.²³ Innocent II’s *Omne datum optimum* says that the Templar life fulfils this scriptural passage, and the same order’s Rule enjoins upon its members “the duty of giving your souls for your brothers.”²⁴ The Rule of Santiago states the matter clearly:

As perfect charity casts out all fear, so the said brethren, by exposing indifferently themselves and everything they have to many kinds of dangers and martyrdoms for the exaltation of the Christian faith and for the defense of the brethren, show that they love God with all their mind and soul, and their neighbor as themselves.²⁵

To live at the borders of Christendom and to regularly place one’s life in peril for its defense was considered an act of charity. The pope applied this idea to the brethren of Santiago when he took them under his protection in 1173 and again when he issued the foundational bull of 1175.²⁶ The thirteenth-century Rule of Santiago has an “Exhortation to Encourage the Brethren to Overcome the Infidels,” which contains numerous references to the essentially charitable nature of the order’s activities, such as the following allusion to Matthew 25:

When the defender frees someone from the captivity of the pagans, or by defending him prevents him from being taken into captivity, is he not feeding the hungry, giving drink to the thirsty, covering the naked, and visiting the sick and the imprisoned? For who can be hungrier or thirstier, more naked or more ill, or who can suffer more cruel imprisonment than he who is a captive of the Saracens?

²⁷

Christo-mimetic overtones are also evident in the invocation of Jesus’ obedience to the Father as a model for the military-religious life.²⁸ This self-immolation could also be presented as an act of gratitude reciprocating Christ’s redemptive sacrifice, a theme that has been identified among crusaders as well.²⁹ A recruiting letter that the master of Santiago directed to Germany in 1250 says that the order’s ranks are full of generous and noble men who do not hesitate to shed

their blood seven times a day for their Redeemer.³⁰ This document is especially insightful, as it shows the self-image the order portrayed to outsiders. This image had a foundation in reality, as some of the early masters, like Martín Peláez Barragán, seem to have died in battle.³¹ The defeat at Alarcos in 1195 was disastrous for both Santiago and Calatrava. The former lost nineteen brothers, many vassals, and its master, and the latter lost two castles, nearly all its possessions, and an unknown number of brethren.³² The loss at Moclín in 1280 was even more catastrophic for Santiago, as fifty-five brothers and Master Gonzalo Ruiz Girón were killed.³³

The third major theme in the foundational documents is the conversion from worldly knighthood to the knighthood of Christ. As discussed in [Chapter 1](#), this trope is more prevalent in texts for Santiago than for Calatrava or Alcántara. Documents from the papal chancery frequently use language highly reminiscent of St. Bernard's *De laude*, as do the rules and *formae vivendi* themselves. The *forma* of 1164 praises the intent of Calatrava to turn from worldly knighthood to the knighthood of God, to expel the enemies of the faith.³⁴ Pope Alexander's confirmation of the same year gives more weight to defensive action than offensive, but his thrust is the same.³⁵ The prologue of Santiago's Rule says that "those who had previously been knights of the Devil now, in their battles, are proud to bear God's yoke," and it goes on to praise in detail how they turned from iniquity to justice.³⁶ Santiago's confirmation bull of 1175 states that when the brothers convene for general chapter meetings, they should consider what must be done for the defense of Christendom, and to seek battle with the Saracens not for worldly praise, or for the love of bloodshed, or for the desire of acquiring land, but only to turn aside the enemy offensive or to bring the Moors to the Christian faith.³⁷ This rejection of familiar worldly motivations was fundamental to ecclesiastical knighthood.

Donations

The picture becomes more complex once one turns away from the foundational documentation to donations. Donors, especially royal ones, display awareness of the orders' purpose and its spiritual significance, but from a different perspective. Explicit references to the imitation of Christ become less prominent, and the "conversion of knighthood" nearly disappears, giving way to the theme of defending Christendom. Alfonso VIII was the most generous royal supporter of Santiago and Calatrava, so his donations have special value. He notes that the brothers of Calatrava left the world to shed their own blood against the enemies of the cross, making themselves a wall and a shield for the faith.³⁸ His chancery also employs a stock phrase about

opposing the enemies of the Cross to the point of bloodshed.³⁹ Similarly, the king's donation of the castle of Espechel to Santiago credits the order with the defense of Christendom both through their prayers and through the shedding of their own blood.⁴⁰ Royal patrons seem to have believed in the dual efficacy of fighting and praying for the same end. In another donation, Santiago's fight against the enemies of the Cross is presented as a defense of the name of Christ.⁴¹ Sometimes the praise emanating from Alfonso's chancery is downright prosaic; one donation speaks at such length of the contempt of worldly pomp, the defense of the Christian religion, the oppression of Saracen perfidy, the shedding of martyrs' blood, and the Lamb who was slain for redemption so that it deserves to be referenced here in its entirety.⁴² Yet Alfonso's confidence in the military orders was in no way feigned. His will of 1204 leaves a third of his weapons to Calatrava, a third to Santiago, and a third to be divided between the Hospital and the Temple.⁴³ Queen Berenguela of Castile recognized that the brothers of Calatrava were *Deo militantium* in a donation of 1229, which phrase implied both temporal and celestial warfare.⁴⁴ In 1177, Nuño Aloitz and María Ovézquiz, a lay couple, donated to Santiago so that they might fight together with the order and thereby obtain an everlasting crown.⁴⁵ Again, the wording suggests a deliberate blending of the notions of spiritual and temporal warfare. Even where explicit spiritual references are absent, there is appreciation for the orders' mission, such as when Alfonso IX made a donation to Alcántara to aid its defense of the frontier.⁴⁶

In addition to donations, the orders were rewarded for their efforts in other ways. Calatrava and Alcántara had rights of conquest over towns or castles that they took from the Muslims.⁴⁷ Santiago was exempted from a royal tax called the *nuncio*, which was collected from lay knights.⁴⁸ Alcántara claimed exemption from royal taxation for the defense of the realm, since the brethren already marched in the royal host. In 1285, Sancho IV granted this request.⁴⁹ In 1245, Innocent IV gave permission for would-be crusaders bound for Jerusalem to commute their vows by entering Santiago instead.⁵⁰ This privilege was granted again in 1291.⁵¹ Santiago received an exemption from taxes normally assessed to laymen on certain goods, such as wine, wool, and animals.⁵² Santiago and Calatrava were exempted from the crusade subsidy of the Council of Lyons because of their constant engagement in war against the Muslims.⁵³ The orders also received important rights and exemptions for the free passage and sustenance of their livestock, as transhumance was fundamental to their economic activity by the middle of the thirteenth century.⁵⁴ These privileges, without specifically invoking spiritual motives, recognized the importance of the orders' warfare and were granted to

foster it.

Narrative Sources

Chronicles and other literature give sporadic but significant testimony to the spiritual merit of the orders' fighting.⁵⁵ One of the few narrative sources emanating from the orders themselves is Pedro López de Baeza's *Dichos de los santos padres*, which ends with a homily on the habit and mission of the Order of Santiago. He says that the order fought to serve God and expand the faith by conquering land where the mosques of the lying Mohammed promoted false teaching. This fight was considered true penance and service of Christ and St. James, and those who died in it would go directly to paradise.⁵⁶ Other important evidence comes from Archbishop Jiménez de Rada, whose *Historia de rebus Hispaniae* includes numerous encomia for the military orders. Santiago is praised for its martial prowess against the Muslims, its charity, and its religious devotion, as well as its consecration of new lands to the Christian religion.⁵⁷ Calatrava's praise is similar: "Those who were praising with psalms are girded with sword, and those who wept in prayer go to defend the fatherland." Jiménez de Rada considered their discipline especially meritorious.⁵⁸ In the section of *Historia* dedicated to the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, he once again praises the orders, this time including the Temple and Hospital as well. The Templars join charity and military might together; the Hospital takes up the sword out of fraternal charity and the needs of the Holy Land; Calatrava is pleasing to God; Santiago performs many deeds of valor.⁵⁹ Given that the military orders were the archbishop's perennial rivals for control of the Tagus Valley, this must be counted as high praise.

Alfonso X's *Cantigas de Santa María* contains a miracle story in which Santiago and Calatrava feature prominently.⁶⁰ A Moorish castle is being besieged by Alfonso Téllez and the two orders.⁶¹ A Muslim woman is trying to save her child, but the Christian forces break through the castle walls and set the place on fire. The master of Calatrava, "who diligently waged war in God's service," orders an attack on the keep, but when the Christians see the Moorish woman and her child, they are moved to pity, for the two resemble the Virgin Mary and Jesus.⁶² The attackers implore God to save them, which is accomplished when the tower miraculously falls without harming either one. Then the Blessed Virgin sets them all down into a meadow, where the two Moors are baptized. From the Florentine codex of this work comes a famous illumination of the military brethren in battle array.⁶³ Aside from combining the horrors of war with sentimental piety, the story also shows a clear estimation for the effectiveness and holiness of the orders' engagement in combat. Don Juan Manuel's

Libro de los estados includes the *órdenes de cavallería* among the religious orders, praising their service of God and defense of the faith against the Moors.⁶⁴ The term *orden de cavallería* reflects well their place in society as seen by contemporaries: special groups of knights organized into religious orders with a particular mission in the world.

In addition to providing ordinary confirmations of privileges, the popes also wrote a number of special laudatory letters on behalf of the Iberian orders. When Alexander III announced the confirmation of the Order of Santiago to the Christian world in 1175, he described the brothers in glowing terms and asked that everyone assist them.⁶⁵ The pope wrote to the patriarch of Antioch in 1234 on Calatrava's behalf with praise of its self-sacrifice and good reputation.⁶⁶ Gregory IX sent a similar letter to King Fernando in 1236. Invoking the king's reverence both for religious in general and for the Holy See, the pope notes that the brothers honor God and spurn themselves in their ministries.⁶⁷

Merit for Nonbrethren

A final indication of belief in the spiritual merit of the orders' warfare was that people outside the orders sought to share in it. There are numerous papal bulls offering indulgences to *fratres ad terminum*, or those who joined in the orders' campaigns for a period of time, often as a form of penance.⁶⁸ This practice was first introduced into the peninsula by the Temple.⁶⁹ A famous case was when the murderers of Thomas Becket were required to serve fourteen years with the Templars in Jerusalem, although the evidence suggests that they did not in fact do so.⁷⁰ Santiago's Rule seemingly alludes to knights *ad terminum*, whereas Calatrava's does not, though the volunteers cited in Jiménez de Rada's foundation narrative may have been recruited in this way.⁷¹ Although this practice was usually undertaken on an individual basis, sometimes it was fostered on a broader scale. Honorius III offered indulgences in 1220 to anyone who came to the aid of Calatrava's frontier castles, and Gregory IX did so again in 1240.⁷² The latter pope made a similar offer in favor of Alcántara in 1238, once again alluding to the theme of John 15:13.⁷³ In 1250, Innocent IV gave the Jerusalem indulgence to people who served with Santiago for a year or to those who aided the order with alms.⁷⁴ In preparation for the battle for the Strait of Gibraltar, Santiago received permission to preach its own crusade and dispense the spiritual benefits associated with it.⁷⁵ Royal letters from 1303 and 1305 offered additional support for this cause.⁷⁶

Limitations

It is, unfortunately, almost impossible to determine the spiritual attitudes of individual brethren given a lack of source material. There are a few extant *cartas de profesión*, or records of profession, but they are not especially revealing, and in any case they were probably not written by the men taking vows. In 1202, Juan de la Pellicería said that he came to God and to the Order of Santiago to observe the three vows.⁷⁷ When Fernando Sánchez entered Alcántara in 1257, he stated his motives as simply “for the salvation of my soul.”⁷⁸ The *Primera crónica general* says that Count Álvaro, in the days of Fernando III and Alfonso IX, entered Santiago *ad succurrendum*, or near the end of his life, because of his ill health, poverty, and political circumstances.⁷⁹ Motivations are often complex and present a particular difficulty for the historian. It is to be expected, however, that the brothers’ religious formation inculcated a belief in the goodness and sanctity of their warfare.

It is abundantly clear that Castilian society believed in the spiritual merit of the orders’ bellicose activities and sought to share in it. At the same time, there were two main areas of difficulty and ambiguity: fighting against other Christians and obedience to the monarchs. These matters were related, because kings, upon whom the Iberian orders were quite dependent, sometimes sought to enlist them in battles against their coreligionists. In theory, the military orders were supposed to avoid this and dedicate themselves to fighting Muslims or pagans only.⁸⁰ The statutes of the Teutonic Knights, for example, specifically forbade giving any assistance to Christians going on campaign against their coreligionists.⁸¹ Then again, the definition of “Christian” could be flexible, as heretics and schismatics were considered enemies of the Church. Peter the Venerable once claimed that such people were worse and more dangerous than pagans or infidels.⁸² When proposals were made for Santiago to assist the Latin Empire of Constantinople in the 1240s against Greek “rebels,” Innocent IV said that this was necessary for the safety of the Holy Land.⁸³ Although the papacy employed the universal orders in conflicts among Christians in the Near East, the same was not true in the western Mediterranean.⁸⁴ Avoiding battle with other Christians was sometimes difficult for the Iberian orders, as kings were eager to obtain military service wherever they could. Other scholars have already addressed the orders’ relationships with the Iberian monarchies more generally.⁸⁵ Here I am concerned with the consequences of those relationships for the orders’ spiritual mission.

A distinction must be made, first of all, between the orders’ participation in offensive campaigns against other Christians and their participation in the defense of a kingdom under attack. Fernando II made just such a distinction in 1176 when he took the Hospitallers

under his protection, saying that they did not have to fight against other Christians unless León were invaded.⁸⁶ Alfonso VIII was evidently concerned about Santiago's reliability in its earliest days, for his donation of the castle of Oreja in 1171 came with the condition that the brethren surrender it to him in the event of a civil war in Castile.⁸⁷ Afonso I of Portugal (1128–1185), timorous of Leonese intervention in his kingdom, made a donation to Santiago in 1172 with the understanding that the order would defend his kingdom's interests against both Christians and Saracens.⁸⁸ Perhaps the distinction between defensive and offensive action was implicit here as well, for some brethren of Santiago helped defend León against invading Portuguese forces in 1179, and they may have done likewise against Castile the following year.⁸⁹ Rades y Andrada claims that a schism broke out between Leonese and Castilian brothers of Santiago in 1195 over the war between their kingdoms and that Alfonso IX dispossessed the order of its Leonese possessions in 1198 for its putative favoritism of Alfonso VIII.⁹⁰ Yet another internal schism, however brief, is said to have arisen in 1216 within Santiago, once again owing to the rivalry between León and Castile.⁹¹ Eventually the union of the two kingdoms put an end to these quarrels, and the order was drawn closer to the unified crown.⁹² Much later, in 1306, brethren of Santiago fought for Castile against the invading Portuguese and Aragonese forces.⁹³

The evidence for the Iberian orders' participation in offensive campaigns against other Christian kingdoms is sketchier. There is a possibility that Santiago fought for Castile against Navarre in 1176 and participated in the conquest of Guipúzcoa and Álava in 1199 and 1200, but its alleged role in the conflict between Castile and León of 1196 and 1197 has been dismissed.⁹⁴ Some knights of Santiago also fought for Castile against the Lord of Vizcaya around 1206, under the leadership of the commander of the hospital of Alarcón.⁹⁵ A well-known brother of Santiago participated in Pedro III's Sicilian armada, and it is probable that other members of the order were present too.⁹⁶ Occupying a kind of middle ground was the use of the orders against Christian rebels. Here the justification was not holy warfare per se but the security of the realm. In 1169, Calatrava fought against Lope de Arenas, an enemy of Alfonso VIII and vassal of the Castros.⁹⁷ When Lope Díaz de Haro fought against King Sancho IV in 1288, Santiago came to the king's aid.⁹⁸ Don Juan Manuel brought his fight against Alfonso XI to Santiago's own domains in 1328, which they were naturally obliged to defend, along with royal authority.⁹⁹ The Order of Alcántara fought for Castile-León against both Muslims and Portuguese, and assisted Alfonso X against the Infantes de la Cerda and Pedro I against his Castilian enemies.¹⁰⁰

Although the defense of the realm against internal Christian enemies could be justified, the participation of Santiago and Calatrava in the rebellions against Alfonso X clearly reflected the orders' growing aristocratic interests and consciousness.¹⁰¹ Pérez Correa was one of the principal instigators behind the revolt of 1273, and in 1282, Santiago and Calatrava joined the Infante Sancho against the king.¹⁰² They were hardly alone, of course, as most of the great lords and ecclesiastics also supported Sancho. The masters of the two orders, in fact, were personally tied to the great Haro and Castro families.¹⁰³ Alcántara, by contrast, sided with the king, and its Master García Fernández Barrantes was named as an executor of his will.¹⁰⁴ Political factors were clearly at the forefront of the whole episode, but the participation of Santiago and Calatrava in the rebellion arguably meant a failure to meet their fundamental obligations: the service of God and king, and the defense of the realm.¹⁰⁵ There are other examples of the orders' questionable use of force against other powers. When the bishops of Sigüenza and Cuenca, acting as ecclesiastical judges, attempted to secure some of Santiago's former territory for the archbishop of Toledo, the order sent out an armed contingent to stop them.¹⁰⁶ Taking their claim of exemption to the hilt, brethren of Alcántara drove off papal tax collectors with swords in 1249, for which they were brought to justice several years later.¹⁰⁷ The bishop of Coria excommunicated some brethren of Alcántara and placed some of their territories under interdict in 1294 because of the violent treatment his collectors had received at their hands.¹⁰⁸

For the most part, the Iberian orders were willing to defend the kingdoms in which they resided, whether against foreign invasion or internal revolt, but were less inclined to participate in campaigns against Christians.¹⁰⁹ Perhaps for this reason, they were sometimes regarded as neutral parties in such conflicts, especially before 1250. In addition to holding the frontier against the Muslims, the military orders were called upon to hold the frontiers between Christians.¹¹⁰ Two separate peace agreements in 1181 and 1183 between León and Castile were cemented by the entrusting of numerous border castles to the Order of Santiago.¹¹¹ Military brethren also acted as royal ambassadors on occasion.¹¹² The insecurity of the frontier and the forward progress of the Reconquest from 1150 to 1250 kept the orders mostly focused on their mission. Thereafter, their involvement in dynastic conflicts and fighting against Christians became more frequent.

The obligation of the orders to maintain royal truces was another challenging question. Rades y Andrada explains the dilemma nicely: "On the one hand, it seemed that the orders were so obligated, as the king's vassals. On the other, it seemed that this was contrary to the

end for which these orders were founded.”¹¹³ Honorius III concurred with the latter sentiment when he issued a bull telling Santiago, Calatrava, the Temple, and the Hospital that they were not bound to respect royal truces.¹¹⁴ Rades y Andrada tells of an incident in 1210 in which the Order of Santiago joined the king of Aragon in attacking a group of Moors with whom the king of Castile had a truce. This understandably displeased the king.¹¹⁵ Calatrava took the fortress of Salvatierra in 1198 during a period of royal truce.¹¹⁶ Pedro II of Aragon sought to make use of Calatrava in 1205 while all was quiet on the Castilian front.¹¹⁷ Around the same time, the abbot of Morimond made the drastic suggestion that Calatrava transfer its activities to the Holy Land on account of the truces in Iberia.¹¹⁸ Yet none of these plans ever came to fruition, and there is no evidence to suggest that the orders heeded papal advice in ignoring royal truces.¹¹⁹ Indeed, Calatrava’s *definiciones* of 1211 say that a brother who breaks the peace can be received back into the order only with the consent of the master, the king, and the visitor.¹²⁰ The decisive role of the Iberian monarchs in directing the orders’ exercise of their mission is quite clear.¹²¹ Although the brothers maintained their commitment to fighting the Muslims and generally avoided offensive action against other Christians, kings were nevertheless guiding hands and counted on respect for their truces.¹²² They kept the orders under their protection as well as under their control, and they were vigilant against being crossed.¹²³ Pope Urban wrote in 1263 on behalf of five brothers of Calatrava whom the king had exiled for allegedly aiding his enemies.¹²⁴ This contrasts markedly with the independence of the Hospital and the Temple in the Near East. In 1168, Bohemund III of Antioch promised to observe the Hospital’s own truces and granted it permission to ignore any that he made without their consent.¹²⁵

As explained in [Chapter 1](#), the role of Jerusalem in the definition of crusading has been a vexatious historiographical issue. Although it has been argued that, by the latter half of the twelfth century, the Iberian crusading project was well established on its own footing, there is some evidence that the Iberian orders were attracted to the Holy Land.¹²⁶ The militia of Ávila, when incorporated into Santiago in 1172, offered to join Santiago in pursuing the Moors across the sea and even unto Jerusalem.¹²⁷ Bohemond of Antioch invited Santiago to establish itself in his principality in 1180 and offered land for this purpose, saying also that he wished to benefit from the brothers’ prayers.¹²⁸ The truces in Iberia prompted Calatrava to organize an expedition to the Holy Land at the beginning of the thirteenth century, for which the pope encouraged donations, although it never came to pass.¹²⁹ This idea surfaced once again in the 1230s, and the pope wrote a letter to the patriarch of Antioch recommending Calatrava’s

qualities and asking for assistance in procuring a territorial base there.¹³⁰ Bohemond V invited Santiago to the Latin East after 1244.¹³¹ Alexander IV sought Calatrava's military expertise in 1260, instructing the order to send representatives to Rome to discuss the Tartar menace.¹³² The source that Lomax has called the *Anales viejos de Uclés*, probably compiled in the 1280s, includes the capture of Jerusalem in its short list of important historical events.¹³³ Ultimately, however, Jerusalem remained a dream, not only because of the orders' lack of practical means but also because of the lack of royal support for these initiatives.¹³⁴

The spiritual significance of the orders' participation in battle, then, consisted of a threefold justification: the defense and expansion of Christendom, the love of neighbor, and the conversion from bad knighthood to good knighthood. The last theme, though important for theorists and the early ecclesiastical supporters, was not explicitly understood by lay donors. For them, it was sufficient that the brethren fought on their behalf. The various sources examined in this chapter demonstrate a widespread belief that such fighting was indeed meritorious. But there were necessarily limitations and obligations imposed by the criteria of holy warfare, and adhering to them was often difficult to do in practice, mostly because of the monarchy's role. The historical record shows that the brethren successfully contributed to the forward progress of the Reconquest and placed themselves in harm's way through constant defense of the frontier. On balance, therefore, and keeping in mind the limitation of the sources, the orders did wage war as a spiritual mission, at least by the criteria according to which they understood it.

CARE OF THE SICK AND RANSOMING

Many military orders were linked in some way with the care of the sick. Among the three Iberian orders, Santiago's commitment to this activity was the most extensive, followed by Calatrava.¹³⁵ Evidence for Alcántara's hospitaller work is thin. In 1238, a *familiar*, or associate, of the order named Julián Busún turned over a third of his goods to the hospital of Santa María de Almocóvar, which apparently was being built at this time, but no other information about it survives.¹³⁶ A single bull of 1265 concedes indulgences for supporting the hospital at Pereiro, which was supposed to care for poor and neglected children, and the *difinciones* of 1306 refer to the office of *enfermero* (infirmarian).¹³⁷ The Order of Santiago was dedicated to caring for the sick from the very beginning, as its Primitive Rule mentions two hospitals, one on the frontier and another on the pilgrimage route.¹³⁸ These were the hospitals at Toledo and San

Marcos de León, respectively.¹³⁹ Santiago's early commitment to this work may reflect a conscious imitation of other military orders, although both these hospitals were already in operation before the order acquired them. Alexander III encourages the endeavor in his confirmation bull.¹⁴⁰ In the course of time, Santiago established numerous additional hospitals, including at Cuenca, Las Tiendas, Villamartín, Alarcón, Talavera, Ávila, and Teruel.¹⁴¹ The Order of Calatrava, although far less conspicuous in this work than Santiago, had an infirmary at Salvatierra while the headquarters resided there, and an infirmary at Calatrava as well. The houses of Zorita, Alcañiz, and Martos had medical facilities, and the order ran freestanding hospitals at Guadalerza, Santa Olalla, and El Collado.¹⁴² Although there was a distinction between the orders' care for their own members and care for the sick in general, there does not seem to have been a rigid separation on an institutional level.¹⁴³

It requires some mental effort to bridge the distance between medieval and modern medical care. Although the popular imagination easily conjures up bloodletting and gruesome surgeries as characteristic of medieval medicine (images that do have some basis in fact), this treatment is inadequate. Partly because of their limited medical knowledge and technology, and partly because of a different view of the world, medieval caregivers did not necessarily view the curing of illness as a major priority.¹⁴⁴ The priority, instead, was providing greater comfort to the ill by way of clean clothing and linens, warmth, and adequate food.¹⁴⁵ As medical care was mostly carried out under religious auspices, patients' spiritual state was often of greater concern than their physical state, and caregivers sought to prepare patients for death with reception of the sacraments. Medieval medical care, therefore, made less use of technical expertise and was more a work of charity. Some studies of medieval Near Eastern medicine have speculated on the extent to which superior Arab and Byzantine techniques were adopted by crusaders and military orders, but unfortunately the evidence for Iberia is quite poor.¹⁴⁶ It is known, however, that urban development and pilgrimage to Compostela were major catalysts for the foundation of new hospitals in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.¹⁴⁷

In the case of the military orders, hospitaller work was generally not performed by the fighting brethren.¹⁴⁸ The brothers who were assigned to the hospitals, probably the "brothers of office" to which Santiago's Rule refers, did acquire basic medical skills.¹⁴⁹ Hence, care of the sick is better understood as an aspect of the orders' corporate charitable work rather than the task of each and every individual member. The commitment of resources and manpower to hospitaller work shows its importance for the military-religious life. According to

the Rule of Santiago, the commanders of infirmaries were supposed to bring necessary equipment on campaign in order to minister to those brothers or other soldiers who fell sick, remembering that such a service was to be done not only for the people but also for Jesus himself: "For such an action contains in itself the fulness of charity toward which everyone must strive so much more since without it all things become less profitable, and with it nothing can prevent the reward of salvation."¹⁵⁰ The clothing and beds of deceased brethren were to be donated to the hospitals as well.¹⁵¹ The *establecimientos* of 1310 stipulate that there should be *Fisicos para los dolientes*, or physicians for the ill, in the infirmaries, and that they have the necessary means to perform their duties.¹⁵² The Rule also prescribes regular donations of food and clothing to the poor on certain feast days.¹⁵³ Although at least one historian has rejected this kind of ritualized giving as true charity, the order probably regarded these donations as just one part of their larger caritative work.¹⁵⁴

Santiago and Calatrava both undertook hospitaller activities, but only the former appears to have built ransoming hospitals. The threat of capture was a constant feature of life on the frontier, but only in the twelfth century did the redemption of captives become an organized activity.¹⁵⁵ Soon it became an important work of mercy in Iberia, around which a large corpus of laws and customs developed during the thirteenth century.¹⁵⁶ Indeed, the majority of Santiago's hospitals were dedicated to this activity: Toledo, Cuenca, Alarcón, Moya, Talavera, and Uclés in Castile; Castrotorafe and Sancti Spiritus in León; and Teruel in Aragon.¹⁵⁷ The Leonese foundations were soon lost or dedicated to other purposes, but the mere number of them shows the order's commitment to the task. A document of 1187 indicates that all spoils taken from the Muslims were to be dedicated to ransoming, echoing a passage from the Rule.¹⁵⁸ The order's enthusiasm for this activity manifested itself in unexpected ways. The *fuero*, or town charter, issued in 1220 to Castrotorafe insists that the settlers contribute to building a hospital there.¹⁵⁹ The masters also showed concern for the spiritual welfare of the institutions. In 1245, Pelayo Pérez Correa ordered that six priests be maintained at San Marcos in Teruel.¹⁶⁰ A distinction should be made between the ransoming of the orders' own brethren and the ransoming of Christians in general. The latter was seen as a charitable activity, and Innocent III enjoined it upon everyone in the Near East who was capable of it, including the military orders.¹⁶¹ Santiago's ransoming foundations were primarily interested in ransoming ordinary Christians. Surprisingly, there is some evidence that the orders were not in the habit of making large or frequent ransoms for their own men.¹⁶² Richard Barber has attributed this to the frequency with

which the military brethren fought to the death or were slaughtered upon capture.¹⁶³

There is little direct evidence of the actual process of ransoming from the military orders' own sources. The *Miraculos romançados de Pedro Marín* contains some ransoming vignettes. A number of these designate fortresses of Calatrava as safe havens to which prisoners arrived but do not indicate that the brethren were directly involved in the rescuing.¹⁶⁴ Although their main purpose was to recount the miraculous intercession of St. Dominic on behalf of captives, the stories offer a window into the temporal reality: cruel treatment in captivity, the difficulty of negotiating a ransom, the harrowing journey to freedom. Anxiety over capture, an important theme among crusaders in general, is evident here as well.¹⁶⁵ The occasional decision of military leaders to kill rather than enslave or ransom their prisoners mitigated worries of long captivity.¹⁶⁶ In Santiago at least, negotiating a ransom required the permission of the master or commander, although this stipulation is relatively late (1310).¹⁶⁷ Ransoming could involve prohibited commerce with the Muslims, for in 1239 the pope absolved members of Santiago who had incurred excommunication thereby.¹⁶⁸ He also gave the order general permission to offer cows and other animals, though not horses or mules, in exchange for prisoners.¹⁶⁹ When Alfonso VIII founded the ransom hospital of Toledo in 1180, he specified that captives be redeemed for ten *aureos* apiece.¹⁷⁰ Forey says that in the Near East, the military orders relied on royal assistance when they did attempt to ransom their own brethren.¹⁷¹ It is possible that the Iberian monarchs exercised a similar role. Ransoming could involve the direct purchase of captives or the exchange of Moorish prisoners, although the military orders were usually reluctant to part with their own slaves, who were most often acquired as spoils of war.¹⁷² Many of these would have normally been used in domestic or agricultural work, but occasionally they figured into ransom exchanges.¹⁷³ A donation of 1220, in fact, left two Moors to Santiago for this purpose.¹⁷⁴ Alfonso VIII gave Santiago the right to half of the total ransom obtained through the redemption of captives worth a thousand *aureos* or more, a considerable sum.¹⁷⁵ The king made a similar concession to Calatrava in 1183, when he allowed the order to keep half of the value of Moorish captives worth a thousand *maravedíes* or more.¹⁷⁶ In less specific terms, but probably along the same lines, the king of León conceded the privilege of *gratia captivorum sarracenorum* to Alcántara.¹⁷⁷

The proper management of patrimony was no less important for the hospitals than for the other commanderies. At least one of them felt compelled to keep track of its goods, as an inventory for the hospital

of Talavera from 1238 is extant. Although much of it is illegible, the record keeping was evidently meticulous.¹⁷⁸ When seven Moors escaped from the ransom hospital of Moya, the local citizens returned them, but the slaves were subsequently stolen by people from a nearby town with which Moya had a peace agreement. Not wanting to aggravate their allies, Moya's town council paid the hospital 1200 *maravedíes*, a transaction that was recorded in 1234.¹⁷⁹ Moorish slaves could also be given for cash or as payment rather than for Christian prisoners. Commander Gonzalo Martínez of Las Tiendas sold a slave named Hameth to Abdallah of Sahagún for fifty *maravedíes*; it is unclear whether this was a ransom or simply the acquisition of another servant by Abdallah.¹⁸⁰ Calatrava gave eleven prisoners to the abbey of Monsalud in 1189 in exchange for a disputed piece of property in Collado and Bern-inches.¹⁸¹ This did not mean, however, that the hospitals exercised independent jurisdiction over their own goods. The prior of Uclés issued statutes for the hospital of Las Tiendas in 1211, which were primarily concerned with the proper payment of tithes.¹⁸² As mentioned in [Chapter 2](#), this could be a source of friction between lay and clerical brothers, and the hospitals were no exception.¹⁸³ John XXII once had to appoint judges in a case between the prior of Uclés and the commander Don Lope Alfonso de Saavedra, who was refusing to pay tithes. Papal intervention in what ought to have been an internal matter may be yet another sign of both waning obedience and the privatization of property by uppity commanders. Apparently Don Lope thought the priests were asking for too much money, for he called witnesses to testify about the donations he had received from one Doña María Alfonso.¹⁸⁴ Caring for the sick and ransoming captives was a crucial aspect of the military orders' work, especially Santiago's. As such, it required considerable investment of various resources, which in turn created friction over who was to manage them.

Donations

The orders' dedication to hospitaller work and ransoming would have been impossible without the generosity of donors, whose documents are a valuable source of information. In the donation charter of the Toledo ransom hospital, Alfonso VIII states that the redemption of Christian captives and the assistance of those who carry out this task are most pious works and helpful for salvation, and he forbids the use of the hospital's revenues for any other purposes.¹⁸⁵ The king is also concerned to provide for his parents' souls.¹⁸⁶ Alfonso VIII was a very generous patron of these hospitals, founding yet another at Alarcón for the redemption of captives in 1203.¹⁸⁷ Fernando III, though less generous, continued this royal tradition with a donation to the

hospital at Toledo.¹⁸⁸ Sancti Spiritus of Salamanca, later converted into a female convent, was originally a donation of Alfonso IX to Santiago for the redemption of captives.¹⁸⁹ A major donation to Santiago's hospital of Las Tiendas, dating from 1222, shows a strong appreciation for the order's vocation. Pedro Fernández and his wife, Teresa, for the sake of their own and their parents' souls, donated five-thousand *maravedíes* to the hospital to buy lands. The annual revenues of these lands were to be distributed in this way: one hundred *maravedíes* for the defense of the frontier, seventy for the hospital to redeem captives, thirty for the convent of Uclés, and the rest to maintain three priests for the celebration of the Divine Office.¹⁹⁰ This donation was important enough to be later translated into the vernacular and preserved in the central archive.¹⁹¹ In 1205, another man by the name of Pedro Fernández, together with his wife, Jimena, offered numerous properties to Calatrava for the establishment of a hospital in Santa Olalla. Its purpose was to care for soldiers, and the donors specified that the commander of this hospital accompany the royal host in campaigns to tend to the wounded poor.¹⁹² Showing a level of concern and prescience that was perhaps atypical of donors, they insisted that the commander bring along a chaplain to provide viaticum and a master of surgery to provide medical care.¹⁹³ Pedro and his wife were also aware of the order's Cistercian affiliation, for their donation was made *Deo et ordini sancti benedicti*. Other donations fit within the giver's larger patterns of charity. Tello Pérez de Meneses, the founder of Santiago's hospitals of Cuenca, Las Tiendas, and Villamartín, specialized in care of the sick.¹⁹⁴ In addition to two abbeys, he also founded another hospital for the care of prisoners at Cuenca and the leper hospital of San Nicolás del Real Camino near Sahagún.¹⁹⁵

Some donations, while not including elaborate statements of spiritual motives, were nevertheless specifically destined to the care of the sick or ransoming captives. Alfonso VIII's notary, as a rather touching memorial of his erstwhile lord, donated his land in Moya to King Enrique to build a ransom hospital for Santiago.¹⁹⁶ Fernando III gave twelve measures of salt annually to Calatrava's infirmary at Collado in 1218 and offered his property in Yegros to Santiago's hospital in Toledo the following year.¹⁹⁷ Tello Pérez de Meneses specifically states that Las Tiendas would care for *leprosis et pauperibus* (lepers and poor people) and that the order cannot use the hospital's possessions for anything else. If it does, Pérez asks the king to revoke the donation.¹⁹⁸ Apparently the clan was satisfied, for Tello's son, Alfonso Téllez de Meneses, founded the order's hospital at Talavera in 1226, and the family continued its patronage for at least another generation.¹⁹⁹ The practice of patronizing the same religious

foundation in this way was common among the Castilian nobility, although here, as in other respects, the Meneses clan was precocious.²⁰⁰ In 1198, the municipal government of Huete promised an annual donation to Santiago's local ransom hospital "for the honor of God and the Blessed Apostle James."²⁰¹ No mention is made of the Order of Santiago itself, and the town states that its motives are the exaltation of the royal family, the good of the council, and the redemption of captives.²⁰² The donation is envisioned as a collaborative effort and specifies the quantities of money and goods in kind that various groups in Huete would have to make. At some point, the town's enthusiasm must have waned, because in 1256 Fernando III, and in 1260 Alfonso X, had to remind Huete to maintain its commitment.²⁰³ The town council of Cuenca offered an annual donation to the local hospital in 1184 for the sake of the living and the dead.²⁰⁴ Alarcón's municipal government made a similar contribution, but like Huete, later wanted to renege, as a document of Pope Honorius III testifies.²⁰⁵ Properties and goods were also acquired piecemeal from individual donors. Gonzalo Rodríguez and his wife, Urraca, donated a considerable amount of livestock to Uclés for the redemption of captives in 1212.²⁰⁶ A married couple in the town of Moya donated a variety of goods, including four hundred *maravedíes*, a house, windmills, two good horses, and arms, to the hospital of Cuenca for the redemption of captives and for the sake of their own and their parents' souls.²⁰⁷ In 1231, Gil Pérez de Molina loaned some mills and vineyards to Santiago, saying that if he were unable to pay back the loan, the order could keep the properties for the redemption of captives, which would benefit his and his wife's souls.²⁰⁸ The church hierarchy also helped protect and promote these institutions. In 1184, the bishop of Cuenca granted an indulgence of forty days for alms given to the hospital, and Urban encouraged the faithful to contribute to the foundation at Toledo in 1187.²⁰⁹ Gregory VIII issued a bull requesting alms for all Santiago's hospitals.²¹⁰ Pope Alexander did likewise in 1258.²¹¹ The pontiffs were also concerned to protect donations already made, as a 1260 bull on behalf of the Cuenca hospital demonstrates.²¹²

The extensive commitment of the military orders, especially Santiago, to care of the sick and ransoming should be seen as integral to their overall mission. In one sense, it could be considered a more "traditional" religious activity, but in fact it was part of the more mobile and active trends of twelfth-century spirituality, and the military orders were on the cutting edge.²¹³ Only after the middle of the thirteenth century did orders specifically dedicated to ransoming, such as the Trinitarians and Mercedarians, effectively eclipse them. The commitment to the work of healing was also a major means by

which the orders attracted donors. They could appeal to both their military and their hospitaller sides as circumstances required.²¹⁴ Ecclesiastical knighthood was dedicated not to mere bloodshed but to the defense and protection of Christians in general, whether from Muslim armies, enslavement, or the ravages of illness. The unifying principle behind these activities, articulated especially well in the Rule of Santiago, was charity. The notion of crusading as an act of love, jarring as it may be to the modern reader, is the same rationale behind the activities of the military orders.

Donations and *Familiaridad*

Thus far, the Iberian military orders' mission in the world has been considered according to their activities: fighting, caring for the sick, and ransoming. Yet contemporaries also perceived them as conduits of spiritual merit, for the simple reason that they were religious communities dedicated to God.²¹⁵ This allowed the orders to create networks of intercession and assistance, by which both they and their donors profited spiritually and materially. The contours of these networks are evident in conventional donations and also in formal associations of confraternity, or *familiaridad*, by which laymen were bound more closely to an order.

Although it has been shown that monarchs often appreciated the importance of the orders' activities, it was not unusual for them to explain donations in more conventional terms, that is, for the sake of their souls, for the remission of sins, or out of a desire to support a religious order.²¹⁶ The last of these was the reason given by Queen Berenguela of León, in a donation to Santiago of 1197.²¹⁷ Early donations to Alcántara by the kings of León employ a stock phrase about the need to maintain religious communities.²¹⁸ Sometimes a whole range of justifications was offered. Alfonso IX gave the fortress of Alcántara to Calatrava in 1217 for services rendered to him, for the sake of his parents' and his own souls, and to benefit from the brothers' prayers.²¹⁹ In another donation to Alcántara, he gave these same motivations but was very specific about remunerating service given in a particular battle.²²⁰ The request for prayers was common in Alfonso IX's donations to Santiago, and in one donation to San Marcos de León he requested a weekly Mass for his father's soul.²²¹ Sancho of Portugal asked (or perhaps required) the priests of Santiago to say three Masses for his soul each Lent, in thanks for his donations.²²² This commitment is repeated in statutes of 1259, to which the name of King Fernando of Castile is added.²²³ Requests for prayers, though less frequent in the fourteenth century, did not disappear altogether. Fernando IV, in donations of 1302 and 1303, asks Alcántara to pray for him and his predecessors.²²⁴ Even the popes in distant Rome

appreciated the brothers' prayers, for both Clement V and Boniface VIII requested them when they wrote the master of Calatrava announcing their election to the chair of Peter.²²⁵ The statement of spiritual motives was also sometimes intended to persuade. Alfonso X, whose donations were generally rather terse, gushes piety when giving Calatrava the property of Osuna, where he wanted them to erect their new central commandery.²²⁶

Private donors were the most likely to give for the good of their souls apart from any explicit consideration of the orders' activities. The Count Fernando Ponce de Cabrera and his wife, Estefanía, gave some houses and a vineyard to Calatrava for the good of their own and their parents' souls.²²⁷ Estéban Fernandez and his wife, Aldonza Rodríguez, made their donation to Alcántara simply "for God and for our souls."²²⁸ In 1198, a widow named María and her children donated properties in Carantona to Santiago for the souls of her dead husband and parents.²²⁹ Pedro Martínez and his wife, Sancha, supported Calatrava for the remission of their sins.²³⁰ García López and his wife, Inglesa, wax eloquent on the goodness of supporting religious orders but without mentioning the uniqueness of Calatrava's activities.²³¹ Pedro Fernández de Castro, who said that his father was a member of Santiago, made a donation to the order for the sake of his own soul during Alfonso IX's rule.²³² In the middle of the thirteenth century, one Don Pelay Pérez de Asturias gave to Calatrava for the good of his soul and the remission of his sins.²³³ Not all statements of spiritual motives, however, were equally authentic, as sales could be thinly disguised as alms.²³⁴

Familiaridad

It was common, especially in the years before 1250, for members of Castilian society to enter into relationships of confraternity, or *familiaridad*, with the military orders.²³⁵ This relationship did not involve direct military service, but rather consisted of several basic elements: the donor's offering of himself to the order, his body for burial, and his soul for participation in the brothers' prayers; the donation of some goods or properties to the community; and the order's acknowledgment of the donor's new status.²³⁶ The particular elements varied from case to case. Sometimes *familiares* received property in usufruct or stipulated that if they should ever enter religion, they would do so in the same order. *Familiares*, therefore, enjoyed both the spiritual benefits of prayer and burial and the material benefits of usufruct. It was also an advantageous arrangement for the orders, which acquired considerable property in this way. Occasionally other benefits were forthcoming, as when, in 1272, Gregory X granted Santiago's *familiares* a seventh part of the

indulgence given at Rome.²³⁷

The Iberian orders counted a few figures of high standing among their *familiares*. The Infante Don Alfonso de Molina offered himself to Calatrava in 1254 for the remission of his sins. Reflecting a poor grasp of history, he justified the choice of this order on the grounds that his grandfather had founded it.²³⁸ Fernando III's son Enrique was close to Calatrava, whereas the Infantes Manuel and Felipe, also sons of Fernando III, entered into *familiaridad* with Santiago.²³⁹ Manuel chose to be buried at Uclés, a rare honor for a nonbrother.²⁴⁰ It also seems that the Leonese magnate Rodrigo Fernández (d. 1246) and Alfonso de la Mesa, brother of King Fernando, were buried at Calatrava la Nueva.²⁴¹ The education of the future Alfonso X was even entrusted to Pérez Correa.²⁴² Alfonso X, in turn, wrote words of high praise of both Pelayo and the Master Lope Díaz of Calatrava.²⁴³ Alfonso Téllez de Meneses, whose links to Santiago have been discussed already, became a *familiar* at some point prior to 1261.²⁴⁴ These relationships, of course, considerably increased the orders' prestige and obtained for them additional influence in the affairs of the kingdom, although Lomax has suggested that Santiago paid too high a price in lands for its friendship with Don Manuel.²⁴⁵ Yet the increased social prestige of the orders in this period can hardly be denied. From the reign of Alfonso X, the masters habitually appear as witnesses to royal charters.²⁴⁶

The Order of Santiago had a particularly close and long-standing relationship with lords of Albarracín, whose lands straddled Castile and Aragon. The negotiations between this family and the master helped establish the order's first real presence in Aragon.²⁴⁷ Fernando Ruiz de Azagra made out three wills, one each in 1190, 1192, and 1193, in which he made the order a beneficiary.²⁴⁸ In the first, Fernando left Albarracín to Santiago and offered himself as a *familiar*; in the second, he repeated the donation and asked that his son Pedro remain under the tutelage of the brethren until the age of twenty. Fernando manifests his concern that Albarracín not be swallowed up by any other lord.²⁴⁹ But in 1194, he changed his mind and issued another will, in which Santiago was only to hold Albarracín in trust until Pedro came of age.²⁵⁰ Mur i Raurell claims that Pedro entered the order as a knightly brother, although this is hard to believe given that he offered himself as a *familiar* in 1223.²⁵¹ The order's inheritance of Albarracín was disputed, for a document of 1211 records Alfonso VIII's settlement of the matter in Santiago's favor.²⁵² Pedro was the father of Sancha Pérez de Azagra, who married Lope de Varea, and this couple also maintained very close ties to Santiago. The Azagras and the Vareas were habitually buried in the Church of San Marcos, which Sancha eventually donated to the order. This church,

together with the ransom hospital she founded at Teruel, became the basis of Santiago's commandery of San Marcos, which she continued to favor with donations. Before her death, Sancha arranged for three priests at San Marcos to say Masses for her soul.²⁵³ The order apparently had problems with the agreement, as four years later, in 1246, its terms were changed, requiring from Sancha a larger monetary contribution.²⁵⁴ Once she died, her daughter Milia made additional donations while ensuring that the commitment of Masses was honored.²⁵⁵ Later on, the family ceased its patronage of the order, but the sixty years of close ties are an impressive testimony to the order's attraction to pious laymen.

There is one peculiar case that is hard to classify as *familiaridad* but does not make sense as an ordinary profession either. In 1223, Juan Estéban and his wife, Justa, offered themselves to Calatrava "not as any kind of *familiares*, but as true brethren," donating to the order all their property.²⁵⁶ This would seem, therefore, a straightforward example of entrance into religion, and given that Calatrava's female community of San Felices had been founded just a few years before, perhaps Justa intended to reside there.²⁵⁷ Yet the agreement contains numerous unusual provisions. First, it stipulates that the order cannot expel the couple or force them to take the habit of any other order. Second, if either Juan or Justa were to die and the other wanted to marry again, the order would retain the property, repudiating the surviving partner as an apostate. The tone of this *carta de profesión*, if such it is, is oddly contractual. It may be that the couple saw themselves as *donnés*, though they do not use this term.²⁵⁸ Of even greater interest, however, are the stated spiritual motives, which extend beyond the usual remission of sins. Because the couple cannot have children, they wish to adopt the members of the order as sons.²⁵⁹ They do not want to fall under the biblical curse of those who leave no seed on earth.²⁶⁰ They claim to be expressing themselves in their own words in order to give the donation greater force.²⁶¹ Whether this document signified entrance into religion or *familiaridad*, it gives a rare glimpse into the deeper motives of ordinary donors.

Aside from these high-profile examples, there are other instances of the orders' ties of *familiaridad*. Pelayo Gallego and his wife, Ozenda, offered themselves to Santiago in 1180, making a postmortem donation of all their goods.²⁶² In an agreement between the bishop of Zamora and Alcántara, it is said that the order once received the Church of San Juan de Tauro from some *familiares*, who had made the donation on behalf of their parents' souls and their own.²⁶³ One Don Peregrinus offered himself and his property to Calatrava on the eve of battle in 1212, promising to enter the order if, having survived, he later chose the religious life.²⁶⁴ Torres y Tapia records a series of

confraternity ties forged in the 1230s by Alcántara, all of which include some kind of postmortem donation to the order. Sometimes the goods involved are specified, with special emphasis on the donation of horse and arms.²⁶⁵ Opponents of the military orders occasionally targeted them through their *familiares*. Gregory IX ordered the town council of Salamanca to stop preventing donations to Alcántara by their *familiares* in 1238, and two years later he prohibited episcopal excommunications of these and others who did business with the order.²⁶⁶ In 1258, the pope forbade the bishops from excommunicating or placing under interdict Calatrava's associates, including *familiares*.²⁶⁷ Dominic Selwood has written of the novelty and openness of the Temple's and the Hospital's confraternity relationships.²⁶⁸ The Iberian orders likewise offered their spiritual and temporal merits to a wide range of people.

DECLINE

Helen Nicholson and Philippe Josserand have argued convincingly that the military orders, despite suffering attacks on their record of accomplishments, were neither subjected to fundamental critique nor in danger of disappearing in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.²⁶⁹ Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara continued to defend the kingdom and wage war in this period and beyond. Yet they experienced a significant shift of motivations and a decline in religious devotion, in favor of more worldly interests. At the same time, the charitable activities of caring for the sick and ransoming diminished. These developments are parallel to the overall decline in religious observance discussed in the previous chapter.²⁷⁰

Although the Reconquest effectively came to a halt in 1250, Castile was still greatly in need of the military service that the orders provided. Periodic rebellions from the conquered Muslim population, new incursions from North Africa after 1275, and internal instability, all provided considerable opportunities for fighting. For the most part, the military orders continued this service, as the chroniclers recount their presence in major campaigns. There is, however, evidence of declining participation in military ventures from the late thirteenth century. In 1303, Jaime II of Aragon asked for one hundred Templars, sixty Hospitallers, thirty brothers of Calatrava, and twenty of Santiago to help him against Granada, but in the end he obtained just twenty or thirty Templars.²⁷¹ The abbot of Morimond told the master of Calatrava in 1311 that he had heard that the order no longer fought for the name of Christ, and he even warned that it could meet the same end as the Temple. The abbot of Citeaux also wrote a similar letter.²⁷² John XXII continued in this vein in 1318, exhorting the

order to fight against the Saracens.²⁷³ Evidently not satisfied with the results, the pontiff wrote two letters to his legate in December of 1320 about the three Iberian orders. In the first, he asked the legate to oblige the orders to supply as many troops as possible for the frontier and alluded to rumors that they were using their funds illicitly.²⁷⁴ In the second letter, issued the following day, he ordered an investigation into the orders' assets to determine just how many armed contingents they were capable of providing.²⁷⁵

Josserand has argued that both the abbot of Morimond and John XXII missed the mark in their assessment. The abbot had recently refereed Calatrava's dispute over the mastership and was influenced by Capetian propaganda against the Templars, whereas the pope was venting his displeasure over the military orders' excessive deference to the Castilian monarchy.²⁷⁶ Josserand is right to insist on the orders' good reputation across Castile. The odd complaint against their unusual status as religious, or some light mockery in literary works, did not amount to serious opposition.²⁷⁷ Yet I think the letters reflect the reality of the orders' declining spiritual status and increasing secularization, a matter that presumably would have worried the pope and the abbot more than the average layman. Instead of seeing the two ecclesiastics as "out of touch" with the Castilian reality, I suggest that they may have been privy to particular internal problems that would not have been obvious to the broader society. Apparently the lax commitment to the frontier was not corrected. In 1325, the Master García López de Padilla of Calatrava lost his mastership for neglecting the defense of fortresses.²⁷⁸

While Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara continued to provide military service during the fourteenth century, there was a shift away from religious motivations to more conventionally aristocratic ones.²⁷⁹ Rades y Andrada reports a speech given by the master of Santiago, Alonso Meléndez de Guzmán, before a battle in which his forces were outmatched by his enemy, the king of Granada. The master expects that God will give him victory, but first he says that his predecessors in the office of master did not fear to fight Moorish kings: "And since my lineage is not better than those Masters', I do not want to diminish anything of what those of the Guzmán line did, from which I come."²⁸⁰ This incident, which took place in the late 1330s, captures well the class-consciousness and pride that increasingly characterized the orders as the fourteenth century progressed. Luis Corral Val says that, in the Late Middle Ages, the master of Alcántara went from being the head of a military-religious order to a powerful and ambitious lord of the realm involved in all the political battles of the age.²⁸¹ This statement likewise applies to the masters of Santiago and Calatrava.

Another sign of the orders' declining mission was the considerable decrease in donations and contracts of *familiaridad*.²⁸² The downward trajectory of the Manuel family is particularly instructive. While the infante was a generous patron and *familiar* of Santiago in the middle of thirteenth century, his son Juan Manuel, while still valuing the military orders, shifted his favor notably toward the Dominicans.²⁸³ This is consistent with a broader change in religious sentiment that favored the mendicants and other orders that were notable for their commitment to poverty and preaching.²⁸⁴ Aside from a general tapering off in donations that was already evident from 1250, there were also legal efforts to prevent the military orders from acquiring property. The Cortes passed laws to prohibit the alienation of the royal demesne and in 1322 attempted to recover former demesne territories that the orders then possessed.²⁸⁵ Alfonso XI later had to promise to fulfill these provisions.²⁸⁶

The orders' ransoming and hospitaller activities also diminished from the middle of the thirteenth century. One reason was that the frontier was no longer a constant source of danger and, therefore, of captives. In a letter concerning Santiago's hospital in Toledo, Innocent IV notes with satisfaction that the Saracens had been driven out of the region. This development, however, had prompted some of the hospital's benefactors to revoke their donations, since the brothers could no longer use them for the redemption of captives.²⁸⁷ The pope forbade the revocation and granted permission for the brothers to use the donations for other pious purposes.²⁸⁸ In 1299, Boniface VIII repeated this privilege.²⁸⁹ In 1327, the master of Santiago gave the commandery of Villamartín to the female convent of Santa Eufemia, as it was no longer needed for ransoming.²⁹⁰ At the same time, however, there were still Christians in captivity and, hence, ransoming to be accomplished. Two orders that specialized in this activity, the Mercedarians and the Trinitarians, were by then well established in the peninsula, which reduced the importance of the military brothers' efforts. The ransom orders were more willing to exchange prisoners, even purchasing Muslims directly for the sole purpose of exchanging them for Christian captives.²⁹¹ Having pioneered ransoming in Iberia, the orders were themselves being eclipsed.

CONCLUSION

The Iberian military orders were undoubtedly conscious of their purpose in the world: to lay down their lives for the defense and expansion of Christendom and thereby to save their souls. Fighting, caring for the sick, and ransoming, as well as the offering of prayers, were different aspects of this same mission. Upon closer examination,

Brodman's distinction between military-monastic and military-hospitaller orders must be nuanced. While Alcántara seems to have been almost exclusively concerned with warfare, the configuration of activities in Santiago and Calatrava was quite similar, even if there were significant differences of commitment and institutional development. As the lay knighthood was expected not merely to fight but to fight and act according to some recognized standard of conduct, so also ecclesiastical knighthood was bound to such a standard, which was defined in terms of charity. The military orders, however, were also tied to the religious traditions that justified their existence as corporate bodies of the Church. This meant that the brethren not only prayed for the faithful, in accordance with the older monastic tradition, but also were at the forefront of the newer active trends of caring for the sick and ransoming captives. The abundance of privileges and donations and the ties of confraternity demonstrate that the society in which they lived appreciated and supported their efforts. For better or worse, royal interests were pivotal, whether as a source of support or as a stumbling block to avoiding wars with other Christians. Although the orders were never subjected to systematic critique, it is nevertheless clear that they were losing their spiritual potency in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. They found themselves, in Josserand's memorable phrase, increasingly at the margins of the economy of grace.[292](#)

CHAPTER FOUR

BROTHERS IN ARMS: THE ORDERS' RELATIONS WITH ONE ANOTHER

With the hope of encouraging their knights to live and work in greater harmony, the masters of Calatrava and Santiago on several occasions concluded *hermandades* or pacts of friendship and brotherhood. . . . [T]hey reveal a continuing desire to achieve a true spiritual fraternity which could be translated into cooperative action on the field of battle.¹

—Joseph O’Callaghan

When representatives of Santiago, Calatrava, the Temple, and the Hospital gathered in 1224 to establish a pact of mutual cooperation, they stated their reason for doing so in the following terms: “But let it be known that we make this pact so that there might be a bond of greater love between us.”² In the previous chapter, I argued that the organizing principle behind the military orders’ activities was charity, as expressed in John 15:13. To what extent did this charity inform the relationships of the orders with one another? To put it another way, to what extent were the orders conscious of having a common vocation to a way of life that I have called ecclesiastical knighthood? To answer these questions, I analyze a series of documents known as *hermandades*, or pacts, pertaining to Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara.³ Decades ago, Joseph O’Callaghan studied some of these documents and suggested their importance for the orders’ spirituality. Although few in number, the *hermandades* are uniquely valuable texts. Scarcity of source material for understanding the military orders’ spirituality is, as I have observed throughout, a serious problem. It is therefore necessary to exploit more fully the potential of the *hermandades* than other scholars have done.⁴ As they were composed by the orders for the orders, they offer insight into the mind-set of the military brethren themselves rather than their lay or ecclesiastical patrons. These documents bring us as close as possible to life on the ground, to the flesh and blood of the military-religious life. Men may live and fight together for the sake of an ideal, but this ideal must find concrete expression in their everyday practices and motivations. The military orders looked to pope and king for inspiration and patronage, but these figures were often fairly distant. Whether in singing the divine praises, or holding the line on a cavalry charge, or enduring the heat and thirst of campaign on the Castilian meseta, the brethren looked, first and foremost, to one another. The Temple and the Hospital, as occasional parties to the *hermandades*, return to the

foreground of the investigation. This chapter explains why the pacts were formed, what they stipulated, and how they were put into effect, keeping in mind O’Callaghan’s claim that their purpose was to establish “a true spiritual fraternity” among the orders.

WHAT IS A *HERMANDAD*?

The literal meaning of the word *hermandad* is “brotherhood.” Latin equivalents include *fraternitas*, *confraternitas*, and *pactum*. Antonio Álvarez de Morales, while noting the conceptual ambiguity of the word, defines it loosely as “a type of association that has spiritual objectives.”⁵ In the West, *hermandades* were closely associated with the spread of Benedictine monasticism and were used by individual monasteries to create ties of prayer and mutual assistance with others. St. Boniface, St. Benedict of Aniane, and Cluny all enthusiastically promoted these associations.⁶ Although the phenomenon spread across Europe, it is best to restrict focus to the Iberian Peninsula, where the Benedictine Rule became established later than in most other places.⁷ Although Catalonia, thanks to its ties to the Carolingian Empire, witnessed the Rule’s widespread diffusion from the ninth century, the other peninsular kingdoms did not experience this until the tenth, when Cluny began acquiring monasteries further to the west. The first extant *hermandades* appeared at this time, and their number increased considerably in the eleventh century, when Cluny’s influence reached its apogee.

Teodoro Ruiz Jusué divides the *hermandades* into two broad categories: particular and collective.⁸ The former were associations between lay donors and religious institutions in which goods were offered in exchange for participation in spiritual or material benefits. This kind of relationship, especially by the twelfth century, is more accurately described by the term *familiaridad*, as discussed in [Chapter 3](#). Collective *hermandades* were formed between two or more religious institutions and usually involved an exchange of spiritual benefits. Although collective *hermandades* first emerged in the monasteries, by the eleventh century the secular clergy were also making use of them. The stated motives for these associations varied little from case to case: to increase mutual charity and friendship, for the love of God, and to aid body and soul.⁹ There were often, however, more proximate reasons as well. Pacts could be formed in recognition of some favor that one party had done for the other or as a means of resolving disputes.¹⁰ Personal friendship between abbots or bishops was often a decisive factor in forming a pact. The actual drafting of the documents usually took place in a monastic or cathedral chapter, with at least one member of each party in attendance. The specific

terms were discussed and the document made in duplicate to be returned to the other communities for approval and safekeeping.

Most pacts follow the same basic structure. They begin with a preface containing pious sentiments and motives, such as the increase of charity and the mutual exchange of benefits. Next, the terms of the agreement are given, usually with the spiritual ones coming first, although this order is sometimes reversed.¹¹ They end with a resolution to maintain the agreement forever and with a condemnation of anyone who might violate it. During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, spiritual concerns tended to predominate. These consisted of the exchange of good works and intercessory prayers for the dead. Good works included prayer, fasting, and almsgiving offered on behalf of the sister community. Prayers for the dead usually meant offering Mass or chanting the Office, although sometimes a temporal element—like a donation of food to the poor—was also included.¹²

Temporal concerns, though less frequent, usually concerned hospitality. This was especially the case before well-organized religious orders existed and when travelers depended on the generosity of isolated monasteries for lodging and sustenance. The specifics of hospitality concerned admission to choir, refectory, dormitory, and chapter. Most often a visiting monk was given full access to all but the chapter, to keep the community's internal affairs private.¹³ Another oft-mentioned aspect of hospitality was the need to seek refuge from one's own community after having run afoul of the superior. In the case that a monk or canon could not tolerate the ire of his master, he could be received in another house and expiate his fault there. Once his penance was complete, he could return to his original community without prejudice.¹⁴

The historical development of the pacts is more difficult to follow. They certainly flourished throughout the thirteenth century and tapered off in frequency by the middle of the fourteenth. In addition, the general lineaments changed somewhat during this period. Whereas earlier *hermandades* had been fairly general about the benefits granted, thirteenth-century agreements became more specific, sometimes to the point of assigning quantities of food or length of stay to hospitality clauses.¹⁵ In some pacts, a traveler was given the option of receiving a ration of food and drink while staying somewhere outside the community, and in other cases cash was substituted for victuals.¹⁶ The new specificity may have intended to correct abuses or problems of interpretation that had resulted from the vagueness of earlier pacts. The anathemas against transgressors tended to disappear, perhaps in recognition of the fact that the agreements had only moral force. There were no real means to punish offenders. There is one case of a *hermandad* between two monasteries, San Pedro de

Cardeña and Sahagún, in which members of both communities shared the same observances and habits, and were treated as indistinguishable from one another. This would be a good document to have, but an eighteenth-century Spanish antiquarian failed to find any record of it during his visit to Sahagún. He did, however, note the oral testimony of its existence.¹⁷ References to material benefits were more frequent during the thirteenth century. This may have been a manifestation of what Teofilo Ruiz calls “bargaining for salvation,” whereby hard-nosed economic considerations entered more prominently into pious donations and exchanges.¹⁸ Ruiz’s study is more concerned with the donations of laymen, but a similar shift of *mentalité* was at work among the clergy as well. Ruiz Jusué says that the *hermandades* were no longer needed in the Late Middle Ages because religious orders, more tightly governed and better administered than before, were meeting their own needs.¹⁹

To avoid confusion, it is necessary to explain that, while the *hermandades* had their origin in religious communities, other groups in society used them for explicitly political purposes.²⁰ The most prominent examples were the municipal *hermandades*, which, after a slow development in the thirteenth century, exploded during Sancho’s rebellion of 1282.²¹ The Order of Santiago entered into several of these political *hermandades* with various other groups in Castilian society.²² Although these are documents of great interest, they are omitted from consideration here, because of their different motivations and character. Yet the *hermandad* as a type of association was already well established in Iberia by the time the military orders began using them. I have already addressed Santiago’s early pacts with Compostela and the militia of Ávila in [Chapter 1](#). Thereafter, the *hermandades* between the military orders were motivated by the desire to foment cooperation in battle and to determine common action toward other groups within society.²³

ANALYSIS OF THE *HERMANDADES*

I count twelve extant *hermandades* between either Santiago, Calatrava, or Alcántara and at least one other military order between 1150 and 1330. The orders signed many types of agreements during this period, and sometimes determining which documents qualify as *hermandades* is challenging. Following a distinction made by Ruiz Jusué, I have included those agreements that have as their principal object the establishment of fraternity through the promise of mutual defense, the exchange of spiritual or temporal benefits, or the establishment of concrete methods to avoid future disputes. I have excluded those agreements in which the pact itself has a secondary importance that

adds moral force to the primary agreement, such as those concerning limits of jurisdiction or the payment of tithes.²⁴ What follows is a close reading of the *hermandades* within their historical context.

1178

In September 1178, King Fernando II of León held a *curia regis* in Salamanca with the bishops and barons of the kingdom. The master of Santiago, the grand prior of the Hospital, and the master of the Temple were present, along with brothers of their respective orders.²⁵ The three leaders reached an agreement, described as *hanc constitutionem*, for the sake of “peace and true concord” between their orders.²⁶ The immediate context may have been a dispute over the possession of Uclés, which Fernando had given to the Hospital during the minority of Alfonso VIII. Once the Castilian king came of age, however, he donated the same place to Santiago.²⁷ The pact states that if a member of one order were to sin against another, the offender was to present himself in chapter of the offended order. If it happened that members of two orders had mutual grievances against each other, the third order was to adjudicate the matter.²⁸ If a member of one order should go to the Roman Curia to handle business, the other orders ought to provide letters manifesting their support of his cause. If he is unable to complete his business and requires help, he can call upon brothers of the other orders to help him with letters to the pope.²⁹ If an order should have to defend its rights against anyone, the other two orders will assist, against any men or even the king himself.³⁰ This agreement exists in two versions: the one published by Martín is nearly identical to the one contained in Santiago’s *bullarium*, except that the former includes a clause concerning battlefield cooperation, stating that the orders should take the vanguard and rear guard and fight together in the royal host, with the king’s permission.³¹ The reason for this discrepancy is unknown, but whatever the case, it is curious that Santiago, not Calatrava, was the first of the Iberian orders to sign a *hermandad*. Santiago had been in existence for less than a decade and had received papal approval just three years earlier. O’Callaghan suggests that, since Calatrava had few possessions in León, it had little interest in the Leonese curia, whereas Ruiz Gómez thinks the conflict between the kings of León and Castile was to blame.³² It appears that, at least for the time being, the pact was successful in resolving the orders’ differences, since in 1184 the Temple and Santiago received a donation in Toro to hold jointly.³³

1182

The next *hermandad*, dating from 1182, is more concerned with

resolving a particular dispute between the orders of Santiago and Calatrava than with outlining terms of close cooperation, but it is important for establishing the tone of their relationship.³⁴ Santiago surrendered the castle of Alcubilla and one hundred *maravedíes* to Calatrava in exchange for its rights in Uclés and the town of Ocaña, east of Toledo. Both the language of the document and the circumstances are somewhat convoluted, but in 1174 the Order of Calatrava had obtained a donation from Alfonso VIII of a tenth of royal revenues in Uclés.³⁵ The brothers of Santiago had just received the fortress three months earlier, and although Calatrava's donation charter protected Santiago's rights, Santiago probably regarded the donation as a move against its interests.³⁶ The brothers of Santiago considered Ocaña rightfully theirs, as it was located in the district of Oreja, which they had received in 1171.³⁷ The master of Calatrava, Martín Pérez de Siones, had aggressive tendencies, and he may have been trying to absorb Santiago.³⁸ Given his similar moves against San Julián del Pereiro described in [Chapter 1](#), this explanation is plausible. The pact of 1182 represents a crucial turning point in the early relationship between the two Iberian orders, because it established Santiago on sufficient territorial footing to continue as an independent entity rather than as one of Calatrava's "conquests." The businesslike terms of the agreement are mitigated by the proposed motive of establishing peace and love between the orders, the prospects of which were about to improve.³⁹ In that same year, Calatrava's Master Martín Pérez de Siones lost his office, apparently for his cruelty to prisoners.⁴⁰ This event was also undoubtedly a factor in the easing of tensions between the two orders.

1188

Six years later, at the *curia regis* held at Carrión, the masters of Calatrava and Santiago, accompanied by other brothers, met again to form a pact. Here the reference to past quarrels is more explicit, implying that the previous agreement had not been entirely successful in settling their disputes, even if hostile takeovers were a thing of the past.⁴¹ One issue the orders probably had in mind was Calatrava's possession of the village of Algarga, located on the Tagus River. Santiago claimed that brothers of Calatrava had wrongfully seized it and placed a boat along the river to collect tolls.⁴² While this new pact of 1188 was supposed to end the orders' existing quarrels, Alfonso VIII had to order the boat removed in 1204, and the issue resurfaced again later.⁴³ Rather than deal with specifics, however, the *hermandad* simply provides for the resolution of future problems. A committee of ten brothers was to be chosen, five from each order, to adjudicate them.⁴⁴ If the committee were to find a brother guilty of an

offense, he was to present himself before the other order's chapter and make satisfaction.⁴⁵ The two orders were not to accept transfers from each other, but rather see to it that each order retained its own members.⁴⁶ This document offers the first of several complex arrangements for dispute resolution, all of which involve the appointment of committees. This provision moved the relations between Santiago and Calatrava from a grudging respect for each other's independence to a mutual understanding of the need for cooperation. They may have concluded that, with the frontier in peril and the Iberian monarchs in disunity, their efforts were best spent opposing the Muslims instead of each other. It has also been suggested that the orders' similarly conflictive relationships with the archbishop of Toledo pushed them closer together.⁴⁷ The year after this pact was signed, one Rodrigo Rodríguez donated the castle of Bogas to both orders to share between them, which may have been a sign of their new friendship.⁴⁸

1202

Alcántara, with its later foundation and militarization, did not enter into the first of its pacts until 1202. The masters of Santiago and San Julián del Pereiro met at Zamora to sign an agreement for mutual assistance and the division of spoils.⁴⁹ The orders pledge to help each other against everyone else, except the king of León.⁵⁰ His privileged status probably reflects both the circumstances of the moment and the orders' reliance on his leadership and favor. Alfonso IX had recently been excommunicated and made the target of a papal crusade because of his aggression against Castile, following the defeat at Alarcos.⁵¹ The orders may have felt pressure to take up arms against Alfonso and wanted to avoid doing so. San Julián's territorial base was limited to León and therefore the order was very dependent on the king. The pact also says that if both orders should fight in the royal host against the Moors, the division of spoils would be equal between them, regardless of how many brothers of each order participated.⁵² If the Moors attacked one of their towns or castles, both orders were to assist in its defense. The document ends with a revealing statement: "And let us consider ourselves brothers in all things, for so it is, as we have the religious habit and we have cut our long hair for the service of God, and so we promise and swear it."⁵³ Here again are echoes of *De laude* and the orders' own rules and statutes regarding the rejection of knightly vanities.⁵⁴ This statement not only underscores the importance of habit and dress discussed in [Chapter 2](#) but also gives some insight into the orders' understanding of a shared religious vocation. The fact that this is the first *hermandad* written in Castilian, when the frequent use of the vernacular in royal documents was still

some years away, is further evidence that this statement reflects the orders' self-perception.

Between 1206 and 1210

Sometime between 1206 and 1210, Santiago and Calatrava signed another pact.⁵⁵ Both orders had survived, in Calatrava's case just barely, the humiliating disaster of Alarcos and were trying to reestablish themselves amid continued Almohad aggression and quarrels between Christian monarchs.⁵⁶ The agreement contains the first specific penalties for failure to maintain good relations and hospitality. A brother guilty of offending a member of the other order was to present himself before its chapter.⁵⁷ If found guilty, the brother was to carry out a fast of bread and water on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, and endure the loss of horse, arms, and rank (if he was a knight) for one year.⁵⁸ A brother who failed to extend hospitality to another was to be punished with a barefoot journey to the other order's commandery while carrying his provisions around his neck.⁵⁹ The specific destinations for the journey are also mentioned. Brothers of Calatrava should go to Uclés, and brothers of Santiago to Maqueda or Zorita, depending on the proximity of their own house.⁶⁰ The trajectory of the relationship between the two orders is manifest here: from hostility and suspicion to tentative efforts at resolving disputes, to open affirmation of hospitality. The emphasis on penance suggests, of course, that there was resistance. But it also demonstrates a sharing of penitential regimes, especially the loss of horse and arms, which was a particularly humiliating punishment.

1221

The next agreement, from 1221, represents a major advance in cooperation between Calatrava and Santiago.⁶¹ By this time, the Almohad threat had significantly diminished, and the kings of León and Castile were pressing the offensive. The 1220s mark the beginning of a transitional stage in the consolidation of the orders' lordships and network of commanderies, and this shift in institutional consciousness is evident here.⁶² The language is more elegant than previous documents and includes a lengthy preamble expressing the masters' desire to establish "unity of brotherhood" on account of the "spiritual friendship" between them.⁶³ The agreement first stipulates that the orders help each other when one of them makes war upon the Moors and that they must consult each other before signing treaties.⁶⁴ If, in spite of an existing royal treaty, the Moors should attack one of the orders, the other must come to its defense.⁶⁵ They agreed to honor each other's peace agreements with Muslims and municipalities. The

orders were to march together in battle or on raids, unless the king ordered them otherwise. If the master of one order were to be present in battle and the other not, the brothers of both orders were to agree to obey the one, or in the absence of any master, both would obey any commander present.⁶⁶ If one order were to suffer some offense, such as the loss of property, at the hands of a third party, the other order must come to its aid against the offenders. Twice this section is punctuated with the statement, repeated numerous times in the agreement, “that they may be seen to be brothers of one order.”⁶⁷

The next provision deals with visits. When the master of one order visited the other, the host brothers were to obey him as if he were their own master, and likewise with commanders.⁶⁸ The orders promised equal division of spoils taken from the Moors, regardless of how many members of each participated in battle.⁶⁹ When passing through each other’s territory, they were to follow the other’s commander as a leader and guide. In the case of unspecified scandals arising, the masters were each to choose three brothers to form a committee to settle the matter. This power of appointment would pass to the grand commander if the masters were unavailable. A yearlong, biweekly fast was imposed on any commander who handled this responsibility in a negligent manner. Stricter punishments were meted out to those brethren who violated any of the foregoing provisions. A brother who was disobedient to a commander was to be stripped of his habit and thrown out of the order.⁷⁰ Violations of hospitality earn the offender a barefoot pilgrimage to the offended order’s headquarters for a biweekly, six-month fast, after which time he was allowed to return to his own house. With respect to more explicitly spiritual concerns, the agreement declares that both orders would offer three Masses a year for each other’s deceased members and that general chapter meetings would offer a *missa general* for the same intention.⁷¹

Santiago and Calatrava had by then acquired sufficient security, territorial basis, and institutional development to think in more systematic terms and attempt to create norms of interaction and cooperation. This is the first period, incidentally, when evidence for regular general chapter meetings emerges, which would make possible the stipulated celebration of Masses and addressing of grievances.⁷² The concept of being brothers of one order is manifestly the driving concern behind the many terms of the agreement, and it is of sufficient importance to warrant the same kind of penances imposed for breaking rules of internal discipline. The will to act together even against royal prerogative likewise indicates the strength of sentiment behind this agreement.

Three years later, in 1224, another pact was signed that included not only Calatrava and Santiago but also the Hospital and the Temple.⁷³ Ayala Martínez places this agreement within the emerging political discourse of Fernando III, in which the Kingdom of Castile-León was beginning to decouple itself from purely dynastic interests to become an entity in itself. The “firm political pact” established between the king and the orders was part of this project.⁷⁴ Aside from the larger political issues at stake, there was need to restore harmony at this moment, for Santiago had lodged a series of complaints with the pope against the Hospital and Temple for taking its lands in Galicia, León, and Palencia.⁷⁵ Brothers’ illicit transfers were also a problem, even if it receives no explicit mention, for in 1220 Honorius III had to tell the Hospital to stop receiving brothers of Calatrava.⁷⁶ Santiago and Calatrava had numerous disputes over property in 1223, indicating that the *hermandad* of 1221 had not been entirely successful.⁷⁷ The four orders’ purpose in drafting the new pact, written in Latin, is stated at the end of the document: “for the service of God and the king’s honor and for the profit and progress of Christendom,” and “so that between us there might be a bond of greater love.”⁷⁸ Here again is consciousness of a common mission and shared religious vocation, this time including both universal and Iberian orders.

The pact’s specific terms, however, are concerned with just two aspects of the orders’ relations: cooperation in battle and the adjudication of disputes. The orders pledge to always assist each other against the Saracens, the “enemies of the cross of Christ.”⁷⁹ They also emphasize, echoing the 1178 pact, the importance of remaining together in the royal host on raids or campaigns, if it were to please the king.⁸⁰ The provisions concerning the settlement of disputes are more convoluted. The pact stipulates that each order was to appoint three brothers, as needed, to form a committee of twelve with full authority to settle issues that may arise between them.⁸¹ The committee of twelve was given the authority to correct any erring member of any of the four orders. If the offender remained obstinate, the committee could denounce him before the pope, the king, and anyone else.⁸² Three members of the committee were supposed to establish the time and place for meetings. If anyone failed to attend, he was to suffer the same penalty as if he had disobeyed his own master, even unto corporal punishment.⁸³ The procedures for actually resolving a dispute are a bit confusing. One clause clearly states that the decision of the majority would be conclusive, and in the case of a deadlock the committee was to defer to a wise and discreet man.⁸⁴ There are other clauses, however, that suggest that the agreement of a few members of the committee is enough, so long as the others do not

object. If any of the twelve should die or be permanently unable to attend, a new member could be elected in his stead. The most provocative clause of the agreement states that if any of the masters or the Hospital's prior (who was the military leader of its brethren in the peninsula, rather than a cleric as in the Iberian orders) should err, they could be accused before their elders. Failing that, they should be denounced before the pope.⁸⁵

The terms concerning cooperation in battle are hardly innovative and make sense within the context of the period's frequent and successful military campaigns. The means for resolving hypothetical disputes are another matter altogether. They are ambiguous, convoluted, and cumbersome—and if put into effect, they would have seriously compromised the governing authority and duties of the highest officials in all four orders. It stretches the imagination to believe that these men would have submitted themselves to the correction of such committees, but that is precisely what the agreement says. Perhaps the orders wanted to make a generous statement of mutual collaboration, even if they had little expectation that these particular means would be put into effect.

1243

The so-called Great Reconquest was in full swing during the two decades that separate the pact of 1224 from the next one. Santiago and Calatrava, swollen with new acquisitions of land, found cause to amplify the provisions of their *hermandad* of 1221 with an addendum written in 1243. Their hope was to make the original pact “stronger for all time.”⁸⁶ The number of Masses to be said for deceased brethren increased from three to six. In the case of brothers who were expelled from their own order for disobedience, the members of the other order were to plead on the brothers' behalf and try to make amends for whatever offense they had caused.⁸⁷ The agreement also envisions a scenario in which the masters of each order were to plead personally on behalf of an expelled brother, although the language is too murky to understand precisely what is meant. At the very least, the agreement intends deliberate mutual action to return brothers to their own communities.⁸⁸ In keeping with this theme, both orders were to exchange their own prisoners of war for any brother held captive by the Moors.⁸⁹ If a brother were to become sick while at the house of the other order, he was to be cared for with much honor and love. If he died, his body was to be buried in the nearest cemetery belonging to either one.⁹⁰

The orders also commit themselves to further military and political cooperation. Besides fighting side by side in battle, they agreed to protect each other's standards and to obey each other's masters and

commanders in the field.⁹¹ All brothers were to offer their horses to any superior of either order if he lost his horse while fighting.⁹² A system of exchanging mounts was also established so that brethren could obtain a fresh horse at any house.⁹³ The orders pledge to help each other in everything, before the king's court or anywhere else, especially concerning the defense of property. In the case that Santiago or Calatrava had procurators in the Roman Curia or royal court, they were to work for the benefit of both orders.⁹⁴ Economic concerns are also addressed. The orders agreed not to steal livestock from each other, to provide documentation for their flocks when passing through each other's lands, and to defend each other's animals as if they were their own.⁹⁵ They also agreed to assist each other in the collection of tolls at Zorita and Alfariella, held by Calatrava and Santiago, respectively. No ferries on the Tagus River were to be maintained, because they reduced revenues from other toll stations.⁹⁶ This was meant to be a final resolution to the problem of the boat at Algarga, which had vexed both parties since the end of the twelfth century. The orders agreed not to collect tolls or other taxes from each other and to share pasture lands.⁹⁷ The punishment of a six-month fast for violators is repeated, and the orders were to send two brothers to each other's general chapter meetings with bills of complaints, so that disputes might be resolved.⁹⁸ The final provision makes the agreement binding throughout Castile, León, Portugal, and Aragon. The text was supposed to be read aloud at every chapter meeting, so that no one could claim ignorance of its terms.⁹⁹ The orders offered the blessing of Jesus Christ and his Mother Mary to those who kept the *hermandad*.¹⁰⁰

This amendment of 1243 represents the high-water mark of the *hermandades* between Santiago and Calatrava, as well as the height of their participation in the Reconquest.¹⁰¹ The range of collaborative efforts and overtures at mutual assistance is extensive, touching nearly every aspect of the orders' life and mission. More important, the documents give evidence of learning from experience and of building on previous agreements. That the pact of 1221 was amended rather than replaced shows a desire to maintain the continuity of past agreements and to expand them further.

1283, 1284

Between 1243 and 1283, when the next extant pact appeared, the Kingdom of Castile, and the military orders with it, passed through many vicissitudes. The Reconquest essentially came to a halt, but the frontier remained threatened, and in 1280 Santiago suffered its disastrous loss at Moclín. Most of the military brethren had joined the Infante Sancho in his rebellion against Alfonso X in 1282. The death of

the Learned King is sandwiched between two pacts involving the Hospital and Santiago, dating from September 1283 and November 1284, respectively. The agreements, however, do not allude to the turbulence of the realm but rather to specific contentions between the two parties.¹⁰² Both agreements, in fact, address the same concerns, except that the first one tells more specifically that illicit transfers between the orders were causing not only harm to the brothers' souls but also mutual loss of horses and arms.¹⁰³ In both agreements, the transfer of brethren was prohibited without permission from the "prelates" in charge of each order.¹⁰⁴ Boundaries between the orders' respective lordships are an issue as well, for one commander from each order was given the responsibility of settling the matter. If the commanders were unable to do so, a "good man" from Santiago or the Hospital would be brought in to mediate.¹⁰⁵ If this fails, and further mediation is impossible, the order responsible for the problem must pay fifteen hundred marks of silver, without possibility of appeal to any other power.¹⁰⁶ The pact of 1284 makes reference to previous divisions of territory and says that they require confirmation from the king.¹⁰⁷ The clause about mutual defense, however, is unique. The brethren of Santiago promised to obey the prior of the Hospital as they would obey their own master. The 1283 agreement contains a reciprocal obligation from the Hospital, whereas the one from 1284 does not. Both orders, furthermore, stated clearly the limitations of their mutual assistance. Santiago said that it would not take action against Calatrava on account of its *hermandad* with that order, whereas the Hospital said the same with respect to the Temple.¹⁰⁸

This is the first clear statement of a hierarchy of relationships among the orders, which is only implicit in the other agreements. The *hermandad* between the Temple and the Hospital to which this pact refers may have been an agreement from the late twelfth century that settled certain disputes between the two orders and established committees for addressing future ones.¹⁰⁹ The Hospital considered its relationship to the Temple, the scope of which far exceeded the Iberian Peninsula, more important than its relationship to Santiago. Likewise, Calatrava and Santiago, from the frequency and content of their pacts, were closer to each other than to anyone else. This underscores the point that not all pacts were of equal importance for the parties that entered into them.¹¹⁰

1313 and 1318

The political situation in Castile did not witness great improvement in subsequent decades, and the final *hermandades* date from the royal minority of Alfonso XI. They concern Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara, and they are listed here together because the two

agreements, one from 1313 and the other from 1318, are virtually identical.¹¹¹ They no longer reflect the crusading spirit of the earlier period but rather the factionalism of the Late Middle Ages.¹¹² The royal minority, which did not end until 1325, witnessed considerable instability and jockeying for position among the nobility.¹¹³ Nearly every clause of these pacts emphasizes the orders' commitment of loyal service to King Alfonso.¹¹⁴ In addition, the orders pledged to act together in seeking his favor, whether from him directly or through his tutor. They promised to assist each other against anyone who took action against any one of them, particularly in defense of a castle, whether against Moors or Christians.¹¹⁵ If a brother should take control of a fortress and hold it against the authority of his master, all the orders would turn against the rebellious brother so that the master might recover his castle.¹¹⁶ Such an act of revolt had in fact happened on at least two occasions in the Order of Santiago, which incidents were recorded in documents of 1299 and 1311.¹¹⁷ The orders likewise agreed to return any fugitive brothers who might have sought to transfer to another community. This had been a point of contention despite previous *hermandades*. In 1312, Calatrava complained to the pope that Santiago had received one of its members, Pedro Suárez, without permission, and in the same year, some brothers of Calatrava had entered Alcántara on account of "grave injuries" suffered at their master's hands.¹¹⁸

Making amends remains a concern of these early fourteenth-century pacts. If a brother of one order made an offense against another, he was to travel to the latter's headquarters to fulfill his penance. Members of Calatrava were to travel to Uclés in the case of Santiago, whereas members of Alcántara were to Mérida for the same purpose. There was no mention of any particular penance to be observed (e.g., going barefoot), but otherwise the terms are similar to the pact of 1206 X 1210. Indeed, the parties stated their intent to renew rather than amend any previous agreements, by which it might be understood that the penances stipulated earlier still applied.¹¹⁹ If any order had a grievance against another, the help of all the masters was to be sought, or if the masters were not present, the grand commanders. This pact ends with an anathema against noncompliance. Failure to fulfill its terms cannot be excused on any grounds or by the testimony of anyone, neither the king nor any other lord.¹²⁰ The fact that this agreement was signed twice, nearly unchanged, within a period of five years, indicates the turbulence of the kingdom.¹²¹ Problems of internal discipline had produced a change of officers, which probably compelled the orders to renew their mutual commitment so quickly.

Common Aspects

Thus far there has been an exposition of the pacts and the historical circumstances in which they emerged. These documents, *prima facie*, indicate considerable collaborative efforts and consciousness of a common religious vocation, especially between the orders of Santiago and Calatrava. The range of the terms is wide, but they revolve around several main concerns: joint action in battle and equal division of its spoils; the extension of hospitality to one another, backed up in some cases by considerable penalties for failure to do so; joint negotiation of relations with other groups, such as kings and popes; and procedures for the resolution of disputes. The agreements between Santiago and Calatrava follow a distinct trajectory through various stages, from the early conflicts to hospitality to extensive collaboration, which peaked around the middle of the thirteenth century. One notable aspect of all the pacts is the predominance of temporal concerns. Apart from the agreements of 1221 and 1243, with their stipulation of Masses, there is little mention of specifically spiritual exchanges between the orders. This can be explained by their materialism, understood in a neutral rather than a pejorative sense. Exchanges of fasting, prayer, and abstinence were less likely to be offered as signs of fraternity between men whose spirituality was characterized less by traditional monastic asceticism and more by action. Ruiz Jusué claims that temporal concerns followed as a logical consequence of spiritual ones.¹²² Perhaps the connection can be taken a step further for the military orders: temporal concerns were loaded with spiritual significance. Acts such as marching together or dividing spoils equally were authentic expressions of spiritual fraternity within the common framework of ecclesiastical knighthood that transcended the limits of each individual religious order.

THE *HERMANDADES* IN THE LIFE OF THE ORDERS

Cooperation is linked to conflict, meaning that the *hermandades* are indicators of both. The pacts must be examined within the larger context of relations between the orders to see how well they reflect reality. Is there evidence that the terms of these agreements were ever put into practice? The disappointing reality is that, for a great many of the prescribed forms of cooperation, there is virtually no extant evidence. Although the loss of source material may be part of the explanation, often enough the activities themselves were not the kind that usually left a record. It is unknown, for example, if Calatrava and Santiago actually celebrated Masses for each other at their general chapter meetings. The liturgical sources for the orders are not very good to begin with, and no member of Calatrava is mentioned in the

Kalendarario de Uclés. The orders' promise to say the Masses may indicate that it was actually done, at least on some occasions, but there is no way to corroborate that claim. Nor is there any sign of whether the specific guidelines for hospitality, or their corresponding punishments, were observed. Some questions, therefore, must be left unanswered. Having said that, the sources do provide some insight into how the *hermandades* were implemented.

Aside from the pacts themselves, other documents state that cooperation ought to be a general principle of action, although this is more pronounced among the universal orders. "Although the Templars and Hospitallers have frequently been portrayed as rivals, in fact instances of cooperation are more numerous than those of conflict. This relationship is built into the Rule."¹²³ Their pact of 1179 was noted already. There are many examples of Templar and Hospital cooperation in Occitania during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, especially when others attacked their financial privileges.¹²⁴ In England, when the London Temple celebrated the completion of its choir, the Hospital threw the banquet.¹²⁵ In the late thirteenth century, superiors of the Temple and Hospital ordered their subordinates in Aragon to bring their quarrels to an end, because there ought always to be peace between the two, and to avoid giving scandal and cause for murmuring among other orders.¹²⁶ The thirteenth-century Rule of Santiago enjoins reverence for all the prelates of the Church, singling out the Temple and the Hospital.¹²⁷ The institutional relationship between Calatrava and Alcántara, despite its many problems, was itself a form of cooperation. Beyond the level of general principles, the military orders found concrete ways to work together.

Military Collaboration

Participation in the same campaigns provided plenty of opportunity for the joint activity that the pacts stipulate. Jiménez de Rada says that the military orders fought in the same line at the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa.¹²⁸ Santiago, the Temple, and the Hospital joined Flemish crusaders in the conquest of Alcácer do Sal in 1217, receiving praise from the bishops for their decisive intervention.¹²⁹ Fernando III made effective use of the orders in his Andalusian campaigns of 1224 and 1225.¹³⁰ Santiago and Alcántara fought together in the conquest of Medellín in 1233 and Santa Cruz de la Sierra in 1234.¹³¹ The masters of Santiago and Calatrava joined each other against Don Juan Manuel in 1334.¹³² Given the relative lack of detail in the chronicle accounts about the orders' battlefield actions, it is not surprising that there is little evidence as to whether the brothers of different orders actually obeyed one another's leaders. Rades y Andrada says that the

brothers of Santiago, when their Master Garcí Fernández was too old to lead them, followed the master of Calatrava into battle. Although he claims that this practice of mutual obedience was common among the orders, it seems likely that his claim is based on the very existence of the pacts.¹³³ There is practically no evidence about whether the division of spoils, sharing of mounts, or other battle provisions of the *hermandades* were put into effect. The orders' rights to land and spoil obtained through conquest were regulated by the monarchs, and it is likely that they were more beholden to kings than to each other in this regard.¹³⁴ These aspects of cooperation are inconclusive, for only the mere fact of common participation in campaigns is beyond dispute.

Islam was by no means the military orders' only common enemy, and the evidence suggests that they needed mutual assistance against fellow Christians. The brethren had countless conflicts with other groups in society, including some that turned violent. The monastery of Sabardos was taken from Santiago by force.¹³⁵ Gregory IX ordered the excommunication of Pedro Miguel Molendo and some other residents of Vermudo in the diocese of Zamora for having shed the blood of clerics and brethren of Santiago, taken their goods, and burned down their forest.¹³⁶ Zamora was apparently a dangerous place for Santiago during the early years of Gregory IX's pontificate, for in 1232 he issued a bull against some laymen in the town of Pennagosent for shedding the blood of priests and brothers.¹³⁷ A group of Valencians was condemned to lose half of its properties in 1283 after it had invaded a castle belonging to Calatrava and killed people.¹³⁸ Santiago complained to the pope about the usurpation of its property by men of Castrotorafe and about *alias graves et iniuriosis plurimum existentes*, or other outstanding grievances.¹³⁹ Most disputes concerned property and were less violent, but they could still be bitter and protracted. Both Santiago and Calatrava experienced long-standing and well-documented problems with the archbishop of Toledo.¹⁴⁰ The orders frequently tried to make Iberian prelates respect their privileges, whether by direct appeal or through royal or papal assistance.¹⁴¹ Sometimes they had to contend with the predations of the monarchs themselves. On one occasion, Innocent III ordered Alfonso of León to return Santiago's usurped properties.¹⁴² There are countless lesser examples as well. Santiago and the Cistercian abbey of Ursaria fought over property claims in 1222. A subdeacon of Segovia named Vincent was accused of stealing some of Santiago's properties in the same year.¹⁴³ Rarely in any of these circumstances, however, is there concrete evidence that the orders enlisted one another's support. It seems that Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara were mostly left to fight their own battles with other Iberian Christians.

These outside powers, nevertheless, tended to view the military orders as a group and named them together in sources. The municipal council and archdean of Calatrava complained to their bishop in 1181 about the abuse of ecclesiastical rights by the Orders of Santiago and Calatrava, recommending recourse to papal authority to rectify the problem.¹⁴⁴ The bishop of Salamanca protested in 1191 the invasion of his churches by the Hospital and the *fratres de Spata* (Santiago).¹⁴⁵ The Temple, the Hospital, and the Order of Santiago were involved in a joint dispute with the archbishop of Compostela over the revenues known as the *vota Sancti Jacobi* at the beginning of the thirteenth century.¹⁴⁶ The papal legate excommunicated the brethren of Santiago, Calatrava, Alcántara, and the Hospital together for their failure to pay certain fees; in 1275, Gregory X lifted this sentence on all the orders simultaneously.¹⁴⁷ In 1236, Fernando III gave some of Santiago's possessions to the municipal government of Anduxarto while granting the same compensation to the order that he had previously granted to Calatrava and the Hospital in similar transactions.¹⁴⁸ The pope told the Temple, Hospital, Calatrava, and Santiago to assist Alfonso Téllez together in the defense of his castle of Albuquerque.¹⁴⁹ Alfonso X named the military orders as a group when he ordered that they each charge tolls in only one place throughout their territories.¹⁵⁰ In 1285, when King Pedro of Aragon was facing invasion by French troops, he called upon the Hospital, Temple, Santiago, and Calatrava jointly to assist him.¹⁵¹ Pope Martin IV informed the three Iberian orders as well as the Temple and the Hospital of the rebellion against Alfonso X in a single letter.¹⁵² This perspective tended to reinforce a common identity among the military orders. The oft-repeated phrase "so that they may be brothers of one order," found in the pacts between Santiago and Calatrava, reflected both their self-understanding and the opinion of others.

Dispute Resolution

The adjudication of disputes is a major aspect of all the *hermandades*, with the provisions for establishing committees being particularly prominent. There is, however, no evidence outside of the documents themselves of these committees ever being formed. Although this is hardly proof that they never existed, it points to the likelihood that disputes were handled on an ad hoc basis and that proposed "systems" were not very practical. The proximity of the orders' lordships in lower Castile and Andalusia produced disputes as well as agreements for the delineation of boundaries, which were sometimes renewed or clarified with the passage of time. In 1240, Santiago and Alcántara agreed to a partition of boundaries between Hornachos and Reina, and between Magacela and Benquerencia, respectively.¹⁵³ It was renewed

in 1254 and witnessed by a brother of Calatrava.¹⁵⁴ The Hospital likewise made agreements over division of boundaries with Calatrava in 1232 and with Santiago in 1237.¹⁵⁵ Somewhat later, in 1271, Santiago and the Temple settled their boundaries as well.¹⁵⁶ Although these documents are notably different from the pacts analyzed earlier, they could entail additional forms of cooperation. Calatrava and the Hospital, for example, agreed to share certain pasture lands.¹⁵⁷ These agreements were evidently not the product of committee work but rather were solutions devised by those parties most aware of practical realities.

There are additional instances of the military orders seeking one another's assistance to arbitrate disputes or confirm agreements. Alexander IV commissioned a knight of Alcántara to bring about the restitution of Calatrava's goods that had been usurped.¹⁵⁸ The masters of Alcántara and the Temple once agreed to entrust the resolution of a property dispute to Pelayo Pérez Correa.¹⁵⁹ Sancho, son of the Infante Pedro, and the Order of Calatrava disputed the possession of the castle of Cabra in 1305. They chose Gonzalo Pérez Gallego, master of Alcántara, and Juan Alfonso, Sancho's *mayordomo* (one of the main officials in the royal household), to act as arbiters.¹⁶⁰ In 1315, the Hospital enlisted a brother of Alcántara named Gonzalo Méndez to witness an exchange of lands with Teresa Pérez.¹⁶¹ The archdean of Calatrava received several papal commissions in 1312 to settle problems that Santiago's ransom hospital faced in the town of Cuenca. These are intermediate cases, because although the archdean was not a member of the Order of Calatrava, he was nevertheless on intimate terms with it. In one instance, Santiago and a charitable confraternity in the town disputed ownership of some mills on the Júcar River; in another, a knight named Pedro Martín took over a house belonging to the order.¹⁶² The most dramatic incident was when several laymen broke down the hospital's doors and stole church ornaments and other goods. The pope told the archdean to pronounce them excommunicated for their sacrilege.¹⁶³

At the same time, the military orders frequently demonstrated an inability to resolve disputes on their own. These persisted in spite of existing *hermandades* and sometimes led to the signing of new ones. The Holy See frequently appointed judges, usually secular clergy, to adjudicate their problems. The most serious instances concerned Alcántara and the Temple, as will be explained later, but there are other examples as well. It was not until 1243 that Santiago and Calatrava resolved the dispute over boats on the Tagus, after nearly sixty years of attempts. In 1223, Honorius III named the bishop of Toro and other ecclesiastics as judges in a case between Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara in which Santiago accused the other two

orders of unjustly occupying its property of Monasteruelo.¹⁶⁴ The same year witnessed the commissioning of the archbishop of Compostela to make Calatrava return the monastery of Sabardos to Santiago.¹⁶⁵ Despite the pact of 1224, Santiago and the Temple continued to quarrel over the possession of Alcañiz, such that the pope had to appoint judges to the case in 1233.¹⁶⁶ Gregory IX commissioned the archbishop of Compostela to adjudicate the competing claims over San Pedro Carpio and other villages between Calatrava and the Templars of Monte Albino in 1238.¹⁶⁷ Alfonso X, in response to complaints from the offended party, ordered certain nobles and the Hospitallers to respect Alcántara's right to collect tolls.¹⁶⁸ Most of these problems emerged during the decades of the Great Reconquest, when the orders were rapidly acquiring new properties and had to wrangle over the definition of their respective lordships. Once this process was complete, the disputes decreased considerably.

Legal Assistance

Several *hermandades* enjoin cooperation between the orders' procurators in royal and ecclesiastical courts. Although Lomax says that there are no known cases of the orders working together at the royal curia, there are other instances of cooperation in legal matters.¹⁶⁹ In 1211, King Alfonso heard a case about Santiago's possession of Santa María de Albarracín in a Hospitaller church near Madrid.¹⁷⁰ When Calatrava entered an agreement with the archbishop of Toledo before the royal court in 1245, the master of Alcántara stood as one of its witnesses.¹⁷¹ During the late 1250s, the Cistercian-affiliated military orders enjoyed the favor of a single protector at Rome, known as Juan of Toledo, cardinal priest of St. Lawrence in Lucina. He had been a Cistercian himself, although his reputation was marred by his knowledge of occult practices.¹⁷² One chronicler calls him *el buen padrino* of Alcántara, and the sources indicate that his godfathering extended to the other Cistercian-affiliated orders.¹⁷³ In 1273, the masters of Calatrava, Alcántara, and Avis named a single procurator, Andres Serra, to represent them in the Roman Curia.¹⁷⁴ At one point during its dispute with the Templars, the master of Alcántara failed to appear before judges in Zamora at the appointed time. When he did arrive, some time later, Santiago and Calatrava sent representatives to testify that the three orders had been fighting together against the Muslims on the appointed date.¹⁷⁵ On another occasion in 1319, a commander of Santiago and a commander of Alcántara appealed jointly to the Holy See against a mandate to contribute to a papal collection of tithes. The document cites as precedent a previous exemption granted by Clement V to the Hospital,

the Temple, Santiago, and Calatrava together.¹⁷⁶ It might be inferred that the cardinal protector named in 1311 for Calatrava, Francis of Santa Maria in Cosmedin, advocated for the other Cistercian affiliates, but this is not stated explicitly.¹⁷⁷ Likewise, Santiago named a royal procurator in 1263 without specifying that he was to work on behalf of anyone else.¹⁷⁸

Sometimes cooperation was manifest in the orders' governance of their internal affairs. Calatrava and Alcántara jointly issued a population charter in 1219 for two towns near Salamanca that belonged to the latter order.¹⁷⁹ Alfonso IX's donation of Sancti Spiritus of Salamanca to Santiago says that the same municipal law (*fuero*) given to the aforementioned towns of Alcántara should be used in Sancti Spiritus's domains as well.¹⁸⁰ In 1222, both Calatrava and Alcántara signed a grant to Countess Sancha to hold the monastery of Asmeses for life but stipulated that it remain populated *por noso freyre o pro nosa freyra que i morar*, and that it return to Calatrava upon the countess' death.¹⁸¹ The reference to "our brothers and sisters" offers at least the possibility that members of either order might live there. When the master of Avis was looking for a sinecure for his son Martín Gil in 1267, Alcántara offered the revenues of the commandery of Valhelhas in exchange for one thousand *maravedies*.¹⁸² After King Dinis of Portugal donated the church of Santa María de Sea to Alcántara, its master, Gonzalo Pérez, entrusted the nomination of a pastor to the master of Avis, Lorenzo Alfonso, in 1309. The master of Alcántara explained that he did so on account of the great friendship between the two men.¹⁸³

Transfers

The transfer of military brethren from one order to another is a major concern of the pacts. In theory, it was permissible only to transfer from a laxer to a stricter order. A few dissenting voices notwithstanding, the military orders were generally considered the least strict religious communities, and among them, Santiago was regarded as the laxest.¹⁸⁴ Yet this was by no means a hard-and-fast rule. The *hermandad* of 1243 indicates transfers going both ways between Santiago and Calatrava, and Calatrava's *difiniciones* envision "lateral" transfers to orders of equal severity.¹⁸⁵ In 1179, the pope forbade brothers of Santiago who wanted a more rigorous life to transfer elsewhere, saying that there were opportunities for stricter observance within the order itself.¹⁸⁶ In 1182, the papal prohibition was modified to give the final decision to the master.¹⁸⁷ Papal views fluctuated over time about whether transfers required permission from the masters, but the military orders' leadership opposed a blanket freedom.¹⁸⁸ Count Rodrigo Álvarez, who left Santiago to found the

Order of Mountjoy, subsequently encountered difficulties of his own. Pope Alexander III, in a bull of 1180, confirmed Mountjoy's legitimate possessions but told Rodrigo that he must restore any lands or goods that had belonged to his former order.¹⁸⁹ Later, there was a series of disputes over leadership and property involving the Temple, and numerous attempts were made to amalgamate Mountjoy into this order, which ultimately succeeded.¹⁹⁰ In 1286, Pope Honorius asked the Hospital to receive a brother of Santiago.¹⁹¹ No particular reason for the transfer was given, but it clearly went against their *hermandad* of just two years earlier. In other cases, more explicit information is available. There is one instance of a brother of Santiago going to the Temple because of the many enemies he had in his own order.¹⁹² Likewise, the bishop of Tusculum allowed two knights and one cleric to leave Calatrava for Alcántara in 1312, on account of a conflict with the master.¹⁹³ Illicit transfers must have been a greater problem, as shown by the many warnings against the practice and the many efforts to bring brethren back into their original communities.¹⁹⁴ Yet these transfers indicate that discontented brothers expected to live the same basic vocation in another military order, despite their differences of tradition and observance.

Systemic Conflicts

The *hermandades* were instruments that the orders applied, with some measure of success, to resolve conflict and promote cooperation. At the same time, there were two problems in their relationships that became systemic. The first was the long-standing enmity and strife between Alcántara and the Temple. Although many of the particulars are obscure, the dispute began over the possession of Ronda, which had been given to the Order of Trujillo in 1188, against the Temple's opposition.¹⁹⁵ After the battle of Alarcos, Trujillo's rights in Ronda, but not the lordship of the place itself, were given to Calatrava in compensation for its losses.¹⁹⁶ Torres y Tapia thinks that Ronda came under the Temple's control around 1207, but Martínez Diez dates it to 1221 and the breakup of the Castilian branch of Mountjoy.¹⁹⁷ Alcántara and the Temple arrived at property settlements, which were mediated by Alfonso IX, in 1211 and 1220, although they did not include the expressions of fraternity or exchange of benefits that characterize the *hermandades*.¹⁹⁸ There was no love lost between the two orders as they fought over Ronda. Although Alcántara had a clear claim, the Templars were reluctant to give back the property because of the increase in value that it had enjoyed, since its total head of sheep had risen from twenty thousand to forty thousand.¹⁹⁹ In 1235, Alcántara complained to the pope about the Temple's unjust seizure of goods in the area.²⁰⁰ Rome seems to have been inclined toward

Alcántara's claim, since in 1243 some Templars were excommunicated for their intransigence in keeping Ronda.²⁰¹ Aside from the competing claims over this property, the orders also quarreled over the possession of Portezuelo and Santibáñez, and the boundaries between the territories of Benquerencia (Alcántara) and Capilla and Almorchón (Temple).²⁰² They commissioned the resolution of the dispute to the master of Santiago sometime around 1250, but it took royal intervention in 1253 to settle it.²⁰³ This did not bring their troubles to a close, as both parties appeared before the king again in 1257, where Alcántara was accused of very serious offenses: murder and kidnapping at Salvatierra, theft and destruction of property at various locations, and armed invasion and murder at the Templar castle of Cabezón, among other things.²⁰⁴ The master of Alcántara claimed grievances of his own, although they were not presented in writing. The king ordered an investigation. Though its outcome is unknown, it is likely that Alcántara won and ended up with possession of Ronda.²⁰⁵ The sources go quiet again until the time of the Temple's suppression, when some of its brothers allegedly took control of the bridge of Alcántara and held it under arms. Torres y Tapia cites sources that claim this was an act of desperation by an order on the brink of elimination.²⁰⁶ After three months, Alcántara reclaimed the bridge with the help of Plasencia and Cáceres.²⁰⁷ Martínez Diez has shown this story to be only partly true. The Temple did indeed acquire the bridge, but earlier, around 1295, and by some other means than armed assault.²⁰⁸

The problems between Alcántara and the Temple spilled over into the other great dispute involving the military orders: the destination of Templar properties after the order's dissolution at the Council of Vienne.²⁰⁹ The pope had reserved to his own discretion the decision regarding certain kingdoms, including the Iberian domains.²¹⁰ After considerable wrangling, it was decided that two new military orders would be created from the Templar properties. These were the Order of Montesa in Aragon and the Order of Christ in Portugal.²¹¹ That left Castile-León, where the Hospital was the intended recipient, according to a bull of 1319.²¹² Yet the Iberian orders were exceedingly obstinate in refusing to hand over the properties. Alcántara, which had coveted Almorchón, Garlitos, and Capilla for years, purchased them from Fernando IV in 1309 for 130,000 *maravedíes*.²¹³ The sale was supposedly conditional upon the ultimate fate of the Temple and papal approval of the transfer, but the king would not have been enthusiastic about losing the money. Meanwhile, the properties passed into the hands of Calatrava, thanks to a complicated loan arrangement.²¹⁴ The pope ordered restitution of former Templar properties to the Hospital in 1319 under pain of excommunication,

but Calatrava and Alcántara, employing all manner of devices and sophistry, refused to hand them over.²¹⁵ When the pope made his will known once more the following year, dismissing all excuses, the orders remained obstinate. Calatrava even returned the castles to Alcántara instead of to the Hospital. This resulted in the excommunication of the two masters, which was not lifted, at least from Alcántara, until 1335.²¹⁶ The pope enlisted the help of María de Molina and numerous ecclesiastics in trying to recover the properties, but to little avail.²¹⁷ In the end, very few holdings were returned to the Hospital, with the Crown, the Iberian orders, and the nobility as the primary beneficiaries.²¹⁸ Property disputes were usually problematic, of course, but the behavior of the Iberian orders suggests that they no longer felt any strong ties to the Hospital. Nearly forty years had passed since the last *hermandad* between them.²¹⁹ Many factors, including processes of nationalization and secularization, as well as the fate of the Temple, may have cooled their relations. But cooperation among the Iberian orders, by contrast, was alive and well, as shown by their common efforts to stonewall restitution of the properties.

The practical achievements of the *hermandades* appear rather limited. Evidence is often lacking, and for every instance of concrete cooperation there are as many of conflict. The examples here of systemic discord show that, in their relations with one another, the military orders, despite the best of intentions, were no different from other medieval institutions in coveting their neighbors' goods. Yet the uniqueness and importance of the pacts is not to be found solely in their practical results but also in the fact that they were signed at all. This study has argued that the orders shared common lineaments of the military-religious vocation. The pacts demonstrate the orders' recognition of this fact and represent an effort to articulate it. Whatever their quarrels, the orders understood that they had much more in common with one another than with anyone else. Even if there were considerable practical difficulties in carrying out their agreements, the willingness to make them in the first place is itself significant. The absence of pacts between Alcántara and the Temple is not accidental. Their differences were too deeply entrenched to even consider the possibility of lasting friendship.

Other Agreements

These realities are thrown into sharper relief when one considers the infrequency with which similar agreements were made with other kinds of religious institutions. The pacts with the archbishop of Compostela and the militia of Ávila, signed when the Order of Santiago was still in its infancy, have been discussed in [Chapter 1](#).

Aside from these and the political *hermandades* formed during the rebellion of Sancho, which represent a special case, there are just a handful of other examples. This is surprising given how often the orders found themselves in disputes with ecclesiastics, secular lords, towns, and others. Written agreements were often used to bring these quarrels to an end, but there is almost never any mention of fraternity or exchange in the *hermandades*.²²⁰ The best-known pact between a military order and another religious community dates from 1224–1225, when the prior of Santiago took refuge from Uclés at the Castilian monastery of San Pedro de Arlanza. This house had been turned over to Peter the Venerable of Cluny in 1142, as part of a larger agreement to end the monarchy's enormous annual subsidy to the Burgundian abbey.²²¹ The prior of Uclés established a friendship with these monks, and a *hermandad* was signed to cement it.²²² The monks of San Pedro promised to celebrate Mass on Monday of the third week of Lent for all the deceased priors of Uclés, and on the following day to do the same for all deceased priests. In return, the clergy of Uclés would do the same for the dead abbots and monks of San Pedro on the same days. The fact that this was the initiative not of a military brother but of a cleric, and one who was then in exile from Uclés, is significant. The primacy of strictly spiritual concerns is explicit, and the military brethren were not evidently included in the stipulated prayers.²²³

The earliest statutes for Calatrava, issued by the abbot of Morimond, say that the brothers and the monks of San Pedro de Gumiel should pray for each other.²²⁴ In a dispute settlement of 1220, Santiago and the town of Ledesma agreed to live in peace and to defend one another's possessions, but without any exchange of benefits.²²⁵ When Alcántara reached an agreement with the abbey of Montederramo concerning some villages in Orsense in 1232, it was agreed that the two communities should always be like brothers. They should jointly possess any additional donations acquired in the villages "as brothers of one order."²²⁶ This language sounds much like the pacts discussed already, but there are no specific pledges of spiritual benefits or mutual defense, nor any additional record of how their relationship developed. At the very end of the period under study, in 1327, a confraternity in Seville called Santa María del Pilar received the master of Santiago as one of its members.²²⁷ The offerings of spiritual fraternity are apparently extensive, as the members of the confraternity promise to include the master in their prayers, fasts, charitable works, and indulgences, as well as to assist him militarily by land or sea "until the end of time." Santa María del Pilar was in fact a military confraternity established in the 1320s to fight against the Moors.²²⁸ This agreement does not seem to have

included the Order of Santiago as an institution, however, nor is there any mention of a reciprocal offering by the master. There is a *hermandad* of 1261 in the archives of Uclés between the chapter of Cuenca and Santiago. The archival index refers to an exchange of spiritual benefits between the two parties, but time has not been kind to the document, which is illegible.²²⁹ All told, this is a rather thin collection of documents. Considering the military orders' countless disputes with other groups, and the general lack of fraternal language in the agreements signed to end them, the *hermandades* acquire greater significance. The prevalence of conflict was the norm; what distinguished the military orders' relations with one another was their attempt to turn that conflict into friendship.

The last *hermandad* involving military orders and other powers is a special case, because it was signed by Santiago, Calatrava, and the archbishop of Toledo.²³⁰ The occasion for this agreement, signed in 1321, was the discord of Alfonso XI's minority. Although it might have been considered under the pacts between the military orders, the language of the document suggests another reading. The masters of the two orders present themselves as a single party entering into an agreement with the archbishop, an understanding that he reciprocates.²³¹ The orders promised to "be with" (*seer convusco*) the archbishop, and he promised to "love" (*poner amor convusco*) them.²³² The terms are notably more restrained than those of any other pacts between Santiago and Calatrava, with only the promise of mutual defense. The document even uses a different word, *ayuntamiento*, in place of *hermandad*. The fact that the orders were acting together as a single party, and that they entered into this pact with the archbishop on account of political necessity for narrowly circumscribed ends, underscores the uniqueness of the orders' relations to one another.

CONCLUSION

The *hermandades* both represent an ideal vision and demonstrate the real difficulties and conflicts that emerged among the orders. The success of some aspects of these agreements, as has been shown, remains nearly impossible to evaluate for lack of direct evidence. Other issues, such as the adjudication of disputes, did not apparently work in practice the way that they are described in the pacts, but cooperative efforts still met with some success. The acrimonious saga concerning the Temple and Alcántara, and the obstinate wrangling over the destiny of the dissolved order's properties, were breakdowns of these efforts. Even here, however, there is some sign of greater cohesion among the three Iberian orders, in that they generally worked together better than they did with their universal

counterparts. Both the voluntary character and the materialism of the *hermandades* offer insight into the orders' spirituality and self-understanding. The pacts relied mostly on goodwill and a sense of brotherhood for their maintenance. Difficult enough to sustain within a single religious order, these qualities became much more challenging when numerous communities were involved, particularly when they occupied the same "niche" within Church and society and competed for the same resources. That the orders attempted to work together at all and achieved any measure of success is a notable accomplishment.

This accomplishment, of course, must be measured according to the standards and priorities of ecclesiastical knighthood. Division of spoils, mutual defense, and cooperation in battle—rather than prayers and fasts—predominate in these pacts, as one might expect from religious men engaged in battle. The shift of *mentalité* toward the material that Teofilo Ruiz discerns in late-medieval Castilian society was already present in the military orders from the beginning. In one sense, therefore, the actual fulfillment of the *hermandades* is less important than the state of mind that they reveal. When the military brothers pledged to lay down their lives for their friends, they meant, first and foremost, the defense of Christendom in general. But, at least in their better moments, their "friends" included one another as well.



Plate 2. The miraculous conversion of a Moorish woman and her son during a siege by Santiago and Calatrava. *Cantigas de Santa María*. Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, MS Banco rari 20, f. 6 r. Florence, Italy
 Courtesy of the Ministero dei beni e delle attività culturali e del turismo/Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Firenze



Plate 3. Calatrava la Vieja
Courtesy of David Céspedes Barroso



Plate 4. Alarcos
Courtesy of David Céspedes Barroso



Plate 5. Salvatierra
Courtesy of David Céspedes Barroso



Plate 6. Calatrava la Nueva
Courtesy of David Céspedes Barroso



Plate 7. Calatrava la Nueva
Courtesy of David Céspedes Barroso



Plate 8. The seal of Calatrava
Courtesy of David Céspedes Barroso

CONCLUSION

The Templars had been established as a living ideal of Christian chivalry, whose standards had been set with great vividness by Bernard of Clairvaux. . . . But ultimately the Templars were no more likely to be able to maintain such a religious ideal than the secular knighthood actually intended to ride out and search for dragons.¹

—Malcolm Barber

By now it is possible to sketch a general picture of ecclesiastical knighthood as instantiated in the Iberian military orders. They owed their existence to the confluence of factors both universal and local: the emergence of crusading and the pursuit of the Reconquest; the foundation and growth of the Temple and the Hospital; the development of Iberian military-religious confraternities; and the desires, interests, and aspirations of knights and monks, kings and popes. Although Brodman's "military-monastic" and "military-hospitaller" models are helpful for understanding the Iberian orders in terms of their activities, the underlying form of their life as the consecrated exercise of arms was the same. This explains the basic similarities between their common practices and activities, despite their different traditions of religious observance. These traditions left their mark, to be certain. Calatrava and Alcántara drew more heavily on the Benedictine-Cistercian monastic tradition, whereas Santiago was more influenced by the new active spiritual trends of the twelfth century, including forms of life for women. Yet the hesitation of both the Cistercian Order and its military affiliates to articulate their relationship in normative Cistercian terms indicates the operation of ecclesiastical knighthood as a prior form. At the same time, their Cistercian origins and affiliation prevented Calatrava and Alcántara from using the same language of conversion of knighthood that Santiago so unambiguously employed.

Whether Augustinian or Benedictine in inspiration, the religious observances of all three orders were remarkably alike, except that the Cistercian-affiliated orders were more demanding, and their members could not marry. Their prayers were simple and their penances were aimed at knightly vices and the preservation of military discipline. Above all, the orders valued obedience. They never drank from the deep wellsprings of monasticism, nor were they ever meant to. The hegemony of the nonordained military brethren, so anomalous in Catholic religious orders, owed to the priority of the exercise of arms as an organizing principle. Yet the prayer and worship of clergy and sisters, even if they occupied a subordinate role, boosted the orders'

religious profile.

Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara shared the same essential mission and purpose: the defense and expansion of Christendom understood as an act of charity, expressed primarily through fighting and secondarily through the care of the sick and the ransoming of captives. Other social groups recognized the merit of this vocation and sought to share in it through donations, ties of confraternity, and direct participation in the orders' activities. Ransoming and care of the sick were more prominent in Santiago, but Calatrava and perhaps even Alcántara pursued these activities too, though on a more limited scale.

The *hermandades* demonstrate the orders' understanding of their shared vocation and spirituality. The effort to identify and pursue common objectives, to share resources and manpower, to assist one another in need, and "to be seen as brothers in all things" are characteristic of these agreements. The Iberian orders were closer to one another than to the universal orders, as indicated by the *hermandades* of the 1280s and the wrangling over the Templar properties. Although the pacts' provisions were not always put into effect, they were more than just sweet sentiment, for the orders saw themselves as closer to one another than to any other group in society. The frequency with which brethren transferred from one order to another, though regarded as a problem in the sources, points to a common way of life that transcended the orders' various traditions and governing norms.

The monarchy's significant role in the history of Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara is a particular feature of ecclesiastical knighthood in Iberia. From the beginning to the end of the period under study, royal prerogative is always present and, in many cases, decisive. Once the period of royal minorities had ended, the fourteenth century witnessed an acceleration and intensification of this process of "nationalization." This happened not only to the military orders but also to the Church in Castile more generally. In some sense, therefore, the "ecclesiastical" aspect of ecclesiastical knighthood was usually mediated by the monarchy. The orders were doing the work of the Church for the Church, but often according to the king's notion of what that meant.

These conclusions come with the caveat, however, that the sources I have used in this study make it easier to explain the Iberian orders' structures of spirituality than how they were understood and filled with content by their members. Even [Chapters 3](#) and [4](#), which move beyond the normative material, have only partially overcome this problem. I am convinced that the concept of ecclesiastical knighthood is a better way to understand the orders than is "warrior monks" or

anything else that has thus far been proposed, but there are still important questions to answer. Perhaps a prosopographical study on the model of Schenk's *Templar Families* would yield a better understanding of the spirituality of Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara. There is, in any case, a need for more comparative approaches to the orders in their particular contexts.

The basic outline of the military-religious life in Castile began to change during the second half of the thirteenth century, when many factors—such as the slowing of the Reconquest, the political turbulence of the realm, the privatization of property, breakdowns in governance and obedience, reductions in donations and ties of confraternity, diminished ransoming and hospitaller work, and an increasing identification with the lay nobility—eroded the orders' religious character. The circumstances of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that had brought them into being and fostered their growth were passing away, and it was necessary for the orders to adjust. The Templars fell afoul of the king of France and were eliminated, whereas the Hospitallers struck out for a new adventure on Rhodes. The Iberian orders, by contrast, reoriented themselves away from the ideals of ecclesiastical knighthood and toward the model of lay Christian knighthood of the Late Middle Ages, in which honor, private possessions, and courtly accoutrements were more conspicuous. The development and elaboration of lay chivalry had caught up with the orders, which had always maintained close ties to their social cradle, the nobility. This process was gradual, as the orders did not abandon their vows entirely until the end of the fifteenth century. Josserand, furthermore, credits them with contributing a stronger Christian profile to the lay Castilian nobility in this latter period.² Yet even this contribution came at the price of compromising their founding ideals.

Once again, the monarch's role was crucial. Alfonso XI achieved what his predecessors had failed to do: take control of the orders' internal life. After 1330, he handed out the lucrative masterships as plums to his loyal supporters, a trend that would continue throughout the fourteenth century. The fifteenth century witnessed, on the one hand, the progressive relaxation of the military orders' religious observance and, on the other hand, increased monarchical control. The papacy granted to Juan II and Enrique IV direct administration of the orders of Santiago and Alcántara for limited periods, and Calatrava aligned itself for a time with the noble opposition. But the Catholic Monarchs sought and achieved the definitive incorporation of the masterships of all three orders into the Castilian Crown during the 1480s and 1490s. This process, already a fait accompli before 1500, was completed in 1523, when Pope Hadrian granted the perpetual administration of the orders to Charles V. Santiago, Calatrava, and

Alcántara survived the Late Middle Ages and into the sixteenth century mainly because the monarchy found them expedient instruments of its will. Was this an inevitable outcome? Speculation is the historian's idle pastime rather than his craft. One thing is clear, however: the limitations of the brothers' spiritual formation, as well as the striking anonymity of individuals within the orders, made it exceedingly unlikely that they could have generated successful reform movements. The examples of such movements in Christian history have always combined personal sanctity with an appreciation of the pertinent spiritual traditions and sensitivity to the religious needs of the day. By the early fourteenth century, the military brethren most often lacked the last two qualities. I leave the question of their sanctity to Him, who alone searches the hearts of men.

NOTES

PREFACE

1. Maurice Keen, *Chivalry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 49.
2. Jonathan Riley-Smith, "New Approaches to the Hospitallers and the Templars in the Central Middle Ages," in *As ordens militares: Freires, guerreiros, cavaleiros; Actas do VI Encontro sobre Ordens Militares*, coord. Isabel Cristina Ferreira Fernandes (Palmela: Município de Palmela, 2012), 43.
3. Joseph Becker, SJ, *The Re-Formed Jesuits*, vol. 1, *A History of Changes in Jesuit Formation During the Decade 1965–1975* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), 112, 217–18, 267.

INTRODUCTION

1. Luis García-Guijarro Ramos, "Exemption in the Temple, the Hospital and the Teutonic Order: Shortcomings of the Institutional Approach," in *The Military Orders*, vol. 2, *Welfare and Warfare*, ed. Helen Nicholson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 289.
2. "Il faut remarquer que l'histoire religieuse a trop souvent oublié l'aspect spirituel de ces ordres militaires. . . . [L]a spécificité religieuse des ordres militaires a été jusqu'à peu la grande absente de l'historiographie." *Prier et combattre: Dictionnaire européen des ordres militaires au Moyen Âge*, ed. Nicole Bériou and Philippe Josserand (Paris: Fayard, 2009), 34, 42.
3. Karl Borchardt, "The Military-Religious Orders: A Medieval 'School for Administrators'?" in *The Military Orders*, vol. 5, *Politics and Power*, ed. Peter Edbury (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), 3.
4. Examples include Malcolm Barber, *The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), and Helen Nicholson, *The Knights Templar: A Brief History of the Warrior Order* (Philadelphia: Running Press, 2010).
5. Alan Forey, *The Military Orders: From the Twelfth to the Early Fourteenth Centuries* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 13.
6. Franco Cardini, *La nascita dei templari: San Bernardo di Chiaravalle e la Cavalleria mistica* (Rimini: Il Cerchio, 1994), 95.
7. "Resulta evidente, por tanto, que el arquetipo de orden militar, el Temple, modelo para las demás, es el resultado de la perfecta conjunción entre dos elementos hasta ese momento excluyentes, monacato y caballería." Carlos de Ayala Martínez, "Tópicos y realidades en torno a las Ordenes Militares," in *Tópicos y realidades de la Edad Media*, vol. 2, ed. Eloy Benito Ruano (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 2000), 109.
8. Antonio Linage Conde, "Tipología de la vida religiosa en las órdenes militares," *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 11 (1981): 58.
9. Joseph O'Callaghan, *A History of Medieval Spain* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), 239.
10. Carlos de Ayala Martínez, *Las órdenes militares hispánicas en la Edad Media (siglos XII–XV)* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003); Enrique Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros en los reinos hispánicos: Las órdenes militares en la Península Ibérica durante la Edad Media* (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2008).
11. Anthony Luttrell, "The Military Orders: Some Definitions," in *Militia Sancti Sepulcri: Idea e istituzioni*, ed. Kaspar Elm and Cosimo Damiano Fonseca (Vatican

City: Commissio Scientifica pro Historia Ordinis, 1998), 78, reprinted in *Studies on the Hospitallers After 1306*, Variorum Collected Studies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), I.

12. “The question of whether the members of the military orders should be called monks or laymen (or neither) remains, therefore, open and is from most points of view badly put, since they were *sui generis*.” Giles Constable, “The Military Orders,” in *Crusaders and Crusading in the Twelfth Century* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 182.

13. James Brundage, “Crusades, Clerics and Violence: Reflections on a Canonical Theme,” in *The Experience of Crusading*, vol. 1, *Western Approaches*, ed. Marcus Bull and Norman Housley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 155–56.

14. ST, 2ae.188.3.

15. Riley-Smith sees in Thomas’s defense of the military orders an apologia for the mendicants, and suggests that the friars are the nearest equivalents in Catholic religious life to the military brethren. Jonathan Riley-Smith, “New Approaches to the Hospitallers and the Templars in the Central Middle Ages,” in *As ordens militares: Freires, guerreiros, cavaleiros; Actas do VI Encontro sobre Ordens Militares*, coord. Isabel Cristina Ferreira Fernandes (Palmela: Município de Palmela, 2012), 46–48.

16. Constable, “Military Orders,” 166. The author of the *Libellus de Diversis Ordinibus*, who wrote in the middle of the twelfth century and was familiar with the many religious groups of the age, did not mention the military orders. *Libellus de Diversis Ordinibus et Professionibus qui sunt in Ecclesia*, rev. ed., ed. Giles Constable, trans. Bernard S. Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003).

17. Kaspar Elm, “Die Spiritualität der geistlichen Ritterorden des Mittelalters: Forschungsstand und Forschungsprobleme,” in *Militia Christi e Crociata nei secoli XI–XIII: Atti della undecima Settimana internazionale di studio: Mendola, 28 agosto–1 settembre 1989* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1992), 477–518; André Vauchez, *La spiritualité du Moyen Âge occidental: VIIIe–XIIIe siècle* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1994), 127, 147. Their perspective on the lay character of the orders’ spirituality has been recently reaffirmed. Nikolas Jaspert, “Military Orders and Social History: Some Introductory Thoughts,” in *As ordens militares: Freires, guerreiros, cavaleiros; Actas do VI Encontro sobre Ordens Militares*, coord. Isabel Cristina Ferreira Fernandes (Palmela: Município de Palmela, 2012), 510.

18. Jonathan Riley-Smith, *Templars and Hospitallers as Professed Religious in the Holy Land* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010).

19. For recent discussion of the Templar trial, see Jonathan Riley-Smith, “Were the Templars Guilty?” in *The Medieval Crusade*, ed. Susan Ridyard (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2004), 107–24; Malcolm Barber, *The Trial of the Templars*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 294–311; Helen Nicholson, *The Knights Templar on Trial: The Trial of the Templars in the British Isles 1308–11* (Stroud: History Press, 2009), 27–31; Alan Forey, “Could Alleged Templar Malpractices Have Remained Undetected for Decades?” in *The Debate on the Trial of the Templars (1307–1314)*, ed. Jochen Burgdorf, Paul F. Crawford, and Helen Nicholson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2010), 11–19; Thomas Krämer, “Terror, Torture and the Truth: The Testimonies of the Templars Revisited,” in *Debate on the Trail of the Templars*, 71–85.

20. James Brodman, “Rule and Identity: The Case of the Military Orders,” *Catholic Historical Review* 87, no. 3 (2001): 383–400.

21. “This distinction between monk and canon may well be the key factor in understanding why some knights were hospitallers, and others were not.” Brodman, “Rule and Identity,” 396.

22. Kaspar Elm has also drawn attention to the different ways that various military orders combined *miles* and *monachus*, but his taxonomy is rather less developed. He sees their willingness to fight pagans and defend Christianity on all fronts as the key to formal unity among the orders. Kaspar Elm, “Gli ordini militari: Un ceto di vita religiosa fra universalismo e particolarismo,” in *Militia Sacra: Gli*

ordini militari tra Europa e Terrasanta, ed. Enzo Coli, Maria De Marco, and Francesco Tommasi (Perugia: S. Bevnate, 1994), 9–28.

23. See Forey, *Military Orders*, which follows this approach.

24. Philippe Josserand, *Église et pouvoir dans la Péninsule Ibérique: Les ordres militaires dans le royaume de Castille (1252–1369)* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2004).

25. Josserand, *Église*, 2–12, 37–96.

26. Josserand, *Église*, 97–163.

27. Giles Constable, *The Reformation of the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 75.

28. Luis Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados de la orden de Alcántara en la Edad Media: Su organización institucional y vida religiosa* (Madrid: Castellum, 1999), 231. Villegas Díaz seems to follow a similar line of thought when he suggests that the aim of Calatrava was to turn warriors into monks, rather than the other way around. Luis Rafael Villegas Díaz, “Influencias de Cister en Calatrava,” in *As ordens militares: Freires, guerreiros, cavaleiros; Actas do VI Encontro sobre Ordens Militares*, coord. Isabel Cristina Ferreira Fernandes (Palmela: Município de Palmela, 2012), 176.

29. While suggesting that the Templars were closer to monks than canons in terms of their liturgical observance, she notes that the Templar Rule consistently refers to the order’s members as *fratres*, never as monks or canons. Simonetta Cerrini, *La révolution des Templiers: Une histoire perdue du XIIe siècle* (Paris: Perrin, 2007), 146.

30. Noting Demurger’s observation that the Temple was a child of the Gregorian Reform, she adds that it was also a revolution against it. Cerrini, *La révolution*, 243–44. For the association of the Templars with Abelard, kabbalism, and religious pluralism, see Cerrini, *La révolution*, 112–13, 71, 234. But she also says that the Templars were not opposed to the clergy or the institutional church. Cerrini, *La révolution*, 148–49.

31. Carlos de Ayala Martínez, “Nuevos tiempos, nuevas ideas,” in *El nacimiento de la Orden de Calatrava: Primeros tiempos de expansión (siglos XII–XIII)*, *Actas del I Congreso Internacional “850 Aniversario de la fundación de la Orden de Calatrava, 1158–2008” (Almagro, October 2008)*, ed. Ángela Madrid Medina and Luis Rafael Villegas Díaz (Ciudad Real: Instituto de Estudios Manchegos, 2009), 9–55.

32. See Carlos de Ayala Martínez, “Las órdenes militares ‘internacionales’ en el contexto del siglo XII: Religión y milicia,” in *Del silencio de la cartuja al fragor de la orden militar*, ed. José Ángel García de Cortázar and Ramón Teja (Aguilar de Campoo: Fundación Santa María la Real, 2010), 127–65; Carlos de Ayala Martínez, “Espiritualidad y práctica religiosa entre las órdenes militares: Los orígenes de la espiritualidad militar,” in *As ordens militares: Freires, guerreiros, cavaleiros; Actas do VI Encontro sobre Ordens Militares*, coord. Isabel Cristina Ferreira Fernandes (Palmela: Município de Palmela, 2012), 139–72.

33. Desmond Seward, *The Monks of War: The Military Religious Orders*, rev. ed. (London: Penguin, 1995); *Los monjes soldados: Los templarios y otras órdenes militares; Actas IX Seminario sobre Historia del Monacato (7–10 agosto de 1995)* (Aguilar de Campoo: Fundación Santa María la Real Centro de Estudios del Románico, 1996); Luis Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados de la orden de Alcántara en la Edad Media: Su organización institucional y vida religiosa* (Madrid: Castellum, 1999); Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*.

34. Vauchez, *La spiritualité*, 147.

35. Sebastián Salvadó, “Interpreting the Altarpiece of Saint Bernard: Templar Liturgy and Conquest in Thirteenth-Century Majorca,” *Iconografia: Rivista di Iconografia Medievale e Moderna* 5 (2006): 48; Dominic Selwood, *Knights of the Cloister: Templars and Hospitallers in Central-Southern Occitania c. 1100–c. 1330* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1999), 1.

36. "Les Templiers ne sont pas de moines, mais des religieux de type militaire." Alain Demurger, *Chevaliers du Christ: Les ordres religieux-militaires au Moyen Âge, XIe–XVIe siècle* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2002), 13.
37. Alain Demurger, *Les Templiers: Une chevalerie chrétienne au Moyen Âge* (Paris: Seuil, 2005), 32.
38. Alain Demurger, *Moines et guerriers: Les ordres religieux-militaires au Moyen Âge* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2010), 8, 11.
39. Saul António Gomes, "Monges e cavaleiros no Portugal medieval: Os horizontes espirituais," in *Ordens militares e religiosidade: Homenagem ao Professor José Mattoso* (Palmela: Gabinete de Estudos sobre a Ordem de Santiago, 2010), 31–50.
40. Damien Carraz, *L'Ordre du Temple dans la basse vallée du Rhône (1124–1312): Ordres militaires, croisades, et sociétés méridionales* (Lyons: Presses Universitaires, 2005), 12–13.
41. Jean Leclercq, OSB, "Saint Bernard's Attitude Towards War," in *Studies in Medieval Cistercian History*, vol. 2, ed. John R. Sommerfeldt, Cistercian Studies Series (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1976), 25; Malcolm Barber, "The Origins of the Order of the Temple," *Studia Monastica* 12 (1970): 237, reprinted in *Crusaders and Heretics, 12th–14th Centuries*, Variorum Collected Studies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1995), I. He says that Bernard's treatise on the Templars was "a justification of the fighting monk."
42. Frederick H. Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 296; Lawrence G. Duggan, *Armsbearing and the Clergy in the History and Canon Law of Western Christianity* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2013), 123.
43. María Echániz Sans, "Austeridad versus lujo: El vestido y los freiles de la Orden de Santiago durante la Edad Media," *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 23 (1993): 380.
44. J. Michael Walsh, *Warriors of the Lord: The Military Orders of Christendom* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 7; Jonathan Phillips, *The Second Crusade: Expanding the Frontiers of Christendom* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 3.
45. C. H. Lawrence, *Medieval Monasticism: Forms of Religious Life in Western Europe in the Middle Ages*, 3rd ed. (New York: Pearson, 2001), 207. But on the following page he also refers to them as "the apotheosis of the Christian knighthood," a description with which I wholeheartedly agree.
46. García Colombás, *El monacato primitivo*, 2nd ed. (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 2004), 369–70.
47. Later writers read back the origins of this monastic "order" to the apostles. "Principium monastici ordinis ab apostolis et ceteris credentibus qui de Iudeis primi crediderunt initium sumpsit," in *Three Treatises from Bec on the Nature of Monastic Life*, ed. Giles Constable, trans. Bernard S. Smith (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 31.
48. Jean Leclercq, OSB, *Aspects of Monasticism*, trans. Mary Dodd (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1978), 328–32.
49. Constable and Riley-Smith have made this link explicit. Constable, *The Reformation*; Jonathan Riley-Smith, "Towards a History of Military-Religious Orders," in *The Hospitallers, the Mediterranean and Europe: Festschrift for Anthony Luttrell*, ed. Karl Borchardt, Nikolas Jaspert, and Helen J. Nicholson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 277. Demurger has referred to the Templars as "religious of a military type." This statement is correct as far as the facts are concerned, yet even here there exists the danger of trying to understand the military orders primarily from the standpoint of the monastic tradition rather than knighthood. Demurger, *Chevaliers du Christ*, 13.

50. Giles Constable, "The Study of Monastic History Today," in *Essays on the Reconstruction of Medieval History*, ed. Vaclav Mudroch and G. S. Grouse (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1974), 32, reprinted in *Religious Life and Thought (11th–12th centuries)*, Variorum Collected Studies (London: Ashgate, 1979), I.
51. Caroline Walker Bynum, *Docere Verbo et Exemplo: An Aspect of Twelfth-Century Spirituality* (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1979), 1–5, 181–97.
52. Christian Vogel, *Das Recht der Templer: Ausgewählte Aspekte des Templerrechts unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Statutenhandschriften aus Paris, Rom, Baltimore und Barcelona*, Vita regularis 33: Ordnung und Deutungen religiösen Lebens im Mittelalter (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2007), 233.
53. Richard W. Kaeuper, *Holy Warriors: The Religious Ideology of Chivalry* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2009), 52–93.
54. Kaeuper, *Holy Warriors*, 36.
55. Katherine Allen Smith, *War and the Making of Medieval Monastic Culture* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2011), 198.
56. Smith, *War*, 39, 7.
57. Smith follows in a long line of scholars who emphasize that clerics and monks were forbidden to participate in earthly warfare. Smith, *War*, 42–44.
58. Duggan, *Armsbearing*, 142.
59. Brundage, "Crusades, Clerics and Violence," 153.
60. Leclercq once used the term "religious knights" with reference to the military orders, but I prefer "ecclesiastical" for its specificity. Jean Leclercq, OSB, "From St. Gregory to St. Bernard: From the Sixth to the Twelfth Century," in *A History of Christian Spirituality*, vol. 2, *The Spirituality of the Middle Ages*, ed. Louis Bouyer, Jean Leclercq, François Vandenbroucke, and Louis Cognet (New York: Seabury Press, 1982), 136.
61. See Marcus Bull, *Knightly Piety and the Lay Response to the First Crusade: The Limousin and Gascony, c. 970–c. 1130* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 8–9. Chibnall regards this tendency as excessive. "Some historians have become so wary of possible misunderstandings that they avoid ever translating *miles* as 'knight' in an eleventh-century document, and prefer 'soldier,' 'warrior,' or some such blandly unspecific term for all references. This, surely, is going too far." Marjorie Chibnall, "Aspects of Knighthood: Knights and Monks," in *Chivalry, Knighthood and War in the Middle Ages*, ed. Susan Ridyard (Sewanee: University of the South Press, 1999), 51.
62. Thus Helen Nicholson and Alan Murray have convinced me that the term "ecclesiastical chivalry," which I had originally wanted to use, is simply anachronistic. See Sam Zeno Conedera, "Ecclesiastical Chivalry: The Military-Religious Life in Leon-Castile, 1150–1330" (PhD diss., University of California–Los Angeles, 2009). The Romance languages generally do not make this distinction and translate both "knighthood" and "chivalry" with a single word.
63. Richard Barber, *The Knight and Chivalry*, rev. ed. (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1995), 4.
64. Riley-Smith regards the members of the military orders as knights by virtue of their profession, although he notes that there is evidence that the Templars sometimes dubbed their postulants before admission. Riley-Smith, "Towards a History," 270.
65. Scholars identify the Templar preference of poverty over largesse, as well as the name *pauperes commilitones Christi*, as a critique of the ways of lay knighthood. Cerrini, *La révolution*, 149; Francesco Tommasi, "'Pauperes commilitones Christi': Aspetti e problemi delle origini gerosolimitane," in *'Militia Christi' e Crociata nei secoli XI–XIII: Atta della undecima Settimana internazionale di studio Mendola, 28 agosto–1 settembre 1989* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1992), 443–75; Cardini, *La nascita*, 73.

66. Joseph de Guibert, SJ, *The Jesuits: Their Spiritual Doctrine and Practice*, ed. George Ganss, SJ, trans. William Young, SJ (Chicago: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1964), 3.

67. “Entiendo este término como el conjunto de rasgos configurantes de un instituto o corporación que le identifican y le dan su particular fisonomía dentro de la Iglesia.” Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados*, 232n8.

68. Hans-Dietrich Kahl, “Die Spiritualität der Ritterorden als Problem: Ein methodologischer Essay,” in *Die Spiritualität der Ritterorden im Mittelalter*, ed. Zenon Hubert Nowak (Toruń: Universitas Nicolai Copernici, 1993), 271–95; José Mattoso, “A vida religiosa e espiritual nas ordens militares,” in *Ordens militares e religiosidade: Homenagem ao Professor José Mattoso* (Palmela: Gabinete de Estudos sobre a Ordem de Santiago, 2010), 11–21.

69. Recently there has been some innovative work on Templar liturgical and hagiographical sources. Salvadó, “Interpreting the Altarpiece”; Jochen Schenk, “Some Hagiographical Evidence for Templar Spirituality, Religious Life and Conduct,” *Revue Mabillon* 22 (2011): 99–119.

70. Kahl, “Die Spiritualität,” 287–88.

71. “The spiritual life of a group of professed religious whose concerns were seldom intellectual and who left little explicit indication of their vocational attitudes was difficult to gauge even for contemporaries.” Anthony Luttrell, “The Spiritual Life of the Hospitallers of Rhodes,” in *Die Spiritualität der Ritterorden im Mittelalter*, ed. Zenon Hubert Nowak (Toruń: Universitas Nicolai Copernici, 1993), 75.

72. I follow Rodríguez-Picavea in designating the Temple and the Hospital as “universal” rather than “international” orders, as the former is more precise. *Los monjes guerreros*, 45.

73. For a table of these groups, see Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 117–18.

74. For bibliographies, see Derek Lomax, *Las órdenes militares en la Península Ibérica durante la Edad Media* (Salamanca: Instituto de Historia de la Teología Española, 1976); Carlos de Ayala Martínez, Carlos Barquero Goñi, José Vicente Matellanes Merchán, Feliciano Novoa Portela, and Enrique Rodríguez-Picavea, “Las órdenes militares en la Edad Media peninsular: Historiografía 1976–1992, I. Reinos de Castilla y León,” *Medievalismo: Boletín de la Sociedad Española de Estudios Medievales* 3 (1993): 87–144; Philippe Josserand, “L’historiographie des ordres militaires dans les royaumes de Castille et de León: Bilan et perspectives de la recherché en histoire médiévale,” *Atalaya* 9 (1998): 5–44; Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, “La investigación sobre órdenes militares en la Edad Media hispánica durante los últimos decenios: Corona de Castilla y León,” in *Las órdenes militares en la Península Ibérica*, vol. 1, *Edad Media*, ed. Ricardo Izquierdo Benito and Francisco Ruiz Gómez (Cuenca: Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 2000), 9–31; Carlos de Ayala Martínez and Carlos Barquero Goñi, “Historiografía hispánica y órdenes militares en la Edad Media, 1993–2003,” *Medievalismo* 12 (2002): 101–61; Luis García-Guijarro Ramos, “Historiography and History: Medieval Studies on the Military Orders in Spain Since 1975,” in *The Military Orders*, vol. 3, *History and Heritage*, ed. Victor Mallia-Milanes (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 25. While applauding the work on the military orders, García-Guijarro Ramos has called Spain “the paradox of a crusader country with no crusade historians.”

75. Jochen Schenk, *Templar Families: Landowning Families and the Order of the Temple in France, c. 1120–1307* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Nicholas Paul, *To Follow in Their Footsteps: The Crusades and Family Memory in the High Middle Ages* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012).

76. Aurea Javierre Mur and Consuelo G. del Arroyo, *Guía de la sección de órdenes militares* (Madrid: Patronato Nacional de Archivos Históricos, 1950).

77. Antonio Francisco Aguado de Córdoba, Alfonso Antonio Alemán y Rosales, and José López Agurleta, eds., *Bullarium equestris ordinis sancti Iacobi de Spatha* (Madrid: Typographia Ioannis de Aritzia, 1719) (hereafter BS); Ignacio José de Ortega y Cotes, Juan Francisco Álvarez de Baquedano, and Pedro de Ortega-Zúñiga y Aranda, eds., *Bullarium ordinis militiae de Calatrava* (Madrid: Antonio Martín, 1759), reedited by Derek Lomax (Barcelona: El Abir, 1981) (hereafter BC); Ignacio José de Ortega y Cotes, José Fernández de Brizuela, and Pedro de Ortega-Zúñiga y Aranda, eds., *Bullarium ordinis militiae de Alcantara, olim sancti Juliani de Pereiro* (Madrid: Tipografía Marín, 1761) (hereafter BA).

78. For Santiago, see Jean Leclercq, OSB, "La vie et la prière des chevaliers de Santiago d'après leur Règle primitive," *Liturgica* 2 (1958): 347–57; Derek Lomax, *La Orden de Santiago* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1965), appendix, no. 1, 221–31; Enrique Gallego Blanco, *The Rule of the Spanish Military Order of St. James: 1170–1493* (Leiden: Brill, 1971). For Calatrava, see Joseph O'Callaghan, "The Earliest 'Definiciones' of the Order of Calatrava, 1304–1383," *Traditio* 17 (1962): 255–84, reprinted in *The Spanish Military Order of Calatrava and Its Affiliates*, Variorum Collected Studies (London: Ashgate, 1975), VII; Derek Lomax, "Algunos estatutos primitivos de la Orden de Calatrava," *Hispania* 23 (1961): 483–94. For Alcántara, see Philippe Josserand, "Pour une étude systématique de la documentation statutaire des ordres militaires: Deux manuscrits des 'definiciones' inédites d'Alcántara de 1306," *En la España Medieval* 20 (1997): 321–38.

79. Bonifacio Palacios Martín, dir., *Colección diplomática medieval de la Orden de Alcántara (1157?–1494)*, 2 vols. (Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 2000–2003).

80. Joseph Delaville Le Roulx, *Cartulaire général de l'ordre des Hospitaliers de Saint-Jean-de-Jérusalem (1100–1310)*, 4 vols. (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1894–1906); Carlos de Ayala Martínez, ed., *Libro de privilegios de la Orden de San Juan de Jerusalén en Castilla y León (siglos XII–XV)* (Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1995).

81. Rudolf Hiestand, *Papsturkunden für Templer und Johanniter: Archivberichte und Texte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972).

82. María Echániz Sans, *El monasterio femenino de Sancti Spiritus de Salamanca: Colección diplomática (1268–1400)* (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1993).

83. José Luis Martín, *Orígenes de la Orden Militar de Santiago (1170–1195)* (Barcelona: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1974); Anna Mur i Raurell, *La encomienda de San Marcos: La Orden de Santiago en Teruel (1200–1556)* (Teruel: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1988).

84. Julio González, *El reino de Castilla en la época de Alfonso VIII*, 3 vols. (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1960); Julio González, *Alfonso IX*, 2 vols. (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1944); Julio González, *Reinado y diplomas de Fernando III*, 3 vols. (Córdoba: Publicaciones del Monte de Piedad, 1980).

85. Paul Kehr, *Papsturkunden in Spanien: Vorarbeiten zur Hispania Pontificia*, 2 vols. (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1926); Demetrio Mansilla, *La documentación pontificia hasta Inocencio III (963–1216)* (Rome: Instituto Español de Estudios Eclesiásticos, 1955); Demetrio Mansilla, *La documentación pontificia de Honorio III (1216–1227)* (Rome: Instituto Español de Historia Eclesiástica, 1965).

86. Archivo Histórico Nacional (hereafter AHN), Sección de Órdenes Militares (hereafter OOMM), libro 931 (now only available online); Juan Antonio Fernández, *Noticias históricas sacadas del Archivo de Uclés, de sus sepulcros y calenda, y del testamento del infante don Enrique con un Cronicón hasta ahora no publicado; Opúsculos castellanos y latinos de Ambrosio Morales*, vol. 2 (Madrid: Benito Cano, 1793), 22–34.

87. The one exception is the very late biography of the founder of Santiago. José López Agurleta, *Vida del venerable fundador de la Orden de Santiago, y de las primeras*

casas de redención de cautivos. Continuación de la apología por el hábito canónico del patriarca Santo Domingo en la misma orden (Madrid: Imprenta de Bernardo Peralta, 1731).

88. *The Rule of St. Benedict: In English and Latin*, ed. and trans. Justin McCann, OSB (Fort Collins: Roman Catholic Books, 1951); Joseph-Marie Canivez, *Statuta capitulorum generalium oridinis Cisterciensis: Ab anno 1116 ad annum 1786*, 8 vols. (Louvain: Bureaux de la Revue, 1933–1941).

89. *Sancti Bernardi Opera*, ed. Jean Leclercq, OSB, H. Rochais, and C. H. Talbot, 8 vols. (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1957–1977) (hereafter *SBO*).

90. Francisco Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de las Tres Ordenes y Cauallerias de Sanctiago, Calatraua y Alcantara*, Toledo, 1572, facs. ed. (Barcelona: El Abir, 1980); Alonso de Torres y Tapia, *Crónica de la Orden de Alcántara*, 2 vols. (Madrid: Imprenta de Don Gabriel Ramírez, 1763).

91. Juan Orozco de la Parra, *Primera historia de la Orden de Santiago: Manuscrito del siglo XV, de la Real Academia de la Historia*, ed. Marquis de Siete Iglesias (Badajoz: Diputación de Badajoz, 1978).

92. Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, ed. Juan Fernández Valverde, *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis* 72 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1987) (hereafter *HDRH*).

93. *Crónica latina de los Reyes de Castilla*, ed. and trans. Luis Charlo Brea (Madrid: Ediciones Akal, 1999); Jofré de Loaysa, *Crónica de los Reyes de Castilla Fernando III, Alfonso X, Sancho IV y Fernando IV (1248–1335)*, ed. and trans. Antonio García Martínez, 2nd ed. (Murcia: Academia Alfonso X el Sabio, 1982); Alfonso X, *Primera crónica general de España*, ed. Ramón Menéndez Pidal (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1955).

94. William of Tyre, *Chronicon*, ed. R. B. C. Huygens, *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis* 63–63A (Turnhout: Brepols, 1986).

1. FOUNDATIONS

1. All Bible passages in English are taken from the Revised Standard Version.

2. “Hoc tempore huius centennii primum inualuerunt ad summum robur Templarii, Hospitalarii in Ierusalem, in Hispania milites qui a gladio nomen habent, de quibus superius sermo decessit.” Walter Map, *De nugis curialium*, ed. and trans. M. R. James (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 124–25.

3. Map’s “Knights of the Sword” is a reference to the Order of Santiago. He locates the Hospitallers’ origins correctly in the care of the sick and makes no mention of their military activities, although he is critical of their privileges. This suggests that Map may not have yet been aware of their militarization.

4. Jean Flori calls attention to the additional skill and training that the couched lance charge required, and the consequent rise in social status for the men who mastered it. Jean Flori, *Chevaliers et chevalerie au Moyen Âge* (Paris: Hachette Littératures, 1998), 93–94.

5. H. E. J. Cowdrey, “The Peace and Truce of God in the Eleventh Century,” *Past and Present* 46 (1970): 42–46, reprinted in *Popes, Monks and Crusaders* (London: Hambledon Press, 1984), VII. For a deeper treatment of the movement, see Thomas Head and Richard Landes, eds., *The Peace of God: Social Violence and Religious Response in France Around the Year 1000* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992). One of the important contributions of the movement is that it offered a way of speaking more positively about the knight’s role in society, and it claimed for the Church the authority to assert control over the use of arms and to direct violent action. Christopher Tyerman, *God’s War: A New History of the Crusades* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 44; Tomaž Mastnak, *Crusading Peace: Christendom,*

the Muslim World, and Western Political Order (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 10. On the new religious practices, see Marcus Bull, *Knightly Piety and the Lay Response to the First Crusade: The Limousin and Gascony, c. 970–c. 1130* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 155–203. For the pilgrimage to Jerusalem, see Colin Morris, *The Sepulchre of Christ and the Medieval West: From the Beginning to 1600* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

6. Bull, *Knightly Piety*, 285; William Purkis, *Crusading Spirituality in the Holy Land and Iberia, c. 1095–1187* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2008), 58.

7. “Knightly piety, in short, involved an appreciable degree of practical lay independence; chivalry took on the valorizing mantle of religion without fully accepting the directive role claimed by ecclesiastics; it virtually absorbed religion for its own purposes, in no small measure on its own terms.” Richard W. Kaeuper, *Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 51.

8. The traditional attitude is captured in a famous passage from Smaragdus of Saint-Mihel, who contrasts the soldiers of the world with the soldiers of Christ. Smaragdus of Saint-Mihel, *Commentary on the Rule of Saint Benedict*, trans. David Barry, OSB (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 2007), 58–59. Flori notes that penitential books prescribed penances even for lawful battlefield killings well into the eleventh century. Jean Flori, “Ideology and Motivations in the First Crusade,” in *The Crusades*, ed. Helen Nicholson (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2005), 17. For the Gregorian Reform and its specific contributions to the use of force, see Gerd Tellenbach, *The Church in Western Europe from the Tenth to the Early Twelfth Century*, trans. Timothy Reuter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Uta-Renate Blumenthal, *The Investiture Controversy: Church and Monarchy from the Ninth to the Twelfth Century* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988); H. E. J. Cowdrey, “Pope Gregory VII’s ‘Crusading’ Plans of 1074,” in *Outremer: Studies in the History of the Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem Presented to Joshua Prawer*, ed. Benjamin Kedar, Hans Mayer, and R. C. Smail (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, 1982), 32, reprinted in *Popes, Monks and Crusaders* (London: Hambledon Press, 1984), X; H. E. J. Cowdrey, “The Mahdia Campaign of 1087,” *English Historical Review* 92 (1977): 6–7, reprinted in *Popes, Monks and Crusaders* (London: Hambledon Press, 1984), XII.

9. Katherine Allen Smith, *War and the Making of Medieval Monastic Culture* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2011), 71–111; André Vauchez, “La notion de *Miles Christi* dans la spiritualité occidentale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles,” in *Chevalerie et Christianisme aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, ed. Martin Aurell and Catalina Girbea (Rennes: University of Rennes Press, 2011), 67–75.

10. The “eyewitness” accounts of Urban’s speech at Clermont come from Fulcher of Chartres, Robert the Monk, Baldric of Bourgueil, and Geoffrey of Vendôme, but they were all composed after 1099. Tyerman says that Urban called for “a penitential journey in arms to Jerusalem to recover the Holy Sepulcher and to ‘liberate Christianity’ and the eastern Christians, the expedition earning warriors satisfaction of penance and remission of sin, signaled by a vow to enforce the obligation and the adoption of the sign of the cross.” Tyerman, *God’s War*, 63. For the spiritual motives and devotion of the First Crusade, see Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1986); Jonathan Riley-Smith, “Crusading as an Act of Love,” *History* 65 (1980): 177–92, reprinted in Thomas Madden, ed., *The Crusades: The Essential Readings* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 31–50. Some of these currents of devotion were poisoned, such as the Jewish pogroms. Robert Chazan, *European Jewry and the First Crusade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

11. For narratives of the First Crusade, see Thomas Asbridge, *The First Crusade: A New History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Jay Rubenstein, *Armies of*

Heaven: *The First Crusade and the Quest for Apocalypse* (New York: Basic Books, 2011).

12. Numerous visitors to Jerusalem in the early twelfth century noticed this problem. Malcolm Barber, "The Origins of the Order of the Temple," *Studia Monastica* 12 (1970): 220–21, reprinted in *Crusaders and Heretics, 12th–14th Centuries*, Variorum Collected Studies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1995), I.

13. William of Tyre, *Chronicon*, ed. R. B. C. Huygens, *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis* 63–63A (Turnhout: Brepols, 1986), bk. 12, ch. 7, 553–55; Map, *De nugis curialium*, 54–63; Michael the Syrian, *Chronique de Michel le Syrien, Patriarche Jacobite d'Antioche (1166–99)*, ed. and trans. J.-B. Chabot (Brussels: Culture et Civilisation, 1963), vol. 3, bk. 15, ch. 11, 201–3; Simon de Saint Bertin, *Gesta abbatum Sancti Bertini Sithensium*, ed. O. Holder-Egger, in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica SS* (Hannover: Impensis Bibliopoli Hahniani, 1881), vol. 13, 649; Orderic Vitalis, *The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis*, ed. and trans. Marjorie Chibnall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969–1980), vol. 6, bk. 12, ch. 29, 310.

14. "Eodem anno quidam nobiles viri de equestri ordine, deo devoti, religiosi et timentes deum, in manu domini patriarche Christi servicio se mancipientes, more canonicorum regularium in castitate et obedientia et sine proprio velle perpetuo vivere professi sunt." William of Tyre, *Chronicon*, bk. 12, ch. 7, 553.

15. "Ut vias in itinera maxime ad salutem peregrinorum contra latronum et incursantium insidias pro viribus conservarent." William of Tyre, *Chronicon*, bk. 12, ch. 7, 553.

16. Map, *De nugis curialium*, 54–55.

17. Nikolas Jaspert, "Frühformen der geistlichen Ritterorden und die Kreuzzugsbewegung auf der Iberischen Halbinsel," in *Europa an der Wende vom 11 zum 12 Jahrhundert: Beiträge zu Ehren von Werner Goez*, ed. Klaus Herbers (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2001), 98.

18. Malcolm Barber, *The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 8–9. Some historians believe that the Council of Nablus of 1120 was the occasion for obtaining support and approval from the authorities in Jerusalem. Alain Demurger, *Les Templiers: Une chevalerie chrétienne au Moyen Âge* (Paris: Seuil, 2005), 30; Christian Vogel, *Das Recht der Templer: Ausgewählte Aspekte des Templerrechts unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Statutenhandschriften aus Paris, Rom, Baltimore und Barcelona*, *Vita regularis* 33: Ordnung und Deutungen religiösen Lebens im Mittelalter (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2007), 28.

19. Simonetta Cerrini, "I templari: Una vita da fratres, ma una regola antiascetica; una vita da cavalieri, ma una regola anti-eroica," in *I Templari, la guerra e la santità*, ed. Simonetta Cerrini (Rimini: Il Cerchio, 2000), 25.

20. For the relevant text of Bernard and analysis, see Anthony Luttrell, "The Earliest Templars," in *Autour de la première croisade: Actes du Colloque de la Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East (Clermont Ferrand, 22–25 juin 1995)*, ed. Michel Balarud (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1996), 193–202.

21. Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, vol. 3, bk. 15, ch. 11, 201; Barber, *New Knighthood*, 10.

22. "Dum nonnulli non amplius ad seculi illecebras post tanta pericula, quae pro Deo sunt perpassi, deliberassent redire, consilio principum exercitus Dei templo Dei se sub hac regula deoverunt, ut seculo abrenunciantes, proprietate carentes, castimoniae vacantes, communem sub paupere habitu ducerent vitam, arma tantum contra insurgentium paganorum impetus ad terram defendendam uterentur, quando necessitas exigeret." Simon de Saint Bertin, *Gesta abbatum*, 649.

23. "Sic uenerandis militibus quorum uita corpore et mente Deo militat, et

contemptis omnibus mundanis sese martirio cotidie preparat, nobilis heros annum uetigal diuino instinctu erogauit.” Orderic Vitalis, *Ecclesiastical History*, vol. 6, bk. 12, ch. 29, 310.

24. Migne, *PL*, vol. 188, col. 1156.

25. The same is true of Syrian and Armenian Christian sources, which use the terms “brothers” and *militia Christi* to designate the military orders. Marie-Anna Chevalier, “La vision des ordres religieux-militaires par les Chrétiens Orientaux (Arméniens et Syriaques) au Moyen Âge (du début du XIIe siècle au début du XIVe siècle),” *Crusades* 5 (2006): 55–84.

26. See Simonetta Cerrini, *La révolution des Templiers: Une histoire perdue du XIIe siècle* (Paris: Perrin, 2007), for an extensive discussion of the Council of Troyes.

27. “But they represented an idea too coloured by the monastic ideal, and too coloured also by the passions engendered in the bitter quarrel of the papacy with the empire, to be offered, even in modified form, to the knighthood at large.” Maurice Keen, *Chivalry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 50.

28. “In this religious order has flourished and is revitalised the order of knighthood.” J. M. Upton-Ward, trans., *The Rule of the Templars: The French Text of the Rule of the Order of the Knights Templar* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1992), ch. 2, 19. As Ayala Martínez remarks, “El Temple es fruto, como la cruzada, de la nueva espiritualidad militar forjada en el arsenal ideológico del reformismo gregoriano, una espiritualidad cualitativamente distinta en este momento de la propia de la tradición monástica.” Carlos de Ayala Martínez, “Espiritualidad y práctica religiosa entre las órdenes militares: Los orígenes de la espiritualidad militar,” in *As ordens militares: Freires, guerreiros, cavaleiros; Actas do VI Encontro sobre Ordens Militares*, coord. Isabel Cristina Ferreira Fernandes (Palmela: Município de Palmela, 2012), 164.

29. Cerrini, *La révolution*, 244.

30. Jochen Schenk, *Templar Families: Landowning Families and the Order of the Temple in France, c. 1120–1307* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 23. Carraz has been more cautious on this point, accepting that reform and crusade created a favorable climate for the military orders in Provence, but also insisting that reform and the papacy, as well as crusading and the military orders, were far from indissociable from each other. He also believes that the orders’ military image was more important for their success among the Provençal nobility than their spiritual quest. Damien Carraz, *L’Ordre du Temple dans la basse vallée du Rhône (1124–1312): Ordres militaires, croisades, et sociétés méridionales* (Lyons: Presses Universitaires, 2005), 146–87.

31. “The military orders combined certain monastic ideals and practices not so much with chivalric traditions as, more practically, with military life and discipline; their brethren militated in the *militia* of the religious warrior rather than in any courtly or noble milieu.” Anthony Luttrell, “The Military Orders: Some Definitions,” in *Militia Sancti Sepulcri: Idea e istituzioni*, ed. Kaspar Elm and Cosimo Fonseca (Vatican City, 1998), 81, reprinted in *Studies on the Hospitallers After 1306*, Variorum Collected Studies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), I.

32. Antonio Linage Conde, “Tipología de la vida religiosa en las órdenes militares,” *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 11 (1981): 38; “The military orders, I would argue, clothed the enthusiasm and the accompanying religious practices of the first crusaders with the legal form of a corporation.” James Brundage, “Crusades, Clerics and Violence: Reflections on a Canonical Theme,” in *The Experience of Crusading*, vol. 1, *Western Approaches*, ed. Marcus Bull and Norman Housley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 152.

33. Jürgen Sarnowsky, “Das historische Selbstverständnis der geistlichen Ritterorden” *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 110 (1999): 315–30.

34. Upton-Ward, *Rule*, ch. 1, 19.

35. She says it was the first religious rule to incorporate a genuine code of knighthood. Cerrini, *La révolution*, 122.

36. Demurger regards the foundation of the Templars as the final stage in the sacralization of knighthood. “La création des ordres religieux-militaires constitue l’ultime étape de ce processus; elle parachève l’oeuvre de sacralisation, mais aussi d’intégration à la société chrétienne des chevaliers.” Alain Demurger, *Moines et guerriers: Les ordres religieux-militaires au Moyen Âge* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2010), 25–26.

37. See G. R. Evans, *Bernard of Clairvaux* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Adriaan H. Bredero, *Bernard of Clairvaux: Between Cult and History* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1996).

38. This misunderstanding is a problem not only for modern scholars but also for the Templars themselves. Many brothers at the time of the Templar trial thought that their order was Cistercian in origin, or even that Bernard had been the founder. Few knew anything about the role of Hugh of Payns. Schenk, *Templar Families*, 87.

39. Bernard of Clairvaux, “Liber ad Milites Templi de Laude Novae Militiae” in *SBO*, vol. 3, *Tractatus et Opuscula*, ed. Jean Leclercq, OSB, and H. M. Rochais (Rome: Ediciones Cistercienses, 1963), 205–39. For English, see Bernard of Clairvaux, “In Praise of the New Knighthood,” trans. Conrad Greenia, in *The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux*, vol. 7, *Treatises*, Cistercian Fathers Series 19 (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1977), 113–67 (hereafter “New Knighthood”). Bernard wrote this treatise in response to a request for a defense of the new order in the face of criticism, an undertaking already begun in the letter of “Hugh peccator.” Jean Leclercq, OSB, “Un document sur les débuts des Templiers,” *Revue d’Histoire Ecclésiastique* 52 (1957): 81–91 (English translation in Malcolm Barber and Keith Bate, eds., *The Templars* [Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002], 54–59). Some have suggested that the author may have been Hugh of St. Victor, but Cerrini has argued vigorously for an identification with Hugh of Payns. Cerrini, *La révolution*, 45–47. Recently she appears to have changed her mind, thanks to an unpublished work of Dominique Poirel, who attributes the work to St. Victor. Simonetta Cerrini, “I templari, i religiosi e gli intellettuali del XII secolo: Alcuni spunti,” in *As ordens militares: Freires, guerreiros, cavaleiros; Actas do VI Encontro sobre Ordens Militares*, coord. Isabel Cristina Ferreira Fernandes (Palmela: Município de Palmela, 2012), 342.

Barber and Bate, *Templars*, 55–56. David Carlos argues that *De laude* was written before 1131, but his evidence is suggestive rather than definitive. David Carlos, “The Practical Theology of St. Bernard and the Date of the *De laude novae militiae*,” in *Erudition at God’s Service*, ed. John R. Sommerfeldt (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1987), 145. Dominic Selwood makes a more convincing case that *De laude* was composed before the Council of Troyes. Dominic Selwood, “*Quidam autem dubitaverunt*: The Saint, the Sinner, the Temple and a Possible Chronology,” in *Around the First Crusade: Actes du Colloque de la Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East (Clermont Ferrand, 22–25 juin 1995)*, ed. Michel Balard (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1996), 226–27.

40. Selwood, “*Quidam autem dubitaverunt*,” 222.

41. John V. Fleming, “Bernard, Chaucer, and the Literary Critique of the Military Class,” in *Chivalry, Knighthood, and War in the Middle Ages*, ed. Susan Ridyard (Sewanee: University of the South Press, 1999), 138.

42. The most recent example is Enrique Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros en los reinos hispánicos: Las órdenes militares en la Península Ibérica durante la Edad Media* (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2008), 33. See [Chapter 1](#) of this volume.

43. Carlos de Ayala Martínez, “Nuevos tiempos, nuevas ideas,” in *El nacimiento de*

la Orden de Calatrava: Primeros tiempos de expansión (siglos XII–XIII), *Actas del I Congreso Internacional “850 Aniversario de la fundación de la Orden de Calatrava, 1158–2008”* (Almagro, October 2008), ed. Ángela Madrid Medina and Luis Rafael Villegas Díaz (Ciudad Real: Instituto de Estudios Manchegos, 2009), 29–33.

44. “Et quidem ubi solis viribus corporis corporeo fortiter histi resistitur, id quidem ego tam non iudico mirum, quam nec rarum existimo. Sed et quando animi virtute vitis sive daemoniis bellum indicitur, ne hoc quidem mirabile, etsi laudabile dixerim, cum plenus monachis cernatur mundus. Ceterum cum uterque homo suo quisque gladio potenter accingitur, suo cingulo nobiliter insignitur, quis hoc non aestimet omni admiratione dignissimum, quod adeo liquet esse insolitum?” “New Knighthood,” 129–130; *SBO*, vol. 3, 214.

45. “Ut pene dubitem quid potius censeam appellandos, monachos videlicet an milites, nisi quod utrumque forsan congruentius nominarim, quibus neutrum deesse cognoscitur, nec monachi mansuetudo, nec militis fortitudo.” “New Knighthood,” 140; *SBO*, vol. 3, 221.

46. “Novum, inquam, militiae genus, et saeculis inexpertum, qua gemino pariter conflictu atque infatigabiliter decertatur, tum adversus carnem et sanguinem, tum contra spiritualia nequitie in caelestibus.” “New Knighthood,” 129; *SBO*, vol. 3, 214.

47. “Quis igitur finis fructusve saecularis huius, non dico, militiae, sed malitiae, si et occisor letaliter peccat, et occisus aeternaliter perit?” *SBO*, vol. 3, 216.

48. “Super haec omnia est, quod armati conscientiam magis terret, causa illa nimirum satis levis ac frivola, qua videlicet talis praesumitur et tam periculosa militia.” “New Knighthood,” 133. *SBO*, vol. 3, 216.

49. “The basic distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ knights was the result of the long-term evolution of the lay group of warriors, and had no relationship to the establishment of the military orders,” Aryeh Grabois, “*Militia and Malitia*: The Bernardine Vision of Chivalry,” in *The Second Crusade and the Cistercians*, ed. Michael Gervers (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 50.

50. “Miles, inquam, Christi securus interimit, interit securior. Sibi praestat cum interit, Christo cum interimit.” “New Knighthood,” 134; *SBO*, vol. 3, 217.

51. “Impavidus profecto miles, et omni ex parte securus, qui ut corpus ferri, sic animum fidei lorica induitur.” “New Knighthood,” 130; *SBO*, vol. 3, 214.

52. “New Knighthood,” 138–41; *SBO*, vol. 3, 219–21.

53. Selwood, “Quidam autem dubitaverunt,” 229.

54. Grabois, “*Militia and Malitia*,” 54.

55. William Purkis, *Crusading Spirituality in the Holy Land and Iberia, c. 1095–1187* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2008), 108–11; Barber, *New Knighthood*, 45–46.

56. Purkis, *Crusading Spirituality*, 108–11. Although it appears unlikely that they actually used the treatise for this purpose, Tom Licence has written compellingly about the order’s Christocentric piety. Tom Licence, “The Templars and the Hospitallers, Christ and the Saints,” *Crusades* 4 (2005) 39–57.

57. It appears, however, that the text’s potential went largely untapped. There is no evidence that the Templars used *De laude* to advertise or promote themselves. The manuscript tradition of this work and of Hugh’s letter is limited, and neither was translated into the vernacular. Karl Borchardt, “Historiography and Memory: What Was New and Unique About the Templars?” in *As ordens militares: Freires, guerreiros, cavaleiros; Actas do VI Encontro sobre Ordens Militares*, coord. Isabel Cristina Ferreira Fernandes (Palmela: Município de Palmela, 2012), 51.

58. Michel Parisse, “Morimond au XIIe siècle,” in *L’abbaye cistercienne de Morimond: Histoire et rayonnement; Colloque international organisé par l’Association des Amis de l’Abbaye de Morimond et la Société Historique et Archéologique de Langres* (Langres, 5–6 septembre 2003), ed. Georges Viard (Langres: Société Historique et

Archéologique de Langres, 2005), 18–20.

59. Bernard wrote letters to Abbot Arnold himself, to two of the monks accompanying him, to the lord of Cologne, and to Pope Calixtus, to make the offenders return to Morimond. See *SBO*, vol. 7, *Epistolae*, nos. 4–7, 24–46; *SBO*, vol. 8, *Epistolae*, no. 359, 304–5.

60. Samuel J. Eales, ed. and trans., *Life and Works of St Bernard, Abbot of Clairvaux* (London: Burns & Oates, 1889) (hereafter *Life and Works*), no. 359, 902; “Quis non videat, plus illic milites pugnantes quam monachos cantantes et plorantes necessarios esse?” *SBO*, vol. 8, *Epistolae*, no. 359, 304–5.

61. *SBO*, vol. 8, *Epistolae*, no. 253, 149–55.

62. “His guiding principle was always the superiority of the religious vocation over the call to arms.” Jean Leclercq, OSB, “Saint Bernard’s Attitude Towards War,” in *Studies in Medieval Cistercian History*, vol. 2, ed. John R. Sommerfeldt, Cistercian Studies Series (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1976), 10. Reporting to Pope Eugenius that an assembly at Chartres had chosen him as leader of an expedition to the East, Bernard wrote, “Who am I that I should have charge of a camp and go out before the faces of armed men? Is there anything more inconsistent with my profession, even if I had the necessary strength and skill?” *Life and Works*, vol. 2, no. 256, 752; *SBO*, vol. 8, *Epistolae*, no. 256, 163–65.

63. *SBO*, vol. 8, *Epistolae*, no. 544, 511–12.

64. “Quid est aliud quod Abiron et Dathan murmurantes contra Moysen absorpti sunt a terra, nisi mentes talium desideriis terrenorum esse defossas? . . . Quid crucem vestibus assuis, qui hanc corde tuo baiulare non cessas, si religionem conservas?” *SBO*, vol. 8, *Epistolae*, no. 544, 511–12.

65. “Verborum itaque prolixitatem vitantes, non nostra, sed apostolica auctoritate generaliter dicimus: si quis monachus conversus in expeditionem ierit, debitae excommunicationis sententiae subiacebit.” *SBO*, vol. 8, *Epistolae*, no. 544, 512.

66. “Qui de ordine exeunt ita ut Ierosolymam eant, vel aliam peregrinationem aliorum faciant, vel seipsos qualibet occasione faciunt abscondi vel incidi, sine omni personarum acceptatione de domibus propriis amoti, mitantur in alias domos ordinis perpetuo numquam reversuri.” Joseph-Marie Canivez, *Statuta Capitulum Generalium Ordinis Cisterciensis: Ab Anno 1116 ad Annum 1786* (Louvain: Bureaux de la Revue, 1933–1941), vol. 1, no. 53, 66.

67. “Et si vultis scire, Claravallis est. Ipsa est Ierusalem, ei quae in caelis est, tota mentis devotione, et conversationis imitatione, et cognatione quadam spiritus sociata.” *SBO*, vol. 7, *Epistolae*, 64, 157–58.

68. Andrew Jotischky, *The Perfection of Solitude: Hermits and Monks in the Crusader States* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 15.

69. “Per Bernardo, come del resto per la migliore tradizione benedettina, la *militia* monastica è un combattimento contro le forze del male.” Pietro Zerbi, “La ‘*militia Christi*’ per i Cisterciensi,” in *Militia Christi e Crociata nei secoli XI–XIII: Atti della undecima Settimana internazionale di studio: Mendola, 28 agosto–1 settembre 1989* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1992), 275.

70. Marco Meschini, *San Bernardo e la Seconda Crociata* (Milan: Mursia, 1998), 159–60.

71. “Estis monachi uirtutibus, milites actibus, illud spiritualiter implendo, istud corporaliter exercendo.” Peter the Venerable, *The Letters of Peter the Venerable*, ed. Giles Constable (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), vol. 1, no. 172, 407–9. As Ayala Martínez has pointed out, Peter was soliciting a favor from the Templar master: that one of his knights be allowed to remain at Cluny in the monastery’s service. The venerable abbot may have employed some deliberate flattery. Carlos de Ayala Martínez, “Las órdenes militares ‘internacionales’ en el contexto del siglo XII: Religión y milicia,” in *Del silencio de la Cartuja al fragor de la orden militar*, ed. José

Ángel García de Cortáza (Aguilar de Campoo: Fundación Santa María la Real, 2010), 143–44.

72. When referring to monks and hermits, Peter emphasizes their dedication to spiritual combat and their separation from worldly wars. “Militant quidem deo, et licet castigando corpus suum et in seruitutem redigendo laborent, tamen corpore a mundi tempestatibus, et maxime a bellorum tumultibus requiescunt.” Peter the Venerable, *Letters of Peter*, vol. 1, no. 172, 408. Shortly thereafter Peter wrote another letter to the pope with the following commentary: “Ut enim quod multi nostrorum sentiunt dicam, si de canonicali, si de monastico, si de heremitico, si de quolibet antiquitus instituto ordine recessisset, iure illum ad illicite dimissa, censura aecclesiastica redire comelleret.” Here, in admitting that members of the established monastic, canonical and eremitic orders should not be able to leave while members of the Temple can, Peter clearly distinguishes between the two. *Letters of Peter*, vol. 1, no. 173, 410–13.

73. This view has been described as “normative” up to the time of Innocent III. James Brundage, “A Transformed Angel: The Problem of the Crusading Monk,” in *Studies in Medieval Cistercian History Presented to Jeremiah F. O’Sullivan* (Spencer: Cistercian Publications, 1971), 57.

74. “La stessa milizia templare, che pure Bernardo ama, non può in alcun modo sostituire la vita monastica, in modo particolare quella cisterciense, la quale rimane per lui la militia Christi nel senso più pieno e più alto.” Zerbi, “Militia Christi,” 275.

75. Franco Cardini, *La nascita dei templari: San Bernardo di Chiaravalle e la Cavalleria mistica* (Rimini: Il Cerchio, 1994), 85–86. Duggan is likewise mistaken to accuse Bernard of self-contradiction for his simultaneous support of the Templars and opposition to clerical arms bearing. Lawrence G. Duggan, *Armsbearing and the Clergy in the History and Canon Law of Western Christianity* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2013), 65.

76. To be sure, there were medieval writers, like Constantine of Orvieto, who attributed to St. Bernard something like the concept of *miles-monachus*. But such writers did not necessarily think they could attribute to the Templars a monastic ancestry. Moreover, it is clear that the Templars referred to themselves overwhelmingly as *milites*, not monks. Franceso Tommasi, “‘Pauperes commilitones Christi’: Aspetti e problemi delle origini gerosolimitane,” in *‘Militia Christi’ e Crociata nei secoli XI–XIII: Atta della undecima Settimana internazionale di studio Mendola, 28 agosto–1 settembre 1989* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1992), 443–75.

77. Barber, *New Knighthood*, 64–114.

78. Rudolf Hiestand, *Papsturkunden für Templer und Johanniter: Archivberichte und Texte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972), no. 3, 204–10; no. 8, 214–15; no. 10, 216–17 (English translation in Barber and Bate, *Templars*, 59–66).

79. One scholar calls these privileges “liberties which would never have received the approval of St. Bernard.” Marie Luise Bulst-Thiele, “The Influence of St. Bernard of Clairvaux on the Formation of the Order of the Knights Templar,” in *The Second Crusade and the Cistercians*, ed. Michael Gervers (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 62.

80. Schenk, *Templar Families*, 252.

81. “Accedit ad hoc, quod tanquam ueri Israelite atque instructissimi diuini prelii bellatores uere karitatis flamma succensi dictum euuangelicum operibus adimpletis, quo dicitur: ‘Maiorem hac dilectionem nemo habet, quam ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis.’” Hiestand, *Papsturkunden*, no. 3, 205–6. “Tollentes crucem suam secuti sunt Christum. . . . Ipsi pro fratribus animas ponere non formidant et peregrinos ad loca sancta proficiscentes in eundo et redeundo ab incursibus paganorum defensant.” Hiestand, *Papsturkunden*, no. 8, 215.

82. Cerrini and Vogel have undertaken detailed studies of the *retrais* along with

the Rule. Cerrini, *La révolution*. Vogel has argued that the *retraiis* were not issued until 1190, nearly half a century later than was previously believed. Vogel, *Das Recht*, 104–8, 345–46; Karl Borchardt, “The Military-Religious Orders: A Medieval ‘School for Administrators’?” in *The Military Orders*, vol. 5, *Politics and Power*, ed. Peter Edbury (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), 4.

83. In his chapter on hypocrites who hide their ambition under the false pretext of religion, John castigates the Templars for the exemptions and privileges granted them by the papacy. Although he praises the brethren as those who lay down their lives for their brothers, on the example of the Maccabees, he considers it a scandal that those engaged in the shedding of blood should have the administration of churches, which he considers mutually exclusive activities. John of Salisbury, *Policratici sive de nugis curialium et vestigiis philosophorum*, ed. Clemens Webb (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), vol. 2, bk. 7, ch. 21, 692–95. William of Tyre criticizes both the alleged harm the Templars’ privileges did to the secular clergy and their lack of humility. He also complains of the nuisance they became in their neglect of humility: they drew away tithes from churches and unjustly disturbed their possessions. “Neglecta humilitate . . . eis decimas et primicias subtrahentes et eorum indebite turbando possessiones, facti sunt valde molesti.” William of Tyre, *Chronicon*, bk. 12, ch. 7, 555.

84. “These and others like them were the experiences of the first Templars, when they held God dear and the world cheap. But as soon as that dearness grew cheap and wealth grew strong, we began to hear quite other stories, which we shall add as well.” His comments on the monks are similar: “Monks both white and black recognize their prey, as the hawk spies the frightened lark, in the shape of knights whom they can pluck—men who have wasted their patrimony or are shackled with debts.” His comment about the Templars’ way of life: “Who taught these to overcome force by violence I know not. They take the sword and perish by the sword.” Map, *De nugis curialium*, 59, 85, 61.

85. Isaac de L’Étoile, *Sermons*, ed. Anselm Hoste and Gaetano Raciti, Sources Chrétiennes 339 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1987), vol. 3, no. 48, 150–67. Historians are uncertain whether Isaac was referring to the Temple or to the recently founded Order of Calatrava, since he nowhere names the target of his criticism. O’Callaghan and Leclercq, however, both think he had the Temple in mind. Joseph O’Callaghan, “La vida de las órdenes militares de España según sus estatutos primitivos,” in *Alarcos 1195: Actas del Congreso Internacional Conmemorativo del VIII Centenario de la Batalla de Alarcos* (1995, Ciudad Real), ed. Ricardo Izquierdo Benito and Francisco Ruiz Gómez (Cuenca: Ediciones Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 1996), 17; Leclercq, “Saint Bernard’s Attitude,” 27–29.

86. The Templars faced critiques throughout their history from a variety of sources for their vices and military failures. Sophia Menache, “The Templar Order: A Failed Ideal?” *Catholic Historical Review* 79, no. 1 (1993): 1–21.

87. Alan Forey, “The Militarisation of the Hospital of St. John,” *Studia Monastica* 26 (1984): 89, reprinted in *Military Orders and Crusades*, Variorum Collected Studies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1994), IX. Burgtorf sees the transformation of the order as having already begun by 1126 but adds that “the Hospital was, then, still a good two or three decades away from being a military order.” Jochen Burgtorf, “Leadership Structures in the Orders of the Hospital and the Temple (Twelfth to Early Fourteenth Century) Select Aspects,” in *The Crusades and the Military Orders: Expanding the Frontiers of Medieval Latin Christianity*, ed. Zsolt Hunyadi and József Laszlovsky (Budapest: Central European University, 2001), 382.

88. Helen Nicholson, *The Knights Hospitaller* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2001), 20–21; Forey, “Militarisation,” 76–77.

89. Joseph Delaville Le Roulx, *Cartulaire général de l’ordre des Hospitaliers de Saint-*

Jean-de-Jérusalem (1100–1310) (Paris: Ernest Leroux 1894–1906), vol. 1, no. 345, 240–41; no. 375, 257; no. 627, 429; Forey, “Militarisation,” 87. Demurger nevertheless insists that there is “no doubt” that the Hospital had become a military order by the Egyptian campaigns of 1164 to 1169. He regards the attempt to pinpoint the moment more precisely as futile. Demurger, *Moines et guerriers*, 40.

90. “Ab armis ferendis iuxta consuetudinem predicti Raimundi omnino quiescas, nisi forte tunc cum vexillum sancte Crucis pro defensione regni aut pro obsidione alicujus civitatis paganorum delatum fuerit . . . sicut domus Hospitalis ad susceptionem et refectionem pauperum est instituta, ita quoque per tuam instantem sollicitudinem in hoc debeat conservari.” Delaville, *Cartulaire*, vol. 1, no. 527, 360–61.

91. Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Knights of St. John in Jerusalem and Cyprus, 1050–1310* (London: Macmillan, 1967), 60–144.

92. “Hoc elemosina in sacra domo Hospitalis fuit proprie statuta, exceptis fratribus armorum, quos sacra domus honoranter tenebat, pluresque alias elemosinas ipsa domus agebat que non possunt particulariter demonstrari.” Delaville, *Cartulaire*, no. 627, 429; Riley Smith, *Knights of St. John*, 55.

93. Luis García-Guijarro Ramos, “La militarización de la Orden del Hospital: Líneas para un debate,” in *Ordens militares: Guerra, religião, poder e cultura: Actas do III Encontro sobre Ordens Militares (Palmela, 22 a 25 de Janeiro de 1998)*, ed. I. Fernandes (Lisbon: Edições Colibri, 1999), vol. 2, 293–302; Nicholson, *Knights Hospitaller*, 13–17.

94. García-Guijarro Ramos, “La militarización,” 296–300.

95. For more on the Assailly schism, see Malcolm Barber, *The Crusader States* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 255; Jochen Burgdorf, *The Central Convent of Hospitallers and Templars: History, Organization, and Personnel (1099/1120–1310)* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 66–72.

96. Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Knights Hospitaller in the Levant, 1070–1309* (New York: Palgrave, 2012), 33–36.

97. H. J. A. Sire, *The Knights of Malta* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 5–6.

98. Monastic authors regularly expounded on the superiority of their own vows to the crusading vow, and it was common practice to commute the latter in favor of entrance into the cloister. Elizabeth Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading 1095–1274* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 36.

99. See Giles Constable, “The Orders of Society,” in *Three Studies in Medieval Religious and Social Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 249–360.

100. Most writers, of course, were themselves priests or religious. One occasionally finds different sentiments in other sources, such as *The Song of Roland* or *Le Moniage Guillaume*, to the effect that knights are superior to monks, though such remarks sometimes have an ironic tone. *The Song of Roland: An Analytical Edition*, vol. 2, *Oxford Text and English Translation*, ed. and trans. Gerard Brault (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1978), 117, vv. 1880–82; *Le Moniage Guillaume: Chanson de geste du XIIe siècle*, ed. Nelly Andrioux-Reix (Paris: Champion, 2003), 69, vv. 621–24. The articulation in clear theoretical terms that knights are better than monks must wait for fourteenth-century authors like Geoffrey of Charny. See Richard W. Kaeuper and Elspeth Kennedy, *The Book of Chivalry of Geoffroi de Charny: Text, Context and Translation* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1996), 174–77; Kaeuper, *Holy Warriors*, 45–46.

101. Antoine Calvet, “Les légendes de l’Hôpital de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem, entre mythe et histoire,” in *La mémoire des origines dans les ordres religieux-militaires au Moyen Âge: Actes des journées d’études de Göttingen (25–26 juin 2009)*, Vita regularis

51: Ordnung und Deutungen religiösen Lebens im Mittelalter, eds. Philippe Josserand and Mathieu Olivier (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2012), 61–71.

102. For the period after Hattin, see Judith Bronstein, *The Hospitallers and the Holy Land: Financing the Latin East, 1187–1274* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2005). For the granting of indulgences, see Judith Bronstein, “Caring for the Sick or Dying for the Cross? The Granting of Crusade Indulgences to the Hospitallers,” in *The Hospitallers, the Mediterranean and Europe: Festschrift for Anthony Luttrell*, ed. Karl Borchardt, Nikolas Jaspert, and Helen J. Nicholson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 39–46.

103. “Sanctity in the Hospital was never defined by the paradigm of saintly knighthood as it was in the Temple, through the Templar rule and *De laude*.” Licence, “Templars and Hospitallers,” 55.

104. Jonathan Riley-Smith, *Templars and Hospitallers as Professed Religious in the Holy Land* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), 61–65.

105. There is one possible exception: the Templar Gerland of Caltagirone (d. 1242), whose cult the Hospitallers seem to have inherited with the commandery and church of Santa Maria del Tempio in Sicily after 1312. Jochen Schenk, “Some Hagiographical Evidence for Templar Spirituality, Religious Life and Conduct,” *Revue Mabillon* 22 (2011): 100.

106. One important question is why the Hospitallers claimed origins in the biblical past, whereas the Templars did not. One possibility is that their connection to the Temple of Solomon already gave the Templars a biblical pedigree. Alain Demurger, “Étourdis ou petits malins? Pourquoi les Templiers n’ont-ils pas eu de mythe d’origine?” in *La mémoire des origines dans les ordres religieux-militaires au Moyen Âge: Actes des journées d’études de Göttingen (25–26 juin 2009)*, Vita regularis 51: Ordnung und Deutungen religiösen Lebens im Mittelalter, ed. Philippe Josserand and Mathieu Olivier (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2012), 73–82.

107. Map, *De nugis*, 70–71.

108. Map, *De nugis*, 68–69; Joannis Saresberiensis, *Policratici* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), vol. 2, bk. 7, ch. 21, 692.

109. Angus Mackay, *Spain in the Middle Ages: From Frontier to Empire, 1000–1500* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1977), 1–3.

110. Martín Ríos Saloma, *La Reconquista: Una construcción historiográfica (siglos XVI–XIX)* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2011). He is one of numerous scholars who prefer *restauratio* or *restauración* as being more closely tied to the concepts and terminology of medieval writers. For summaries of the debates and vast historiography on this subject, see Francisco García Fitz, *La Reconquista* (Granada: University of Granada, 2010); Martín Ríos Saloma, *La Reconquista en la historiografía española contemporánea* (Madrid: Sílex, 2013).

111. Teofilo F. Ruiz, *Spain’s Centuries of Crisis, 1300–1474* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 14.

112. See Ian Almond, *Two Faiths, One Banner: When Muslims Marched with Christians Across Europe’s Battlegrounds* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009), 13–48; Simon Barton, “Traitors to the Faith? Christian Mercenaries in al-Andalus and the Maghreb, c. 1100–1300,” in *Medieval Spain: Culture, Conflict and Coexistence: Studies in Honour of Angus MacKay*, ed. Roger Collins and Anthony Goodman (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002), 23–45.

113. “In spite of the similarities underlying the ideologies of the two crusading theatres, the Spanish venture lacked an important element at work in the eastern crusading movement: pilgrimage to a holy place, and more specifically to *the* holy place.” Patrick J. O’Banion, “What Has Iberia to Do with Jerusalem? Crusade and the Spanish Route to the Holy Land in the Twelfth Century,” *Journal of Medieval History* 34 (2008): 386.

114. See Richard Fletcher, “Reconquest and Crusade in Spain, c. 1050–1150,”

Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th ser., 37 (1987): 31–47, reprinted in Thomas Madden, ed., *The Crusades: The Essential Readings* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 59–62.

115. Joseph O’Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 18.

116. After 1150 the number of Iberian laymen going to the Holy Land dropped off considerably. Simon Barton, *The Aristocracy in Twelfth-Century León and Castile* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 156. 117. Fletcher, “Reconquest and Crusade,” 58.

118. Purkis, *Crusading Spirituality*, 124–38. See also the accounts in Emma Falque Rey, ed., *Historia Compostellana*, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis 70 (Turnholt: Brepols, 1988), bk. 1, ch. 9, 25–26; bk. 1, ch. 39, 77–78.

119. “At the time of the First Crusade, the papacy must therefore be seen to be reacting to the pious aspirations of the Spanish rather than seizing the opportunity to extend crusading warfare to the peninsula.” Purkis, *Crusading Spirituality*, 126.

120. “Eos autem qui vel pro Hierosolymitano vel pro Hispanico itinere cruces sibi in vestibus posuisse noscuntur et eas dimisisse, cruces iterato assumere et viam ab instanti pascha usque ad sequens proximum pascha perficere, apostolica auctoritate praecipimus.” *Conciliarum oecumenicorum decreta*, 3rd ed., ed. Giuseppe Alberigo (Bologna: Istituto per le Scienze Religiose, 1973), 191–92.

121. “Quemadmodum milites Christi, fideles Sancte Ecclesie filii iter Iherosolimitanum multo labore et multi sanguinis effusione aperuerunt, ita et nos Christi milites efficiamur et, eius hostibus debellatis pessimis Sarracenis, iter, quod per Hispanie partes breuius et multo minus laboriosum est, ad idem Domini sepulchrum ipsius subueniente gratia aperiamus.” Falque Rey, *Historia Compostellana*, bk. 2, ch. 78, 379. Patrick O’Banion suggests that Gelmírez may have been contemplating a sea route. O’Banion, “What Has Iberia,” 387.

122. Purkis, *Crusading Spirituality*, 139–78. A good illustration of this comes from the nineteenth miracle of book 3 of the *Liber Sancti Jacobi*. A holy bishop, upon hearing some rustics address Santiago in their prayers as *bone miles*, rebuked them, saying that the saint had been a fisherman, not a knight. The following night the apostle appeared to the bishop dressed as a warrior and assured him that he indeed fought for the Christian cause. *Liber Sancti Jacobi Codex Calixtinus*, ed. Walter Muir Whitehill (Santiago de Compostela: Seminario de Estudios Gallegos, 1944), vol. 1, *Texto*, 283–285.

123. Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade*, 30; Jotischky, *Crusading*, 189; Tyerman, *God’s War*, 660–62; Nikolas Jaspert, *The Crusades*, trans. Phyllis Jestice (New York: Routledge, 2006), 119. For an alternative perspective, see Paul Chevedden, “The Islamic View and the Christian View of the Crusades: A New Synthesis,” *History* 93 (2008): 181–200.

124. “Too often the reconquest has been presented in a monolithic, institutionalized way, without nuance or variation. On the contrary, it was a process unfolding in the context of the changing political, religious, social, and economic circumstances of each epoch.” O’Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade*, 19.

125. Barton, *The Aristocracy*, 45.

126. Jesús D. Rodríguez-Velasco, *Order and Chivalry: Knighthood and Citizenship in Late Medieval Castile*, trans. Eunice Rodríguez Ferguson (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 27–28.

127. Annie Frémaux-Crouzet, *La chevalerie dans la couronne de Castille du XIe au XV e siècle* (Paris: Ellipses, 2001), 20–21.

128. Jesús D. Rodríguez-Velasco, “Invención y consecuencias de la caballería,” in *La caballería y el mundo caballeresco*, ed. Josef Fleckenstein (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 2006), xiii.

129. Gonzalo Martínez Diez, SJ, *Los templarios en la Corona de Castilla* (Burgos: Editorial La Olmeda, 1993), 23–28.
130. Carlos Barquero Goñi, *Los caballeros hospitalarios durante la Edad Media en España* (Burgos: Editorial La Olmeda, 2003), 12–14.
131. Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 56–57. For the text of the will, see José Ángel Lema Pueyo, *Colección diplomática de Alfonso I de Aragón y Pamplona (1104–1134)* (San Sebastián: Editorial Eusko-Ikaskuntza, 1990), no. 241, 356–365.
132. Joseph O’Callaghan, *A History of Medieval Spain* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), 221–25.
133. Martínez Diez, *Los templarios*, 29–30.
134. Bernard Reilly, *The Kingdom of León-Castilla Under King Alfonso VII* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 272. No fewer than twenty grants were made to St. John, but only two to the Temple.
135. Peter Rassow, “La cofradía de Belchite,” *AHDE* 3 (1926): 200–226; Antonio Ubieto Arteta, “La creación de la cofradía militar de Belchite,” *Estudios de Edad Media de la Corona de Aragón* 5 (1952): 427–34.
136. Rassow, “La cofradía,” 225.
137. Theresa Vann thinks there was such a confraternity at Toledo around the time of Calatrava’s foundation. Theresa Vann, “A New Look at the Foundation of the Order of Calatrava,” in *On the Social Origins of Medieval Institutions: Essays in Honor of Joseph F. O’Callaghan*, ed. Donald Kagay and Theresa Vann (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 107. The Real Cofradía del Pendón de San Isidro was formed during Alfonso VII’s campaigns of the 1140s. Etelvina Fernández González, “Iconografía y leyenda del Pendón de Baeza,” in *Medievo hispano: Estudios in memoriam del Prof. Derek Lomax* (Madrid: Sociedad Española de Estudios Medievales, 1995), 142.
138. Speaking of these confraternities, Corral Val says, “La progresiva evolución y maduración de las mismas y la consolidación de sus notas religioso-castrenses fue dando origen a las órdenes militares propiamente dichas. Estas, por tanto, derivaron su abolengo e inspiración de las órdenes militares internacionales y de las hermandades, milicias o cofradías autóctonas.” Luis Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados de la orden de Alcántara en la Edad Media: Su organización institucional y vida religiosa* (Madrid: Castellum, 1999), 79.
139. *HDRH*, bk. 7, ch. 14, 234–36.
140. *BC*, 2.
141. “Tunc abbas reversus est ad monasterium armenta et greges et cetera mobilia, quibus tunc temporis Fiterium habundabat, necnon et multitudinem bel-latorum, quibus stipendia et uatica ministravit, duxit secum ueniens Calatrauam, exceptis debilibus et egrotis quod ad ministerium monasterii dereliquit.” *HDRH*, bk. 7, ch. 14, 235.
142. Vann, “New Look,” 99–102. Ayala Martínez thinks that Raimundo and Diego represented the militant spirituality of Morimond, to which Fitero was linked through Scala Dei. Carlos de Ayala Martínez, “Guerra santa y órdenes militares en época de Alfonso VIII,” in *La Península Ibérica en tiempos de Las Navas de Tolosa*, coord. Carlos Estepa Diez and María Antonia Carmona Ruiz (Madrid: Sociedad Española de Estudios Medievales, 2014), 116.
143. Carlos de Ayala Martínez, *Las órdenes militares hispánicas en la Edad Media (siglos XII–XV)* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003), 68–70; Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 75–76.
144. Joseph O’Callaghan, “The Affiliation of the Order of Calatrava with the Order of Cîteaux,” *Analecta Sacri Ordinis Cisterciensis* 15–16 (1959–1960): 183, reprinted in *The Spanish Military Order of Calatrava and Its Affiliates*, Variorum Collected Studies (London: Ashgate, 1975), I.
145. In this respect the Cistercians differed from the centralizing tendency

prevalent in the Gregorian Reform. See Juan María de la Torre, OCSO, *Presencia cisterciense: Memoria, arte, mensaje* (Zamora: Ediciones Monte Casino, 2000), 541–42.

146. Louis Lekai, *The Cistercians: Ideals and Reality* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1977), 26–27.

147. Giles Constable, *The Reformation of the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 77.

148. C. H. Lawrence, *Medieval Monasticism: Forms of Religious Life in Western Europe in the Middle Ages*, 3rd ed. (New York: Pearson, 2001), 176.

149. See Chrysogonus Waddell, *Cistercian Lay Brothers: Twelfth-Century Usages with Related Texts* (Brecht: n.p., 2000).

150. Schenk has shown how support for Cistercians among noble families often went hand in hand with support for the Templars in France, and that institutional bonds between the orders were facilitated by personal and familial ties. Schenk, *Templar Families*, 100–112.

151. Luis Rafael Villegas Díaz, “De nuevo sobre los orígenes de la Orden de Calatrava,” *Revista de las Órdenes Militares* 1 (2001): 13–30.

152. “Vobis Monachis, et Fratribus de Calatrava,” *BC*, 2–3.

153. Cristina Monterde Albiac, *Colección diplomática del monasterio de Fitero (1140–1210)* (Zaragoza: Caja de Ahorros de Zaragoza, Aragón y Rioja, 1978), nos. 130–32, 459–462.

154. Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 78.

155. Ayala Martínez, *Las órdenes militares hispánicas*, 77.

156. *BC*, 3–4.

157. “Non ut familiares, sed ut vere Fratres gratanter annuimus.” *BC*, 4.

158. “Cum autem ad aliquam Abbatiam Ordinis nostri veneritis, quoniam consuetudines nostra minus novistis, non in Conventu, sed in Hospitiis honeste, et charitative, et quantum familiarius fieri poterit recipiemini.” *BC*, 4.

159. O’Callaghan, “The Affiliation,” 189.

160. “Laudabile propositum vestrum, quo a Militia mundi ad Dei Militiam conversi, inimicos Fidei statuistis, plurimum approbamus.” *BC*, 3.

161. *BC*, 5–6.

162. *BC*, 20–21.

163. D. H. Williams, “Cistercian Settlements in the Lebanon,” *Cîteaux* 25 (1974): 61–74; Parisse, “Morimond au XIIe siècle,” 20, 22.

164. Ayala Martínez, “Nuevos tiempos, nuevas ideas,” 38–39.

165. Serafín Olcoz Yanguas, *San Raimundo de Fitero, el monasterio cisterciense de la frontera y la fundación de la Orden Militar de Calatrava* (Mutilva Baja: Eurograf Navarra, 2002), 95.

166. Ayala Martínez, “Guerra santa,” 123. This relationship is reflected in the earliest statutes for Calatrava, issued by Morimond in 1195, which create a strong tie with San Pedro. “Mutua si ex integro persolvant officia et fratres de Sancto Petro et illi de Calatrava tam in vita quam in morte utrorumque obitu ad invicem denunciato.” Derek Lomax, “Algunos estatutos primitivos de la Orden de Calatrava,” *Hispania* 23 (1961): 491. Alfonso VIII had already donated San Pedro de Gumiel to the Cistercian Order in 1194, affiliating it to Morimond. By creating a kind of intermediary link between Calatrava and Morimond, he hoped to bring the former more fully under his control. Olcoz Yanguas, *San Raimundo*, 96–97.

167. *BC*, 31–35. For the difficulties occasioned by the arrangement, see O’Callaghan, “The Affiliation,” 190. Another explanation for the issuing of bulls in 1199 was that the order had to be “refounded” after its near destruction at Alarcos. Francisco Ruiz Gómez, *Los orígenes de las órdenes militares y la repoblación de los territorios de la Mancha (1150–1250)* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2003), 251.

168. Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 81.
169. BC, 68; Canivez, *Statuta*, vol. 2, 145.
170. Canivez, *Statuta*, vol. 2, 340; BC, 128–29, 136.
171. Feliciano Novoa Portela, “García Fernández y la política de afirmación monárquica de Alfonso X,” in *As ordens militares: Freires, guerreiros, cavaleiros; Actas do VI Encontro sobre Ordens Militares*, coord. Isabel Cristina Ferreira Fernandes (Palmela: Município de Palmela, 2012), 441–54.
172. Assuming, of course, that Isaac of Stella was writing about the Templars rather than Calatrava.
173. O’Callaghan, “The Affiliation,” 42.
174. Philippe Josserand acknowledges that “pour une bonne part, les ambitions de Morimond dans la péninsule Ibérique restent ainsi inexplicées et les interventions de ses abbés méconnues.” Philippe Josserand, “D’un couvent l’autre: L’abbaye de Morimond et les ordres militaires hispaniques de filiation cistercienne au Moyen Âge,” in *L’abbaye cistercienne de Morimond: Histoire et rayonnement; Colloque international organisé par l’Association des Amis de l’Abbaye de Morimond et la Société Historique et Archéologique de Langres (Langres, 5–6 septembre 2003)*, ed. Georges Viard (Langres: Société Historique et Archéologique de Langres 2005), 337.
175. Alan Forey, *The Military Orders: From the Twelfth to the Early Fourteenth Centuries* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 188.
176. Antonio Linage Conde, “Las órdenes militares y la tradición benedictina,” *Hidalguía* 177 (1983): 243.
177. The fact that Alfonso VIII, continuing the tradition of his predecessors, made few donations to the Temple seems to support this view.
178. Derek Lomax, *La Orden de Santiago* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1965), 5. Pedro Fernández was the son of Fernando Garcés, an influential noble from the reign of Urraca. Barton, *The Aristocracy*, 158. The other founders may have been related to Fernando Rodríguez de Castro and Armengol VII of Urgel, two great warlords of Fernando’s reign. José Luis Martín, *Orígenes de la Orden Militar de Santiago (1170–1195)* (Barcelona: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1974), 7.
179. BS, 5–6. The archbishop and the militia agreed to assist one another in battle, and the archbishop conceded certain revenues as well as the fortress of Albuquerque.
180. José Luis Martín, “Orígenes de las órdenes militares: La Orden de Santiago,” in *Alarcos 1195: Actas del Congreso Internacional Conmemorativo del VIII Centenario de la Batalla de Alarcos (1995, Ciudad Real)*, ed. Ricardo Izquierdo Benito and Francisco Ruiz Gómez (Cuenca: Ediciones Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 1996), 43.
181. Years later the conquest was achieved and the city of Mérida divided between the archbishop and the order. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 198, no. 4.
182. “Regie siquidem precipue conuenit dignitati milites quosque diligere, militantes uero soli Deo tam affectu quam effectu cariores habere.” Julio González, *El reino de Castilla en la época de Alfonso VIII* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1960), vol. 2, no. 162, 275–77.
183. Derek Lomax, “The Order of Santiago and the Kings of León,” *Hispania* 18 (1958): 11–12. Within fifteen years it also had possessions in England and Carinthia. Lomax sees in these and other moves the “determination to create a great international order like the Temple or Hospital.”
184. BS, 8–9. One of the most curious clauses of this agreement is that the brothers of Ávila pledged to pursue the Muslims across the sea into North Africa, and even to Jerusalem, if necessary. This echoes the *iter per Hispaniam* motif of the early twelfth century. It appears again in a late work, the *Dichos de los santos padres* of Pedro López de Baeza, written around 1327. Derek Lomax, “Pedro López de

Baeza: 'Dichos de los Santos Padres' (Siglo XIV)," *Miscelánea de Textos Medievales* 1 (1972): 177.

185. Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 84–85.

186. *BS*, 11–12.

187. *BS*, 2.

188. See Jean Leclercq, OSB, "La vie et la prière des chevaliers de Santiago d'après leur Règle primitive," *Liturgica* 2 (1958): 351–55.

189. For the role of Cardinal Morra, who later became Pope Gregory VIII, see Ángel Ferrari, "Alberto de Morra, postulador de la Orden de Santiago y su primer cronista," *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia* 146 (1960): 63–139.

190. AHN OOMM, carp. 1, no. 4, published in *BS*, 13–17.

191. *BS*, 1–3; Enrique Gallego Blanco, *The Rule of the Spanish Military Order of St. James: 1170–1493* (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 76–83.

192. "Sancti Spiritus gratia in his ultimis temporibus partes Yspaniarum clementer irradiavit, et nonnullos, nomine magis quam numine, numero plusquam merito, christianos a fastu secularis pompae, ab operibus sathanae misericorditer revocavit." Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 76–77.

193. "Sicut militie strenuitate ad plenum sunt prediti, si malitia totius enormitatis omnibus modis extiterunt irretiti." Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 76–77.

194. Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 76–79.

195. Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 78–79.

196. Klaus Herbers thinks that the patronage of the apostle Santiago, rather than tying the order specifically to the Kingdom of León, actually increased its scope to the entire peninsula. Klaus Herbers, "Las órdenes militares: Lazo espiritual entre Tierra Santa, Roma y la Península Ibérica? El ejemplo de la orden de Santiago," in *Santiago, Roma, Jerusalén: Actas del III Congreso internacional de estudios jacobeos (Santiago de Compostela, 1997)*, ed. Paulo Caucci von Saucken (Santiago de Compostela: Xunta de Galicia, 1999), 171.

197. Map, *De nugis*, 84–85. He mentions Santiago in connection to the Hospital and Temple with the words "in Hispania milites qui a gladio nomen habent." This refers to their common designation as *de Spatha*.

198. Ángela Madrid y Medina, "La hospitalidad en las órdenes militares españolas," in *Lux Hispaniarum: Estudios sobre las órdenes militares*, ed. Fray Javier Campos, OSA (Madrid: Real Consejo de las Órdenes Militares, 1999), 243.

199. Between 1178 and 1180, the independent hospital confraternity of San Marcos in León was incorporated into the Order of Santiago. Care of the sick is addressed in more detail in [Chapter 3](#).

200. This same privilege was supposedly granted to the Order of St. Lazarus, also in 1175, but the original document has not survived, only a notice from the seventeenth century. Given that lepers constituted the majority of the order's membership, it is questionable just how common marriage was, if indeed the privilege existed. Herbers, "Lazo espiritual," 170–71.

201. "Cum mulieribus suis non conueniant quando ieunant nec in solempnitatibus Sancte Marie, Sancti Johannis Baptiste, Apostolorum nec in aliis festiuitatibus maioribus. Nam omnis uehemens amator proprie coniugis adulter est." Leclercq, "La vie," 354. There are also numerous statutes concerning the brothers' children.

202. "Quia universa turba fidelium in coniugatos, et continentes distinguitur, et Dominus Iesus Christus non solum pro viris, sed et pro foeminis quoque de foemina nasci voluit, et cum hominibus conversari, habeantur in ipso Ordine, qui coelibem, si voluerint, ducant vitam." *BS*, 13.

203. "Et consilium Beati Pauli sequantur qui dicit: De Virginibus autem praeceptum Domini non habeo, consilium autem do, sint etiam qui iuxta

institutionem Dominicam ad procreandum sobolem, et incontinentiae praecipitum evitandum coniugibus suis untantur.” *BS*, 13; see 1 Cor. 7:25.

204. “Si eos super fundamentum suum, quod Christus est, pro cura carnis, et affectibus liberorum ligna, foenum, stipulam aedificare contingant, cum alii expeditores, et continentes aedificent aurum, argentum, et lapides pretiosos, et isti tamen et illi militent uni Regi, et super unum fundamentum coelestem unam aedificent mansionem.” *BS*, 13; see 1 Cor. 3:12–13.

205. *BS*, 2.

206. Klaus Herbers suggests that the desire to increase papal influence in the peninsula was also a factor in the decision. I find his other claim, that the papacy wanted to create a form of “apostolic life” for married men, more dubious. Herbers, “Lazo espiritual,” 170–71.

207. Carlos de Ayala Martínez, “Órdenes militares hispánicas: Reglas y expansión geográfica,” in *Los monjes soldados: Los templarios y otras órdenes militares; Actas IX Seminario sobre Historia del Monacato (7–10 agosto de 1995)* (Aguilar de Campoo: Fundación Santa María la Real Centro de Estudios del Románico, 1996), 65.

208. “La de Santiago fue siempre la mas seglar de las órdenes militares. Su militarismo, sus matrimonios, su riqueza y su sistema de encomiendas debilitaron su espíritu religioso, y aproximaron a sus freiles siempre a la sociedad laica en que vivían.” Lomax, *La Orden*, 36.

209. Feliciano Novoa Portela, *La Orden de Alcántara y Extremadura (Siglos XII–XIV)* (Mérida: Editora Regional de Extremadura, 2000), 23–25.

210. Bonifacio Palacios Martín, dir., *Colección diplomática medieval de la Orden de Alcántara (1157?–1494)*, 2 vols. (Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 2000–2003), vol. 1, no. 12, 5–6.

211. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 13, 6–8. “En esta primera etapa todo parece indicar que nos encontramos con una institución ajena a cualquier connotación de tipo militar.” Novoa Portela, *La Orden de Alcántara*, 31.

212. “Cum locus vester in saracenorum faucibus constitutus . . . et libentius defensionis Christianitatis pro viribus et aliis divinis obsequiis insudetis.” Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 16, 10–13

213. “Ut ordo monasticus, qui secundum Deum et beati Benedicti regulam in eo loco institutus esse dignoscitur, perpetuis ibidem temporibus inviolabiliter observetur.” Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 16, 10.

214. *BC*, 23.

215. Canivez, *Statuta*, vol. 1, 126.

216. Ayala Martínez, *Las órdenes militares hispánicas*, 85–86. As I will explain in [Chapter 4](#), Calatrava under Master Martín was in an expansionist mood.

217. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, nos. 62–63, 32–34. It seems that Alfonso first gave the fortress to Calatrava the previous year, but the first document referenced here already records it being in the hands of Alcántara by early 1218. For the donation to Calatrava, see Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 58, 29–31.

218. Joseph O’Callaghan, “The Foundation of the Order of Alcántara, 1176–1218,” *Catholic Historical Review* 47, no. 4 (1962): 480–81, reprinted in *The Spanish Military Order of Calatrava and Its Affiliates*, Variorum Collected Studies (London: Ashgate, 1975), IV.

219. Luis Corral Val, “La Orden de Alcántara y el Císter durante la Edad Media,” *Cistercium* 216 (1999): 572.

220. Honorius III commissioned some clerics of Idanha to order the master of Calatrava to allow the house of Pereiro to exercise its rights, meaning that Calatrava would have to recall one of its brothers who had been set over Pereiro. Derek Lomax, “Las milicias cistercienses en el reino de León,” *Hispania* 23 (1963): appendix, no. 2, 40.

221. Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados*, 98.
222. Philippe Jossereand, "Pour une étude systématique de la documentation statutaire des ordres militaires: Deux manuscrits des 'definiciones' inédites d'Alcántara de 1306," *En la España Medieval* 20 (1997): 321–38. In 1259 Alcántara obtained the right to all privileges enjoyed by the Cistercian Order. *BA*, 110–11.
223. Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados*, 165.
224. Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados*, 91.
225. Joseph O'Callaghan, "The Foundation of the Order of Alcántara, 1176–1218" *Catholic Historical Review* 47, no. 4 (1962): 482, reprinted in *The Spanish Military Order of Calatrava and Its Affiliates*, Variorum Collected Studies (London: Ashgate, 1975), IV.
226. Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 90.
227. *BA*, 39.
228. James Brodman, "Rule and Identity: The Case of the Military Orders," *Catholic Historical Review* 87, no. 3 (2001): 397.
229. This is a point upon which Demurger lays particular emphasis. Demurger, *Moines et guerriers*, 37.
230. Schenk, *Templar Families*, 86.
231. This idea, which is already clear in the Castilian version of the Rule published by Lomax, is made still more explicit in the later Latin version, which adds the following point: "Quia defensor implet omnia opera misericordie." Lomax, *La Orden*, appendix, no. 1, 223; Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 96–97.
232. Santiago's Primitive Rule promises to assist members of the Hospital, Temple, and Holy Sepulcher, along with all other monks and clerics. This is the only explicit indication of a special relationship to the universal orders. Leclercq, "La vie," 353.
233. Martín, *Orígenes*, 30. Lucy Pick has challenged the strength of the "Reconquest mentality" even during and after Las Navas de Tolosa but acknowledges that it was always the driving force behind the military orders. Lucy Pick, *Conflict and Coexistence: Archbishop Rodrigo and the Muslims and Jews of Medieval Spain* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 21, 29.
234. This was sometimes a source of criticism, especially from monarchs who found them insufficiently pliable to their will. Forey, *The Military Orders*, 209.
235. The "international" character of the Iberian orders has been a subject of debate. In reviewing the recent literature, Elena Bellomo concludes that while Santiago and Calatrava possessed properties outside the peninsula, the Iberian monarchies were largely successful in limiting the orders' expansion when it did not coincide with their interests. The Order of Mountjoy, by contrast, favored its connections in Italy and the Latin East over Iberia. Elena Bellomo, "Fulfilling a Mediterranean Vocation: The *Domus Sancte Marie Montis Gaudii de Jerusalem* in North-West Italy," in *On the Margins of Crusading: The Military Orders, the Papacy and the Christian World*, ed. Helen J. Nicholson (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 13–29; Elena Bellomo, "The Spanish Military Orders in Italy: Initial Remarks on Patronage and Properties (Twelfth–Fourteenth Centuries)," in *The Military Orders*, vol. 5, *Power and Politics*, ed. Peter Edbury (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), 253.

2. INTERIOR CASTLE

1. *The Rule of St. Benedict: In English and Latin*, ed. and trans. Justin McCann, OSB (Fort Collins: Roman Catholic Books, 1951), prologue, 7.
2. Blas Casado Quintanilla, "'Intitulatio' y 'directio' en la documentación de Calatrava," *Cuadernos de Estudios Manchegos* 19 (1990): 28; AHN OOMM Calatrava, carp. 459, no. 107.

3. Casado Quintanilla, “‘Intitulatio,’” 55.

4. See Joseph O’Callaghan, “The Order of Calatrava: Years of Crisis and Survival, 1158–1212,” in *The Meeting of Two Worlds: Cultural Exchange Between East and West During the Period of the Crusades*, ed. Vladimir Goss (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1986), 419–30.

5. Ayala Martínez divides the development of the orders’ organizational network into three periods: a period of formation from the foundations until the first quarter of the thirteenth century, a period of territorial delineation from the 1220s until late century, and a period of “patrimonialization” from the beginning of the fourteenth century. Carlos de Ayala Martínez, “Comendadores y encomiendas: Orígenes y evolución en las órdenes militares castellano-leonesas de la Edad Media,” in *Ordens militares: Guerra, religião, poder e cultura: Actas do III Encontro sobre Ordens Militares (Palmela, 22 a 25 de Janeiro de 1998)*, ed. I. Fernandes (Lisbon: Edições Colibri, 1999), vol. 1, 102–3.

6. The theme of decline in the military orders, as noted in the Introduction, has been the subject of controversy. Echániz Sans calls decline “a dead end,” since decline would have required reform or abolishment, neither of which took place. María Echániz Sans, “Austeridad versus lujo: El vestido y los freiles de la Orden de Santiago durante la Edad Media,” *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 23 (1993): 376. Philippe Josserand has dedicated much of his book *Église et pouvoir* to arguing for a change of image and values rather than decline. Philippe Josserand, *Église et pouvoir dans la Péninsule Ibérique: Les ordres militaires dans le royaume de Castille (1252–1369)* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2004). Yet both authors freely admit that this transformation brought with it a devaluation of the orders’ religious status. Corral Val puts it nicely when he says that these adjustments, while they allowed the orders to survive, “se hizo a costa de la desnaturalización y distorsión de la organización interna y la vida religiosa primigenia.” Luis Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados de la orden de Alcántara en la Edad Media: Su organización institucional y vida religiosa* (Madrid: Castellum, 1999), 307.

7. Lomax, Sastre Santos, and Ayala Martínez all favor the Augustinian view, whereas Linage Conde rejects it and sees more Benedictine influence. Derek Lomax, *La Orden de Santiago* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1965), 51–54; Eutimio Sastre Santos, *La Orden de Santiago y su Regla* (Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1982); Carlos de Ayala Martínez, “Órdenes militares hispánicas: Reglas y expansión geográfica,” in *Los monjes soldados: Los templarios y otras órdenes militares; Actas IX Seminario sobre Historia del Monacato (7–10 agosto de 1995)* (Aguilar de Campoo: Fundación Santa María la Real Centro de Estudios del Románico, 1996), 59–61; Antonio Linage Conde, “Tipología de la vida religiosa en las ordenes militares,” *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 11 (1981): 49–51. Even if one accepts the description “Augustinian” for this rule, however, it should not be understood that the brothers of Santiago were therefore canons: “Desde luego que estos no fueron del todo monjes. Pero de clérigos nada tuvieron.” Linage Conde, “Tipología,” 34n4. Sastre Santos disagrees, saying, “La Orden de Santiago constituye, en nuestra opinión, un capítulo de la vida apostólica canonical: clérigos y laicos unidos en formas muy diversas, y entregados al servicio de las obras de misericordia.” Sastre Santos, *La Orden*, 248. Tempting as the latter formulation may be, the clear preeminence of the lay fighting brothers in the military orders, and the consequent subordination of the clerics, shows that canonry was a different model.

8. Enrique Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros en los reinos hispánicos: Las órdenes militares en la Península Ibérica durante la Edad Media* (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2008), 273–74.

9. Jean Leclercq, OSB, “La vie et la prière des chevaliers de Santiago d’après leur Règle primitive,” *Liturgica* 2 (1958): 347–57.

10. *BS*, 13–17.

11. Lomax, *La Orden*, appendix, no. 1, 221–231. There is also a sixteenth-century Rule whose text is substantially the same as Lomax's. Antonio Ruiz de Morales y Molina, *La Regla y establecimiento de la Orden de la Cauallería de Santiago del Espada, con la hystoria del origen y principio de ella*, ed. María Isabel Viforcós Marinas and Jesús Paniagua Pérez (León: Universidad de León, 1998), 161–95.

12. Enrique Gallego Blanco, *The Rule of the Spanish Military Order of St. James: 1170–1493* (Leiden: Brill, 1971).

13. Half a dozen sets of statutes, promulgated between 1251 and 1275, can be found in Biblioteca Nacional (BN) MS 8582, and are published in Josserand, *Église*, appendix, 833–850. Series from the fourteenth century are available in *BS*, 220–21 and 260–64.

14. *BC*, 3–6, 20–25, 30–35.

15. Joseph O'Callaghan, "The Earliest 'Definiciones' of the Order of Calatrava, 1304–1383," *Traditio* 17 (1962): 255–84, reprinted in *The Spanish Military Order of Calatrava and Its Affiliates*, Variorum Collected Studies (London: Ashgate, 1975), VII; Derek Lomax, "Algunos estatutos primitivos de la Orden de Calatrava," *Hispania* 23 (1961): 483–94; Philippe Josserand, "Pour une étude systématique de la documentation statutaire des ordres militaires: Deux manuscrits des 'definiciones' inédites d'Alcántara de 1306," *En la España Medieval* 20 (1997): 321–38. Outside of visitations, Morimond made occasional forays into their filial communities' affairs. The abbot wrote King Fernando IV in 1307 requesting the return of apostate brothers. *BC*, 161.

16. Joseph O'Callaghan, "The Affiliation of the Order of Calatrava with the Order of Cîteaux," *Analecta Sacri Ordinis Cisterciensis* 15–16 (1959–1960): 193, reprinted in *The Spanish Military Order of Calatrava and Its Affiliates*, Variorum Collected Studies (London: Ashgate, 1975), I.

17. Torres y Tapia insists on the uniformity of rules and statutes between Calatrava and Alcántara. Alonso de Torres y Tapia, *Crónica de la Orden de Alcántara*, (Madrid: Imprenta de don Gabriel Ramírez, 1763), vol. 2, 216. O'Callaghan has made the same claim. "Por consiguiente creo que podemos decir que los freiles de San Julián y de Évora seguían la misma forma de vida que los calatravos." Joseph O'Callaghan, "La vida de las órdenes militares de España según sus estatutos primitivos," in *Alarcos 1195: Actas del Congreso Internacional Conmemorativo del VIII Centenario de la Batalla de Alarcos* (1995, Ciudad Real), ed. Ricardo Izquierdo Benito and Francisco Ruiz Gómez (Cuenca: Ediciones Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 1996), 12.

18. The "knights" are called *miles* or *caballero* in the sources. Many, though not all, of them would have been of noble birth, but not all of them would necessarily have been knighted either before or after their entrance into an order.

19. "Let them teach the sons of the knights whom the Master should select, and administer the sacraments to the brethren in life as well as in death." Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 118–19.

20. Corral Val thinks that, because it was originally a monastic community, San Julián de Pereiro had its own clerics from the beginning. Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados*, 191.

21. "Certainly in the Temple and the Hospital sergeants considerably outnumbered knights." Alan Forey, "Literacy and Learning in the Military Orders During the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries," in *The Military Orders*, vol. 2, *Welfare and Warfare*, ed. Helen Nicholson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 185. The categories of membership in the Temple and the Hospital, including the division between knights and sergeants, was the result of development over several decades rather than the organizational point of departure. Jochen Burgdorf, *The Central Convent of*

Hospitallers and Templars: History, Organization, and Personnel (1099/1120–1310) (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 34–37.

22. There are a few passages in the Rule and some clauses of *establecimientos* that refer to the sergeants. Juan de la Pellicería's *carta de profesión* includes a promise by the master to make Juan's servant "secundum Deum et secundum ordinem quomodo a sergent." Lomax, *La Orden*, appendix, no. 9, 239–40.

23. Carlos de Ayala Martínez, "The *Sergents* of the Military Order of Santiago," in *The Military Orders*, vol. 2, *Welfare and Warfare*, ed. Helen Nicholson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 230.

24. "If someone is so timorous as not to be fit for war, let him keep busy in other labors of the house according to the Master's provision, that he may not be idle." Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 98–99.

25. Alan Forey, "Recruitment to the Military Orders (Twelfth to Mid-Fourteenth Centuries)," *Viator* 17 (1986): 147, reprinted in *Military Orders and Crusades*, Variorum Collected Studies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1994), II.

26. At first the plan for Santiago may have been for the clerics and knights to live together. José Luis Martín, *Orígenes de la Orden Militar de Santiago (1170–1195)* (Barcelona: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1974), 23.

27. Alcántara explicitly reserved the right to appoint its own prior, who had to be a member of the community itself or of Calatrava: "Et quod nunquam recipiant monachum pro priore nisi voluerint, sed cum priorem facere debuerint, recipiant illum de domo sua, vel de Calatrava aut de filiabus suis, dummodo monachus non sit." Bonifacio Palacios Martín, dir., *Colección diplomática medieval de la Orden de Alcántara (1157?–1494)* (Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 2000–2003), vol. 1, no. 63, 33–34. Rivera Garretas says that the violence and duration of the conflict within Santiago threatened the order's basic unity. María-Milagros Rivera Garretas, *La Encomienda, el Priorato y la villa de Uclés en la Edad Media: Formación de un señorío de la Orden de Santiago* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1985), 214.

28. "Let the Brethren pay to these clergymen the tithe of their labors and of the other riches granted by God." Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 118–121. The *establecimientos* contain numerous statutes insisting on compliance with this norm.

29. Rivera Garretas, *La encomienda*, 214. The order's clerics took refuge in San Pedro de Arlanza and other monasteries at this time.

30. José Luis Martín, "Órdenes militares en la Península Ibérica," in *'Militia Christi' e Crociata nei secoli XI–XIII: Atta della undecima Settimana internazionale di studio Mendola, 28 agosto–1 settembre 1989* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1992), 558.

31. Rivera Garretas, *La encomienda*, 218. For the Council of Thirteen, see "Offices."

32. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 339, no. 11.

33. "Las luchas por la supremacía dentro de la Orden concluyeron con la victoria del maestre y los freiles caballeros." Rivera Garretas, *La encomienda*, 220. In 1320, the lay brother Rodrigo Juan Messia, sent by the *comendador mayor* of Castrosegura, broke into a house belonging to the priory of Uclés, wounded the guards, and stole some ornaments and other treasures. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 339, no. 20.

34. Even the Temple, whose Rule forbade the reception of sisters, in some cases maintained a close association with women. In 1272, the Templars received a nunnery in the diocese of Worms, which they administered until their dissolution. Helen Nicholson, *The Knights Templar: A Brief History of the Warrior Order* (Philadelphia: Running Press, 2010), 141–46. Myra Bom has also offered more extensive evidence of female associates and even fully professed sisters in the Temple. Myra Miranda Bom, *Women in the Military Orders of the Crusades* (New York: Palgrave, 2012), 24–27.

35. Thus, I would nuance Helen Nicholson's claim that "the military orders' attitudes towards women and relations with women put them in the mainstream of religious developments of the central Middle Ages." The statement is true with respect to the universal orders but overlooks Santiago's innovations. Helen Nicholson, "The Military Orders and Their Relations with Women," in *The Crusades and the Military Orders: Expanding the Frontiers of Latin Christianity*, ed. Zsolt Hunyadi and József Laszlovsky (Budapest: Central European University, 2001), 407.

36. Rafael Sánchez Domingo, *Las monjas de la orden militar de Calatrava: Monasterio de San Felices (Burgos) y de la Concepción (Moralzarzal-Madrid)* (Madrid: Editorial La Olmeda, 1997), no. 1, 203–4.

37. "Ut mulieres vel filiis militum calatravensium vitam apotentium quibus hoc voluerint facere, inveniant locum semper paratum inter nos ubi Deo possint servire." AHN OOMM Calatrava, Registro de Escrituras, 1342C, fols. 94–95.

38. Carlos de Ayala Martínez, *Las órdenes militares hispánicas en la Edad Media (siglos XII–XV)* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003), 178.

39. For the foundation charter, see AHN OOMM Calatrava, Registro de Escrituras, 1342C, fols. 76r–77v.

40. There is no clear evidence that Alcántara had any female communities during the period under consideration.

41. "Ab illis mulieribus que viros non habuerint, queratur si maritos velint accipere. Volentibus liceat nubere. Nolentes locabuntur locis aptis et monasteriis que sunt de domo, ubi necessaria eis administrabuntur." Leclercq, "La vie," 354.

42. María Echániz Sans, "Espiritualidad femenina en la Orden Militar de Santiago (siglos XII–XV)," in *Religiosidad femenina: Expectativas y realidades*, ed. Angela Muñoz and María del Mar Graña (Madrid: Asociación Cultural Al-Mudanya, 1991), 125–26. Since the first female convent was not yet founded, Echániz Sans supposes that the women may have lived in houses owned by the order.

43. "Si autem viri premortui fuerint et relicte ipsorum, que Ordinem susceperunt, nubere voluerint, denuntietur hoc magistro sive commendatori, ut cum illius conscientia, cui mulier ipsa vult nubeat." *BS*, 14.

44. Bom, *Women in the Military Orders*, 31.

45. Echániz Sans, "Espiritualidad femenina," 130. She designates these two categories as *freiras seculares* and *freilas conventuales*. Both took vows and could wear the habit.

46. María Echániz Sans, *Las mujeres de la Orden Militar de Santiago en la Edad Media* (Salamanca: Junta de Castilla y León, 1992), 42–43.

47. In 1220 Fernando III issued a prohibition against the forcible removal and rape of Cistercian nuns, which indicates that such a crime was not uncommon. Penalties included confiscation of property, exile, and death. Julio González, *Reinado y diplomas de Fernando III* (Córdoba: Publicaciones del Monte de Piedad, 1980), vol. 2, no. 120, 148–50.

48. Echániz Sans, "Espiritualidad femenina," 132–33.

49. María Ferrer-Vidal Díaz del Riguero, "La mujer en la Orden Militar de Santiago," in *Las mujeres medievales y su ámbito jurídico: Actas de las II jornadas de investigación interdisciplinaria* (Madrid: Seminario de Estudios de la Mujer, 1983), 207.

50. Lomax, *La Orden*, appendix, no. 1, 224; Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 98–101. The Rule also allowed the married women to stay in the convents while their husbands were away on campaign or other business.

51. Ferrer-Vidal, "La mujer," 202–3. The Rule stipulates that the daughters of widows be educated in letters. Lomax, *La Orden*, appendix, no. 1, 224; Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 102–3.

52. Ferrer-Vidal, "La mujer," 204–5; Echániz Sans, "Espiritualidad femenina," 129.

53. Ayala Martínez has noted the same process at work in Calatrava's convent of San Felices de Amaya. Carlos de Ayala Martínez, "San Felices de Amaya, monasterio medieval de la Orden de Calatrava," in *Medievo hispano: Estudios in memoriam del Prof. Derek Lomax* (Madrid: Sociedad Española de Estudios Medievales, 1995), 17–34.
54. Schenk questions the whole notion of an institutional spirituality for the Templars, not only because of the diversity of membership but also because of changing spiritual expectations and mind-sets over time. Jochen Schenk, "Some Hagiographical Evidence for Templar Spirituality, Religious Life and Conduct," *Revue Mabillon* 22 (2011): 101.
55. Saul António Gomes, "Monges e cavaleiros no Portugal medieval: Os horizontes espirituais," in *Ordens militares e religiosidade: Homenagem ao Professor José Mattoso* (Palmela: Gabinete de Estudos sobre a Ordem de Santiago, 2010), 33; Dominic Selwood, *Knights of the Cloister: Templars and Hospitallers in Central-Southern Occitania c. 1100–c. 1330* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1999), 1.
56. Philippe Josserand, "De l'arrière au front: Perspectives croisées, perspectives compares; Regards sur la logistique des ordres militaires au Moyen Âge," in *As ordens militares: Freires, guerreiros, cavaleiros; Actas do VI Encontro sobre Ordens Militares*, coord. Isabel Cristina Ferreira Fernandes (Palmela: Município de Palmela, 2012), 692.
57. Bom, *Women in the Military Orders*, 42. I believe that the origins and higher religious profile of the Hospital go a long way in explaining the fuller development of female convents and observance that Bom explores throughout the book.
58. Ayala Martínez, *Las órdenes militares hispánicas*, 193–99.
59. The evidence for the death of masters in battle is controversial; see [Chapter 3](#) for more detail. Yet the importance of the master's leadership in battle is shown in the *hermandad* with the militia of Ávila, whose members agreed to share a fifth of battle spoils under his leadership, but only a tenth if he were absent. *BS*, 8–9.
60. Carlos de Ayala Martínez, "Maestres y maestrazgos en la Corona de Castilla (Siglos XII–XV)," in *Las órdenes militares en la Península Ibérica*, vol. 1, *Edad Media*, ed. Ricardo Izquierdo Benito and Francisco Ruiz Gomez (Cuenca: Universidad de Castilla–La Mancha, 2000), 339.
61. The 1238 confirmation of Alcántara provides for the election of the master "secundum Dei timorem et beati Benedicti regulam." Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 169, 86–93; *BA*, 42–45.
62. "De his omnibus praecipimus, ut obediatis Magistro vestro, et professionem faciatis sicut Abbati." *BC*, 4.
63. Ayala Martínez, *Las órdenes militares hispánicas*, 199–204.
64. As early as 1199, however, there were concerns about the master of Calatrava's use of resources. The pope told him not to take too much of the order's common property and to be content with whatever was provided to him. *BC*, 35. Yet allowance must be made for the historical context: after the disaster at Alarcos had wiped out Calatrava's holdings, scarcity may have been a real problem.
65. *BS*, 15; *BC*, 24.
66. The pope told Santiago to hold its annual chapter on All Saints' Day and to announce the location in advance, but the brothers probably did not adhere too closely to this injunction. *BS*, 202–3. The earliest clear evidence for a chapter of Santiago comes from 1212. *BS*, 58–59. Donations of 1215 also refer to a "Uclense capitulum." *BS*, 66. For Alcántara, Corral Val proposes the following dates as likely occasions for chapter meetings that have left evidence: 1218, 1234, and 1318. Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados*, 216–17.
67. Innocent IV granted power to the Thirteen to depose a pernicious master, especially one who had alienated castles. *BS*, 167.

68. Alcántara sometimes used the name “Thirteen” for this group in imitation of Santiago. *BC*, 173–76, 193–96; Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados*, 222.

69. The *establecimientos* of 1275 stated that the Council of Thirteen, not the master, was to retain the order’s seal. This statute, along with many others, was a response to perceived abuses of authority during the long mastership of Pelayo Pérez Correa. Jossierand, *Église*, appendix, 849. A bull of 1256 says that the procedures for electing and deposing the master of Calatrava are the same as for a Cistercian abbot. *BC*, 109.

70. *BS*, 205.

71. Ayala Martínez, *Las órdenes militares hispánicas*, 273–74. In Alcántara the advent of the grand commander relegated the prior to a tertiary position of importance within the order. This event postdates 1218. Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados*, 195, 200.

72. Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 329.

73. Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 328.

74. Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados*, 201.

75. Jossierand, *Église*, appendix, 839; Lomax, “Algunos,” 492; Jossierand, “Pour une étude,” 333–34.

76. *BS*, 15.

77. But the Rule of Santiago nowhere states who is to elect the prior, which led to a series of internal disputes. It seems, at least after the mastership of Pelayo Pérez Correa, that the prior was elected by the chapter, but certainly with the master’s input.

78. *BC*, 117.

79. Martín, *Orígenes*, 35.

80. Borchardt has highlighted the importance of the military orders’ institutional innovations and cautioned against overemphasizing Cîteaux as a model for their organization. Karl Borchardt, “The Military-Religious Orders: A Medieval ‘School for Administrators’?” in *The Military Orders*, vol. 5, *Politics and Power*, ed. Peter Edbury (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), 3–20.

81. The *encomienda* is defined as a “benefice comprising a unit of territory, the rents of which provided the income of the incumbent, who also sometimes enjoyed legal jurisdiction over the inhabitants of the region. O’Callaghan, “The Affiliation,” 9.

82. Calatrava had just two priories, whereas Torres y Tapia gives five priories for Alcántara in the middle of the thirteenth century: Alcántara, Pereiro, Santibañez, Valencia de Alcántara, and Magacela. Torres y Tapia, *Crónica*, vol. 1, 404–5. For Castile-León, Santiago had priories at Uclés, San Marcos de León, and Vilar de Donas. There were three residences each for Portugal (Palmela, Alcácer do Sal, and Mertola) and Aragon (Montanchez, Segura de la Sierra, and Montalbán). Gonzalo Martínez Díez, SJ, *La cruz y la espada: La vida cotidiana de las órdenes militares españolas* (Barcelona: Plaza y Janés, 2002), 50.

83. Carlos de Ayala Martínez, “Tópicos y realidades en torno a las Ordenes Militares,” in *Tópicos y realidades de la Edad Media*, vol. 2, ed. Eloy Benito Ruano (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 2000), 141.

84. “La autoridad del maestre permaneció intangible.” Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados*, 213.

85. “In deeply conservative institutions like monasteries, which find their models in the past and identify what has been with what should be, signs and ceremonies are of special importance in protecting conformity and continuity, both by bridging the gap between past and present, especially in periods of change, and by summing up and giving meaning to past experience.” Giles Constable, “The Ceremonies and Symbolism of Entering Religious Life and Taking the Monastic Habit, from the

Fourth to the Twelfth Century,” in *Segni e riti nella chiesa altomedievale occidentale, Spoleto, 11–17 aprile 1985 (Settimane di studio del Centro italiano di studi sull’alto medioevo 33)* (Spoleto, 1987), 774, reprinted in Giles Constable, *Culture and Spirituality in Medieval Europe*, Variorum Collected Studies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1996), VII.

86. Joseph Lienhard, SJ, “Signs of the Times: Signs, Symbols, and Meaning in Religious Life,” (unpublished paper, Stonehill College, Boston, September 27, 2008), 4.

87. Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 279.

88. BS, 178.

89. “In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries entry into the military orders, as into other religious houses, was limited to freemen.” Forey, “Recruitment,” 141.

90. Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 444; Forey, “Recruitment,” 148. See the *definiciones* of 1325: “E viendo ser servicio de la casa de Calatrava, ordenamos que el maestre non nombre a ninguno que non sea legitimo o fixo de dueña, de cavallero, o de escudero, que cavallero pueda ser. Assi guarde.” O’Callaghan, “Earliest,” 270.

91. See Santiago’s *establecimientos* of 1259, which contain the first restrictions against non-nobles entering the order. Josserand, *Église*, appendix, 840–41.

92. BS, 111.

93. Forey, “Recruitment,” 155.

94. A certain knight, when he fell ill, professed in the Order of Grandmont but without taking the habit. When his health improved, he asked for permission to transfer and was denied. He left for Santiago, where he made profession and took the habit. Innocent III ruled that the man should return to Grandmont, because it was stricter. BS, 54.

95. Alan Forey, “Novitiate and Instruction in the Military Orders During the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries,” *Speculum* 61 (1986): 2, reprinted in *Military Orders and Crusades*, Variorum Collected Studies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1994), III; Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 282, 171–73. Fernando Sánchez’s profession to Alcántara of 1257 said that he would forego the novitiate. Nevertheless, the Cistercian order considered entrance into Calatrava adequate preparation for life as a monk, for a year’s time spent in the latter community allowed a man to forgo the Cistercian novitiate. BC, 31.

96. Forey, “Recruitment,” 160; Josserand, *Église*, 133–40.

97. “There were, therefore, in military orders various practices which might be seen as characteristic of a mainly non-literate society.” Alan Forey, “Literacy and Learning in the Military Orders During the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries,” in *The Military Orders*, vol. 2, *Welfare and Warfare*, ed. Helen Nicholson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 194. The evidence is not conclusive, however; Santiago did expect that the Rule be read at table once a month, and one of its *establecimientos* prohibited brothers from taking a copy of the Rule without permission. Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 92; Josserand, *Église*, appendix, 838.

98. For the essential differences between the two main forms of the Office, see Pierre Salmon, *L’Office divin au Moyen Âge: Histoire de la formation du bréviaire du IXe au XVIe siècle* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1967), 86–123.

99. Lomax, *La Orden*, appendix, no. 1, 222; Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 88–91. Salvadó’s description of the Templars as “especially devout spectators, but certainly not practising clergy,” in relation to the liturgy applies to the Iberian orders as well. Sebastián Salvadó, “Templar Liturgy and Devotion in the Crown of Aragon,” in *On the Margins of Crusading: The Military Orders, the Papacy and the Christian World*, ed. Helen J. Nicholson (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 37.

100. Lomax, *La Orden*, appendix, no. 1, 223; Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 88–93.

101. Lomax, *La Orden*, appendix, no. 1, 222; Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 88–89.
102. “The White Monks were told to have the same missal, Gospel book, epistolary, book of collects, gradual, antiphony, hymnary and calendar in every monastery and new foundation.” Bede K. Lackner, SO Cist., “Early Cîteaux and the Care of Souls,” in *Noble Piety and Reformed Monasticism*, ed. E. Rozanne Elder (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1981), 54.
103. “Constituimus, ut ordo monasticus, qui secundum Deum et beati Benedicti regulam in eo loco institutus esse dinoscitur, perpetuis ibidem temporibus inviolabiliter observetur.” *BA*, 7–9; Palacios Martín, *Colección*, no. 16, 11.
104. *BC*, 64.
105. *BC*, 223–24.
106. Lomax, *La Orden*, appendix, no. 1, 223.
107. “Que ninguno de los freyres mientras que la missa conventual se celebra, vayan vagamundos por la plaça del castiello, ni en otro lugar, entrada la missa por la iglesia conventualmente sea cantada.” O’Callaghan, “Earliest,” 281.
108. “Que todos los freyres de la cassa clerigos sean en el convento, e celebren su divino officio, por el qual todos somos guardados, e non sea menguado.” O’Callaghan, “Earliest,” 269.
109. “Let them keep silence at the table, nor talk unless the service of the table or other grave motive requires it.” Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 110–11. “E como nos leamos el silencio sea llave de la orden e San Bernallo diga que el que expresa-mente quebranta el silencio peca mortalmente, mandamos al maestre, o a aquel, o a aquellos que por el estobieren en el convento, que el silencio firmemente sea guarado en la iglesia, en el claustro, en el dormitorio, en el refitorio, so la pena puesta del capitulo general, la qual es pan e agua e disciplina sin misericordia.” O’Callaghan, “Earliest,” 269. This clarification may have been necessary because an earlier statute merely reminds the prior to maintain silence “in those places where it ought to be kept”: “E mandamos al prior que faga tener el silencio en aquellos logares que se debe tener.” O’Callaghan, “Earliest,” 268.
110. “Magister etiam Capitulum quotidie teneat vobis.” *BC*, 4. Corral Val suspects that local chapters were held only on a weekly basis, although he admits there is no evidence either way. Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados*, 212.
111. *Rule of Benedict*, ch. 48, 110–11.
112. Some brothers of Santiago may have had too much fun hunting, for the *establecimientos* of 1252 prohibit the keeping of a falcon without permission of the master. Josserand, *Église*, appendix, 840.
113. Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 300–302. Playing dice, in contrast, was punishable by a year’s imprisonment, according to Calatrava’s *difiniciones* of 1325. O’Callaghan, “Earliest,” 271.
114. Rivera Garretas, *La encomienda*, 224; Martín, *Orígenes*, appendix, no. 239, 415–16.
115. Angela Muñoz Fernández, “Cultos, devociones y advocaciones religiosas en los orígenes de la organización eclesiástica cordobesa,” in *Andalucía entre Oriente y Occidente (1236–1492): Actas del V Coloquio Internacional de Historia Medieval de Andalucía (Córdoba, 27–30 de noviembre de 1986)*, ed. Emilio Cabrera Muñoz (Córdoba: Diputación Provincial, 1988), 139.
116. Helen Nicholson, *Templars, Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights: Images of the Military Orders, 1128–1291* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1995), 116–17. Santiago’s *establecimientos* of 1251 stipulate that the Salve Regina must be said at Lauds and Vespers on feasts of the Blessed Virgin. “La oraçion de Santa Maria Salve Reguna sea dicha por toda la orden a maytines e a biesperas sinon en las fiestas prinçipales asy de Santa Maria commo de las otras fiestas.” Josserand, *Église*, appendix, 837.

117. Muñoz Fernández, “Cultos,” 138.

118. Francisco Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de Sanctiago*, Toledo, 1572, facs. ed. (Barcelona: El Abir, 1980), 32v.

119. Daniel Rodríguez Blanco, “Pelay Pérez Correa. Entre la historia y la leyenda,” in *Sevilla 1248: Congreso Internacional Conmemorativo del 750 Aniversario de la Conquista de la Ciudad de Sevilla por Fernando III, Rey de Castilla y León (Sevilla, Real Alcázar, 23–27 de noviembre de 1998)*, ed. Manuel González Jiménez (Madrid: Editorial Centro de Estudios Ramón Areces, 2000), 215–16. There is also an account of the miraculous discovery of a statue of the Virgin discovered by a peasant near Uclés, but it postdates the period under investigation. The episode resulted in the construction of a church by a cleric who later became prior of Uclés. *BS*, 310.

120. Richard Barber, *The Knight and Chivalry*, rev. ed. (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1995), 73.

121. Jossierand, *Église*, 157.

122. Jochen Schenk, “The Cult of the Cross in the Order of the Temple,” in *As ordens militares: Freires, guerreiros, cavaleiros; Actas do VI Encontro sobre Ordens Militares*, coord. Isabel Cristina Ferreira Fernandes (Palmela: Município de Palmela, 2012), 207–19. Santiago did inherit some relics of the True Cross, the most of important of which was kept at Murcia, after the Temple’s dissolution. In 1187, Pedro Fernández de Castro promised to donate a variety of castles and other objects to Santiago if he died without issue. Included among the items is *lignum Domini*, which may refer to a piece of the Cross. Since Pedro did in fact have a male heir, it is most likely that the donation was never made. Martín, *Orígenes*, appendix, no. 224, 402.

123. Sebastián Salvadó, “Icons, Crosses and the Liturgical Objects of Templar Chapels in the Crown of Aragon,” in *The Debate on the Trial of the Templars (1307–1314)*, ed. Jochen Burgtorf, Paul F. Crawford, and Helen J. Nicholson (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 183–97.

124. Anthony Luttrell, “The Hospitallers’ Medical Tradition: 1291–1530,” in *The Military Orders*, vol. 1, *Fighting for the Faith and Caring for the Sick*, ed. Malcolm Barber (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1994), 74.

125. “Pero no le quedó en el Mundo mas testigo, que su Epitafio.” José López Agurleta, *Vida del venerable fundador de la Orden de Santiago, y de las primeras casas de redención de cautivos: Continuación de la apología por el hábito canónico del patriarca Santo Domingo en la misma orden* (Madrid: Imprenta de Bernardo Peralta, 1731), 167. This epitaph at his tomb in San Marcos de León reads as follows: “Mens pia, larga manus, os prudens, haec tria clarum Coelo fecerunt, et Mundo te Petre Fernandi Militiae Iacobi Magister, Scitor, Rectorque fuisti. Sic te pro meritis ditavit gratia Christi.” *BS*, 29.

126. “Mortuus autem sepultus est in uilla que Cirolas dicitur prope Toletum, ubi Deus per eum, ut fertur, miracula operatur.” *HDRH*, bk. 7, ch. 14, 235.

127. Joseph O’Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 199–200. The Order of Calatrava did erect a chapel outside the walls of Calatrava to commemorate those brethren who had lost their lives in the siege.

128. Juan Antonio Fernández, *Noticias históricas sacadas del Archivo de Uclés, de sus sepulcros y calenda, y del testamento del infante don Enrique con un Cronicón hasta ahora no publicado; Opúsculos castellanos y latinos de Ambrosio Morales*, vol. 2 (Madrid: Benito Cano, 1793), 22–34. The phrase “pro Christi nomine,” however, does occur in several entries. Sastre Santos calls references to martyrdom in Santiago’s sources as “sobria en extremo.” Sastre Santos, *La Orden*, 227.

129. Simonetta Cerrini, *La révolution des Templiers: Une histoire perdue du XIII^e siècle* (Paris: Perrin, 2007), 33, 36.

130. Thus Calatrava's *difiniciones* of 1211 reserve the confession of mortal sins to the prior, though venial sins could be confessed to other priests of the order. Lomax, "Algunos," 492. Santiago's concern for the morality of parish clergy is evident in a query to Lucius III about whether they could hear Mass and receive the sacraments from priests who were believed to keep concubines. The pope said they could do so as long as the Church had not publicly condemned such priests. Martín, *Orígenes*, appendix, no. 135, 322.

131. In 1336 the *difiniciones* of Calatrava say that the brothers need to communicate on Christmas, Easter, and Pentecost, which they were supposed to do at the central convent after having confessed. O'Callaghan, "Earliest," 274.

132. Josserand, *Église*, appendix, 839; Josserand, "Pour une étude," 334. Corral Val thinks that the brothers may have sought outside confessors to obtain lighter penances. Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados*, 273.

133. See Giles Constable, "The Second Crusade as Seen by Contemporaries," *Traditio* 9 (1953): 249–52, reprinted in *Religious Life and Thought (11th–12th centuries)*, Variorum Collected Studies (London: Ashgate, 1979), X.

134. Lomax, *La Orden*, 98.

135. Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 113.

136. During this period, it was expected that confession would normally precede communion. Miri Rubin, *Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 148.

137. David Bachrach, *Religion and the Conduct of War, c. 300–1215* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2003), 117–18; Christopher Tyerman, *The Invention of the Crusades* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 81.

138. Ayala Martínez, *Las órdenes militares hispánicas*, 376.

139. "The Military Orders were thus not in a traditional manner monastic. They formed a bridge that spanned a century of experimentation with new forms of religious life, and which culminated in the mendicant friars. One can discern in the Military Orders aspects that would be deemed hallmarks of the mendicants' break from the cloister." Selwood, *Knights*, 212.

140. The first reference to this tripartite formula comes from a letter of Odo of St. Victor on monastic profession. Although Odo uses the term "communione" instead of "paupertatem," he explains the vow as "nihil habendo proprium communiter vivo." Migne, *PL*, vol. 196, cols. 1399A–1400A.

141. "Here begins the Rule of the Knights and Priest of the Military Order of the Blessed Apostle James, which consists altogether of three chapters, namely, on conjugal chastity, observing obedience, and living in poverty." Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 82–85.

142. *RB*, ch. 58, 130–31.

143. *BC*, 4.

144. Finally in 1411 Alcántara's *difiniciones* say that the brothers "pusieron sobre los sus ombros yugo de obediencia y de castidad y de pobreza." Derek Lomax, "La reforma de la Orden de Alcántara durante el maestrazgo del Infante don Sancho," *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 11 (1981): 767.

145. Constable, "Ceremonies and Symbolism," 802–5. Santiago's foundational bull combines several of these elements: "in habitu, et conversatione Religionis sub unius Magistri statuerunt obedientia commorari." *BS*, 13.

146. "Qui in fornicatione publice deprehensus fuerit, anno uno in terra come-dat, tribus diebus in septimana in pane, et aqua, sexta Feria disciplinam accipiat." *BC*, 4, 21.

147. AHN OOMM Calatrava, Registro de Escrituras, 1342C, fols. 94–95. The charter stipulates that the new female convent can be used to care for the wives and daughters of brethren. Although this could refer to families that the brothers had

had before entering the order, it may also indicate violations of chastity.

148. Calatrava's *difiniciones* of 1211 add the loss of horse and arms for a year. Lomax, "Algunos," 494.

149. "Videlicet ut in coniugali castitate, sine crimine viuendo, antiquis patribus asimilentur, cum mellius sit nubere quam uri; nostris progenitoribus meliores esse non possumus nec temere sit presumendum nos ea perficere, quae ipsi non potuerunt portare." Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 85.

150. Sastre Santos, *La Orden*, 219; 1 Cor. 7:9.

151. Lomax, *La Orden*, appendix, no. 1, 224; Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 102–3. The Rule also says that the clerics are responsible for teaching the sons of the military brethren. Lomax, *La Orden*, appendix, no. 1, 226–27; Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 118–19.

152. Lomax, *La Orden*, appendix, no. 1, 224; Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 98–101.

153. "Nam uehemens amator propriae coniugis adulter est." Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 98–99. This phrase was present in the Primitive Rule, deleted from the thirteenth-century Spanish version and reintroduced into the later version edited by Gallego Blanco.

154. López Agurleta, *Vida del venerable*, 294.

155. Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de Sanctiagio*, fol. 27v.

156. Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de Sanctiagio*, fol. 34v.

157. Ayala Martínez, *Las órdenes militares hispánicas*, 367–70.

158. Sastre Santos suggests that, in the Church's eyes, the order's strong obedience and poverty made conjugal chastity "excusable." Sastre Santos, *La Orden*, 218.

159. A bull of Innocent III from 1208 noted that the practice of allowing brothers to marry before profession was "tolerated." *BS*, 54–55. In 1215 Honorius III ordered an end to efforts to subject brethren of Santiago to secular law "tamquam laicos" (like laymen). *BS*, 66.

160. Martín, *Orígenes*, 55. The count had had a wife of his own, but she decided to enter religion as well and became a Cistercian nun.

161. Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 84–85.

162. Ayala Martínez, *Las órdenes militares hispánicas*, 615–16.

163. Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 323–24.

164. The Rule of Santiago was clear but evidently difficult to uphold. "They should possess nothing of their own nor keep anything except what they have been granted by the Master of the commander." Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 108–9. Beginning in 1251, the *establecimientos* repeatedly condemn the practice. "Stablesçido es que todo freyre sea tenido de non aver propio e todos ende sean amonestados. . . . [O]trosi quien toviere propio sea dexcomulgado e anatematizado en la iglesia en dia de Navidad o en dia de Pascua de Resureçion o en la fiesta de Pentecoste ante que comulgue, e maldiganlos con candelas ençendidas e despues amatenlas en el agua." Josserand, *Église*, appendix, 835. The penitential and liturgical aspects of this statute are interesting. Calatrava also legislated against private property, though somewhat later, in 1325. O'Callaghan, "Earliest," 266–67.

165. Lomax, *La Orden*, 93.

166. José Luis Martín, "Órdenes militares en la Peninsula Ibérica," in *"Militia Christi" e Crociata nei secoli XI–XIII: Atta della undecima Settimana internazionale di studio Mendola, 28 agosto–1 settembre 1989* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1992), 559.

167. Lomax, "Algunos," 493; Josserand, *Église*, appendix, 842; Josserand, "Pour une étude," 336.

168. O'Callaghan, "Earliest," 265; Josserand, "Pour une étude," 337.

169. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 327, no. 2. Díaz became a close friend of Alfonso as an official of his chancery and executor of his will, which favor allowed him to act quite independently of the order. Carlos de Ayala Martínez, "Alfonso VIII y la Iglesia de su reino," in *1212, un año, un reinado, un tiempo de despeque: XXIII Semana de*

Estudios Medievales; Nájera, del 30 de julio al 3 de agosto de 2012, coord. Esther López Ojeda (Logroño: Instituto de Estudios Riojanos, 2013), 290–91.

170. O'Callaghan, "Earliest," 266–67; Josserand, "Pour une étude," 336. The statutes prescribe expulsion from the order and refusal of burial for a brother who makes a will; if he has already been buried, he is to be disinterred.

171. Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados*, 167.

172. AHN OOMM Calatrava, carp. 445, no. 70; carp. 446, nos. 81, 87; carp. 446, no. 82; carp. 445, no. 77.

173. BS, 98–99.

174. See the chapters by Eloy Benito Ruano, "La banca toscana y la Orden de Santiago" and "Deudas y pagos del Maestre de Santiago D. Pelay Pérez Correa," in his *Estudios santiaguistas* (León: Colegio Universitario de León, 1978), 61–154 and 155–172.

175. Nicholson, *Templars, Hospitallers, Teutonic Knights*, 129–30.

176. "Inter ea sane, quae in professionis vestrae Ordine statutum est observari, primum est, vt sub vnus Magistri obedientia in omni humilitate." BS, 14.

177. *Rule of Benedict*, ch. 73, 160–61.

178. In this respect Antonio Linage Conde is right to insist on the resonance of the Rule of Benedict's military vocabulary for the Iberian orders. Antonio Linage Conde, "Las órdenes militares y la tradición benedictina," *Hidalguía* 177 (1983): 234–36.

179. "Let the brethren freely consent to do, and carry out without contradiction, whatever they are ordered by the Master or the commander; and what has been ordered they should try to do without delay. If the order seems to them unjust, let them not contradict the word of the Master or commander, but, after the command has been freely accepted, they can advise them if they think it to be good. In any case they must endeavor to fulfill indeed what they have been told." Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 142–43.

180. Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 146–47.

181. Lomax, "Algunos," 494.

182. "Qui tempore pacis salierit ut malum inferat Christianis uel paganis non recipiatur nisi consensu uisitoris, magistri et regis." Lomax, "Algunos," 494.

183. Joseph O'Callaghan, "The Order of Calatrava and the Archbishops of Toledo, 1147–1245," in *Studies in Medieval Cistercian History*, 74, reprinted in Joseph O'Callaghan, *The Spanish Military Order of Calatrava and Its Affiliates*, Variorum Collected Studies (London: Ashgate, 1975), VI.

184. O'Callaghan, "Earliest," 263; Josserand, "Pour une étude," 334–35. This was repeated in 1336. O'Callaghan, "Earliest," 274.

185. O'Callaghan, "Earliest," 264–65, 272, 275.

186. "En virtud de santa obediencia." O'Callaghan, "Earliest," 269, 270.

187. The cited offenses against obedience are milder, such as the prohibition against writing letters to people outside the order without permission. Josserand, *Église*, appendix, 844.

188. Carlos de Ayala Martínez, "Maestres y maestrazgos en la Corona de Castilla (siglos XII–XV)," in *Las órdenes militares en la Península Ibérica*, vol. 1, *Edad Media*, ed. Ricardo Izquierdo Benito and Francisco Ruiz Gomez (Cuenca: Universidad de Castilla–La Mancha, 2000), 339–40.

189. Manuel López Fernández, *La Orden de Santiago y el Maestre Pelay Pérez Correa* (Ciudad Real: Instituto de Estudios Manchegos, 2001), 201.

190. Josserand, *Église*, appendix, 849–50.

191. Josserand, *Église*, appendix, 837.

192. BS, 244–45, 259–60.

193. AHN OOMM Calatrava, carp. 445, no. 68.

194. "Ad saeculum, tamquam canis ad vomitum, redeuntes saeculariter vivere non

verentur.” *BS*, 20–21.

195. *BS*, 83.

196. *BS*, 140, 141, 145.

197. *BS*, 139.

198. *BC*, 87, 125–26.

199. *BS*, 203–4, 204–5, 205–6.

200. “An inch or two of cowl can put 25,000 monks up in arms.” Blaise Pascal, *Penseés*, ed. and trans. A. J. Krailsheimer (New York: Penguin Books, 1966), no. 18, 35.

201. “The increasingly formal character of entry to religious life, and the requirement of both profession and consecration, was an important aspect of the development of monasticism in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, but it did not obliterate the traditional view of the monastic habit as the principal sign and symbol of religious life or the significance attached to the ceremony of vesting, which in some early sources was considered to be the single most important element in making a monk.” Constable, “Ceremonies and Symbolism,” 808.

202. Janet Mayo, *A History of Ecclesiastical Dress* (London: B. T. Batsford, 1984), 26–27; Echániz Sans, “Austeridad,” 358–59.

203. When in 1233 some priestly members of Santiago left the order, stealing away with some church ornaments, their action was described as “putting aside the habit.” AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 179, no. 9; *BS*, 97.

204. “Lineis itaque in femoralibus tantum vobis uti licebit.” *BC*, 4.

205. “Vestiti et cincti dormietis . . . summopere autem curabitis, ne in qualicumque veste, aut superfluitatis argui, aut curiositatis possitis notari. Sint ergo panni vestri in colore, et crassitudine nostris similes.” *BC*, 4.

206. O’Callaghan, “The Affiliation,” 34.

207. *BC*, 21.

208. María del Carmen Yáñez Boza, “Imagen y signos del Caballero Calatravo,” in *Alarcos 1195: Actas del Congreso Internacional Conmemorativo del VIII Centenario de la Batalla de Alarcos (1995, Ciudad Real)*, ed. Ricardo Izquierdo Benito and Francisco Ruiz Gómez (Cuenca: Ediciones Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 1996), 603–5.

209. O’Callaghan, “The Affiliation,” 35. The cowl was considered by some as the “true monastic habit.” “Monachilis uero habitus secundum sancti Benedicti regulam, cuculla est et dicitur.” Giles Constable, ed., *Three Treatises from Bec on the Nature of Monastic Life*, trans. Bernard S. Smith (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 56.

210. “Let them wear white, black, and brown clothes, skins of lamb and other types of equally low price; let them observe all this as the Master provides.” Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 110–11. A virtually identical formulation comes at the end of the Primitive Rule of 1172. See Leclercq, “La vie,” 355.

211. *BS*, 2, 5–6.

212. “E la espada que es vuestro ábito signfica muchas cosas. La primera es la sennal de la cruz que vos traedes en los pechos, e significa aquella mesma vera cruz que Jesu Cristo puso las sus espaldas e en que murió por los nuestros pecados lavar, por la qual muerte todo buen freire deve morir quando acaesçiere e non la dubdar, pues que Él tan vil e tan cruda muerte por nos la tomó.” Derek Lomax, “Pedro López de Baeza: ‘Dichos de los Santos Padres’ (Siglo XIV),” *Miscelánea de Textos Medievales* 1 (1972): 177.

213. *BS*, 15.

214. Lomax, *La Orden*, appendix, no. 1 226; Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 116–17. This injunction is repeated in the *establecimientos* of 1274. Josserand, *Église*, appendix, 848.

215. “E mandamos que los freyres que vistan estanfortes e rras e valençianas e

frisa e sarga çinco varas e dende asuso mantos a garnanchas e sayas e pellotes e calças de blanqueta de [. . .] o otro paño que vala tanto e capas de viii morabetinos ayuso e ninguno non faga mas de una vez en el año paños e peñas que sean desta natura que los prendan e non los vista sin liçençia del maestre o del comendador.” Josserand, *Église*, appendix, 838.

216. Francisco Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de Alcántara*, Toledo, 1572, facs. ed. (Barcelona: El Abir, 1980), fol. 2v.

217. Torres y Tapia, *Crónica*, vol. 1, 429–30.

218. Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados*, 295–7.

219. Lomax, “Algunos,” 493.

220. AHN OOMM Calatrava, carp. 441, no. 16.

221. BC, 137–38.

222. “Mandamos que los freyres no vistan ni trayan paños de color que corran en bermejo, no blanco, no de otra color notable, ni reprehensible.” O’Callaghan, “Earliest,” 272, 280.

223. O’Callaghan, “Earliest,” 275, 278.

224. Josserand, “Pour une étude,” 335, 334.

225. Josserand, *Église*, appendix, 840, 838. The *venera* was apparently a mark of distinction added to the habit for members of noble families, a further sign of Santiago’s movement toward an aristocratic mind-set. Pope Alexander approved this regulation in 1259. BS, 197.

226. Josserand, *Église*, appendix, 836.

227. “Establecido es que ningund freyre de nuestra orden que non vista sino rras o valencianas o sarga e sant clemente cinco varas a iii e dende asuso saya e calcas de blanqueta de camuna e unas peñas por año para el manto e garnancha e sobre capas que las traygan pero si quisiere con capirotas asi en la iglesia commo en el cabildo e sean de sayal blanco o de pardo o de sarga e que fagan capas de viiii maravedis ayuso e que coman con ellos quando fuere y el maestre e les duren dos años.” Josserand, *Église*, appendix, 842. This level of specificity in terms of types of garments, fabric, price and duration of use goes well beyond the text of the Rule and is closer to the attention to detail found in Calatrava’s foundational documents.

228. BS, 263.

229. AHN Cod. 1046-B, *Tumbo menor de Castilla*, bk. 1, 15; Echániz Sans, “Austeridad,” 370.

230. Echániz Sans, “Austeridad,” 370–71. She attributes this lack of uniformity to the lay origin of the group. I find this claim dubious, given that the habit of Calatrava and Alcántara is also difficult to establish and seems to have gone through changes, despite the Cistercian affiliation.

231. “Si el incumplimiento de lo estipulado por la Regla acerca del vestido es un problema que existió en casi todas las rdenes religiosas en algún momento de su historia, pocas son las que como Santiago acabaron por crear dos reglamentos diversos para sus miembros a este respecto.” Echániz Sans, “Austeridad,” 358.

232. BC, 227–28.

233. Lomax, “La reforma,” appendix, 767–68. The sincerity of this prohibition was mitigated by exceptions granted for hunting or recreating.

234. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 785, 543–44. As late as 1338, however, the habit could still be considered a distinctive marker of the vocation. Calatrava and Alcántara claimed that the Hospital del Rey of Burgos, which was a royal foundation, really belonged to them, because the brothers who worked there had a habit very similar to their own, without any distinctive markings. Alfonso XI resolved the matter by altering the habit of hospital’s brethren to include a coat of arms. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 563, 403–4.

235. Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados*, 293. This stands in stark contrast to the

original function of the habit, which, in Constable's words, had been "the mark of religious life and the principal distinction between monks and other members of society." Constable, "Ceremonies and Symbolism," 814.

236. Echániz Sans, "Austeridad," 374.

237. The injunction of the 1211 *difiniciones* for a monthly haircut, "ad mediam aurem" for the military brethren and "super aurem" for *conversi*, should be seen as another effort to curb knightly vanity. Lomax, "Algunos," 494.

238. "You cover your horses with silk, and plume your armor with I know not what sort of rags; you paint your shields and your saddles; you adorn your bits and spurs with gold and silver and precious stones, and then in all this glory you rush to your ruin with fearful wrath and fearless folly. Are these the trappings of a warrior or are they not rather the trinkets of a woman?" Continuing, Bernard asks, "Then why do you blind yourselves with effeminate locks and trips yourselves up with long and full tunics, burying your tender, delicate hands in big cumbersome sleeves?" Bernard of Clairvaux, "In Praise of the New Knighthood," trans. Conrad Greenia, in *The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux*, vol. 7, *Treatises*, Cistercian Fathers Series 19 (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1977) (hereafter "New Knighthood"), 132–33.

239. "But these robes should be without any finery and without any show of pride. And so we ordain that no brother will have a piece of fur on his clothes, nor anything else which belongs to the usages of the body, not even a blanket unless it is of lamb's wool or sheep's wool." J. M. Upton-Ward, trans., *The Rule of the Templars: The French Text of the Rule of the Order of the Knights Templar* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1992), ch. 18, 24.

240. Elizabeth Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading 1095–1274* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 106–7.

241. *Cistercians and Cluniacs: The Case for Cîteaux*, trans. Jeremiah O'Sullivan (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1977), 111–12.

242. "Multo melius est defendere quam ieiunare." Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 96.

243. "Tribus vero in Hebdomada diebus, id est, Feria tertia, quinta et Dominica, cum praecipuis diebus festis, carnibus vesci licebit. Uno tantum serculo, et unius generis, quantum ad carnes pertinet contenti eritis." *BC*, 4.

244. *BC*, 4.

245. "In jejuniis eandem observantiam tenebitis, quam, et conversi illorum." *BC*, 6.

246. *BC*, 22.

247. Lomax, *La Orden*, appendix, no. 1, 225; Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 108–9.

248. Lomax, *La Orden*, appendix, no. 1, 224; Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 92–93.

249. "If some of the brethren want to abstain from food or to observe abstinences other than those mentioned previously, let them perform them according to the Master's dispositions, for they should not, on that account, abandon the defense and service of Christianity." Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 94–95.

250. *BS*, 171.

251. *BS*, 171–72.

252. Lomax, *La Orden*, appendix, no. 1, 225; Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 110–11. The *definiciones* of 1307 and 1325 say that silence should be kept in the refectory. O'Callaghan, "Earliest," 268–70.

253. Josserand, *Église*, appendix, 848. There was, however, penance imposed for failing to say grace correctly before meals. Josserand, *Église*, appendix, 841.

254. Josserand, *Église*, appendix, 848.

255. "Et mandamos que ningun comendador non coma vianda apartada, salvo si fuere dolient, mas que coma de lo que comieren los otros freyres; O'Callaghan, "Earliest," 273. "E como todas las cosas deben ser comunes, mandamos que ningun comendador non coma vianda apartada en convento, ni fuera de convento, sino, con los otros, las viandas comunales." O'Callaghan, "Earliest," 266; Josserand, "Pour une étude," 336.

256. *BC*, 35.

257. Carlos de Ayala Martínez, "Un cuestionario sobre una conspiración: La crisis del maestrazgo de Calatrava en 1311–1313," in *Aragón en la Edad Media XIV–XV: Homenaje a la profesora Carmen Orcástegui Gros* (Zaragoza: Universidad de Zaragoza, 1999), 80.

258. Luis Rafael Villegas Díaz, "De regla a código: Sobre el sistema correccional de la Orden de Calatrava," in *Ordens militares: Guerra, religião, poder e cultura: Actas do III Encontro sobre Ordens Militares (Palmela, 22 a 25 de Janeiro de 1998)*, ed. I. Fernandes (Lisbon: Edições Colibri, 1999), vol. 1, 251. This system is distinct from the practice of confession discussed here earlier.

259. Numerous *establecimientos* specifically name the visitors for that year. Josserand, *Église*, 839, 840, 843. Whether visitations were carried out with great regularity is difficult to establish.

260. "Let him eat on the ground without the benefit of tablecloth and let him eat the food of the servants and carry out their duties; let him not drive away from the place or bowl, where he might be eating, neither dog, nor cat, nor bird that might approach." Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 126–27.

261. Echániz Sans, "Austeridad," 369.

262. Lomax, *La Orden*, appendix, no. 1, 229; Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 130–31.

263. Alan Forey, "Judicial Processes in the Military Orders: The Use of Imprisonment and Chaining," in *The Hospitallers, the Mediterranean and Europe: Festschrift for Anthony Luttrell*, ed. Karl Borchardt, Nikolas Jaspert, and Helen J. Nicholson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 87–97; Guy Geltner, *The Medieval Prison: A Social History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 3.

264. Lomax, *La Orden*, appendix, no. 1, 229–30; Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 132–45.

265. For the most part, however, the sources have not left particular cases of

infractions and how they were punished.

266. Lomax, "Algunos," 494; Jossierand, "Pour une étude," 335–36; Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados*, 283–84.

267. O'Callaghan, "Earliest," 264.

268. O'Callaghan, "Earliest," 270; Jossierand, "Pour une étude," 337.

269. Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados*, 306.

270. The following account is taken from Ayala Martínez, "Un cuestionario," 73–89.

271. A document of 1301 records the agreement between two claimants to the mastership that the abbot of Morimond should judge between them. AHN OOMM Calatrava, carp. 461, no. 170.

272. Some depositions from this visit have survived, but not, unfortunately, the ultimate decision of the abbot. It can be safely assumed, however, that he ruled in the master's favor, since the latter remained in office.

273. BC, 173–75; Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados*, 101.

274. Ayala Martínez, *Las órdenes militares hispánicas*, 497–98.

275. "Las Guerras, e por las Huestes, e por mucho otros excessos que acaecen . . . los Freires de Convento no han tan bien paradas las vestiduras, como solian aver, e los Comendadores son menguados de los derechos de las Encomiendas e la tierra de la Orden." BS, 261.

276. "Vestuario para si segund solian aver en el tiempo de los otros Maestres; BS, 263. "Otro si establecemos que non vistamos sinon blanquetas prietas o blancas." BS, 261.

277. BS, 261–63.

278. "E que los Visitadores en cada uno de los Reynos tambien en lo espiritual como en lo temporal todas las cosas que fallaren que las enmienden." BS, 263.

279. Sastre Santos, *La Orden*, 255.

280. Carlos de Ayala Martínez, "La escisión de los santiaguistas portugueses: Algunas notas sobre los establecimientos de 1327," *Historia. Instituciones. Documentos*. 24 (1997): 54.

281. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 263, no. 14.

282. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 263, no. 29; BS, 271–74, 295–96.

283. Ayala Martínez, "La escisión," appendix, 62–68.

284. Ayala Martínez, *Las órdenes militares hispánicas*, 715.

285. Casado Quintanilla, "Intitulatio," 39–40.

286. Julio González, *El reino de Castilla en la época de Alfonso VIII* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1960), vol. 1, 592.

287. BS, 27, 35; González, *Alfonso VIII*, vol. 2, no. 432, 746–47; Julio González, *Alfonso IX* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1944), vol. 2, no. 48, 77–78. Another form of this appellation was "Ordini Iacobitanae Militiae." BS, 49.

288. Selwood, *Knights*, 115.

289. See Constable's observation that "knights who became monks seem to have been especially prone to excessive asceticism, perhaps because they continued to wage against their own bodies the physical battle they had previously waged against their enemies in the world." Giles Constable, "Moderation and Restraint in Ascetic Practices in the Middle Ages," in *From Athens to Chartres: Neoplatonism and Medieval Thought—Studies in Honour of Edouard Jeuneau*, ed. Haijo Jan Westra (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 322, reprinted in *Culture and Spirituality in Medieval Europe*, Variorum Collected Studies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1996), X.

290. Cerrini, *La révolution*, 20.

291. Alain Demurger, *Chevaliers du Christ: Les ordres religieux-militaires au Moyen Âge, XIe–XVIIe siècle* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2002), 182.

292. It is curious, however, that around this same time that a new foundation myth appears for Santiago, one that associates the order's origins with the Battle of Clavijo in the ninth century. See Philippe Josserand, "L'ordre de Santiago face au récit de ses origines au tournant du Moyen Âge et de l'époque moderne: Variations sur l'espace et le temps," in *La mémoire des origines dans les ordres religieux-militaires au Moyen Âge: Actes des journées d'études de Göttingen (25–26 juin 2009)*, Vita regularis 51: Ordnung und Deutungen religiösen Lebens im Mittelalter, ed. Philippe Josserand and Mathieu Olivier (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2012), 121–34.

3. AD EXTRA

1. Bernard of Clairvaux, "In Praise of the New Knighthood," trans. Conrad Greenia, in *The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux*, vol. 7, *Treatises*, Cistercian Fathers Series 19 (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1977) (hereafter "New Knighthood"), 141.

2. "Y tanto era con ellos el temor de Pelayo Correa, que esos moros a sus hijos quando llorauan y a los mochachos los amansauan diziendo: 'Guarte de Pelayo Correa,' y como los moços estas palabras oyan, no llorauan más." Julio Puyol, *Crónica de España por Lucas, obispo de Tuy* (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1926), 438. For an exhaustive study of this man, see Manuel López Fernández, *Pelayo Pérez Correa: Historia y leyenda de un maestro santiaguista* (Badajoz: Diputación de Badajoz, 2010).

3. More detailed accounts can be found in Carlos de Ayala Martínez, *Las órdenes militares hispánicas en la Edad Media (siglos XII–XV)* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003), 405–69; Enrique Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros en los reinos hispánicos: Las órdenes militares en la Península Ibérica durante la Edad Media* (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2008), 167–224; Enrique Rodríguez-Picavea, "The Armies of the Military Orders in Medieval Iberia," *Mediterranean Studies* 20 (2012): 28–58.

4. Alan Forey says the evidence for the use of mercenaries by the Iberian orders is inconclusive, whereas Rodríguez-Picavea argues in favor of it. Alan Forey, "The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries," *Traditio* 40 (1984): 221, reprinted in *Military Orders and Crusades*, Variorum Collected Studies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1994), V; Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 127. A group of bishops once complained of being attacked by brethren of Santiago, who were using Muslim mercenaries. María-Milagros Rivera Garretas, *La Encomienda, el Priorato y la villa de Uclés en la Edad Media: Formación de un señorío de la Orden de Santiago* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1985), no. 183, 387–90. Calatrava's statutes of 1211 refer to the provision of "mercede mercennariorum suorum." Derek Lomax, "Algunos estatutos primitivos de la Orden de Calatrava," *Hispania* 23 (1961): 493.

5. Carlos de Ayala Martínez, "Tópicos y realidades en torno a las Ordenes Militares," in *Tópicos y realidades de la Edad Media*, vol. 2, ed. Eloy Benito Ruano (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 2000), 127.

6. Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 145. At the same, the military capabilities of the kingdom were fairly limited. Writing of the reign of Alfonso VII, Bernard Reilly says, "The theoretical potential of the kingdom might be estimated at something like 1,750 heavy cavalry and another 3,500 squires and grooms necessary for their effective operation. . . . Of course, no such force was ever mobilized." Bernard Reilly, *The Kingdom of León-Castilla Under King Alfonso VII* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 216.

7. Joseph O'Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 128.

8. Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 134–35.

9. “En líneas generales, no se puede decir que las órdenes militares constituyeran un contingente numericamente decisivo en la España de la Reconquista.” Ayala Martínez, “Tópicos,” 131.

10. “Le trait le plus remarquable de l’organisation des Templiers est la discipline que devait presider a chacune de leurs actions militaires. Alors que la tactique resposait, bien plus qu’a toute autre epoque, sur la valeur individuelle des combattants—et les chevaliers d’Ordre ne faisaient pas exception a cette norme—la Regle imposait au contraire un sense etroitement communaire a leur conduite en campagne.” Claude Gaier, “La valeur militaire des Templiers,” in *Armes et combats dans l’univers medieval*, ed. Claude Gaier (Brussels: De Boeck-Wesmael, 1995), 51; Alan Forey, “The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries,” *Traditio* 40 (1984): 229, reprinted in *Military Orders and Crusades*, Variorum Collected Studies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1994), V; Rodríguez-Picavea calls the orders “unidades de elite para operaciones especiales: asaltos, ataque por sorpresa, cobertura estratégica, abastecimiento de guarniciones y otras operaciones logísticas.” *Los monjes guerreros*, 147.

11. O’Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade*, 112–14; Francisco Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de Sanctiago*, Toledo, 1572, facs. ed. (Barcelona: El Abir, 1980), 39r–v.

12. Francisco Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de Calatrava*, Toledo, 1572, facs. ed. (Barcelona: El Abir, 1980), 57v.

13. In 1181 Calatrava agreed to populate Ocaña in an exchange with Tello Pérez. *BC*, 16.

14. “Caeterum nullus est in terra nosta, qui Castrum istud ad populandum recipere vellet, etiam cum huiusmodi libertate prout vos praedicti Magister, et fratres, et domus de Alcañiz, qui pro hac populatione facienda personas, et res periculis exponere non timetis.” *BC*, 40–41. At the same time, there were instances when the orders seemed unable to fulfill this duty, as when Santiago donated the castle of Alfambra to Alvaro Nuñez de Lara *ad populandum*. *BS*, 61.

15. The Templar reception ceremony gives three legitimate reasons for seeking entrance: “one, to put aside and leave behind the sin of this world; the other, to do the work of Our Lord; the third is in order to be poor and do penance in this world, that is for the salvation of the soul.” J. M. Upton-Ward, trans., *The Rule of the Templars: The French Text of the Rule of the Order of the Knights Templar* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1992), ch. 663, 169.

16. “Defendatis eam a Paganis inimicis Crucis.” *BC*, 2. “Institutionem vero, quam dilecti filii nostri Abbas, et Fratres Cistercienses in eodem loco sedisse noscuntur, videlicet, ut ordinem eorum firmiter servaretis, et militaribus armis accincti contra Saracenos, ad ipsius loci defensionem viriliter pugnaretis.” *BC*, 5.

17. “Ut militaribus armis accincti contra Saracenos pro tuitione christiani populi fideliter dimicetis.” *BC*, 22.

18. Enrique Gallego Blanco, *The Rule of the Spanish Military Order of St. James: 1170–1493* (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 79; *BS*, 2.

19. “Et libentius defensionis Christianitatis pro viribus et aliis divinis obsequiis insudetis.” Bonifacio Palacios Martín, dir., *Colección diplomática medieval de la Orden de Alcántara (1157?–1494)* (Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 2000–2003), vol. 1, no. 16, 10–13.

20. Honorius III was especially graphic in 1223 when he wrote to Santiago “quam utiliter universorum agatis negotium cotidie pro defensione fidei nostrae certando, quantumve per vos Paganorum reprimatur barbaries blasphemantium nomen Christi et sanguinem sitientium Christianum.” *BS*, 78–79.

21. *BS*, 104; *BC*, 86.

22. See Jonathan Riley-Smith, “Crusading as an Act of Love,” *History* 65 (1980): 177–92, reprinted in Thomas Madden, ed., *The Crusades: The Essential Readings*

(Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 31–50.

23. Derek Lomax, *La Orden de Santiago* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1965), appendix, no. 1, 223; Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 94–95.

24. Rudolf Hiestand, *Papsturkunden für Templer und Johanniter: Archivberichte und Texte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972), no. 3, 204–10; Upton-Ward, *Rule*, ch. 56, 33.

25. Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 85.

26. “Quomodo contra gentem nefariam Massimutorum extrema pro Fratribus vestris non dubitetis discrimina experiri nihilominus cogitantes.” *BS*, 10. “Nec solum res, sed personas ipsas pro tuitione fratrum incunctanter exponere.” *BS*, 14.

27. Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 94–99; Lomax, *La Orden*, appendix, no. 1, 223–24.

28. “Sed et corpora sua dare in extrema quaeque pericula pro Domino decreverunt, et ad exemplum Domini nostri Jesu Christi qui ait: *Non veni facere voluntatem meam, sed eius qui misit me Patris.*” *BS*, 13.

29. Caroline Smith, *Crusading in the Age of Joinville* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 103.

30. “Quanto Nos, qui relinquimus omnia totius affectui sufficientiae complementum, personas nostras diversorum generum periculis iugiter exponimus, quantoque ex quadam Ordinis claritate, qui multos in se recipit Nobiles, et continet Generosos nullatenus formidantes septies in die nostrum effundere sanguinem pro eo, qui gratis proprio sanguine, nos redemit.” *BS*, 178.

31. Ayala Martínez says that there is no “incontrovertible” evidence for the death of any of the masters of Santiago in battle before 1280. He lists the following possible cases (in addition to Martín Peláez Barragán): Sancho Fernández de Lemos (1195), Pedro Arias (1212), Pedro González de Aragón (1213), and Pedro González de Mengo (1237). For each, the evidence for death in combat varies in credibility. Ayala Martínez, *Las órdenes militares hispánicas*, 200.

32. José Luis Martín, *Orígenes de la Orden Militar de Santiago (1170–1195)* (Barcelona: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1974), 10.

33. Juan Antonio Fernández, *Noticias históricas sacadas del Archivo de Uclés, de sus sepulcros y calenda, y del testamento del infante don Enrique con un Cronicón hasta ahora no publicado; Opúsculos castellanos y latinos de Ambrosio Morales*, vol. 2 (Madrid: Benito Cano, 1793), 25.

34. “Laudabile propositum vestrum, quo a Militia mundi ad Dei Militiam conversi, inimicos Fidei expugnare statuistis, plurimum approbamus.” *BC*, 3.

35. “Et militaribus armis accinti contra Sarracenos, ad ipsius loci defensionem viriliter pugnaretis.” *BC*, 5.

36. Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 78–79; *BS*, 2.

37. “Ut in Sarracenos non mundanae laudis amore, non desiderio sanguinis effundendi, non terrenarum rerum cupiditate bellum tractent, sed in tantum in pugna sua intendant, ut vel Christiani ab eorum tueantur incursu, vel ipsos ad culturam possint Christianae fidei provocare.” *BS*, 15. The last phrase is one of very few references to the military orders working to convert the infidel, and it probably ought to be considered rhetorical.

38. “Regali nempe convenit Majestati, quosque honestos, ac religiosos viros diligere, et eos maxime, qui relictis saecularibus voverunt sponte contra Crucis Christi adversarios, et proprium sanguinem fundere, seseque pro Christiane Fidei defensione murum, et clypeum constanter opponere.” *BC*, 11.

39. *BC*, 11, 12.

40. “Tam oratione quam proprii sanguinis effusione Christianitatis loca et habitationes uiriliter in Domino defendunt.” Julio González, *El reino de Castilla en la época de Alfonso VIII* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas,

1960), vol. 2, no. 435, 750.

41. "Qui relictis seculi militaribus contra crucis Christi inimicos de cetero cupiunt militare et eius nomen deffendere et exaltare." González, *Alfonso VIII*, vol. 2, no. 243, 403.

42. "Contemptis mundanis pompis et spreto seculari tumultu, in defensionem christiane religionis et eius dilatationem et inimicorum crucis Christi expugnationem, perfidie sarracenicæ opprimende se muros inexpugnabiles constituunt, et, non immemores agni qui pro nostra occisus est redemptione, Saluatori suo assidue militant, indesinenti desudant certamine, sanguinem suum sub lege martirii effundere non formidant, et sic tandem Deo soli uitam finire laetantur." González, *Alfonso VIII*, vol. 2, no. 432, 746.

43. González, *Alfonso VIII*, vol. 3, no. 769, 341–47.

44. Julio González, *Reinado y diplomas de Fernando III* (Córdoba: Publicaciones del Monte de Piedad, 1980), vol. 2, no. 250, 291–92.

45. "Ut iam non militemus nec pugnemus huic seculo, set militemus et pugnemus una cum omnibus qui in Ordine militant et pugnant ut accipiamus coronam inmarcessibilem et remunerationem a Domino Ihesu Christo." Martín, *Orígenes*, appendix, no. 85, 264–65.

46. "Ad defensionem frontariae regni mei adversus mauros, ac praecipue at tenentiam et ad defensionem de Alcantara." Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 62, 32–33.

47. BC, 11, 28, 103–5; Francisco Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de Alcántara*, Toledo, 1572, facs. ed. (Barcelona: El Abir, 1980), fol. 8r. Curiously the monarchs of León and Castile did not favor Santiago in this way.

48. BS, 28–29.

49. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 365, 237–39.

50. BS, 140.

51. BS, 235–36.

52. BS, 183.

53. BS, 220; BC, 136–37.

54. BS, 248–49; BC, 150–51.

55. "Sin embargo, fuera de las crónicas de carácter histórico, ya generales, ya particulares de los distintos reinados, no hallamos testimonios de aquéllas en ésta, hasta muy avanzado el siglo XIV." Isidoro Villalobos Racionero, "Las órdenes militares y la literatura española (hasta el primer tercio del siglo XVI)," in *Lux Hispaniarum: Estudios sobre las órdenes militares*, ed. Fray Javier Campos, OSA (Madrid: Real Consejo de las Órdenes Militares, 1999), 267.

56. Derek Lomax, "Pedro López de Baeza: 'Dichos de los Santos Padres' (Siglo XIV)," *Miscelánea de Textos Medievales* 1 (1972): 176–77.

57. "In Vclesio statuit capud ordinis et opus eorum ensis defensionis. Persecutor Arabum moratur ibi et incola eius defensor fidei. Vox laudancium auditur ibi et iubilis desiderii ilarescit ibi. Rubet ensis sanguine Arabum et ardet fides caritate mentium. Execratio est cultori demonum et uita honoris credenti in Deum. Ripam Tagi repleuit habitatoribus et incolis defensionis saltus Ocanie. Optulit Excelso terram illam et milicie sancti Iacobi dedicauit eam. Rupes Aurelie uniuit ei et presidium More subiecit illi, ut dedicaret terram sanctimonie et particeps fieret religionis." *HDRH*, bk. 7, ch. 27, 249–50.

58. "Desiderabilis Sancius pater eius dedit Fiterio Calatrauam, Aldefonsus nobilis consumator eorum: suscepit miliciam contemplatio et egressus fratrum a Fiterio. Rex Aldefonsus educauit eos et possessionibus pluribus ditauit eos. Çuritam, Almocariam, Maquedam, Acecam et Cucullutum optulit eis et sustulit sarcinam paupertatis et superaddidit diuicias competentes. Multiplicatio eorum gloria regia et disciplina eorum corona principis. Qui laudabant in psalmis accinti sunt ense et qui

gemebant orantes ad defensionem patrie. Victus tenuis pastus eorum et asperitas lane tegumentum eorum. Disciplina assida probat eos et cultus silentii comitatur eos. Frequens genuflexio humiliat eos et nocturna uigilia macerat eos. Deuota oratio erudit illos et continuus labor exercet eos. Alter alterius obseruat semitas et frater fratrem ad disciplinam.” *HDRH*, bk. 7, ch. 27, 250.

59. “Fuerunt etiam fratres Calatraue sub uno milicie sue magistro Roderico Didaci, grata Deo et hominibus fraterna societas; fratres milicie Templi sub uno magistro Gomicio Remiri, qui post bellum feliciter expirauit. Hii sunt qui primi in Nouo Testamento, signo crucis suscepto, superbie militaris fastum, strenuitate seruata, caritatis et religionis uinculo artauerunt; fratres etiam milicie Hospitalis, qui fraternitatis caritati insistentes deuote, zelo fidei et Terre Sancte necessitate accensi, deffensionis gladium assumpserunt. Hii sub uno priore Guterrio Ermigildi; fratres etiam milicie Sancti Iacobi sub uno magistro Petro Arie. Hii in partibus Hispanie multa opera milicie decenter egerunt.” *HDRH*, bk. 8, ch. 3, 262.

60. Alfonso X, *Cantigas de Santa María*, ed. Walter Mettmann (Madrid: Clásicos Castalia, 1986), vol. 2, *cantiga* 205, 251–53.

61. “Na frontetria un castelo de mouros mui fort’ avia / que combateron crischãos que sayan d’ açaria / d Ucres e de Calatrava con muita cavalaria; / e era y Don Affonso / Telez, ric-ome preçado.” Alfonso X, *Cantigas*, vol. 2, *cantiga* 205, 252.

62. “O mestre Don Gonçalvo Eanes de Calatrava, / que en servir Deus en mouros guerrejar se traballava / e porend’ aquela torre muito conbater mandava . . . E quando viron a torre que era toda cavada / e viron ontr’ as amêas aquela mour’ assentada, / semellou lles a omagen de com’ está fegurada / a Virgen Santa María que ten seu Fill’ abraçado.” Alfonso X, *Cantigas*, vol. 2, *cantiga* 205, 253.

63. Alfonso X, *Cantigas de Santa María: Edición facsímil del códice B.R. 20 de la Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale de Florencia* (Madrid: Edilan, 1989), vol. 1, fol. 6r.

64. “Otrosí ay órdenes de cavallería, que pueden aver cavallos et armas, et usar dellas en servicio de Dios et defendimiento de la fe contra los moros, et pueden aver proprio en común. Et éstas son en Castiella—onde yo só natural—la orden de Sanctiago, et de San Johan, et de Calatrava, et de Alcántara.” Don Juan Manuel, *Libro de los Estados*, ed. R. B. Tate and I. R. Macpherson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), bk. 2, ch. 33, 253–54.

65. “Versus Hispaniam contra gentem nefariam paganorum surrexerunt de novo viri Domini timentes et zelantes legem Domini, videlicet fratres Sancti Iacobi qui pro defensione fidei christiane se ipsos extremis periculis exponunt et fines christianitatis ab incursibus paganorum, induti lorica fidei et multiplici succincta virtute tuentur.” Martín, *Orígenes*, appendix, no. 75, 255–56.

66. “Cum Calatravenses fratres Cisterciensis Ordinis, qui nequaquam pretiosiores se ipsis vitam propriam facientes, et pro Domino exercituum agonizare parati de ipsius gratia per Hispaniam multiplicati sunt hactenus, et bonae opinionis odorem, longe, lateque per vitae meritum effundentes, flores, et fructus proferunt gratiarum, firmum gerant (Deo sicut credimus, inspirante) propositum acquirere in Siria pro Terrae Sanctae subsidio locum.” *BC*, 67.

67. “Scientes quod serenitati regiae proficit ad salutem, si viros religiosos habueris in visceribus charitatis, cum Dominus honorari et sperni se asserat in ministris, secundum evangelicam veritatem, celsitudinem regiam rogamus propensius, et hortamur quatenus dilectos filios magistrum et fratres domus de Pirario, cisterciensis ordinis, quae ad Romanam Ecclesiam, nullo pertinet mediante, pro divina et nostra reverentia taliter habere charos demonstres, quod ipsi preces nostras sibi sentiant fructuosas et nos devotionem tuam possimus merito commendare.” Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 154, 78–79.

68. For an overview of this practice, see Alan Forey, “*Milites ad terminum* in the Military Orders During the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries,” in *The Military Orders*,

vol. 4, *On Land and by Sea*, ed. Judi Upton-Ward (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 5–12.

69. Guillem Ramón de Montcada and his brother offered themselves in this capacity to the Templars during the order's early years in Catalonia. Nikolas Jaspert, "Bonds and Tensions on the Frontier: the Templars in Twelfth-Century Western Catalonia," in *Mendicants, Military Orders and Regionalism in Medieval Europe*, ed. Jürgen Sarnowsky (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 30.

70. Alan Forey, *The Military Orders: From the Twelfth to the Early Fourteenth Centuries* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 56.

71. Giuseppe Ligato, "Fra Ordini Cavallereschi e crociata: 'Milites ad terminum' e 'confraternitates' armate," in *"Militia Christi" e Crociata nei secoli XI–XIII: Atta della undecima Settimana internazionale di studio Mendola, 28 agosto–1 settembre 1989* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1992), 677–78.

72. Demetrio Mansilla, *La documentación pontificia de Honorio III (1216–1227)* (Rome: Instituto Español de Historia Eclesiástica, 1965), no. 339, 251; *BC*, 73.

73. "Sane cum immensam habeat charitatem, qui suam ponit animam pro amicis, et ipsa sit, quae multitudinem operit peccatorum . . . militibus et peditibus vobiscum terram sarracenorum intrantibus et decedentibus en praelio pro Christi et Christianitatis amore." Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 168, 87–88; *BA*, 49.

74. *BS*, 181–82.

75. *BS*, 235–26.

76. *BS*, 249–50; José Goñi Gaztambide, *Historia de la bula de cruzada en España* (Vitoria: Editorial del Seminario, 1958), 263–64. Forey thinks that overall the practice was in decline in the thirteenth century. Forey, "*Milites ad terminum*," 10.

77. "Uenio ad Deum et ad ordinem sancti Iacobi sicut est stabilita ut sedeam obediens et ut uiuam sine proprio et teneam castitatem coniugalem, et sinon ut uiuam casta mente." Lomax, *La Orden*, appendix, no. 9, 239–40.

78. "Por salvamento de mi anima." Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 282, 171–73.

79. Alfonso X, *Primera crónica general de España*, ed. Ramón Menéndez Pidal (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1955), 717.

80. The Primitive Rule of Santiago says "Christianos ulterius non inugnare." Jean Leclercq, OSB, "La vie et la prière des chevaliers de Santiago d'après leur Règle primitive," *Liturgica* 2 (1958): 352; "If fighting against Christians was not explicitly forbidden by the Rule, it had been renounced, at least informally, by those entering the order." Derek Lomax, "The Order of Santiago and the Kings of León," *Hispania* 18 (1958): 12–13.

81. *Die Statuten des Deutschen Ordens nach den ältesten handschriften*, ed. Max Perlach (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1890), 58.

82. Peter the Venerable, *The Letters of Peter the Venerable*, ed. Giles Constable (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), vol. 1, no. 172, 407–9.

83. *BS*, 168.

84. Alan Forey, "The Military Orders and Holy War against Christians in the Thirteenth Century," *English Historical Review* 104 (1989): 10–13, reprinted in *Military Orders and Crusades*, Variorum Collected Studies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1994), VII.

85. Carlos de Ayala Martínez, "Las órdenes militares y los procesos de afirmación monárquica en Castilla y Portugal (1250–1350)" *Revista da Faculdade de Letras—Historia*, 2nd ser., vol. 15 (1998): 1279–1312; Manuel González Jiménez, "Relaciones de las órdenes militares castellanas con la corona," *Historia. Instituciones. Documentos*. 18 (1991): 209–22; Manuel Alejandro Rodríguez de la Peña, "Las órdenes militares como instrumento de la monarquía: Una panorámica europea," in *Las órdenes militares en la Península Ibérica*, vol. 1, *Edad Media*, ed. Ricardo Izquierdo Benito and Francisco Ruiz Gómez (Cuenca: Ediciones Universidad de Castilla-La

Mancha, 1996), 511–35.

86. Carlos de Ayala Martínez, ed., *Libro de privilegios de la Orden de San Juan de Jerusalén en Castilla y León (siglos XII–XV)* (Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1995), no. 126, 300–302.

87. González, *Alfonso VIII*, vol. 2, no. 162, 276.

88. Martín Rodríguez, *Orígenes*, 82.

89. Martín Rodríguez, *Orígenes*, 64–65.

90. Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de Sanctiago*, 20v–21v.

91. Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de Sanctiago*, 26r–v.

92. The war between Aragon and Castile from 1296 to 1304 showed the favoritism of the master of Santiago for the Castilian monarchy. Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 227–28.

93. Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de Sanctiago* 37v–38r

94. Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 226–27.

95. Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de Sanctiago*, 23r–v.

96. Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 239.

97. Francisco Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de Calatrava*, Toledo, 1572, facs. ed. (Barcelona: El Abir, 1980), 14v–15v.

98. Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de Sanctiago*, 36v.

99. Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de Sanctiago*, 41r–v.

100. Luis Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados de la orden de Alcántara en la Edad Media: Su organización institucional y vida religiosa* (Madrid: Castellum, 1999), 171–72, 187.

101. Manuel González Jiménez, “Alfonso X y las órdenes militares: Historia de un desencuentro,” *Alcanate* 2 (2000–2001): 215.

102. González Jiménez, “Relaciones,” 219.

103. Peter Linehan, *The Spanish Church and the Papacy in the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 220–23.

104. González Jiménez, “Alfonso X y las órdenes,” 216.

105. González Jiménez, “Alfonso X y las órdenes,” 218.

106. Rivera Garretas, *La encomienda*, 203.

107. AHN OOMM Calatrava, carp. 444, nos. 48, 50; Peter Linehan, *The Spanish Church*, 197.

108. José Luis Martín Martín, *Documentación medieval de la iglesia catedral de Coria* (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1989), no. 35, 68.

109. Torres y Tapia says that Alfonso IX sent Alcántara to fight the Muslims in 1212 while he was engaged against the king of Portugal on account of “el poco gusto con que hacían guerra a Christianos.” Alonso de Torres y Tapia, *Crónica de la Orden de Alcántara*, (Madrid: Imprenta de don Gabriel Ramírez, 1763), vol. 1, 139.

110. “The other role, or rather, *use* of the military orders—especially of the international ones—was as ‘defenders’ of neutral zones between the Christian kingdoms.” José Manuel Rodríguez García, “Alfonso X and the Teutonic Order: an Example of the Role of the International Military Orders in Mid Thirteenth-Century Castile,” in *The Military Orders*, vol. 2, *Welfare and Warfare*, ed. Helen Nicholson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 324.

111. Martín, *Orígenes*, 66–67.

112. Rodríguez García, “Alfonso X and the Teutonic Order,” 322.

113. “Parescia por una parte que lo eran, por ser vassallos del Rey: Por otra parescia que esto era contra el fin para que estas Ordenes fueron instituydas.” Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de Sanctiago*, 24r.

114. Mansilla, *Documentación de Honorio III*, no. 569, 421–22.

115. Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de Sanctiago*, 24r–v.

116. Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 149.

117. Demetrio Mansilla, *La documentación pontificia hasta Inocencio III (963–1216)*

(Rome: Instituto Español de Estudios Eclesiásticos, 1955), no. 321, 351.

118. Mansilla, *La documentación pontificia*, no. 342, 366–67.

119. There is, however, a curious document of 1220 in which Honorius warned the Iberian monarchs not to hinder Calatrava and its associates from making war upon the Moors. The nature of the interference is unclear. AHN OOMM Calatrava, carp. 441, no. 19.

120. Lomax, “Algunos,” 494.

121. Josserand has called attention to the theme of royal prerogative vis-à-vis the military orders in all the major chronicles, including Jiménez de Rada. Philippe Josserand, “Les orders militaires dans la chronique castillane à l’époque de Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada,” *Cahiers de Linguistique et de Civilisation Hispaniques Médiévales* 26 (2003): 130.

122. This does not preclude the possibility that the monarchs turned a blind eye to violations of their truces when it suited them, as Alvira Cabrer has suggested with respect to Alfonso VIII’s truce with the Almohads during the first decade of the thirteenth century. Martín Alvira Cabrer, “Prendiendo el fuego de la guerra: Operaciones militares en las fronteras cristiano-almohades entre 1209 y 1211” in *Iglesia, guerra y monarquía en la Edad Media: Miscelánea de estudios medievales*, ed. José Peña González and Manuel Alejandro Rodríguez de la Peña (Madrid: CEU Ediciones, 2014), 139–92.

123. In 1257 Fernando III obtained from the pope a prohibition against members of Santiago being called to justice outside his kingdom. *BS*, 194.

124. *BC*, 121.

125. Joseph Delaville Le Roulx, *Cartulaire général de l’ordre des Hospitaliers de Saint-Jean-de-Jérusalem (1100–1310)* (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1894–1906), vol. 1, no. 391, 266–68.

126. William Purkis, *Crusading Spirituality in the Holy Land and Iberia, c. 1095–1187* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2008), 176–78. Philippe Josserand has argued convincingly for Castilian interest in the Holy Land during the thirteenth century. Philippe Josserand, *Église et pouvoir dans la Péninsule Ibérique: Les ordres militaires dans le royaume de Castille (1252–1369)* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2004), 40.

127. Martín, *Orígenes*, appendix, no. 52, 226–28.

128. “Ut per hanc eorum orationibus adiutus aeternam a Deo consequar retributionem.” *BS*, 22.

129. *BC*, 39–40.

130. *BC*, 67.

131. Juan Orozco de la Parra, *Primera historia de la Orden de Santiago: Manuscrito del siglo XV, de la Real Academia de la Historia*, ed. Marquis de Siete Iglesias (Badajoz: Diputación de Badajoz, 1978), 369.

132. *BC*, 117–19.

133. “Era de mill e dozientos e treynta annos fue presa Jherusalem.” Derek Lomax, “The Medieval Predecessors of Rades y Andrada,” *Iberoromania* 23 (1986): 90.

134. Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 220.

135. A document of 1269 names Pedro Díaz as Calatrava’s “Comendador del Espital.” *BC*, 130–34.

136. Torres y Tapia, *Crónica*, vol. 1, 292.

137. *BA*, 110–11; Philippe Josserand, “Pour une étude systématique de la documentation statutaire des ordres militaires: Deux manuscrits des ‘definiciones’ inédites d’Alcántara de 1306,” *En la España Medieval* 20 (1997): 335.

138. “Duo hospitalia domus, quorum unum est in forntera, alterum in strata beati Jacobi.” Leclercq, “La vie,” 353.

139. San Marcos de León was a hospitaller confraternity founded in 1152, which

was incorporated into to the Order of Santiago between 1178 and 1180. Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 86.

140. "Sit vobis praecipua cura hospitum, et indigentium, et necessaria illis pro facultate Domus liberaliter conferantur." *BS*, 16.

141. Lomax, *La Orden*, 95. Apparently St. Dominic had some role in establishing the hospital in Zaragoza. Ángela Madrid y Medina, "La hospitalidad en las órdenes militares españolas," in *Lux Hispaniarum: Estudios sobre las órdenes militares*, ed. Fray Javier Campos, OSA (Madrid: Real Consejo de las Órdenes Militares, 1999), 245.

142. Enrique Rodríguez-Picavea, "The Military Orders and Hospitaller Activity on the Iberian Peninsula during the Middle Ages," *Mediterranean Studies* 18 (2009): 31.

143. Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 259.

144. "The medieval hospital was an institution devoted to the care of needy groups within society: the sick, aged, poor and destitute. It did not function as a modern hospital, treating the seriously ill and urgent medical cases, but represented a form of more general charitable relief." Roberta Gilchrist, *Contemplation and Action: The Other Monasticism* (London: Leicester University Press, 1995), 8.

145. "The fact that the rule of the Order of Santiago did not insist that a physician must be present in the house may indicate that the infirmaries of the Order, like most hospitals in western Europe in the Middle Ages, were, rather, nursing homes, in which case the presence of a physician would not be necessary." Paula Pinto Costa and António Pestana de Vasconcelos, "Christ, Santiago and Avis: An Approach to the Rules of the Portuguese Military Orders in the Late Middle Ages," in *The Military Orders*, vol. 2, *Welfare and Warfare*, ed. Helen Nicholson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 254.

146. Christopher Toll, "Arabic Medicine and Hospitals in the Middle Ages: A Probable Model for the Military Orders' Care of the Sick," in *The Military Orders*, vol. 2, *Welfare and Warfare*, ed. Helen Nicholson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 35–41.

147. James Brodman, *Charity and Welfare: Hospitals and the Poor in Medieval Catalonia* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 28.

148. "It is clear, however, that Orders normally relied on outsiders for medical skills." Alan Forey, "Literacy and Learning in the Military Orders During the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries," in *The Military Orders*, vol. 2, *Welfare and Warfare*, ed. Helen Nicholson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 199.

149. Forey, "Literacy and Learning," 193.

150. The text continues, "Let the commanders who have been appointed to manage those infirmaries, try to be prepared, when the host enters the land of the Saracens, themselves to enter with the necessary things so as to be able to help, according to need, the brethren and the other faithful of the host should they become sick, and to supply all necessities to those in so perilous a situation, because they have done such service not only to his people but to Himself, as Jesus, our Savior, bears witness." Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 114–15.

151. Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 116–17.

152. *BS*, 261.

153. Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 118–19.

154. "Compare the heroic qualities of apostolic examples, that of the first Franciscans, or the words of early modern writers such as Domingo de Soto, the spirit in which they gave and shared, with the limited and formal way in which northern Castilians assigned a few coins to feed and clothe the poor, with food and fabrics which painfully reminded the needy of their station in life, which told the world, once a year, ceremonially, of the donor's munificence. It was bread and vestments given without love. It was not charity." Teofilo F. Ruiz, "The Business of Salvation: Castilian Wills in the Late Middle Ages," in *On the Social Origins of Medieval Institutions: Essays in Honor of Joseph F. O'Callaghan*, ed. Donald Kagay and

Theresa Vann (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 89.

155. James Brodman, *Ransoming Captives in Crusader Spain: The Order of Merced on the Christian-Islamic Frontier* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), 1–14.

156. “In Spain we can chart what may be defined as a full-blown development of institutions and laws dealing with captives: the municipal militias; royal intervention; the Siete Partidas of Alfonso X (1252–84), which included a codification of the laws of war; and intensive activity by redemptionist orders.” Yvonne Friedman, *Encounter Between Enemies: Captivity and Ransom in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 239.

157. Alan Forey, “The Military Orders and the Ransoming of Captives from Islam (Twelfth to Early Fourteenth Centuries),” *Studia monastica* 33 (1991): 268–69, reprinted in *Military Orders and Crusades*, Variorum Collected Studies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1994), VI.

158. Martin, *Orígenes*, appendix, no. 225, 403; Gallego Blanco, *Rule*, 112–13; Lomax, *La Orden*, appendix, no. 1, 226.

159. BS, 69–70.

160. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 324, no. 9.

161. Migne, *PL*, vol. 216, cols. 507–9.

162. Forey, “Ransoming,” 264.

163. Richard Barber, *The Knight and Chivalry*, rev. ed. (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1995), 275.

164. Pedro Marín, *Los miraculos romançados de Pedro Marín*, ed. Karl Antón (Santo Domingo de Silos: Studia Silensia, 1988), 49–50, 63–64, 83–84. Jossereand and Rodríguez-Picavea believe these accounts refer to active ransoming missions by Calatrava. Jossereand, *Église*, 150; Rodríguez-Picavea, “Hospitaller Activity,” 41.

165. Smith, *Age of Joinville*, 96–97.

166. Saladin infamously executed the Templars and Hospitallers he captured at the Battle of Hattin. Thomas Madden, *The New Concise History of the Crusades* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 76. Likewise Alvar Pérez ruthlessly slaughtered his Muslim captives during a campaign of the 1220s. Alfonso X, *Primera crónica general*, 726.

167. BS, 263.

168. BS, 111.

169. BS, 112.

170. BS, 21–22.

171. Alan Forey, “The Military Orders and the Ransoming of Captives from Islam (Twelfth to Early Fourteenth Centuries),” *Studia Monastica* 33 (1991): 266, reprinted in *Military Orders and Crusades*, Variorum Collected Studies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1994), VI.

172. Forey, “Ransoming,” 275–76. When Calatrava and Santiago raided the environs of Seville in the 1230s, they reportedly took more than five hundred captives. Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de Sanctiago*, 29r.

173. The hospital of Talavera had twenty “moros de labor, dos moreznos y una mora” in 1238; they were kept chained. Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros*, 265.

174. Anna Mur i Raurell, *La encomienda de San Marcos: La Orden de Santiago en Teruel (1200–1556)* (Teruel: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1988), no. 17, 316–18.

175. González, *Alfonso VIII*, vol. 2, no. 543, 931.

176. González, *Alfonso VIII*, vol. 2, no. 412, 714–15.

177. BA, 81. This indicates that Alcántara, despite having no ransom hospitals, did on occasion perform this activity.

178. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 323, no. 8.
179. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 100, no. 18.
180. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 325, no. 23.
181. AHN OOMM Calatrava, Registro de Escrituras, 1341C, 111r.
182. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 325, no. 9. This document, however, recognized the importance of the hospital's work, leaving a fourth of tithes to care for pilgrims and the poor of Christ. José Vicente Matellanes and Enrique Rodríguez-Picavea, "Las órdenes militares en las etapas castellanas del Camino de Santiago," in *El Camino de Santiago, la hospitalidad monástica y las peregrinaciones*, ed. Horacio Santiago-Otero (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 1992), 352–53.
183. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 328, no. 23.
184. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 328, no. 24.
185. "Inter cetera pietatis opera piissimum est et saluti animarum accomodum christianos captiuos redimere et eos qui ad hoc intendunt terrenis facultatibus iuuare . . . nisi ad redimendos Christianos Captiuos de terra Maurorum." *BS*, 21–22; González, *Alfonso VIII*, vol. 2, no. 338, 568.
186. "Pro animabus parentum meorum." *BS*, 21.
187. *BS*, 49–50.
188. González, *Fernando III*, vol. 2, no. 78, 96–97.
189. Julio González, *Alfonso IX* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1944), vol. 2, no. 434, 548.
190. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 325, no. 15; *BS*, 73–74.
191. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 325, no. 16.
192. AHN OOMM Calatrava, carp. 457, no. 54; *BC*, 38–39.
193. AHN OOMM Calatrava, carp. 457, no. 54; *BC*, 38–39.
194. Tello Pérez was responsible for the foundation of the hospital at Cuenca, but he named Alfonso VIII its "fundator et gubernator." *BS*, 26–27.
195. Simon Barton, *The Aristocracy in Twelfth-Century León and Castile* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 199–200.
196. *BS*, 60–61.
197. González, *Fernando III*, vol. 2, no. 48, 60; no. 78, 96–97.
198. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 325, no. 6.
199. *BS*, 86; Lomax, *La Orden*, 26; Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de Sanctiago*, 29v.
200. Isabel Beceiro Pita and Ricardo Córdoba de la Llave, *Parentesco, poder y mentalidad: La nobleza castellana siglos XII–XV* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1990), 78, 273.
201. "Facimus helemosinam ad honorem Dei omnipotentis et beati Iacobi." AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 100, no. 1.
202. "Ad exaltationem regis illefonsi et uxoris sui regine alienoris et filii ei fernandi et ad utilitate concilii, et ad redemptionem captiuorum." AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 100, no. 1.
203. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 100, nos. 25, 26.
204. "Ad proficuum Parentum nostrorum, vivorum scilicet, et mortuorum." *BS*, 29.
205. *BS*, 70.
206. José López Agurleta, *Vida del venerable fundador de la Orden de Santiago, y de las primeras casas de redempción de cautivos. Continuación de la apología por el hábito canónico del patriarca Santo Domingo en la misma orden* (Madrid: Imprenta de Bernardo Peralta, 1731), appendix, no. 178, 87–88.
207. "Animabus nostris et parentum nostrorum in Domino providere." AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 100, no. 14; *BS*, 77–78.
208. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 99, no. 21.
209. *BS*, 30; *BS*, 35–36.

210. *BS*, 41.
211. *BS*, 194–95.
212. *BS*, 197–98.
213. Tom Licence, “The Military Orders as Monastic Orders,” *Crusades* 5 (2006): 40.
214. “Thus, the Military Orders utilized both aspects of their natures to attract the laity to give to them. They promoted both their religious and their military facets and conjointly or separately these appealed to benefactors.” Dominic Selwood, *Knights of the Cloister: Templars and Hospitallers in Central-Southern Occitania c. 1100–c. 1330* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1999), 114.
215. “Although some religious carefully distinguished between the different orders within the Church, there is no evidence that benefactors were particularly interested in such technicalities.” Tom Licence, “The Military Orders,” 40.
216. The king of Aragon cites some of these motivations in a donation of 1179. “Pro remedio animae meae, et Patris, ac Matris meae, et aliorum parentum meorum, ad defensionem et exaltationem Christianitatis, et oppressionem Paganorum.” *BC*, 13.
217. *BS*, 47.
218. “Catholicorum regum est sancta loca personasque religiosas, largis ampliari muneribus et pro ipsarum meritis, amplius ditare beneficiis.” Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 14, 8–10; no. 18, 14–15.
219. “Pro bono et grato servitio quod mihi fecistis et ibidem facturi estis, et pro anima mea et parentum meorum, et quia de bonis et orationibus que in ordine vestro Deo iugiter exhibentur partem disero promereri.” Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 58, 30–31.
220. “Ob remedium animae meae et parentum meorum, et pro multo bono servitio quod mihi in pluribus locis fecistis, et specialiter in captione civitatis praedictae et in bello campestri quod habui cum Abenhut ultra aquam Dianae, prope civitatem praedictam, et ut de bonis et de orationibus quae a vobis Deo iugiter exhibentur, ipso largiente mihi partem valeam promereri.” Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 116, 60–61.
221. González, *Alfonso IX*, vol. 2, no. 74, 111–12; no. 86, 129–30; no. 89, 133–34; no. 92, 137–38; no. 123, 176–77; *BS*, 74.
222. Josserand, *Église*, appendix, 838–39.
223. Josserand, *Église*, appendix, 841.
224. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 411, 265–68; no. 415, 269–72; *BA*, 129–31, 131–33.
225. *BC*, 125–26, 152–54.
226. *BC*, 123–25.
227. *BC*, 18–19.
228. “E esto vos damos por Dios y por nuestras almas.” Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 353, 225–26.
229. López Agurleta, *Vida del venerable*, appendix, no. 193, 100.
230. *BC*, 9–10.
231. “Nobilium interest virorum, sancta loca, et Ordines diligere, venerari, ac tueri, necnon de affluentis suis, ea sufficienter eorum paupertate sublevando ditare, ut hujus terreno mundi labilia, et caduca largendo, coronam infine temporum, quam Dominus promisit diligentibus se, percipere mereantur.” *BC*, 37–38.
232. López Agurleta, *Vida del venerable*, appendix, no. 75, 39–40.
233. *BC*, 114–15.
234. See *BS*, 50–51.
235. The *Siete Partidas* defines the relationship in the following terms: “Familiares o cofrades son llamados los que toman señal o hábito de alguna orden et moran en

sus casas seyendo señores de lo suyo, et non se desapoderando dello.” Alfonso X, *Las Siete Partidas* (Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1972), *partida primera*, título 13, ley 8, 386.

236. José Orlandis, “*Traditio Corporis et Animae*: La ‘familiaritas’ en las iglesias y monasterios españoles de la alta Edad Media,” *Anuario de Historia de Derecho Española* 24 (1954): 136.

237. BS, 214.

238. BC, 103–5.

239. Manuel López Fernández, *La Orden de Santiago y el Maestre Pelay Pérez Correa* (Ciudad Real: Instituto de Estudios Manchegos, 2001), 302.

240. Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de Sanctiago*, 33r.

241. Olga Pérez Monzón, “Espacio funerario y órdenes militares en la Castilla medieval,” in *As ordens militares: Freires, guerreiros, cavaleiros; Actas do VI Encontro sobre Ordens Militares*, coord. Isabel Cristina Ferreira Fernandes (Palmela: Município de Palmela, 2012), 908.

242. BS, 117; Philippe Josserand, “Itinéraires d’une rencontre: Les ordres militaires et l’ideal chevaleresque dans la Castille du bas Moyen Âge (XIII–XV siècles),” in *L’univers de la chevalerie en Castille: Fin du Moyen Âge*, ed. Jean-Pierre Sanchez (Paris: Éditions du Temps, 2000), 90.

243. José Luis Martín, “*Militia Christi, Malitia Mundi*,” in *Las órdenes militares en la Península Ibérica*, vol. 1, *Edad Media*, ed. Ricardo Izquierdo Benito and Francisco Ruiz Gómez (Cuenca: Universidad de Castilla–La Mancha, 2000), 917–18.

244. López Fernández, *Orden de Santiago*, 298.

245. Lomax, *La Orden*, 39.

246. Manuel González Jiménez, “La Corona y las órdenes militares castellano-leonesas,” in *Lux Hispaniarum: Estudios sobre las Órdenes Militares*, ed. Fray Javier Campos, OSA (Madrid: Real Consejo de las Órdenes Militares, 1999), 77.

247. In 1191 Alfonso VIII gave the town of Cobillas Mayor to Fernando Ruiz de Azagra on the occasion of his wedding. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 152, no. 3.

248. Martín, *Orígenes*, appendix, no. 266, 438–39; Mur i Raurell, *La encomienda*, appendix, no. 5, 306–7; AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 152, no. 2; Mur i Raurell, *La encomienda*, appendix, no. 6, 307–8.

249. “Numquam licentiam habeant ullum hominem in mundo viventem introducendi castrum vel intus recipiendi nisi eiusdem Ordinis frater fuerit.” Mur i Raurell, *La encomienda*, appendix, no. 5, 306.

250. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 152, no. 6; Mur i Raurell, *La encomienda*, appendix, no. 7, 308–10.

251. Mur i Raurell, *La encomienda*, 36; AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 152, no. 9. This archival folder is quite confusing, as there are several missing documents whose descriptions muddle the particulars of this relationship.

252. BS, 58.

253. Mur i Raurell, *La encomienda*, appendix, no. 29, 329–31.

254. Mur i Raurell, *La encomienda*, appendix, no. 33, 336–37.

255. Mur i Raurell, *La encomienda*, 72–73.

256. “Offerimus nosmetipsos non pro qualibuscumque familiaribus, sed pro rectis fratribus.” BC, 57–58.

257. Although Calatrava did not have married brethren, it was not unusual in the Middle Ages for married people to enter religion, with their spouse’s permission.

258. There has been much debate about the relationship of confreres or *familiares* to *donnés*. This particular document may bring together the elements that Miramon has identified as fundamental for *donnés* in the proper sense. See Charles de Miramon, *Les “donnés” au Moyen Âge: Une forme de vie religieuse laïque v. 1180–v. 1500* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1999), 411. For an up-to-date discussion of the historiographical debate, see Myra Miranda Bom, *Women in the Military Orders of the*

Crusades (New York: Palgrave, 2012), 65–75.

259. “Quia filios carnales habere non possumus, vos, et Ordinem vestrum in filios adoptamus.” *BC*, 58.

260. “Quatenus maledictioni illi subiacere nullatenus videamur, in qua dicitur: *Maledictus homo, qui non reliquerit semen suum super terram.*” *BC*, 58.

261. “Ut igitur hac nostra donatio firmiorem radicem possit habere, ea qua vobis dedimus, propriis vocabulis exprimere curamus.” *BC*, 58.

262. Martín, *Orígenes*, appendix, no. 107, 290–91.

263. “Pro remedio animarum suarum et parentum suorum.” Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 79, 44–45.

264. *BC*, 451–52.

265. Torres y Tapia, *Crónica*, vol. 1, 277–78.

266. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 163, 85–86; *BA*, 48, 49–50.

267. *BC*, 115.

268. Selwood, *Knights*, 141.

269. Helen Nicholson, *Templars, Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights: Images of the Military Orders, 1128–1291* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1995), 129–135; Josserand, *Église*, 37–96.

270. “Passé le milieu du XIIIe siècle, l’atténuation du rayonnement spirituel des ordres militaires est indéniable.” Josserand, *Église*, 163.

271. Forey, *The Military Orders*, 80; Ayala Martínez, “Tópicos,” 130.

272. “Considerad que acescio a los del Temple muy mas poderosos allende de medida que vosotros, la memoria de aquellos perescio.” AHN OOMM Calatrava, Registro de Escrituras, 1349C, fol. 77r; AHN OOMM Calatrava, Registro de Escrituras, 1349C, fol. 76r–v.

273. *BC*, 177–79.

274. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 504, 361–62.

275. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 505, 362–63.

276. Josserand, *Église*, 55–56, 67–68.

277. Josserand, *Église*, 81–82. Jiménez de Rada had once complained to the pope that Santiago should not enjoy religious exemption because its members were laymen and some were even married. “Quamquam laici sint, et quidam eorum etiam uxorati.” *BS*, 94. The military orders are among those religious who come out to receive Don Amor in Juan Ruiz’s *Libro de Buen Amor*, but they are not singled out for particular criticism. “Orden de Santiago, con la del Ospital; Calatrava e Alcántara, con la de Buenaval; los abades benditos en esta fiesta atal: ‘Te, Amorem, laudamus,’ le cantan, e non ál.” Juan Ruiz, *Libro de Buen Amor*, ed. Raymond Willis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), stanza 1237, 337.

278. Ayala Martínez, “Tópicos,” 141.

279. María Echániz Sans, “Austeridad versus lujo: El vestido y los freiles de la Orden de Santiago durante la Edad Media,” *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 23 (1993): 376.

280. “Y puesto que mi linage no es mejor que el de aquellos Maestres, no quiero yo menguar cosa alguna de aquello que hizieron los del linage de Guzman, de donde yo vengo.” Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de Sanctiago*, 44r. This ought to be treated with some caution, since premodern historians frequently insert fictitious speeches into their narratives.

281. Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados*, 194.

282. Josserand, *Église*, 100, 106; Lomax, *La Orden*, 39; Emma Solano Ruiz, *La Orden de Calatrava en el siglo XV: Los señorios castellanos de la orden al fin de la Edad Media* (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 1978), 135.

283. Josserand, *Église*, 118–20.

284. Peter Linehan, *The Ladies of Zamora* (University Park: Pennsylvania State

University Press, 1997), 4–5.

285. *Cortes de los Antiguos Reinos de León y Castilla* (Madrid, 1861–1903), vol. 1, 245–46, 360–61.

286. *Cortes*, vol. 1, 382, 387.

287. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 328, no. 12; *BS*, 180.

288. “Quod in alios pios usus prouentus et redditus huiusmodi conuertatis.” AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 328, no. 12; *BS*, 180.

289. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 328, no. 22.

290. Matellanes Merchán and Rodríguez-Picavea, “Las órdenes militares,” 357.

291. Forey, “Ransoming,” 275.

292. Jossierand, *Église*, 97.

4. BROTHERS IN ARMS

1. Joseph O’Callaghan, “*Hernandades* Between the Military Orders of Calatrava and Santiago during the Castilian Reconquest, 1158–1252,” *Speculum* 44 (1969): 609, reprinted in *The Spanish Military Order of Calatrava and Its Affiliates*, Variorum Collected Studies (London: Ashgate, 1975), V.

2. “Hoc autem factum esse dignoscitur ut inter nos maioris dilectionis vinculum habeatur.” O’Callaghan, “*Hernandades*,” appendix 2, 618.

3. For an earlier and inchoate treatment of this topic, see Sam Zeno Conedera, SJ, “Brothers in Arms: *Hernandades* Among the Military Orders in Medieval Iberia,” in *Crusades: Medieval Worlds in Conflict*, ed. Thomas F. Madden, James L. Naus, and Vincent Ryan (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 35–44.

4. See Derek Lomax, *La Orden de Santiago* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1965), 41–50; José Luis Martín, *Orígenes de la Orden Militar de Santiago (1170–1195)* (Barcelona: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1974), 55–57; María-Milagros Rivera Garretas, *La Encomienda, el Priorato y la villa de Uclés en la Edad Media: Formación de un señorío de la Orden de Santiago* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1985), 221–22; Francisco Ruiz Gómez, *Los orígenes de las órdenes militares y la repoblación de los territorios de la Mancha (1150–1250)* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2003), 177–87.

5. “La palabra hermandad no expresa un concepto preciso y determinado cuando la encontramos empleada en las fuentes medievales . . . En los siglos altomedievales, en que este fenómeno se da únicamente en el ámbito religioso, designa un tipo de asociaciones que tienen objetivos espirituales.” Antonio Álvarez de Morales, *Las hermandades, expresión del movimiento comunitario en España* (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1974), 9.

6. Teodoro Ruiz Jusué, “Las cartas de hermandad en España,” *Anuario de Historia de Derecho Española* 15 (1944): 388–90.

7. See Antonio Linage Conde, *Los orígenes del monacato benedictino en la Península Ibérica*, vol. 2, *La difusión de la “Regula Benedictina”* (León: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1973).

8. Ruiz Jusué, “Las cartas,” 392.

9. See the *hermandad* made by bishops in León in 1114: “Confraternitatem etiam inter nos fecimus, ut alius alium diligat et alius alii, si necesse fuerit, pro posse suo subueniat et mutuum caritatem inuicem habeamus, et quando aliquis nostrum obibit, eius animum unanimiter alii succurrant elemosinis, orationibus, sacrificiis, quatinus ad eternam beatitudinem peruenire possit. Ad hanc autem confraternitatem confirmandam statuimus, ut unoquoque anno mediante quadragesima Compostelle conueniamus et corrigamus malefacta, que ad audientiam nostram uenerit.” *Historia Compostellana*, ed. Emma Falque Rey, *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis*

70 (Turnholt: Brepols, 1988), bk. 1, ch. 101, 170. For skepticism regarding the motivations behind it, see Bernard Reilly, *The Kingdom of León-Castilla Under Queen Urraca: 1109–1126* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 236.

10. Ruiz Jusué, “Las cartas,” 399–400.

11. See the *hermandad* between San Pedro de Arlanza and San Cristóbal de Ibeas from the late twelfth century, in which prayers for the dead and Masses were offered. Luciano Serrano, OSB, *Cartulario de San Pedro de Arlanza, antiguo monasterio benedictino* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Históricos, 1925), no. 131, 239–40.

12. The *hermandad* between the churches of Tarragona and Tortosa from 1158 reads, “Et omnes Ecclesiasticis officiis, commemoratione habita annuatim Missa celebretur, et pauper reficiatur.” Enrique Flórez, *España Sagrada*, vol. 42, tract 80, appendix 4, 308.

13. “Sicut eorum concanonici, et bonorum tam spiritualium, quam corporalium participes, sine ulla differentia in choro nocturnis, diurnisve officiis Deo inserviant, in claustro studeant, ad mensam corporalem reficiantur, in dormitorio jaceant, in Capitulo resideant, exceptis secretis correctionibus, et disciplinis, quibus tamen, si adveniens frater spiritum directionis, et consilii habuerit, postquam de Capitulo, sicut mos est, cum Novitiis exierit, arbitrio Prelati advocatus interesse possit.” Flórez, *España Sagrada*, vol. 42, tract 80, appendix 4, 307–8.

14. “Hac quoque consideratione habita, ut si frater Dertusensis in Tarraconsensem Ecclesiam, vel Tarraconensis in Dertusensem causa infirmitatis in melius vel correctionis venerit, ejus arbitrio, qui vices illas tenuerit, post Capitulum in loco secreto ad hoc idoneo pro quantitate peccati, et modulo personae nudus, vel camisia indutus corporalem subeat disciplinam, ut in sequenti spirituali fruge collecta non redeat vacuus ad aream, sed laetabundo gregi suo suscipiendus veniens, veniat cum exultatione manipulos suos portans.” Flórez, *España Sagrada*, vol. 42, tract 80, appendix 4, 308.

15. The *hermandad* between Santo Domingo de Silos and the church of Osma from 1278 specified that visitors from Osma should be given “singulis diebus per triduum tres panes et tres iusticie de vino, decem ova vel media pixota seu medium quartum arietis, prout exigerit ipsa dies, et annona pro duabus equitaturis.” These rations were to be doubled for the bishop. D. Marius Férotin, *Recueil de chartes de l'Abbaye de Silos* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1897), no. 224, 254.

16. Ruiz Jusué, “Las cartas,” 435.

17. Francisco de Berganza, *Antigüedades de España* (Madrid: Francisco de Hierro, 1721), vol. 2, 224–25.

18. Teofilo F. Ruiz, *From Heaven to Earth: The Reordering of Castilian Society, 1150–1350* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 3.

19. Ruiz Jusué, “Las cartas,” 423–24.

20. The definition of Luis Suárez Fernández applies to these: “para un hombre medieval la palabra Hermandad significa reunion de personas, ciudades o entidades sociales de culaquier tipo, que poseen intereses comunes, para cuya defensa la union es indispensable.” Luis Suárez Fernandez, “Evolución histórica de las Hermandades castellanas,” *Cuadernos de Historia de España* 16 (1951): 6.

21. See Suárez Fernandez, “Evolución histórica,” 5–78; Álvarez de Morales, *Las hermandades*; Julio Puyol Alonso, *Las hermandades de Castilla y León: Estudio histórico* (León: Nebrija, 1982). The first extant municipal *hermandad*, curiously, was the result of royal initiative. Alfonso VIII brought together Uclés and five other towns on the Tagus into such an association in 1190. See María-Milagros Rivera Garretas, *La Encomienda, el Priorato y la villa de Uclés en la Edad Media: Formación de un señorío de la Orden de Santiago* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1985), 83 and appendix, no. 22 bis, 249.

22. With the bishop of Osma: AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 249, no. 3; with the town

council of Madrid: AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 260, no. 11; with the town council of Segovia: AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 260, no. 10; with the archbishop of Toledo: AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 326, no. 30.

23. Ruiz Gómez, *Los orígenes*, 179.

24. Ruiz Jusué, "Las cartas," 402.

25. "Congregatis in unum apud Salamanticam fratribus Hospitalis, fratri-busque Militie Templi, et fratribus Sancti Iacobi . . . videlicet Domini Petri de Arey Hispaniis Prioris et Domini Suidonis de Garda Magistri Militie Templi et Domini Petru Fernandi Magistri Militie S. Jacobi." *BS*, 20.

26. "Pacem, et veram concordiam unanimiter inter se habituram de mandato magistrorum suorum." *BS*, 20.

27. Martín, *Orígenes*, 57 and appendix, no. 66, 241–42.

28. "Quod tertius ordo super hoc indicaverit ratum teneatur et firmum." *BS*, 20.

29. "Alios advocet in auxilium et ipsi studiose cum magna diligentia Domino Papae propter ipsum litteras suas transmitant." *BS*, 20.

30. "Alias duo ordines adiuvent eum quasi semetispos contra omnes homines contra regrem etiam rogando et supplicando per terras etiam." *BS*, 20.

31. "Statuimus simul in exercitu habitare in prima acie et in ultimo et in bello simul esse nisi fuerit per mandatum domini regis, que nos preterire non possumus, vel per licentiam aliorum fratrum." Martín, *Orígenes*, appendix, no. 92, 272–73.

32. O'Callaghan, "Hernandades," 611 n. 10; Ruiz Gómez, *Los orígenes*, 180.

33. Martín, *Orígenes*, appendix, no. 172, 354.

34. AHN Cod. 1046-B, *Tumbo menor de Castilla*, bk. 3, no. 43, 284–85; Martín, *Orígenes*, appendix, no. 145, 332.

35. *BC*, 10.

36. *BS*, 12–13. This document says that they neither knew about the donation to Calatrava nor were pleased by it.

37. Julio González, *El reino de Castilla en la época de Alfonso VIII* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1960), vol. 2, no. 162, 275–77.

38. Lomax, *La Orden*, 42.

39. "Et hoc fecerunt ut semper sic firma pax et firma societas inter eos et cum amore dilectione hoc fecerunt ut semper sit." Martín, *Orígenes*, appendix, no. 145, 332.

40. Francisco Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de Calatrava*, Toledo, 1572, facs. ed. (Barcelona: El Abir, 1980), fol. 17.

41. "Omnes controversiae, et querelae, quae fuerint a principio sui Ordinis inter jam dictos fratres usque ad diem Sancti Joannis, quando fuit Curia in Carrión, sopitae sunt, et delectae inter utrosque fratres sine omni calumnia, et contradictione, tali tamen tenore, ut de caetero sint unanimes, et concordēs, et vivant in pace." *BC*, 25–26.

42. AHN Cod. 1046-B, *Tumbo menor de Castilla*, bk. 3, no. 76, 312.

43. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 58, no. 7; AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 316, no. 4.

44. "Judicio quinque fratrum de Calatrava, et quinque de Militia Sancti Jacobi, quales singuli Magistri elegerint de utroque Capitulo terminetur, et componatur." *BC*, 25.

45. "Si talis fuerit excessus, frater, qui culpam incurrerit, veniat satisfactorius Capitulo fratrum de Calatrava, vel Capitulo de Militia Sancti Jacobi." *BC*, 25.

46. "Quisque eorum habeat redditos suos, et nullus eorum recipiat aliquem sine licentia Magistri de Calatrava, vel de Militia Sancti Jacobi, et si fecerit, cito corrigatur, et emendetur." *BC*, 26.

47. Ruiz Gómez, *Los orígenes*, 182–85.

48. Martín, *Orígenes*, appendix, no. 255, 429.

49. Bonifacio Palacios Martín, dir., *Colección diplomática medieval de la Orden de*

Alcántara (1157?–1494) (Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 2000–2003), vol. 1, no. 45, 24.

50. “Salvo empero nuestra ley y nuestro señor, el rey de León e Galicia.” Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 45, 24.

51. Joseph O’Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 62–63.

52. “Sea repartida entre todos los destas dos, maguer los unos sean más que los otros.” Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 45, 24.

53. “E que en todo nos hayamos por hermanos, ca ansi es ello, pues tenemos hábito de religión y habemos cortado la longura de nuestros cabellos para el servicio de Dios, e así lo prometemos e juramos.” Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 45, 24.

54. The Templar Rule also prohibits long hair. J. M. Upton-Ward, trans., *The Rule of the Templars: The French Text of the Rule of the Order of the Knights Templar* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1992), ch. 22, 25. James Powers has commented on the use of shaving as a form of military justice in the period. “By itself this shearing of the prideful male hair and beard in the manner of a sheep constituted a potent penalty. The Cid and other heroes swore by their beards, and the shearing must have induced an intense humiliation.” James Powers, *A Society Organized for War: The Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central Middle Ages, 1000–1284* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 198.

55. *Tumbo menor de Castilla*, bk. 2, no. 45, 180–81; O’Callaghan, “Hermandades,” appendix 1, 616–17. O’Callaghan dates it according to the mastership of Fernando González of Santiago, who is mentioned in the text of the *hermandad*.

56. It has been suggested that the Temple added to Calatrava’s woes after Alarcos by giving support to the rebels of Calatrava’s Aragonese commandery of Alcañiz, who elected their own master in defiance of the central community. Ruiz Gómez, *Los orígenes*, 250.

57. “Et tal es el pleyto que ningun frare que rencura ouiere de los frares ducles, uaya a so caballo.” O’Callaghan, “Hermandades,” 616.

58. “Pierda las armas et el caualllo et la baylia por I anno, et sea postremero de todos.” O’Callaghan, “Hermandades,” 616.

59. “Et el que mal recibiere en ballia que touiere a los frares de Saluatierra, si quiere sea cauallero, si quiere non, prenda el conducho e las arguenas en el pescozo et descalzo.” O’Callaghan, “Hermandades,” 617.

60. “Si fuere de Oreia a iuso uaya a Maqueda, et si fuere de Oreia adelant uaya ad Zorita.” O’Callaghan, “Hermandades,” 616.

61. *BC*, 683–85.

62. Carlos de Ayala Martínez, “Comendadores y encomiendas: Orígenes y evolución en las órdenes militares castellano-leonesas de la Edad Media,” in *Ordens militares: Guerra, religião, poder e cultura: Actas do III Encontro sobre Ordens Militares (Palmela, 22 a 25 de Janeiro de 1998)*, ed. I. Fernandes (Lisbon: Edições Colibri, 1999), 120.

63. “Unedad de hermandad” and “espiritual amiganza.” *BC*, 683.

64. “E si por ventura los Freyles de Calatrava ovieren guerra con Moros sin consejo de los Freyles de Uclés, non puedan firmar treuga, nin los Freyles de Uclés sin consejo de los Freyles de Calatrava.” *BC*, 683.

65. “Los Freyles de Calatrava non dexen por treuga del Rey de ayudar a los Freyles de Uclés, nin los Freyles de Uclés por la paz del Rey non dexen de ayudar a los Freyles de Calatrava.” *BC*, 683.

66. “O quier que el Maestre qualquier destas Ordenes, con los Freyles de ambas estas Ordenes, acaescier no estando i el Maestre de la otra Orden, todos los Freyles, tan bien los otros, como los suyos, todos le obedescan . . . a un Comendador

obedescan.” BC, 684.

67. “Que todos sean vistos por todas cosas seer Freyles de una Orden.” BC, 683.

68. “Quando el Maestre de la una Orden fuere en la Casa de la otra Orden, assi les obedescan como a su Maestre. E otrosi obedescan, e sirvan al Comendador, como al su Comendador propio.” BC, 684.

69. “Maguer que la una parte de los Freyles sea menor que la otra, toda la quenta sea partida por medio.” BC, 684.

70. “E el Freyle, que non fuere obediente a estos Comendadores, a todas cosas que ellos mandaren, sin habito sea echado de la Orden.” BC, 684.

71. “E cada uno de los Freyles por aquellos diga tres Missas: e otro dia del Cabildo, missa general sea celebrada.” BC, 684.

72. Ayala Martínez, “Comendadores y encomiendas,” 121.

73. *Tumbo menor de Castilla*, bk. 3, no. 101, 337–39; O’Callaghan, “Hermandades,” 617–18.

74. Ayala Martínez, “Comendadores y encomiendas,” 118–19.

75. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 179, no. 3, 4; AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 332, no. 2, 5; AHN OOMM Ucles, carp. 58, no. 3; BS, 69, 71, 76, 82.

76. Joseph Delaville Le Roulx, *Cartulaire général de l’ordre des Hospitaliers de Saint-Jean-de-Jérusalem (1100–1310)* (Paris: Ernest Leroux 1894–1906), vol. 2, no. 1699, 278.

77. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 222, no. 6; AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 316, no. 2.

78. “Ad Dei seruicium et honorem regum et ad Christianitatis conmodum et profectum et per Dei gratiam ad gentilium detrimentum . . . ut inter nos maioris dilectionis uinculum habeatur.” O’Callaghan, “Hermandades,” appendix 2, 618. Ayala Martínez considers the first statement “todo un complejo combinado de principios muy adecuado al discurso político de Fernando III.” Ayala Martínez, “Comendadores y encomiendas,” 119.

79. “In primis constituimus et constituendo firmamus quod in Sarracenorum confinio contra ipsos inimicos crucis Christi, nos ad inuicem adiuuemus bona fide et sine dolo.” O’Callaghan, “Hermandades,” appendix 2, 617.

80. “Addimus etiam statuendo quod quando isti quatuor ordines uel de illis aliqui fuerint in regum exercitu uel in aliqua caualgada siue exercitum procedendo siue exercitum subsequendo uel in bello etiam de regum beneplacito simul permaneant et consistant.” O’Callaghan, “Hermandades,” appendix 2, 617.

81. “Pro bono pacis etiam et concordie tres fratres de singulis predictorum ordinum duximus eligendos, quibus de communi consilio omnimodam concessimus potestatem, ut eorum consilio et providencia et auctoritate, quidquid questionis inter nos emersum esse vel emerserit, sine fraude et fideliter sopiatur, prius ueritatem in omnibus inquirendo.” O’Callaghan, “Hermandades,” appendix 2, 617.

82. “Et si ammonitus legitime quod ab istis duodecim diffinitum fuerit tanquam contumax noluerit obseruare, coram summo pontifice et regibus et aliis quibuscumque in perpetuum blasphemetur, sicut qui in tantis et tam iustis conuenientiis deuiat et mentitur.” O’Callaghan, “Hermandades,” appendix 2, 617.

83. “Talem penam sustineant qualem debent qui magistro proprio inobedientes existunt, corporaliter sustinere.” O’Callaghan, “Hermandades,” appendix 2, 617.

84. “Precipimus ut de communi consensu eligant uirum prouidum et discretum cum qualibet istarum medietatum consenserit eius sententia teneatur.” O’Callaghan, “Hermandades,” appendix 2, 617.

85. “Item constituimus quod si aliquis istorum magistrorum uel prior Hospitalis in ordine suo, quod Deus auertat, errauerit uel bona sui ordinis scienter uel negligenter dissipauerit, per istos fratres duodecim corrigatur, et si per eosdem emmendare nouerit ab eis coram suis maioribus accusetur. Si enim aliquis ordo supradictorum ordinum quod isti duodecim fratres decreuerint in huiusmodi constitutionibus

complexe noluerit, coram summo pontifice sicut superscriptum est blasphemetur.” O’Callaghan, “Hermmandades,” appendix 2, 618.

86. *BC*, 685–86.

87. “E quando este Freyle fuere echado de la Orden, la otra parte sea tenuta de rogar por el, emendando el Freyle lo que oviere de emendar, o de entregarm que sea rescebido por aquel ruego.” *BC*, 685.

88. “E quando acaescier que por ventura algun Freyle destas Ordenes salier de alguna dellas, quier que salga él, quier que faga cosas porque lo hayan de echar de la Orden, que quando vinier a la puerta dalguna destas Ordenes, e el Maestre de la otra Orden acaesciendo i si por él rogare, e si el Freyle soviere fuera, que sea cabido a la puerta por su ruego. E si soviere rescebido a la puerta, quel sea dado el habito, e que por su ruego haya misericordia, todavia el Maestre que este ruego fizier; haviendo antes consejo, que mja se faga con el otro Maestre.” *BC*, 685.

89. “Quando acaesciere que algun Freyle destas Ordenes ambas cativare, e en alguna destas Ordenes oviere Moro cativo, por que lo tengan, que sea este Moro dado por este Freyle sin contradicho ninguno, portal Moro cativo, qual cada uno de las Ordenes seria tenuta de dar por su Freyle.” *BC*, 685.

90. “E si algunos destos Freyles destas Ordenes enfermar en la otra Orden, que fagan mucha ondra, e mucho amor. E si finar, que lo lieven a la sepultura destas Ordenes, qual mas acerca fuer.” *BC*, 686.

91. “Que la una Orden tambien aguarde la seña de la otra Orden, como la suya misma, e la otra Orden esto mismo sea tenuta de fazer. E si fuer uno de los Maestres, e non mas, que todos aguarden adaqueel Maestre, e a él obedezcan, o al uno de los Comendadores, si í Maestre non fuere, o í non fuere mas de un Comendador, e cada un Freyle sea tenido en cada una de las Ordenes.” *BC*, 686.

92. “Que si por ventura en batalla mataren Caballo al Maestre, o al Comendador Mayor, que el Freyle de la otra Orden sea tenuto de le dar luego el Caballo.” *BC*, 686.

93. “E todo Freyle, que por las Casas destas Ordenes passar, si bestias cansadas troxier, que gelas camien fasta la primera Casa de su Orden, e aquellas bestias cansadas, que sean bien guardadas fasta que las otras envie aquel Freyle.” *BC*, 686.

94. “E quando alguna destas Ordenes, o ambas tovieran Procuradores en la Corte de Roma, o en las Cortes de los Reyes, estos Procuradores sean tenidos de procurar en todos los negocios destas Ordenes, tambien a la una Orden, como a la otra lealmientre.” *BC*, 685.

95. “E de los nuestros ganados ponemos assi, que non prendamos unos a otros, nin otrosi de los ganados de nuestros aportellados; pero quando los ganados entraren en termino de alguna destas Ordenes . . . sean todos tenidos de traer cartas selladas de los Baylios de sus Señores . . . E en sus ganados, que otrosi se ayuden a defenderlos cada una Orden como los suyos mismos.” *BC*, 685.

96. “E ningun destas Ordenes non sea tenuta de traer barcos en Tajo, porque las rendas de los otros Puertos se minguen en mucho, ni en poco.” *BC*, 685.

97. “E en ningunos nuestros Logares non tomemos portadgos ningunos entre Nos, nin saquemos defessas forras de Cballos, e de Yegua, e de Boys, e de Conejos, en todos los otros Logares cortemos, e pazcamos en sembla.” *BC*, 686.

98. “Que dos Freyles de cada una destas Ordenes vayan todavia a los Cabildos Generales destas Ordenes con sus escritos de las querellas, que ovieren unos de otros.” *BC*, 686.

99. “E todavia usen estas Ordenes esta composicion desta hermandad en sus Cabildos, e leerla como la sepan bien todos, porque non digan despues los otros, que non lo sopieron.” *BC*, 686.

100. “E aquellos que nuestra Carta de nuestra hermandad aguarden, e la cumplieren, hayan la bendicion de Jesu Christo, e de su Madre Sancta Maria.” *BC*,

101. Carlos de Ayala Martínez, "Tópicos y realidades en torno a las Ordenes Militares," in *Tópicos y realidades de la Edad Media*, vol. 2, ed. Eloy Benito Ruano (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 2000), 131.

102. Carlos de Ayala Martínez, ed., *Libro de privilegios de la Orden de San Juan de Jerusalén en Castilla y León (siglos XII–XV)* (Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1995), no. 364, 586–88; *BS*, 225–26. Problems between the Hospital and Santiago may have had a long history. In 1242, Santiago's priory of Vilar de Donas in Galicia gave some houses in usufruct to a priest and some laymen with the stipulation that help the priory against the Hospital. José Vicente Matellanes Merchán, "Las Órdenes de Santiago y el Hospital: Relaciones feudales de un grupo de poder," in *Medieval hispano: Estudios in memoriam del Prof. Derek Lomax* (Madrid: Sociedad Española de Estudios Medievales, 1995), 289.

103. "Por razon de los freires que se ivan escandalizados e levavan los cavallos e las armas e los averes de la una Horden para la otra sin licencia, que era dampño de nos e de nuestras Hordenes e perdemiento de las almas de los freires que estas cosas fazian." Ayala Martínez, *Libro de privilegios*, no. 364, 587.

104. "Entendiendo e veyendo que era daño de Nos e de nuestras Ordenes ir los Freires de la una Orden para otra sin licencia de los muy Religiosos Prelados oviemos nuestro acuerdo, etc. Establecemos que aquellos Freires del Hospital que agora son el la Orden de Santiago e otrosi los Freires de Santiago que agora son en la Orden de Sant Johan, que non sean recibidos en ningunas de las Ordenes sin licencia de los Prelados de aquestas Ordenes en cuyo poder agora son." *BS*, 225.

105. "Que tomen un omme bono de Orden que ame Dios e su alma, e do se otorgare uno destos freires sobredichos con aquel ome bono que y posieren, que se parta por alli so la pena que dizere en esta composicion." Ayala Martínez, *Libro de privilegios*, no. 364, 587.

106. Ayala Martínez, *Libro de privilegios*, no. 364, 587.

107. "Otroi por razon de las contiendas que aviemos sobre terminos que agora ay e por las que vernan de aqui adelant, mandamos e tenemos por bien que sean partidas por el Comendador de Ucles, e por el Comendador de Velmos, e estos que vean las cartas e las composiciones que ha en las Ordenes sobredichas unas con otras e que las fagan cumplir e tener, e las den al Rey para que las confirme, e las que non son partidas que las partan segun Dios e sus almas." *BS*, 225.

108. "E salvo contra la Orden de Calatrava con quien avemos Ermandad . . . e salvo contra la Orden del Temple con quien avemos Ermandat." Ayala Martínez, *Libro de privilegios*, no. 364, 588; *BS*, 225–26.

109. Delaville, *Cartulaire*, vol. 1, no. 558, 378–79. The agreement gives a list of the orders' grievances against each other and provides for the creation of committees to solve future problems.

110. Ruiz Jusué, "Las cartas," 409.

111. *BC*, 498–500; Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 485, 325–328.

112. Ruiz Gómez, *Los orígenes*, 267.

113. Joseph O'Callaghan, *A History of Medieval Spain* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), 403–4.

114. "Que seamos todos unos, e a una voz ayuntados cada que menester fuere a servicio de nuestro Señor el Rey Don Alfonso, e guarda e defendimiento de su Señorío e de la su tierra." *BC*, 499.

115. "Que si algun Castiello de qualquier de nuestras Ordenes se viere en algun afincamiento de Moros, o de Christianos, que qualquier de nosotros que mas aina lo podiere acoger, que lo acoja con homes, con armas, y con ayuda, y con todas aquellas cosas que acogerle pudiese." *BC*, 499.

116. "Que si algun Freyre de nuestras Ordenes, o de qualquier de ellas se alciare

con algun Castiello contra su Maestre, que todos seanmos tenudos de ir contra el, y de premiallo, en manera que la Orden cobre su Castiello.” BC, 499.

117. BS, 244–45; BS, 259–60.

118. BC, 165, 166.

119. “E como quier que esta hermandad que aora facemos de nuevo, non entendemos revocar, nin menguar las otras hermandades que ante Nos son fechas, que ficieron nuestros antecessores, ante las innovamos, e las confirmamos por aqueste escrito.” BC, 500.

120. “E qualquier que lo assi non tuviere, e lo non guardare, e lo non cumpliere todo lo que . . . que sea por ello perjuro de alevoso, e que se non pueda salvar por sus manos, nin por ajenas ante el Rey, nin ante otro Señor ninguno.” BC, 499.

121. Francisco Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de Sanctiago*, Toledo, 1572, facs. ed. (Barcelona: El Abir, 1980), 40r–v.

122. Ruiz Jusué, “Las cartas,” 412.

123. Upton-Ward, *Rule*, 6–7. Ward notes the special arrangements that existed between the two orders, such as staying in each other’s houses without permission, or following each other’s banners in battle.

124. Dominic Selwood, *Knights of the Cloister: Templars and Hospitallers in Central-Southern Occitania c. 1100–c. 1330* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1999), 79.

125. “Tempore quoque sub eodem, dedicata est nobilis ecclesia structurae expectabilis Novi Templi Londoninarum, praesente rege et multis regni magnatibus, qui eodem die, scilicet die Ascensionis, completis dedicationis sollempniis, convivium in mensa laute nimis sumptibus Hospitalariorum celebrarunt.” Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, vol. 4, ed. Henry Richards Luard, Rolls Series 57 (London: Longman, 1877), 11.

126. “Inter nos et venerabilem religionem Hospitalis secundum Deum pax et concordia debeant nutriri, ne in scandalum utriusque religionis ceteris detur materia murmurandi.” Alan Forey, “The Military Orders in the Crusading Proposals of the Late-Thirteenth and Early-Fourteenth Centuries,” *Traditio* 36 (1980), 319, reprinted in *Military Orders and Crusades*, Variorum Collected Studies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1994), VIII.

127. Lomax, *La Orden*, appendix, no. 1, 221–22; Enrique Gallego Blanco, *The Rule of the Spanish Military Order of St. James: 1170–1493* (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 86–87.

128. HDRH, bk. 8, ch. 9, 270–71.

129. BS, 66–67.

130. Lomax, *La Orden*, 11.

131. Luis Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados de la orden de Alcántara en la Edad Media: Su organización institucional y vida religiosa* (Madrid: Castellum, 1999), 109.

132. Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de Sanctiago*, 41v.

133. Rades y Andrada, *Chronica de Sanctiago*, 40v.

134. Alfonso VIII, for example, reduced the amount of spoils granted to Calatrava from one-fifth to one-tenth between 1175 and 1189. BC, 11, 28.

135. BS, 75.

136. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 261, no. 7.

137. BS, 96–97.

138. AHN OOMM Calatrava, carp. 460, no. 134.

139. BS, 81–82.

140. Derek Lomax, “El arzobispo don Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada y la Orden de Santiago,” *Hispania* 19 (1959): 323–65; Joseph O’Callaghan, “The Order of Calatrava and the Archbishops of Toledo, 1147–1245,” in *Studies in Medieval Cistercian History II*, edited by John R. Sommerfeldt, 63–87, reprinted in *The Spanish Military Order of Calatrava and Its Affiliates*, Variorum Collected Studies (London: Ashgate, 1975), VI.

141. AHN OOMM Calatrava, carp. 459, nos. 120, 122.

142. BS, 61–62.
143. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 369, no. 14; carp. 316, no. 3; carp. 260, no. 7.
144. Martín, *Orígenes*, appendix, no. 129, 316–17.
145. Lomax, *La Orden*, 44.
146. Delaville, *Cartulaire*, vol. 2, no. 1237, 59.
147. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 342, 220–21.
148. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 69, no. 3.
149. Delaville, *Cartulaire*, vol. 2, no. 1819, 340–41; José Goñi Gaztambide, *Historia de la bula de cruzada en España* (Vitoria: Editorial del Seminario, 1958), 149.
150. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 232, 123.
151. BC, 737–38.
152. Delaville, *Cartulaire*, vol. 3, no. 3798, 434.
153. Alonso de Torres y Tapia, *Crónica de la Orden de Alcántara*, (Madrid: Imprenta de Don Gabriel Ramírez, 1763), vol. 1, 297.
154. Torres y Tapia, *Crónica*, vol. 1, 332–33.
155. BC, 64–66; AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 81, no. 2.
156. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 355, no. 1.
157. “E estas particiones que ficieron ambas las Ordenes han de pacer, e de cortar los montes en uno, si no fuere defesas de cavallos, o de boes.” BC, 65.
158. AHN OOMM, Calatrava, *Índice* 56, fol. 113.
159. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 210, 111–12; BA, 56.
160. AHN OOMM, Registro de Escrituras, vol. 5, 1345C, fol. 47.
161. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 478, 320–22.
162. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 99, no. 35; AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 99, no. 34; BS, 259.
163. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 94, no. 33; BS, 258.
164. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 222, no. 6.
165. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 316, no. 2.
166. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 58, no. 4.
167. AHN OOMM Calatrava, Registro de Escrituras, vol. 2, 1342C, fol. 187r.
168. BA, 69.
169. Lomax, *La Orden*, 45.
170. BS, 58.
171. BC, 77–82.
172. Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados*, 129–30.
173. Torres y Tapia, *Crónica*, vol. 1, 374; Feliciano Novoa Portela, *La Orden de Alcántara y Extremadura (siglos XII–XIV)* (Mérida: Editora Regional de Extremadura, 2000), 287; BC, 121–22.
174. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 336, 213.
175. Torres y Tapia, *Crónica*, vol. 1, 348, 353.
176. BS, 277–78.
177. BC, 164.
178. BS, 263.
179. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 67, 35–36.
180. María Echániz Sans, *El monasterio femenino de Sancti Spiritus de Salamanca: Colección diplomática (1268–1400)* (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1993), no. 10, 31–32.
181. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 77, 42–43; BA, 24.
182. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 325, 205–6.
183. “Como a uno de los amigos del mundo que mais amo e de que mais fio e para quien eu queria que desse Dios tanta honra et bona ventura como para mi.” BA, 139–40.
184. Alan Forey discusses both the general rule and the dissenting voices. Alan

- Forey, "Desertions and Transfers from Military Orders (Twelfth to Early-Fourteenth Centuries)," *Traditio* 60 (2005): 147–52. Alexander III prohibited transfers from San Julián unless to a stricter order. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 13, 7. Innocent III told the master of Santiago in 1208 that there should be no transfers except to a stricter life. *BS*, 54. Aside from the case of Santiago, determining a hierarchy of severity was more challenging, but Honorius III said that Calatrava was more demanding than the Hospital. Delaville, *Cartulaire*, vol. 2, no. 1699, 278.
185. O'Callaghan, "Earliest," 270. The relaxation of discipline within all the orders may have further blurred distinctions of strictness and laxity; in 1385 the pope allowed four brothers of Calatrava to transfer to Santiago. *BC*, 224–35.
186. *BS*, 20–21.
187. *BS*, 28.
188. Forey, "Desertions and Transfers," 156.
189. AHN OOMM Calatrava, carp. 440, no. 3; *BC*, 14–16.
190. Alan Forey, "The Order of Mountjoy," *Speculum* 46 (1971): 250–66, reprinted in *Military Orders and Crusades*, Variorum Collected Studies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1994), XI.
191. *BS*, 232.
192. Alan Forey, "Recruitment to the Military Orders (Twelfth to Mid-Fourteenth Centuries)" *Viator* 17 (1986): 154, reprinted in *Military Orders and Crusades*, Variorum Collected Studies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1994), II.
193. *BC*, 166.
194. Although it is difficult to determine the frequency of transfers made without permission, some evidence suggests that it was rather common. Forey, "Desertions and Transfers," 179–81.
195. *BA*, 11; Corral Val, *Los monjes soldados*, 111.
196. González, *Alfonso VIII*, vol. 3, no. 658, 165.
197. Torres y Tapia, *Crónica*, vol. 1, 293; Gonzalo Martínez Diez, SJ, *Los templarios en la Corona de Castilla* (Burgos: Editorial La Olmeda, 1993), 44.
198. *BA*, 18, 23–24.
199. Carlos Estepa, "La disolución de la Orden del Temple en Castilla y León," *Cuadernos de Historia* 6 (1975): 152.
200. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 148, 74–75; *BA*, 51–52.
201. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 189, 101–3; *BA*, 51–53.
202. Estepa, "La disolución," 147.
203. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 239, 128–30; *BA*, 66–67.
204. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 285, 174–76.
205. Estepa, "La disolución," 153.
206. Torres y Tapia, *Crónica*, vol. 1, 478–80.
207. Estepa, "La disolución," 126.
208. Martínez Diez, *Los templarios*, 198–200.
209. Josserand claims that the Castilian Templars were in a state of crisis from 1295, even before the arrests in France. Philippe Josserand, "Troubles and Tensions Before the Trial: The Last Years of the Castilian Templar Province," in *The Military Orders*, vol. 5, *Politics and Power*, ed. Peter Edbury (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), 363–75.
210. Sophia Menache, "The Hospitallers During Clement V's Pontificate: The Spoiled Sons of the Papacy?" in *The Military Orders*, vol. 2, *Welfare and Warfare*, ed. Helen Nicholson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 160.
211. See their foundation charters in *BC*, 169–73; *BC*, 180–86.
212. AHN OOMM San Juan de Jerusalén, carp. 569, no. 31.
213. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 453, 301–4; *BA*, 142–45.
214. Carlos Barquero Goñi, "El conflicto por los bienes templarios en Castilla y la

Orden de San Juan,” *En la España Medieval* 16 (1993): 44.

215. The master of Calatrava said that he had an agreement to return the properties to Alcántara once the loan was paid; the master of Alcántara said that he held the castles from the king and could not break fealty. Barquero Goñi, “El conflicto,” 45.

216. Barquero Goñi, “El conflicto,” 48.

217. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 500, 358–59; no. 497, 355–57.

218. Alfonso XI donated the castle of Almorchón to Alcántara in 1333, making no mention of the Hospital’s claims. Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 540, 387–89; BA, 165–67.

219. “Sin lugar a dudas, el más reñido conflicto producido por la reclamación sanjuanista de los bienes templarios castellanos fue el que enfrentó a los hospitalarios con las otras Órdenes Militares peninsulares, especialmente las de Calatrava y Alcántara.” Estepa, “La disolución,” 43.

220. An agreement between Calatrava’s commandery of Alcañiz and the town’s secular clergy makes reference to the brothers’ service in defense of the faith as the reason for granting them rights over certain churches. “Porro considerantes sumptus, et labores multiplices, quos pro defensiones fidei dicti fratres assidue patiuntur, compatientes ipsorum passionibus.” BC, 74–76.

221. Bernard Reilly, *The Kingdom of León-Castilla Under King Alfonso VII* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 74.

222. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 339, no. 5.

223. “Quoniam ea quae ad salutem animarum pertinent primum sunt attendenda deinde quae corporibus sunt necessaria non sunt postponenda.” AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 339, no. 5; Serrano, *San Pedro*, no. 149, 269–70.

224. “Mutua si ex integro persolvant officia et fratres de Sancto Petro et illi de Calatrava tam in vita quam in morte utrorumque obitu ad invicem denunciato.” Derek Lomax, “Algunos estatutos primitivos de la Orden de Calatrava,” *Hispania* 23 (1961): 491.

225. Julio González, *Alfonso IX* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1944), vol. 2, no. 389, 503–4.

226. “Et simus in suprafatis villulis semper quasi germani et confratres, ita ut numquam illi nobis nec nos ilis aliquam faciamus contrarietatem, et si forte nos vel illi de rege vel de aliquo homine aliquam haereditatem vel aliquam rem infra terminos supranominatarum villarum lucrari poterimus, illam quasi germani et fratres unius ordinis habeamus.” AHN OOMM Calatrava, Registro de Escrituras, 1342C, 151r–v; Palacios Martín, *Colección*, vol. 1, no. 78, 43–44.

227. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 313, no 21.

228. In 1326 Pope John XXII wrote the archbishop of Seville requesting information about the confraternity’s capabilities. Goñi Gaztambide, *Historia*, appendix, no. 3, 644–45. For more on these groups, see Manuel González Jiménez, “La caballería popular in Andalucía,” in *Andalucía a debate y otros estudios*, ed. Manuel González Jiménez (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1998), 203–32.

229. AHN OOMM Uclés, carp. 98, no. 15.

230. BS, 288; BC, 187–88. The master of Alcántara was at this time a partisan of the Infante Felipe, showing once again that the political interests of the orders were sometimes at variance. See Enrique Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros en los reinos hispánicos: Las órdenes militares en la Península Ibérica durante la Edad Media* (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2008), 242.

231. “Sepan quantos esta carta vieren como Nos Don Garcia Ferrandez e Don Garcia Lopez por la gracia de Dios Maestres de las Ordenes de Cavallerias de Santiago e de Calatrava . . . facemos ayuntamiento con vos señor Don Joahn por la gracia de Dios Arçobispo de Toledo . . . Et Nos dicho Arçobispo veyendo el buen

prometimiento de vosotros Maestres . . . tenemos por bien de poner amor convusco, e prometemos de vos emparar e guardar a vos e los vuestros Vasallos, etc.” *BS*, 288.

232. “E prometemos de seer convusco . . . tenemos por bien de poner amor convusco.” *BS*, 288.

CONCLUSION

1. Malcolm Barber, “The Social Context of the Templars,” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 34 (1984): 46, reprinted in *Crusaders and Heretics, 12th–14th Centuries*, Variorum Collected Studies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1995), VIII.

2. “Il ne fait ainsi aucun doute que les Ordres militaires, passé le début du XIV^e siècle, se sont massivement ralliés aux idéaux de la chevalerie castillane. Ils se sont ouverts, modifiant leur système initial de valeurs, a une éthique très proche de celle de la noblesse, sans que ce fait soit du a un simple rapport d’imitation dans la mesure où ils n’ont pas seulement joué un rôle de support passif. Ils semblent bien au contraire avoir contribué a donner a la chevalerie castillane, au seuil du Moyen Age tardif, un profil moins strictement laïc qu’elle ne l’avait a l’origine.” Philippe Josserand, “Itinéraires d’une rencontre: Les ordres militaires et l’ideal chevaleresque dans la Castille du bas Moyen Âge (XIII–XV siècles),” in *L’univers de la chevalerie en Castille: Fin du Moyen Âge*, ed. Jean-Pierre Sanchez (Paris: Éditions du Temps, 2000), 98.

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